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This thesis is about achieving local procedural legitimacy through fair, 
culturally relevant sentencing procedures. Its scope, is reconciling international 
due process guarantees and a traditional notion of rights, in sentencing 
procedures of the International Criminal Court.  
My interest in this topic arose from the 2003 Uganda Law Reform 
Commission study on sentencing legislation reforms. There, participants 
regarded clan courts as functional in rural areas, because they had more 
informal, conciliatory sentencing processes than the ‘alien’ national courts. I 
later became aware that incorporation of traditional restorative processes may 
also help solve problems of legitimacy at the international level, as manifested 
in the case of Joseph Kony, discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis.  
I then investigate whether the international sentencing framework could 
accommodate features of traditional restorative process despite incongruent 
standards, and if so, how this could be achieved. I argue that procedural rights 
ought to underpin this reconciliation, harnessing aims of international criminal 
justice with traditional restorative justice.  
Through my translation model, I propose small structural changes to 
international sentencing practice, and doctrinal reforms based on precedent. 
Using critical legal analysis and a small empirical study, the thesis demonstrates 
how translation could achieve just, culturally apposite sentencing outcomes. The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone provide insight into challenges to accommodating African normative 
standards. Nominal guidance from the African human rights mechanism and 
national courts, on an African notion of procedural fairness, further complicates 
this reconciliation. I conclude that we could translate laws across divergent legal 
systems, drawing from experiences of clan courts that assimilate legal structures 
and concepts from national courts. Major international instruments: Rome 
Statute 1998, United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 1966 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981, are 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
 
The first question addressed in this thesis is whether the international sentencing 
framework could accommodate traditional African concepts of procedural justice, to 
ensure fair, culturally relevant sentencing outcomes. The second question is how this 
could be achieved. The importance of these questions arises in part from a recent 
challenge to the International Criminal Court. The challenge is that the court’s 
normative sentencing framework excludes African restorative justice process and 
communitarian values. The answer to my questions, it is argued, will depend to a large 
extent on how much international law can borrow from traditional practices to inform 
itself. The questions will be addressed within the context of Uganda where its practical 
importance can easily be seen.  
Section 1: International Crimes – customary remedies  
 
On the 8th July 2005, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest 
warrants for Ugandan rebel leader Joseph Kony and four others, for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.
1
 This followed a referral by Uganda- the first ever referral by 




 To date the warrants have not been 
enforced, because in a bizarre twist, Kony and his commanders are trying to evade the 
                                                 
1
 ICC-02/04-01/05-53 as amended on 27/09/05 (Joseph Kony); ICC-02/04-01/05-54 (Vincent Otti) killed 
in 2007 on the orders of Kony; ICC-02/04-01/05-56 (Okot Odhiambo) and ICC-02/04-01/05-57 
(Dominic Ongwen). The case against Raska Lukwiya who was killed in 2006 by the Ugandan army was 
terminated in ICC-02/04-01/05-248. The counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity like murder, 
rape, sexual enslavement and forced enlistment of children are available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/visited on 11/03/2009. 
This 23 year old war, is a continuation of ethnic tensions between the Bantu linguistic group (South) and 
the Nilotics (North), fuelled by economic imbalance in the northern Acoli sub-region. There is also 
retaliation by the North for atrocities committed in their region by the government forces (perceived as 
coming from the South) when they took over political power in 1986. Claims by Joseph Kony that he had 
magical powers to defeat the government forces fanned the rebellion: K. P Apuuli, ‘The International 
Criminal Court (ICC) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency in Northern Uganda’ (2004) 15 
Criminal Law Forum 391-409, 392-402 and E. K Baines, ‘The Haunting of Alice: Local approaches to 
Justice and Reconciliation in Northern Uganda’ (2007) 1 International Journal of Transitional Justice, 
91-114, 98-103 give a detailed account of the root of this rebellion. 
2
 ICC-02/04-01/05-329-Conf-Anx B. A detailed legal analysis of this referral is undertaken by P. 
Akhavan, ‘The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: Uganda’s Submission of the First State Referral to the 
International Criminal Court’ (2005) 99 (2) American Journal of International Law 403-421,409-412; K. 
P Apuuli, ‘The ICC Arrest Warrants for the Lord’s Resistance Army Leaders and Peace Prospects for 
Northern Uganda’ (2006) 4 (1) Journal of International Criminal Justice, 179-187, 183-186 and M. 
Zeidy, ‘The Ugandan Government Triggers the First Test of the Complementarity Principle: An 
Assessment of the First State’s Party Referral to the ICC’ (2005) 5 (1) International Criminal Law 
Review 83-119, 90-110. 
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paradigm of international criminal justice by insisting on trial under Acoli traditional 
justice in Uganda. In this regard, the Government of Uganda and Kony’s Lords’ 
Resistance Army (LRA) rebels signed the 29th June 2007 Agreement on Accountability 
and Reconciliation (hereafter ‘June Agreement’); and it’s Annexure of 19th February 
2008.
3  Uganda’s President, Mr Museveni, later announced a decision arrived at by the 
government and Acoli leaders, on Kony and his rebel leaders:  
 
‘What we have agreed with our people is that they should face traditional 
justice, which is more compensatory than a retributive system.... If that's what 
the community wants, then why would we insist on a trial in The Hague?’4  
 
Despite Mr. Museveni’s assurances, Kony refused to sign the final peace agreement 
because he wants details on how the Acoli traditional justice mechanism would work.
5
 
Museveni’s pledge and Kony’s rejection of the June Agreement, portrays the failure of 
international justice to accommodate traditional justice. The peace talks are now in 
abeyance. 
The June Agreement opts for alternative justice, defined as ‘justice mechanisms 
not currently applied by the formal courts of judicature’, including traditional justice 
process and alternative sentences.
6
 The emphasis is on collective and individual acts of 




The procedural guarantees are then set out in Paragraph 3.33 as follows: 
 
‘With respect to any proceedings under this Agreement, the right of the 
individual to a fair hearing and due process, as guaranteed by the Constitution, 
shall at all times be protected.’  
 
                                                 
3
 The June Agreement is one step towards the signing of a final peace agreement. Both Agreement and 
Annexure are reproduced in Appendix 7 and 8. 
4
 BBC News: 12/03/08 http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/africa/7291274.stm: visited 
12/03/2008. Ironically, it is Mr. Museveni himself who requested the ICC to investigate the LRA rebels. 
As Drumbl convincingly puts it, this ‘hedging’ results from a realisation by the government that it has no 
influence over the ICC intervention: M. A Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 146. Hedging may also reflect the political influence of 
Acoli traditional leaders: N. Grono and A. O`Brien, ‘Justice in Conflict?: The ICC and Peace Processes’ 
in N. Waddell and P. Clark (eds.), Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, (Royal 
African Society, March 2008) 14-16. Available at http://www.royalafricansociety.org visited on 
16/06/2008.  
5
 New Vision 10
th
 April 2008. Kony wrote a letter in his language –Luo, saying he would rather die 
fighting than be taken to Europe and hanged. Kony also rejects trial and hanging in Uganda. The letter is 
printed in the Sunday Monitor 25
th
 May 2008. 
6
 June Agreement, op cit, definition section and para 5.3. Under para 6.3 (Sentences and Sanctions), 
legislation will introduce a regime of alternative penalties and sanctions, replacing existing penalties with 
respect to serious crimes and human rights violations committed by non –state actors during the conflict. 
7
 Ibid, paras. 5.3, 7 - 9. 
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Paragraph 3.33 refers to procedural rights under Article 28 of the Ugandan 1995 
constitution.
8
 The right to legal representation for defendants and victims in formal 
proceedings is also protected (Paragraphs 3.7-3.8). Notably absent, is any reference to a 
traditional notion of rights under the alternative justice mechanisms.  
Two procedural mechanisms are then defined. The first is based on traditional 
justice mechanisms described as central to the framework for accountability.
9
 
Traditional mechanisms encompass what I call a traditional restorative justice model. 
This model applies traditional criminal laws and processes, aimed at restoring the 
victim to their previous position and bringing the society into social harmony. Such a 
model, like the Acoli Mato Oput, is advocated for by pressure groups including Acoli 
clan elders and religious leaders like the outspoken Bishop Baker Ochola. He posits 
that the model is sufficient in itself because it promotes: ‘a model of healing through 
the culture of non violence, forgiveness, reconciliation and peace.’10 Bishop Ochola’s 
views are echoed by some Acoli people who urge that the ICC warrants should be 
withdrawn to allow Mato Oput model to be implemented.
11
 The Chief Justice agrees: 
‘As the custodian of the judiciary, I still believe in traditional justice like the Mato Oput 
(…).’12  
The Mato Oput works in the following manner.  The perpetrator stands outside 
the ‘Gate of the village’ (perpetrator’s village), gives his or her particulars, describes 
the crimes committed and why the perpetrator committed them. The elders take 
collective responsibility on the perpetrator’s behalf. Two sacrificial lambs are 
slaughtered. The victim community and perpetrator’s community exchange half of each 
lamb, cook and eat the legs after which both communities jointly drink (mato) a bitter 
                                                 
8
 The Constitution of Uganda, Cap 1 (Laws of Uganda, revised edition of 2000). Unless otherwise stated, 
laws referred to in this thesis are of this 2000 edition. 
9
 Ibid, para.3.1 refers to Culo Kwor, Mato Oput, Kayo Cuk, Ailuc and Tonu ci Koka traditional 
mechanisms used in different ethnic communities to compensate and reconcile parties torn by conflict. J. 
Ogik, International Justice Systems: Linkages to National and Traditional Justice Systems a paper 
presented at the Freiderich Eibert Foundation and Uganda Law Society workshop, Kampala: Hotel 
Africana, 8
th
 February 2007 3-4 gives a description of these mechanisms. 
10 Bishop B. Ochola, New Vision 28th August 2006. Details in Liu Institute for Global Issues, Roco Wat I 
Acoli, Restoring Relationships in Acoli-Land: Traditional approaches to Justice and Reintegration 
(September 2005) Chapter 5 pages 54-58, available at http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/page121.htm Visited on 
28/06/2008. 
11
 New Vision, 3
rd
 October 2006 quoting some victims who state emphatically that: ‘We want no case 
against the LRA.’ 
12
 New Vision, 17
th 
May 2007. 
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herb called Oput to signify the reconciliation.
13
 Reparation includes compensating the 
victim family with payment of cattle or money. This ritual is part of the traditional 
sentencing and reconciliation process. The emphasis is on the oral nature of 
proceedings and public participation, without legal representation.  
  The second procedural mechanism is based on formal court procedures 
(Paragraphs 6.1-6.2). Uganda’s formal procedures are modelled on the common law 
adversarial system, premised on judicial control. The judge hears evidence from both 
sides (prosecution and the defence) then passes both verdict and sentence, while 
making sure that the defendant’s rights are protected throughout the trial. 
This overarching justice framework conflates two procedural models (formal 
courts and traditional justice) that do not speak normatively to each other and in 
practice, operate as separate justice systems. Yet, they appear to be brought together to 
circumvent the paradigm of international procedural justice. This is apparent in the 
Annexure of 19th February 2008 (hereafter ‘Annexure’) that provides for a War Crimes 
(Special) Division of the High Court to try persons responsible for war crimes.
14
 This 
Division’s legislation may provide for the ‘recognition of traditional and community 
justice processes in proceedings’.15 Although these processes are not defined, traditional 
mechanisms therein include ‘communal dispute settlement institutions such as family 
and clan courts’. Participation in rituals is voluntary.16 Under Paragraph 23, clan courts 
will have criminal jurisdiction on a par with the High Court War Crimes Division, to 
handle serious crimes of lower rank LRA rebels. Thus, the Annexure underscores the 
importance of traditional courts as institutions of social control and re-affirms the 
centrality of traditional justice in the June Agreement. Conspicuously, the Annexure is 
silent in terms of sentencing,
17
 and the applicability of a traditional notion of rights. 
Though the June Agreement is described as an effort to ‘meld local demands and 
international legal obligations,
18
 clearly this domestic arrangement cannot supplant 
                                                 
13
 The mystical legend of how the Oput tree settled a dispute between clans by mysteriously uprooting 
itself and falling between the two warring clans, is regarded as the origin of Mato Oput as a 
reconciliation ritual: S. Abili, Sunday Monitor 30
th
 July 2006. 
14
 Annexure 2008 op cit paras. 7-9.
 
This Division: ‘War Crimes Court’, has been created under paragraph 
2, Administrative Circular 1/2008 by the Principal Judge, dated 23/05/08, effective 1
st
 July 2008. A copy 
of the circular given to me, courtesy Mr. L. Tweyanze- the Principal Judge’s Assistant, is on my file. 
15
 Annexure ibid, para.9 (e).   
16
 Ibid, para.21 (ii)- para 22.  
17
 M. Otim and M. Wierda, ‘Justice at Juba: International Obligations and Local Demands in Northern 
Uganda’ in N. Waddell and P. Clark (eds.), Courting Conflict op cit 25. 
18
 Ibid, 21. While both parties have declared their commitment to honour Uganda’s international 
obligations as a party to the Rome Statute of the ICC, the Agreement is also driven by the perceived need 
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international criminal justice. Indeed, both the Agreement and Annexure are criticised 
for attempting to use traditional justice to replace the criminal justice process.
19
 Even 
so, they challenge the legitimacy of international criminal law in adjudicating crimes 
both at an international and national level.  
The ICC on its part will not countenance alternative trial frameworks and insists 
that the indicted rebels will face a fair trial before it.
20
 Recently, Pre-Trial Chamber II 
held that the case against Kony and his rebel commanders is still admissible under 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereafter ‘Rome 
Statute’) therefore the ICC could hear it.21 Under Article 17, the Rome Statute is 
complementary to national law and is applicable only where the state has failed to 
prosecute its offenders. Paradoxically, as the Pre Trial Chamber observed, Uganda 
government gave conflicting information: on the one hand that it will try offenders 
before its Special Division, and on the other hand that it will not supplant the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.
22
 This paradox emerges because Article 17 has inadvertently 
caused states to attempt to homogenise domestic laws, by ‘massaging the traditional 
into the neo traditional’ to prevent the ICC from trying the case.23 Uganda’s proposed 
conflation of systems under the June Agreement and Annexure are a case in point. 
Two problems arise from this proposed merger of systems that mirror the 
weakness in the established international sentencing framework. The first problem is 
the belief in mysticism as an element of crime, mitigating factor and part of traditional 
sentencing process: a peculiar feature of this LRA case. The Mato Oput model is now 
used as a euphemism for purification and reconciliation, but its application in a war 
situation has roots in the supernatural. Traditionally performed in the village by clan 
elders only, it is now done in the towns and camps.
24
 Traditionalists regard this modern 
                                                                                                                                              
to use traditional criminal processes of accountability to bring an end to the war and promote 
reconciliation: Agreement op cit Preamble paragraphs 3-4. 
19
 Amnesty International, ‘Uganda: Agreement and Annex on Accountability and Reconciliation Falls 
Short Of a Comprehensive Plan to End Impunity’ (March 2008) AI Index: AF 59/001/2008 para.4 page 
19-20 at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/LRON-7CTEZN?OpenDocument Visited on 
16/06/2008.  
20
 Ms. S. Arbia, Registrar of the ICC in an interview with the Daily Monitor, 30
th
 May 2008, 3
rd
 June 
2008. She maintained that the warrants must be enforced since Uganda is a party to the Rome Statute. 
21 The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen ICC-02/04-01/05 
Decision On The Admissibility Of The Case Under Article 19(1) of the Statute of 10 March 2009. 
22
 Ibid, para 45. Pre-Trial Chamber II found that the June Agreement and Annexure were not evidence of 
the state’s ability to prosecute under Article 17 since both lacked the force of law: paras. 49-52. 
23
 M. Drumbl op cit at 145 citing E. Blumenson and J R Quinn. 
24
 T. Allen, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army (London, 
New York: Zed Books, 2006) 132-136. 
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form of Mato Oput as deficient because it does not remove the cen (ill luck) and does 
not involve the use of ajwaki (spirit mediums) to remove the spirits:  
 
‘We need to perform ceremonies to deal with the spirit. … Kony may agree to 
talk but you have to find the spirit … If they arrest Kony, the spirit will just 
continue. It is the spirit that has forced Kony to do things’.25 
 
Indeed Kony himself asserts that he is guided by spirits who talk to him, direct his 
actions and help him foretell events.
26
 This aspect of mysticism is a controversial point 
of departure in sentencing. Mysticism is unacceptable in a legal setting founded on 
Judeo-Christian beliefs. Equally, from a traditional perspective, courts of law lack the 
‘jurisdiction’ to remove ‘spirits’. This ‘inability’ of courts of law to remove ill luck: 
cen, as part of the sentencing process, shows how the proposal for an overarching 
justice framework in the June Agreement oversimplifies the problem. Therefore, there 
is need for careful re-consideration of the impact of spiritualism on international 
criminal proceedings. 
The second problem is that the June Agreement highlights normative 
impediments to the successful importation into a domestic context, of international 
procedural regimes. Akhvan cautions that the functional importance of the ICC in 
trying the top LRA leaders under international criminal justice, should not eclipse the 
equally important traditional restorative justice process.
27
 As Stahn argues, these 
international procedural regimes may fail to gain acceptance at the domestic level if 
they are incompatible with the legal culture of that society. He cautions that 
institutional frameworks operating in one country cannot simply be transposed on a 
different society without adjustment.
28
 Such incompatibility is assured for as long as 
any adoption by international procedural justice of traditional customary procedures 
fails to deal with issues like mysticism, rituals and the traditional notion of participatory 
justice as part of the sentencing process.  
However, as I demonstrate in this thesis, the patchwork of procedural systems 
embodied in the June Agreement cannot be used as a long term solution for achieving 
                                                 
25
Ibid, 152-156 quoting Esther Aluk. Spiritualism has also proved to be a thorny issue to religious leaders 
and some Christians who are outright opposed to Mato Oput on grounds that it involves satanic practices. 
They press for the adoption of an adapted version of it ‘minus the spiritual/ritualistic overtones’: J. Ogik, 
Daily Monitor 24
th
 October 2006.  
26
 Kony affirms this in his interview with Sam Farmer of the BBC: New Vision 28
th
 June 2006. 
27
 P. Akhvan op cit 421. 
28
 C. Stahn, ‘Between Harmonization and Fragmentation: New Groundwork on Ad Hoc Criminal Courts 
and Tribunals’ (2006) 19 (2) Leiden Journal of International Law 567-577, 576-577. 
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procedural justice. This is because Uganda’s procedural framework does not have 
sufficient procedural guarantees for all parties during sentencing hearings. Customary 
laws are likewise deficient in this area. Also as M. Senyonjo contends, Mato Oput is 
not an alternative to the ICC because it does not afford due process rights to the 
accused: like the right to legal representation, or to be given information about the 
allegations against them.
29
 These issues must be taken into account while considering 
the two questions set out at the start of this thesis. 
This chapter provides a backdrop against which the question on achieving 
procedural justice in the African context is answered. Following this introduction, I 
delineate the problem of accommodating traditional justice in international sentencing 
proceedings (Section 2). I then set out my argument (Section 3). Next is a definition of 
central concepts in the thesis (Section 4). I outline Uganda’s historical, political and 
legal background in Section 5, followed by a précis of the methodological approaches 
(Section 6). Lastly is the layout of the thesis (Section 7).  
 
Section 2: Human rights, traditional justice and international sentencing 
proceedings   
 
Human rights protection is central to the question of accommodating traditional 
restorative justice in international criminal proceedings. This section sketches the 
conjoined origins of human rights and international procedural models particularly, the 
emphasis on protection of individual rights. The result is the exclusion of any direct 
reference to a traditional notion of rights and traditional restorative process.  
 
(i) Human rights origins and international criminal tribunals 
 
For much of its history, international criminal law has been rudimentary and 
indeterminate.
30
 Such unsystematic growth hinders the development of sentencing 
practice that takes into account indigenous local criminal processes and a traditional 
notion of human rights within international procedural law. 
                                                 
29
 M. Senyonjo, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army leaders: Prosecution 
or Amnesty?’ (2007) LIV Netherlands International Law Review: 51-80, 64-65. 
30
 L. Sunga, The Emerging System of International Criminal Law (The Hague: Kluwer, 1997) 2-8 and 
Chapter VI. G. K McDonald and O. S Goldman, Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International 
Criminal Law: the Experience of International and National Courts, Vol. I and II, (Cambridge, MA: 
Kluwer, 2000). 
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Human rights evolved from due process origins in the English Magna Carta of 
1215, where no free man would be imprisoned or deprived of liberty ‘except by legal 
judgement of his peers and by the law of the land’.31 Due process was crystallised 
during the Enlightenment, when rules were created to limit the power the state could 
have over the liberty and security of the person.
32
 One of the distinctive features of 
these rules was the respect for the defendant’s rights.33 Protection of the defendant’s 
rights filtered through western societies till the world wars. After the 2nd World War, 
the establishment of the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo 
marked the real beginning of international criminal trials and justice.
34
  
The atrocities of the Nazi regime partly led to the development of the United 
Nations (UN) Charter in 1945 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
in 1948.
35
 The UDHR marked the emergence of the international status of human 
rights. It contained two parts: the first being protection of individual civil and political 
rights and the second being economic, social and cultural rights. These parts were 
concretised into two covenants: The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) respectively.
36
 Subsequently, a strong victim-centred movement 
evolved: one that wanted states to bring alleged perpetrators of atrocities to face 
justice.
37
 The idea of an international criminal court then grew from a provision in the 
1948 Genocide Convention.
38
 Article 6 thereof was adopted by the UN General 
                                                 
31
 S. Zappala, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) at 3 
citing Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta. 
32
 C. Safferling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 
21. A comprehensive appraisal of this phase of the human rights evolution is in S. Greer, The European 
Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects (New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 2-7.  
33
 F. Tulkens, ‘Criminal Procedure: Main Comparable Features of the National Systems’ in M. Delmas-
Marty (eds.), The Criminal Process and Human Rights: Towards a European Consciousness, 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995) 7.  
34
 D. McGoldrick, ‘Criminal Trials before International Tribunals: Legality and Legitimacy’ in D. 
McGoldrick, P. Rowe and E. Donnelly (eds.), The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and 
Policy Issues (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2004). The Allies, (United States of 
America, Britain and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) who set up the Tribunals, derived 
their legitimacy as de facto rulers of the territory they took over, and exercised jurisdiction ostensibly on 
behalf of the international community as universal jurisdiction: 14-20.  
35
 Ibid, 19. D. Weissbrodt and M. Hallendorff, ‘Travaux Preparatoires of the Fair Trial Provisions-
Articles 8 to 11-of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 1061-
1096, 1069-1083 for a comprehensive analysis of the travaux preparatoires of the UDHR.  
36
 ICCPR (1976) adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966.  ICESCR 
(1976) adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966.  
37
 W. A Schabas, ‘International Justice For International Crimes: An Idea Whose Time Has Come,’ 
(2006) 14 (4) European Review 421-439, 422. 
38
 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951) 78 UNTS 277. 
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Assembly in recognition of the fact that genocide was a crime under international law 
and persons could be tried by an international penal tribunal. Towards the end of the 
1980s, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 44/89, directing the International 
Law Commission (ILC) to prepare a report on the creation of an international criminal 
court. 
In the mid 1990s, war broke out in the Balkans and in February 1993, the UN 
Security Council adopted a draft statute prepared by the Secretary General to set up an 
International Tribunal in former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
39
 The ICTY Statute and ICTY 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) concretised Article 14 ICCPR, but with little 
emphasis on victims’ rights. The following year there was genocide in Rwanda and the 
Security Council adopted a draft statute setting up an ad hoc International Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR).
40
  The text of the ICTR Statute and RPE were substantially the same 
as that for the ICTY. In effect, Article 14 ICCPR rights were applied wholesale. 
Rwanda then passed the Organic laws setting up Gacaca jurisdiction: a model based on 
international and traditional procedures but without the bulwark of Article 14 ICCPR 
safeguards like the right to legal representation.
41




In 1994, the ILC adopted its Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court.
43
 
The UN General Assembly gave the task of examining the ILC draft Statute to a 
Preparatory Committee (Prep Com) whose membership was open to all member states 
of the UN and specialised agencies. The Prep Com completed its task, reporting in 
April 1998.
44
 The Rome Statute was subsequently adopted by the Rome Conference
45
 
with some major modifications that include an expanded scope of Article 14 ICCPR, 
                                                 
39 
Statute of the ICTY: UN Doc. IT/32 Rev. 39 (1994) is annexed to the Security Council Resolution 
827/1993. See also Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 808 (1993) presented 3 May 1993 (S/25704) setting out the legal basis, competence and 
organisation of the Tribunal. L. Sunga op cit 284-290. 
40
 Statute of the ICTR: UN Doc. IT/32/Rev.1 (1995) is annexed to the Security Council Resolution (S.C. 
Res) 955/ 1994. L. Sunga ibid 290-297. 
41
 K. P Apuuli, Procedural Due Process Safeguards in the Prosecution of Genocide Suspects: The Case 
for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), National Genocide Trials and the Gacaca 
Courts in Rwanda unpublished D. Phil Thesis (University of Sussex, 2006) 183-186. 
42
 A comprehensive summary of these critiques is in A. Meyerstein, ‘Between Law and Culture: 
Rwanda’s Gacaca and Postcolonial Legality’ (2007) 32 (2) Law and Social Inquiry 467-508, 478-480. 
43
 Report Of The International Law Commission On The Work Of Its Forty-Sixth Session, 2 May-22 July 
1994 GOAR forty-ninth session, supplement 10 (A/49/10). The Draft Statute for an International 
Criminal Court with commentaries (1994) is available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/7_4_1994.pdf.   Visited on 16/02/2009. 
44
 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court: U.N. 
Doc.A/CONF.183/2Add.1 April 14, 1988.  
45
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998. 
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and more participation for victims during trials. The ICC is now investigating 
situations, issuing arrest warrants, and some trials have begun.
46 
 
Previously, another UN war crimes tribunal was established in 2002 in Sierra 
Leone. By an agreement, a treaty was entered between the United Nations and the 
government, setting up the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).
47 
This hybrid 
international-national model is based largely on the ICTR procedural framework and 
rights protected therein.
 









 and Iraq tribunals.
52
 
This thesis only focuses on the SCSL and the ICTR. It does not investigate the other 
tribunals because the context in which they operate does not relate directly to African 
customary law in action.
53
  
This brief history shows that in respect to the African crises in Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone, the international procedural models were transplanted with no direct reference 
to traditional customary practices or values. This criticism could also be levied at the 
ICC. This has direct implications for the protection of human rights. I develop this 
argument further in sub section (ii) below. 
  
 
                                                 
46
 The trials include ICC-01/04-01/06,  Case The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo  of Democratic 
Republic of Congo; and  ICC-01/05 -01/08 Case The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo of 
Central African Republic. Other cases before the court are: ICC-01/04-02/06, Case The Prosecutor v. 
Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-01/07, Case The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui of Congo. A situation under investigation in Darfur is ICC-02/05-01/07 Case The Prosecutor v. 
Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman. The court has issued an arrest 
warrant for President Bashir of Sudan for atrocities committed in Darfur: ICC-02/05-01/09 In The Case 
Of The Prosecutor V. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir. Source: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases  visited on 10/03/2009.  
47
 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1315(2000) of 
14/08/2000.  
48
 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Set up by the UN and Government of Cambodia. 
General Assembly Resolution 57/288 of 18
th
 December 2002.  
49
 Serious Crimes Panels in the District Court in East Timor established by the Security Council by SC 
Res. 1272 (1999). The courts are set up under Regulation 2000/11.  
50
 Regulation 64 Panels in the courts of Kosovo established by the UN Mission in Kosovo under 
Regulation 2000/64 of 15/12/2000.  
51
 Special Tribunal for Lebanon set up under Security Council Resolution 1757/2007 to try persons 
responsible for the attack on 14
th
 February 2005 that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.   
52
 Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal was originally set up under Article 48 of the Transitional Authority 
Law. However in mid-2005, a new statute was promulgated as Law 10 of 2005 on 18
th
 October 2005. 
53
 References may be made only in as far as is relevant. Merits and demerits of these hybrid courts are 
analysed, for example, by S. M. H Nouwen, ‘Hybrid courts: The Hybrid Category Of A New Type Of 
International crimes courts’ (2006) 2 (2)Utrecht Law Review 190-214;  L. Dickinson, ‘The Promise of 
Hybrid Courts’ (2003) 97 (2) American Journal of International Law 295-309 and W. Burke-White, ‘A 
Community of Courts: Towards a System of International Criminal Law Enforcement’ (2002) 24 (1) 
Michigan Journal of International Law, 1-101. 
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(ii) The right to a fair trial in international law: Article 14 ICCPR 
 
International criminal procedure is premised only on protection of individual 
accused’s rights. Individual rights are set out in Article 10 of the UDHR where 
everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal in the determination of any criminal charge. This article enshrines the 
doctrine of due process that ensures procedural fairness. Article 14 ICCPR protects the 
right to a fair trial and also guarantees in full equality for the accused, due process 
rights to the use of language of choice; facilities for preparation of the defence; trial 
without delay; legal representation of choice; the right to give and confront evidence; 
assistance of an interpreter and protection against self incrimination.54  
The right to a fair trial has been replicated in Statutes of international criminal 
tribunals like the ICTR, ICTY and SCSL and their RPE.
55
 Also the Rome Statute 
guarantees a broader range of rights for the accused in Article 67 than Article 14 
ICCPR like the entitlement to raise defences and present other admissible evidence.
56
 
The ICC model is based in part, on protection of individual victim’s rights. In this 
regard, Article 68 provides for protection of victims including special measures for 
victims’ participation in proceedings.  
Regional instruments and domestic legislation have also borrowed extensively 
from the UDHR and ICCPR. To illustrate: Article 14 ICCPR is protected by the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (1950);
57
 the American Convention 
                                                 
54
 ICCPR op cit: Article 14 (3) (a-g). Others rights include equality before the law, presumption of 
innocence and the right to judicial review - clauses 1, 2 and 5. 
55
 For instance, Article 21 ICTY Statute, Article 20 ICTR Statute op cit and Article 17 SCSL Statute 
protect the right to a fair trial. Also ICTR RPE UN Doc.IT/29(1994) protects the right to a public 
hearing: Rules 78; the right to give and confront evidence: Rule 85(A)-(C) and the right to be protected 
against self incriminating evidence: Rule 90 (E). 
56
 Article 67(1e) Rome Statute op cit. For instance, the Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber’s 
oral decision that the accused is entitled to full disclosure from the prosecution, is under no pressure to 
testify or raise defences early as a condition of obtaining prosecution disclosure and is entitled to rely 
upon the right to remain silent in Article 67 (1) (g) in Prosecutor v T. Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04-01/06 
OA 11 Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Lubanga Dyilo against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber 1 of 
18
 January 2008: para 55. Other ‘broad’ provisions include the right to remain silent, which silence shall 
not be construed as a consideration of guilt or innocence (1g); the right to make an unsworn oral or 
written statement in one’s defence (1h) and the right not to have imposed any reversal of burden of proof 




 Nov.  1950) (ETS No.5) 213 U.N.T.S. 222 entered into force 3rd September 1953:  Article 6 
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on Human Rights (1969);
58
 the Arab Charter on Human Rights (2004)
59
 and Article 7 
of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1981) (hereafter the ‘African 
Charter’).60 The African Charter is developed by the Principles and Guidelines on the 
right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (2003), under which the right to a 
fair trial applies to both national and traditional courts. Notably absent, is a definition of 
a traditional communitarian notion of ‘rights’ both in the African Charter and decisions 
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  
Domestic legislation like the 1995 Ugandan constitution, incorporate most of 
Article 14 (1) ICCPR and Article 10 UDHR. The Bill of Rights in Article 28 protects 
the right to a fair trial for the accused. This right may not be derogated from under 
Article 44. There are no provisions on protection of victims or witnesses.
61
 Further, the 
Supreme Court in Attorney General v Sarah Kigula and 416 others in 2009, held that 
offenders have a right to be heard during sentencing, even where a mandatory sentence 
is passed.
62
 Uganda being a state party to the Rome Statute
63
 has given effect to it by 
passing the International Criminal Courts Bill, 2006 (ICC Bill).
64
 The ICC Bill enables 
the ICC to conduct trials in Uganda. Ugandan courts of law may also try international 
crimes under the Rome Statute and enforce penalties and orders of the ICC.
65
 While it 
is true that the ICC Bill makes no explicit reference to rights for the accused and 
protection of victims and witnesses during the trial, these rights are arguably covered 
under the ‘functions and powers’ of the ICC sitting in Uganda (Clause 92 (1) ICC Bill). 
In this case, the Uganda constitution would apply.
66
 Conspicuously absent, is any 
reference in either the ICC Bill or Uganda’s constitution to a traditional notion of 
procedural rights. 
                                                 
58
 Also known as the Pact of San José (1969) entered into force 18
th
 July 1978, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 
36: Article 8 (2) (a)-(h).  
59
 Article 7- Arab Charter on Human Rights adopted 22
nd
 May 2004, entered into force on 15/03/08. 
60
 It is also known as the Banjul Charter because its final draft was made in Banjul, The Gambia. 
61
 D. D. N. Nsereko, ‘Uganda’ in R. Blanpain (ed.) International Encyclopaedia of Laws (London: 
Kluwer Law International, 1995) on rights of the accused during trial: 302-309. 
62
Attorney General v Sarah Kigula and 416 others, Sup. Court Constitutional Appeal No. 3 of 2006, 
Judgement of 21
st
 January 2009.  
63
 Uganda signed the Rome Statute on 17
th
 March 1999 and ratified it on the 14
th
 June 2002: 
www.mindfully.org/WTO/2003/Rome-Statute-ICC-Ratifications7jun03.htm. Visited on 24/04/2008. 
64
 International Criminal Court Bill No. 18 of 2006 Uganda Gazette No. 67 Volume XCVIX of 17/11/06.  
65
 Ibid, Objects of the ICC Bill in the Memorandum, Paragraph (g) (h) and (i). For a commentary on 
efforts by African states to adapt legislation in cooperation with the ICC, see O. Bekou and S. Shah, 
‘Realising the Potential of the International Criminal Court: The African Experience’ (2006) 6 (3) 
Human Rights Law Review 499-544. 
66
 Clause 30 of the Bill ibid, provides only for the rights of arrested persons. Clause 58 only affirms 
victim’s physical protection under Article 93 (1) (j) of the Rome Statute. This is not in the context of 
Articles 67 or 68 of the Rome Statute.  
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Despite this entrenchment of Article 14 ICCPR in the Rome Statute (and at the 
national level) the following observation can be made. The apparent consensus in the 
Rome Statute on the application of international human rights norms masks a 
complicated reality. Uganda like other African countries is culturally diverse. It is a 
country in which the traditional customary practices of the majority were abolished by 
legislation and has for a long time applied procedural laws founded on English common 
law. In reality, local communities operate a de facto traditional justice system as the 
Kony saga illustrates. Thus, the international and traditional systems remain divergent 
at a theoretical level due to two competing interests. At the procedural level, the 
sentencing model in Article 76 Rome Statute based on judicial control, differs from the 
traditional participatory restorative process. At the doctrinal level, the notions of 
autonomy and equality inherent in Article 14 ICCPR, conflict with rights of a 
communitarian nature that govern trials under traditional restorative justice.
67
  
Clearly then, reconciling the international and traditional models are important to 
the way in which international sentencing hearings are taken and received by the local 
communities. This is more so because international criminal law, though applied only 
where national jurisdictions cannot guarantee adequate prosecution [and sentencing] of 
crimes under international law (Article 17 Rome Statute); remains distant from 
traditional restorative and re-integrative methodologies. The Preamble to the Rome 
Statute, paradoxically, resolves to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of 
international justice.’68 I hypothesize that achieving this respect entails a concern about 
the local legitimacy of international sentencing procedures. I develop this argument 
further in the next section.  
 
Section 3: Achieving local procedural legitimacy for international sentencing 
  
This section sets out my main argument. It may be helpful to begin by stating 
explicitly where the frontiers of my concerns are to be found. This work is located in 
international procedural justice and traditional restorative justice. This thesis is not a 
narrative concerning issues of transitional justice in Uganda as reflected specifically in 
                                                 
67
 Autonomy refers here to the Kantian reasoning that an individual is an independent moral agent free to 
think rationally; make well reasoned choices and no person should be used solely as a means to an end. 
Equality refers to individual’s equal opportunities to participation of a system: A. Gerwith, Human 
Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) 5, 27-30, 
61-63, 283. 
68
 Rome Statute op cit, Preamble paragraph 4. Emphasis is mine. 
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the impending LRA trial. Nor does it engage in a theoretical debate on values, rules and 
principles of international procedural law or restorative justice. This thesis does not 
engage with sociological or legal anthropological literature on the relationships 
between types of society and types of justice. Also, it does not go into too much detail 
on punishment and substantive human rights law on sentences. This is because to 
achieve fair sentencing outcomes, what is important is the process leading up to 
sentence and the implications of that process for human rights protection. In particular, 
I am interested in whether notions of traditional restorative justice could be 
accommodated in international notions of procedural justice in order to achieve a more 
legitimate sentencing process. I look for inspiration to the customary procedures of the 
Ugandan clan courts. 
The main problem in assessing the merits of these customary procedures is the 
paucity of evidence to confirm or discount the claims of its critics or proponents. Since 
international criminal law excludes the application of customary African law, there is a 
dearth of evidence on how the international sentencing framework might work in 
practice, if combined with legitimate aspects of traditional restorative justice. My view 
is that this theoretical reconciliation cannot take place in the absence of empirical 
evidence. Moreover, the Kony saga with its search for a quick transitional justice 
solution has overshadowed the need to get evidence on how traditional restorative 
justice transformations could work. 
There is anecdotal evidence of cases handled by clan court criminal jurisdiction in 
Uganda. Although academic works refer to their sentencing jurisdiction as being 
mainly compensatory, there is little data to back up this assertion.
69
 A national 
empirical study: the Criminal Justice Baseline Survey was carried out in 2002 by the 
government’s Justice, Law and Order Sector (JLOS). The survey established that public 
confidence in national law courts was waning and people resorted to kinship systems, 
including clan courts, to get atonement for victims through compensation. The survey 
concluded, however, that ‘in less formal ways of dealing with criminal cases including 
clan, lineage or family elders, resort to kinship structures is no longer frequent’.70 This 
conclusion was arrived at without citing supporting evidence. The survey further 
                                                 
69
 See D. D. N Nsereko, ‘Victims of Crime and Their Rights’ in T. Mwene-Mushanga (ed.) Criminology 
in Africa (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2002) discussed in section 5 infra. Even older African studies 
like T. O Elias, The Nature of Customary Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956) have no 
figures but only a descriptive account of the sentencing process. 
70
 Justice, Law and Order Sector, Criminal Justice Baseline Survey (Kampala: JLOS, 2002) para 14.2.2, 
at 83, emphasis added. 
 M. Owor  Page 15 
 
asserted that probably 50% of crimes go unrecorded as people handle cases 
informally,
71
 although it gave no details on whether cases handled by clan courts are 
included within this 50%. 
A more relevant investigation is the Uganda Law Reform Commission’s (ULRC) 
2003 study on sentencing reform. The study established that participants regarded 
sentencing procedures of the clan courts to be more informal, accessible and 
conciliatory than those of the national courts. The ULRC report concluded that the 
sentencing procedures in the national courts are ‘alien to most respondents’.72 Two 
clear points emerge from the JLOS survey and ULRC study. First, that clan courts are 
prominent and handle a sizeable portion of the criminal cases. Secondly, that the 
processes by which criminal cases are heard in national courts, lack a restorative 
participatory approach, hence the crisis of confidence.  
My thesis is that accommodating traditional African concepts of procedural 
justice is difficult, unless procedural rights become a kind of normative bridge between 
the aims of international criminal justice and the values of localized communities. I 
propose using a translation model that draws from the operation of clan courts’ de facto 
sentencing regime to create this normative bridge.
73
 Using the Rome Statute, I show 
how the ICC may accommodate distinctive features of clan courts by applying 
principles derived from national law, in a manner that is consistent with international 
human rights law- Article 21 (1) (c) and (3). These principles include, in my view, 
traditional norms and values recognised in Article 126 (1) of Uganda’s constitution and 
communitarian duties recognised in the African Charter (Articles 17, 27 and 29). 
However, integrating traditional justice raises important questions about the way in 
which universal human rights norms, specifically the right to a fair trial, could be 
applied in a culturally diverse context under the auspices of international criminal 
procedure.  
This question has been considered on the fringes of academic literature. Findlay 
and Henham propose the integration of an ‘expanded notion of individual and 
collective rights, centrally within a normative framework for international criminal 
trials’, which accommodates both the restorative and retributive paradigms of 
                                                 
71
 Ibid, para 4.1 at 30. Emphasis added. 
72
 Uganda Law Reform Commission, Draft Study Report of the Laws on Sentencing (Kampala: Uganda 
Law Reform Commission, September 2006) 109-111. 
73
 A normative bridge simply refers here to the bringing together of two divergent normative standards of 
international and traditional customary laws. An overview of the translation model is in Section 4 infra. 





 Drumbl’s cosmopolitan pluralist model 
integrates non-legal local traditions into international penology. Drumbl’s proposal is 
for a vertical-bottom up approach to procedure and sanction, where in situ (local) 
justice modalities are accorded a presumption of deference but subject to 
qualification.
75
 I agree with both propositions that a local procedural approach can offer 
lessons to international law on alternative ways of achieving this reconciliation. 
However, I go a step further to show how, by using the ‘translation’ theory, a 
traditional notion of rights applied by clan courts could be adapted to achieve a 
procedurally legitimate, culturally appropriate sentencing outcome. This contrasts with 
existing theories that fail to draw on local African experiences. For instance,
 
Drumbl 
sees little value in ‘irresponsible’ veneration of a local process merely to promote 
‘pluralistic difference as an end in itself’.76 Even so, I maintain that it is from 
examining pluralistic difference at a micro clan court level, that lessons in reconciling 
divergent procedural approaches become apparent. 
My argument assumes a system of African customary law that should be lex 
legitima and recognised by international and national law on a juridical and 
constitutional basis. In Uganda, African customary law is arguably a discernible branch 
of law of jurisprudential significance and operates side by side with other laws.
77
 
Customary law has similar features to any written law: limits and sanctions are known 
and publicised through oral tradition; absolute conformity is demanded from its 
members; so in this sense it is positive law.
78
 Furthermore, ethical theory and rules of 
conduct can be found in a code of ‘tribal’ law.79 ‘Tribal’ laws protect rights of a 
communitarian nature consisting of values like the duty to kin, reconciliation, 
restitution and the role of ritual. The latter is regarded as inseparable from restitution.
80
 
My interest in this work arises out of intellectual considerations that comprise 
three factors. Firstly, the legitimacy of African customary criminal law is controversial 
                                                 
74
 M. Findlay and R. Henham, Transforming International Criminal Justice: Retributive and Restorative 
justice In the Trial Process (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2005) 331.  
75
 M. Drumbl op cit, Chapter 7, 186-191. 
76
 Ibid, 13.  
77
 J. M. N Kakooza, ‘The Application of Customary Law in Uganda’ (2003) 1 (1) The Uganda Living 
Law Journal 23-42, 23-24. He examines the application of customary law to marriage and succession. 
78
 F. G Burke, Local Government and Politics in Uganda (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1964) 
64. 
79
 J.H Driberg, ‘Primitive Law in Eastern Africa’ (1928) 1 (1) Africa: Journal of the International 
African Institute, 63-72, 71; T. Elias op cit at 189 and  J. H Driberg, ‘The African Concept of Law’ 
(1934) 16 (4) Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, 230-245: 231-232 and 238. 
80
 J. H Driberg (1928) op cit 69-70. 
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because despite its abolition as a penal law within Uganda, it operates among local 
communities as a de facto sentencing regime. Secondly, there is a scarcity of empirical 
research on the contemporary sentencing practices and jurisprudence of traditional 
African courts. This is particularly true of the Jopadhola clan courts that, as my 
empirical study will demonstrate, have something worthwhile to contribute to solving 
this dilemma of reconciling competing notions of procedural justice to achieve 
legitimate sentencing process.
81
 Thirdly, the competing goals of individual rights and 
communitarian values have not been adequately addressed by international criminal 
courts in their sentencing practice and jurisprudence. Both international practice and 
jurisprudence may thus be perceived as procedurally deficient by local communities. 
Obvious objections may be raised at such attempts to provide for traditional 
restorative justice in international criminal procedure. It might be objected that 
international procedures and outcomes, if they are to be seen by locals as legitimate, 
will have to be very different depending on the legal and traditional context into which 
those judgments are received. It could be argued that adopting such an ‘expansionist’ 
approach, involves surrendering to the traditional and will lead to lesser protection of 
rights in some instances. Another problematic area is the possibility of bias on my part 
in favour of traditional restorative process and communitarian values. However, I view 
these as more technical issues in rather than as insuperable obstacles to the 
development of a liberal –communitarian notion of procedural justice. I deal with these 
objections by presenting a critical analysis of the topic, and making arguments in 
favour of developing a translation model as a theoretical solution. I now describe my 
working definition of central concepts in the next section. 
 
Section 4: Central concepts defined  
 
The complexities of the legal argument outlined above, demonstrate the need for 
a definition of central concepts that I use in this thesis. These are procedural justice, 
sentencing, procedural rights and rights in a communitarian setting, clan courts, 
traditional clan law, precedent, and translation.  
Procedural justice is likely to mean different things to different groups both 
international
 
and local, depending on the vagaries of interpretation by adjudicating 
                                                 
81
 This the first empirical research that has been carried out on trial procedures in clan courts among the 
Jopadhola. 




 By procedural justice, I mean the fair administration of procedural rules based 
on protection of rights during the sentencing phase. I adopt the definition given by the 
ILC that fundamental procedural guarantees inherent in a fair trial also extend to the 
sentencing hearing.
83
 For me, procedural justice should combine the application of 
procedural rules and due process, using the shared features of the international and 
traditional model, while mitigating any differences so as to find a nexus upon which 
procedural rights can be anchored. I am therefore proposing that the debate on 
international procedural rights ought to be broadened beyond the legalist focus on 
individual rights.  
I use the term sentencing- meaning the giving of an appropriate punishment in 
relation to the individual and crime
84
- to describe a separate phase distinct from the 
trial. The main phases of trial procedure are collection of evidence,
85
 and determination 
of the offender’s guilt. Unless otherwise indicated, my scope of investigation is 
sentencing procedure in the ICC Trial Chamber. My assumption is that both 
international and traditional models include a sentencing phase. Sentencing is a feature 
of trial procedure that symbolises society’s sanction of the offence. It attempts to give a 
legitimate punishment that does not exceed the offender’s culpability, bearing in mind 
the principle of proportionality.
86
 Since I argue that sentencing hinges on society’s 
evaluation of an offence, I widen the scope of sentencing to include the community, 
borrowing from Drumbl’s vertical bottom-up approach and Findlay and Henham’s 
retributive-restorative justice model. This may seem to run contrary to the international 
model where judicial sentencing arguably developed to protect defendants against 
arbitrary punishments imposed by a prejudiced or vengeful community. I maintain that 
legal pluralism persists anyway, and society’s ‘evaluation’ is in practice channelled at 
the local level through regularised systems and norms that involve protections for the 
                                                 
82 The term ‘international’ is used in a generic sense to cover the international community of nations, the 
ICC, international ad hoc tribunals like ICTR on whose procedural framework the ICC is built; and 
hybrid tribunals like the SCSL. Adjudicatory bodies are the ICC, ad hoc tribunals, hybrid tribunals, 
national courts and clan courts. 
83
 Report of the ILC on the Work of Its 46
th





 C. Safferling op cit 314-31 points out that collection of facts can be presented in two structural models: 
by parties (adversarial) or inquired by the judge (inquisitorial), but I propose a third structural model in 
which collection of facts is done by the community using a participatory approach.  
86
 Ibid, 314. Safferling makes a compelling argument that the extent of punishment should not be 
considered as an automatic consequence of the verdict, every case must be decided on its merits to avoid 
treating the offender like an object of the trial. 
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defendant. Moreover, it is at the sentencing stage that the traditional and international 
procedural frameworks strongly conflict each other. 
A procedural right grants the holder a realizable legal claim and derives from a 
legal procedure that helps in the enforcement of a substantive right.
87
 Procedural rights 
or the right to ‘procedural fairness,’ are one of the three components that constitute the 
right to a fair trial.
 
The other two are institutional guarantees and legal principles like 
equality of arms.
88
 I develop my point from arguments advanced by S. Zappala that fair 
trial rights of the accused in Article 14(3) ICCPR ought to apply during sentencing.
89
 
What I wish to argue is that offenders, victims and communities should all be regarded 
as legitimate holders of procedural rights. Procedural rights during sentencing would 
thus cover both individual rights and communitarian values.
90
 The rights discussed in 
this thesis are not exhaustive of all procedural guarantees under Article 14 ICCPR. 
Rather, I select those that are most likely to be controversial from a traditional 
perspective, like the right to legal representation.  
Rights in a communitarian setting are defined as the right of one kinship member 





Gyekye, have described this to mean that individual rights are 
abridged by social responsibilities in so far as curtailing individual rights is necessary to 
maintain the integrity and stability of the group.
92
 Others like Cobbah maintain that 
social roles within kinship are rights which each member possesses and duties which 
each member has towards kin. In short, entitlements and obligations form the basis of 
the kinship system.
93
 I combine this communitarian notion of rights with rights of the 
                                                 
87
 B. A Garner, (ed.) Black’s Law Dictionary 8th Edition (Minnesota: Thomson West, 2004), 1348-1349. 
A. Gerwith op cit holds that rights also involve a normative necessity: 48-49.  
88
C. Safferling op cit, 31. He calls these ‘moral’ principles and defines all three components as the right 
to procedural fairness. H. Friman, ‘Procedural Law of Internationalised Criminal Courts’ in C. P. R 
Romano, A. Nollkaemper and J. K Kleffner (eds.), Internationalised Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East 
Timor, Kosovo and Cambodia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 353- 354, also uses Safferling’s 
definition of the three components as part of the right to a fair trial. I find these definitions appropriate.  
89
 S. Zappala op cit 199-208.  A similar argument is made by R. Henham, ‘Procedural Justice and Human 
Rights in International Sentencing’ (2004) 4 (2) International Criminal Law Review 185-210, 190-191. 
90
 C. Safferling op cit 42 posits that human rights are a legal position that human beings occupy 
regardless of their status and time, which is analogous to a fair trial. My definition stretches this 
interpretation to include the community. 
91
 N. Sudarkasa, ‘African and Afro-American Family Structure: A Comparison’ (1980) 11 Black Scholar 
37-60, 44. 
92
 K. Gyekye, Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African experience, (New 
York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 65. 
93
 J. A. M Cobbah, ‘African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African Perspective’ (1987) 9 
Human Rights Quarterly, 309-331, 320-321. 
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accused to a fair trial in Article 14 (3) ICCPR.
94
  In sum, individual rights can be 
perceived as interconnected with a duty to community and to the communitarian way of 
life. These communitarian ‘rights’ I call ‘communitarian values’, for they encapsulate 
communal values of duty to kin, restitution, reconciliation and the role of ritual. 
Clan courts refer here to kinship courts that hear cases of a criminal nature within 
a social group from the same extended family lineage. This is part of what 
anthropologists call kinship organisation.
95
 I use the term ‘traditional clan law’ as 
distinguishable from ‘African customary law’ for expediency. I refer to the traditional 
clan laws as ‘legislation’, applied in contemporary times by clan courts and binding on 
both the community and individual. I am aware that the term implies uniformity of 
African customary law which is far from the case, but I use it here to refer to the 
traditional law of any particular African community. I adapt this phrase from 
Nabudere’s ‘New traditionalism’ where African customary law was socially engineered 
by the colonialists to function under indirect rule and has survived.
96
  
Precedent is used in its doctrinal sense as a prior judicial decision.
97
 The 
conditions for the development of precedent set by Koopsman are that the main rules 
are unwritten, the court should function as a unifying element in a legal system and 
there is a necessity of resorting to principles.
98
 There is evidence that increasingly 
international law is becoming case law with a range of admissible precedents applied 
by international bodies not only to substantive law but also procedural law.
99 
The 
assumption I make here is that the juridical worth of case law both as persuasive and 
binding precedent, will help ensure consistency and predictability of sentencing 
outcomes when  advanced through the international system. 
                                                 
94
 The Human Rights Committee in ICCPR General Comment 13 of 13/04/84 stated that Article 14 
applies to procedures to determine rights and obligations of an accused in a suit at law.  
95
 P. Kirchloff, ‘Kinship Organization: A study of Terminology’ (1932) 5 Africa: Journal of the 
International African Institute, 184-191. 
96
 D. W Nabudere, ‘Towards the Study of Post Traditional Systems of Justice in the Great Lakes Region 
of Africa’ (2002) 8 (1) East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights (EAJPHR) 1-40, 4. 
97
 I combine the descriptions by N. MacCormick and R. Summers in Interpreting Precedents (Hants: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997) 1; with M. Shahabuddeen’s Precedent in the World Court (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996) 8. 
98
 T. Koopsman, ‘Stare decisis in European Law’ in David O’Keefe and Henry G. Scherners (eds.), 
Essays in European Law and Integration (Kluwer: Deventer, 1982) 14-17. 
99
 M. Shahabuddeen, op cit depicts how international law slowly resembles the common law of England 
15-16, 18. 
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Translation, a term I adapt from M. Langer, refers to translation of legal ideas 
(doctrines or norms) and institutional structures, as contrasted with legal transplants.
 100
  
Legal transplants occur where legal ideas and structures are applied unmodified in a 
recipient country. This leaves the effect of a ‘copy and paste model’.101 For example, 
the ICTR Statute and its RPE are grounded in individual human rights philosophy. 
These are applied wholesale in a community that adheres to a traditional Rwandese 
Gacaca justice system that applies communitarian values. Applying international 
criminal procedural norms in local communities, leads to what Drumbl aptly calls 
‘externalised justice’.102 Conversely, in legal translation, legal ideas and institutional 
structures are transformed through assimilation or borrowing from the ‘other’ and 
melding them together. This may be through changes to procedural powers, individual 
dispositions and structures of interpretation.
103
 
The first aspect of translation in my model, takes into account structural 
transformations within the receiving system, following changes in dispositions (or 
procedural approach) by key translators (judges).
104
 For instance, borrowing from 
traditional participatory processes, may involve modest transformation to the ICC 
sentencing practice that is presently based on sole judicial discretion. The second aspect 
of translation considers transformations to the structures of interpretation, in the 
recipient system.
105
 In borrowing this concept, I adjust it to include the doctrine of 
judicial precedent as a legal tool through with the translators (judges) may interpret 
principles, norms or how a procedural rule or system ought to work in a different 
procedural model. For example, the ICC in applying principles of national law under 
the Rome Statute, could, arguably, apply precedent from national courts on traditional 
restorative processes and traditional sentences. In so doing, judges could transform the 
normative framework by applying an expanded notion of procedural rights during 
                                                 
100
 M. Langer, ‘From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea bargaining and 
the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure’ (2004) 45 (1) Harvard International Law Journal 1-
64. 
101
 Ibid, 5-7, 33-35.  
102
 M. Drumbl op cit 14 and Chapter 5. 
103
 M. Langer op cit 10-14. Translation is defined in detail in Ch.3 S.5 infra. 
104
 I adopt this from Langer ibid, 11-13. I focus on individual disposition because unlike procedural 
powers (functions) of judges that are specified by law under the Rome Statute, disposition is the way in 
which judges are predisposed to understand criminal procedure and their role, based on their legal 
training. Arguably, it is in through disposition or procedural approach that small changes may be made 
without infringing on procedural powers in the Rome Statute.   
105
 Legal doctrine according to Langer is an influential aspect of American law that has been transplanted 
in parts of the world: ibid 2. His extensive study of the Italian, French, German and Argentine civil law 
plea bargaining procedures, examines the extent to which the American system, through a ‘weak’ thesis 
of ‘Americanisation’, has influenced their legal doctrine and institutional arrangements: 39-62.   
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sentencing. The ICC could thus accommodate values of localized communities without 
infringing on international human rights standards. 
The concept of translation is appropriate where an institution needs to 
accommodate divergent normative features. Indeed, when examined against traditional 
restorative justice imperatives, the international sentencing framework has room for 
some aspects of the traditional model, although it does not always protect 
communitarian values. This need for translation is better understood against Uganda’s 
background, discussed in section 5 below. 
 
Section 5: Uganda’s historical, political and legal background  
 
In order to set the scene for my analysis, it is important to say something about 
the recent history of Uganda and its legal structure. In this section, I argue that the 
historical background to legal pluralism masks the political tensions of indirect rule and 
the problems that arose from the cultural domination of the Baganda ethnic group over 
other Ugandan groups. I examine the outcome of the imposition of Buganda’s 
traditional court structure and administration system onto other ethnic groups, and how 
resistance manifested itself. The present court structure and constitutional 
developments are partly a consequence of this resistance.  
 
(i) Historical background 
 
Uganda is in East Africa at the centre of the Great Lakes region, with Kenya to 
the East, Sudan to the North, Democratic Republic of Congo to the West, Rwanda to 
the South West and Tanzania to the South.
106
 Uganda has a population of 24.4 million 
people
107
 made up of 65 ethnic groups
108
 categorised into 4 linguistic groups: Bantu, 
Nilotic, NiloHamitic and Sudanic.
109
 These linguistic groups are culturally 
                                                 
106
 Territorial boundaries of Uganda are delineated in the 2
nd
 schedule of the constitution op cit under 
Article 5 (3) and are illustrated in Figure 1.  
107
Uganda Bureau of Statistics, The 2002 Population and Housing Census, Population Composition 
(Kampala: Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2006) vii, Table 3.3 page 12. 
108
 56 ethnic groups are listed in Schedule 3 constitution op cit. S.48 of the Constitution (Amendment) 
(No.2) Act 2005 amends Schedule 3 by adding 9 groups, bringing the total to 65. 
109
 H. F Morris and J. S Read, Uganda: The Development of its Laws and Constitution (London: Stevens 
and Sons, 1966) 237.  
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heterogeneous with diverse political structures. Their geographical distribution is 
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Figure 1 Map showing linguistic groups in Uganda. © Department of Mapping and Surveying, 
Entebbe, Uganda (2007) 
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My interest is in the customary practices of the Nilotic group referred to collectively as 
Luo or Lwo,
110
 and the Jopadhola ethnic group in particular.  
The history of Uganda traces its development from the pre-colonial era circa 
1500-1890, when the country comprised a diversity of kingdoms, chiefdoms and 
‘stateless’ communities, each with their own system of social control.111 The Bantu had 
kings and chiefs and were organised in closely knitted clusters of clans, with the 
paramount head of the clan or kingdom (a cluster of clans that form the bigger 
community) as the political leader. The other groups were organised in loose kinship 
units
112
 without a central leader. Despite this divergence in political authority, there was 
some commonality in customs relating to the trial and sentencing of offenders.  
The pre-colonial criminal justice system focussed on vindicating the victim and 
their rights, so the sanction was compensatory rather than punitive.
113
 The main 
procedural features in customary trials were the identification of the perpetrator; their 
admittance of guilt (both individual and collective guilt); the process of individual or 
collective purification and reparation or compensation for the wrongs done. To promote 
equilibrium in the society, the offender was forgiven by the victim and peace was 
made, marked by the sharing of a meal as part of the reconciliation.
114
  
Procedural differences related to the type of society. For example, in centralised 
societies, decisions were made by chiefs or kings. Among the loose kinship groups like 
the Jopadhola, decision making was collective. During the colonial era (circa 1890-
1957) Britain made Uganda a protectorate. Tensions between the two systems arose out 
of political manoeuvres to impose the English legal system over the local one, without 
taking into account existing traditional criminal laws.
115
 The English common law and 
                                                 
110
 Nilotics encompass the Acoli, Lango, Kumam, Jopaluo of Bunyoro, Alur, Luo and the Jopadhola 
ethnic groups: E. E Evans-Pritchard, ‘Nilotic Studies’ (1950) 80 Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 1-6. There are anthropological distinctions made by Evans-
Pritchard between the Shilluk Luo comprising the Nilotics of Uganda (ibid note 26) and historical 
differences described by B. A. Ogot, History of the Southern Luo: Vol.1 Migration and settlement 1500-
1900 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967) at 32, between the two groups of Luo: Group A 
comprise the Shilluk, Acoli, Lango and Palwo and Group B the Alur, Jopadhola and Kenya Luo. Since 
these distinctions are not of great importance in this study, I shall use the ethnic group names to identify 
the individual groups. 
111
 G. W Kanyeihamba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda: From 1894 to the Present 
(Kampala: Centenary Publishing House Ltd, 2002) Chapter 1, 1-4. 
112
 D. Nsereko (1995) op cit, 19.  
113
 D. Nsereko (2002) op cit, 22-25. 
114
 P. Nyaba, ‘The Grassroots Peacemaking in South Sudan’ (2002) 8 (1) East African Journal of Peace 
and Human Rights, 97-110, 104. 
115
 E. Beyaraza, Social Foundations of Law: A Philosophical analysis (Kampala: Law Development 
Centre Publishers, 2003) at 112 citing J. M. N Kakooza ‘Uganda’s legal history in a nutshell’ (1993); 
also J. Oloka-Onyango, ‘Law, Custom and Access to Justice in Contemporary Uganda: A Conceptual 
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its court systems now operated alongside the local kinship courts that applied 
traditional clan law. This changed the features of criminal procedure in quite 
fundamental ways as explored below in sub-section (ii).  
 
(ii) Political background 
 
On June 19th 1894 Uganda became a British protectorate.
116 
The country was 
subjected to ‘Indirect Rule’ through which the different ethnic groups continued to 
administer their territories using traditional clan law and adjudicated their crimes in a 
like manner.
117
 However, a system of government from Buganda (the kingdom with the 
largest Bantu ethnic group) was imposed on other groups to expedite the colonial rule. 
This was a result of scarcity of European administrators and so the recognition of 
existing chieftainship beyond the village level was inevitable.
118
 The imposition of 
Buganda administration substantially changed decision making in the clan, from 
kinship units to a chief imposed by the colonial administration. This chief imposed by 
the state, had legislative and judicial powers to preside over the clan courts.
119
   
In practice, however, Buganda administration failed to triumph over kin-based 
societies that had no central authority. The Jopadhola, for instance, were traditionally 
unaccustomed to the system of chief hierarchy, and exhibited strong anti-authority 
sentiments.
120
 Despite lack of any central authority, the Jopadhola were held together 
by a tribal consciousness which was the worship of a deity called Bura and an emphasis 
on responsibility to the clan. Consequently, the structural process that evolved was a 
reinforcement of clan cohesion through mysticism and collective decision making. 
Each clan court system was independent of the other but retained features of the 
traditional restorative justice model. 
                                                                                                                                              
and Analytical review’ paper prepared for New Frontiers of Social Policy World Bank Conference (Dar 
Es Salaam, 2005), Part II para. 2.1-2.2 explores the history of these manoeuvres. 
116
 H. Morris and J. Read op cit, Chapter 1 and G. Kanyeihamba op cit 6-10 describing the process. 
117
 J. Oloka-Onyango op cit Part II para 2.1-2.2 on the jurisdiction of clan courts during the colonial era. 
118
 M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism 
(Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2004) in Chapter 3, 85, gives an excellent analysis of this political move. 
Also S. R Karugire, A Political History of Uganda (Nairobi, London: Heinemann, 1980) Chapter 3. 
119
 M. Mamdani ibid, Chapter 4 especially 117- 128 where he identifies the weak process of state 
formation through compulsion as a result of the need to create a market economy. The fastest way to 
achieve this, he argues, was to give the chief consolidated powers of judge, legislator and executive. 
120
 F. Burke op cit 219: describing how in the 1960s, large crowds of up to 10,000 people would attack 
chiefs and European district officers, aiming to kill them.  
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Circa 1894–1962, Uganda as a Protectorate had no formal protection or 
promotion of human rights because the colonial rulers usurped the power of the 
indigenous ethnic groups to define their own rights and interests.
121
 The 1962 
Independence constitution guaranteed the retention of customary authority, though it 
granted a superior status to Buganda. This is because through the Buganda kingdom, 
the British protectorate was established, from where it gradually spread to the rest of 
Uganda. The rest of the country comprised smaller kingdoms,
122
 chiefdoms and 
segmented societies like the Jopadhola, who all fell under this ill defined 
arrangement.
123
 The constitution also embodied a Bill of Rights based on the ECHR, 
which outlawed unwritten penal laws under Article 24 (8) and by implication, 
traditional clan laws and their procedural rules. Clan courts survived because- as is 
exemplified by the Jopadhola, for many, clan courts as part of the kinship organisation 




The 1962 constitution was abrogated by the 1966 constitution that abolished the 
kingdoms and other traditional rulers (Article 118). In the following year, the 1967 
Constitution declared Uganda a Republic. The Bill of Rights in Chapter 3 remained 
unchanged. 
Post independence Uganda was politically unstable. The most destructive regime 
was that of Idi Amin that saw the suspension of the constitution, abolition of parliament 
and destruction of the judiciary. During this time, ‘official’ courts of law on the one 
hand existed marginally with little effective jurisdiction.
125
 The clan courts on the other 
hand survived, filling a vacuum created by the weakened official court system.  
Uganda is now a Republic where all arms of the state are enjoined to uphold the 
rule of law. A new Constitution of 1995 restored traditional leaders and created a new 
Bill of Rights in Chapter 4, but retained Article 28 (12) that outlaws unwritten penal 
law. Article 37 protects the right to practice one’s culture. Furthermore, under the 
cultural objectives of the constitution, the state is obliged to promote and preserve 
                                                 
121
 M. Senyonjo, ‘The Domestic Protection and Promotion of Human Rights under the 1995 
Constitution’ (2002) 20 (4) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 445-483, 447-448. 
122
 These included the kingdoms of Ankole, Bunyoro, Toro and Busoga. 
123
 J. Oloka-Onyango, ‘Constitutional Transition in Museveni’s Uganda: New Horizons or Another False 
Start?’ (1995) 39 (2) Journal of African Law 156-172, 157-159. On the constitutional developments in 
Uganda during this period, see Morris and Read, op cit: Chapter 3. 
124
 F. Burke op cit 189. 
125
 D. Nsereko (1995) op cit 18-19. The abolition of the rule of law lasted 8 years (1971-1979). 
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cultural values and practices that promote the dignity and well being of Ugandans.
126
  
This constitution also has an article not found in any other African constitution: Article 
126(1) enjoins courts of law to exercise judicial power in accordance with the law and 
the ‘values, norms, and aspirations of the people’. This provision creates space for the 
continued operation of traditional clan law at some level within the national court 
structure.  
The state of legal pluralism that gradually evolved continues to exist today, 
despite legislative attempts to abolish traditional clan criminal law. Legal pluralism 
now consists of two procedural traditions. On the one hand, the national system based 
on common law trial procedures buttressed by due process, and on the other, a 
traditional restorative justice process based on communitarian values.  
 
(iii) Court structures 
 
The legal structure of the ‘official’ courts in Uganda is common to that of the rest 
of Anglophone Africa because it is based on English common law
127
 though with its 
own unique hierarchy of courts. The first tier comprises the High Court, Court of 
Appeal- also sitting as a Constitutional Court, and the Supreme Court. Collectively, 
their jurisprudence constitutes binding precedent for Magistrates and other subordinate 
courts.
128
 The second tier comprises Magistrates courts. Together, both tiers are 
referred to as the judiciary. The hierarchy of courts is illustrated overleaf.   
At the lowest rung are the local council courts. These are not strictly courts of law 
but have unique quasi-judicial status. They are run by the members of the community 
and handle only civil cases, except for specific offences involving children over which 
they have criminal jurisdiction.
129 
The lower level courts comprise the entire executive 
committee of the village or parish. Local council courts fall under the Ministry of Local 
Government, although the Chief Magistrates’ courts can hear appeals from them.130  
                                                 
126
 Uganda constitution op cit, National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy: Cultural 
Objective (XXIV) (a). 
127
 H. Morris and J. Read op cit 237. 
128
 They are superior courts of record as defined in the constitution op cit Article 129(2). Other courts 
include the Family and Children courts, the Courts Martial and the Industrial Court. 
129
 Local Council Courts Act 13/2006, (Section 10). The Act establishes these courts for the 
administration of justice at the local level. S.49 (2) (a) limits their criminal jurisdiction in respect to 
children, to specified offences like common assault and theft that fall under the Penal Code Act, Cap 120. 
130
 Ibid, Section 4 (1) on the composition of the village and parish court. Under S. 32 (2) (c) the Chief 
Magistrate’s court can only hear appeals from decisions of a town, division or sub county court. Appeals 
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At the next level are the Magistrates’ courts with original jurisdiction to hear both 
civil and criminal matters, including civil customary law under Section 10 of the 
Magistrates Courts Act (MCA).  They are not courts of record. Magistrates’ courts are 
ranked as Grade II, Grade I or Chief Magistrate. The latter has powers to hear appeals 
and revisions from the lower courts.
131
 Criminal cases are heard by Grade I Magistrates 





magistrates also sit alone and try cases.
132
 For example, in the Family and Children 
court, children are tried by a lay Grade II Magistrate.
133
   
                                                                                                                                              
from the lower level local council courts are heard by the parish court then town, division or sub county 
court: S. 32(2) (a) (b).  
131
 Magistrates Courts Act (MCA) Cap 16 S.4 (2) sets out the grades of magistrates courts. Under S.15, a 
magistrate’s court may enforce the observance of custom that is not ‘repugnant to natural justice, equity 
and good conscience’. S. 204 provides for the Chief Magistrate’s appellate and revision powers. 
132
 Magistrates’ Courts (Amendment) Act, 2007 S.1 amended S.4 MCA and abolished the post of 
Magistrate Grade III courts. Eventually Grade II magistrate courts will also be abolished. According to 
the Chief Justice, ‘In the next 10 years the entire magistrates’ bench will be professional to contain the 
case backlog’: Daily Monitor 18th Feb 2008. 
133
 S. 13 of the Children Act Cap 59 establishes Family and Children Courts. A child under S.2 is any 
person below the age of 18 years.  
Supreme Court 
Court of Appeal and 
Constitutional court  
The High Court 
Chief Magistrate’s 
Court  
Grade One Magistrates’ 
Court 
Grade II Magistrates court/ 
Family and Children court  
Local council 
Town, Division 
sub-county courts  
Lower level local 
council courts  
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Next is the High Court with unlimited original jurisdiction in civil and criminal 
matters.
134
 Under Section 14 (2) of the Judicature Act, the High Court may apply, 
among others, established and current custom or usage. The court also has appellate 
jurisdiction to hear appeals and revisions from decisions of the Grade I and Chief 
Magistrates’ court.135 All sittings of the High Court are presided over by judges who sit 
alone and hear cases.  
There are two further appellate courts: the Court of Appeal and, higher still, the 
Supreme Court. The Court of Appeal is a second tier appellate court
136 
 that hears 
appeals from decisions of the High Court
137
 and in certain circumstances, second and 
third appeals from magistrate’s courts.138 The Constitutional Court sits to hear 
constitutional matters only and is made up of the judges who constitute the Court of 
Appeal bench.
139
 The Supreme Court is the final appeal court
140
 headed by the Chief 
Justice who is also the head of the Judiciary.
141 
The Supreme Court has appellate 
jurisdiction within the territorial limits of Uganda.
142 
 
Procedural rules in criminal matters are governed generally by the Trial on 
Indictments Act (Chapter 23), Magistrates Courts Act (Chapter 16) and Criminal 
Procedure Code (Chapter 116). All are modelled on the 1898 Indian Code of Criminal 
Procedure founded on English law.
143
 Rules of evidence are set out in the Evidence Act 
(Chapter 6). The appellate courts each have their rules of procedure set out in 
subsidiary legislation.
144
 Penal sanctions include the death penalty, imprisonment, fines, 
compensation and community service.
145
  
The ‘official’ court structure excludes clan courts yet they are active, on a par 
with the Ugandan judiciary in the local communities where they operate and have 
similar powers of adjudication, sentencing and appellate procedures. Through my 
                                                 
134
 S. 13 &, Part IV Judicature Act, Chapter 13; and Articles 138-139 of the constitution op cit.  
135
  Ibid, S. 14. 1S. 16 Judicature Act and Article 138 – 140 constitution, give appellate jurisdiction.  
136
 Ibid, S. 9 Judicature Act and the constitution, Article 134-135, 136 (1) (b).  
137
 Ibid, S. 10, 11 Judicature Act and S. 45 Criminal Procedure Code, op cit. 
138
 Ibid, S. 46 Criminal Procedure Code: third appeals from Grade II courts may be heard on a matter of 
great importance or a question of law.   
139
 Constitution op cit, Article 137.  
140
 Established under S. 3 Judicature Act op cit and Article 132 (1) constitution ibid. 
141
 Ibid, Articles 130 (a), 133(1) (a). 
142
 Judicature Act op cit S. 4- 5. 
143
 Uganda Order-In-Council 1902. 
144
 The Supreme Court Rules Directions 1996 S.I 13-11/1996 and the Court of Appeal Rules Directions 
1996 S.I 13-10/1996. 
145
 Penal sanctions are prescribed for each offence in the Penal Code Act, op cit; and in any legislation 
that prescribes penal offences like the Witchcraft Act, Chapter 124. An overview of national Sentencing 
laws is in Appendix 10. 
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empirical study, I will demonstrate the functionality of these clan courts within a 
community participatory process, in providing generalised lessons for domesticating 
international sentencing in Africa. I now explain briefly the methodology that I used. 
 
Section 6: Methodology 
 
To date little attention has been paid to communitarian values in traditional 
restorative justice process. To bridge this knowledge gap, I conducted a small empirical 
study with clan court heads to see how they interpret complex notions of individual 
rights during sentencing. Before examining these substantial findings directly, it is 
necessary to outline the methodology used in this thesis which I do in this section. 
Details of the methodology are in Appendix 1. 
The objective of the thesis is to seek to reconcile international sentencing 
hearings with values of localized communities through an application of procedural 
rights. To achieve this objective, I use two approaches. Through these two approaches, 
the capacity of the international system to accommodate aspects of the traditional 
restorative justice system will become clear. The first approach involves a legal 
analysis of the international and traditional sentencing frameworks to examine 
similarities and tensions between them, in light of human rights imperatives. The 
second approach involves the use of empirical methods. I will present the results of an 
empirical study I conducted in 2006, of clan courts of the Jopadhola ethnic group in 
Tororo district (Eastern Uganda). Jopadhola clan courts apply traditional clan law using 
traditional restorative processes. 
The aim of the study was to examine empirically the processes by which clan 
courts assimilate judicial and interconnected national structures, and individual rights 
into traditional restorative justice. I believe the years of experience of clan court 
officials’, makes them well positioned to speak authoritatively and reflectively about 
issues affecting integration of transplanted law and due process implications. I focus on 
the clan courts of the Jo-Gem (or Jo-Gemi)
146
 and Morwa Guma Malasang (hereafter 
‘Morwa Guma’) clans in Budama North constituency of West Budama County; 
comprising the sub counties of Kirewa, Kisoko, Petta, Paya and Nagongera. 
                                                 
146
 The names are used interchangeably, with the former being the official spelling in historical and 
anthropological texts. I use Jo-Gem in this thesis.  
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The choice of these two clans is because they are a good archetypal sample of 
clan experiences as illustrative of how clan courts solve a theoretical problem of 
reconciling structurally divergent procedural frameworks.
147
 In this sense, I am not just 
presenting a study of ‘typical’ Uganda traditional justice. A study of ‘stateless’ societies 
is important to show how they translate legal structures and ideas in the absence of a 
centralised leadership and prescriptive framework. Their interpretation of law gives 
salutary lessons on how similarities are harnessed and how divergence may be 
mitigated.  
The choice of methodology arises from the complexity of issues (both theoretical 
and methodological) in this type of restorative justice research.
148
 These include, in 
relation to the clan courts, dearth of archival documentation both academic and non 
academic, poor electronic communication, low levels of literacy in rural areas and the 
holistic context within which the sentencing process is addressed. To this end, three 
qualitative research methods were used.  
Firstly, archival research techniques complemented other methods of information 
gathering. The methodological starting point was to examine available primary and 
secondary material including legislation, government publications, white papers, law 
reports, clan courts records, judgments of superior courts of record and widely 
circulated local daily newspapers: The New Vision and Daily Monitor. I also examined 
books, periodicals, legal encyclopaedias and mimeographs. These sources provided 
some information on the doctrinal and historical aspects of traditional justice within the 
human rights framework in sentencing practice. However, given the limited insights 
available from a doctrinal or statistical study, it was necessary to use interviews to fill 
in the gaps. 
Next, unstructured and semi–structured interviews were used because they attain 
a higher response rate than any survey technique and generate better quality data.
149
 In 
accordance with research regulations in Uganda, I applied for and was granted 
permission to carry out the research by the relevant Research Ethics body: Uganda 
National Council for Science and Technology. In practice, no ethical problems arose 
during the course of the study. Over a period of six and a half weeks from 27
th
 July–
                                                 
147
 A fuller explanation of my choice of clans to study is given in Chapter 6 S. 2 infra.  
148
 C. T Griffiths ‘Sanctioning and Healing: Restorative Justice in Canadian Aboriginal Communities’ 
(1996) 20 (2) International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 311-314. 
149
 C. M Judd, E. R Smith and L. H Kidder Research Methods in Social Relations (6
th
 Ed.) (Forthworth: 
Texas: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston for the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, 1986) 
218. The response rate may be over 80%. 




 September 2006, un-structured interviews were held with people in various 
institutions like Makerere University, and the Judiciary. In all, 40 respondents were 
interviewed: 23 men and 17 women, whose details are in Appendix 4. Selection of 
respondents was based on their knowledge (or lack of) in the area of traditional justice 
as well as the position they held.  Those interviewed included the Chief Justice, judges, 
academics, and public servants. 
In August 2006, semi-structured interviews were used in the empirical study of 
clan court heads, in two stages: a pre-visit interview followed by a formal workshop. A 
‘pre-visit’ refers to the preparatory visit made to the study area prior to the main 
interviews. I set up a pre-visit meeting to get more background information about the 
court systems and Jopadhola criminal laws. The meeting was also to establish when it 
was most suitable to carry out more interviews and to select participants. This is 
standard research protocol in Uganda. The second set of semi structured interviews was 
conducted on the 15th August 2006,
150
 at a one-day workshop. In all, 25 participants 
attended: 7 women and 18 men. 7 were absent with apology, due to other engagements. 
I divided participants into 7 working groups representing 7 clan courts. These were the 
Gombolola, Miluka and Kisoko (Jo Gem clan), and the P’Oriwa, Saza, Gombolola and 
Miluka (Morwa Guma clan).  
Each group was given a question guide in Dhupadhola, flip charts and markers. 
Participants read, discussed the questions and then wrote down their responses in 
Dhupadhola. This was a better method of recording than tape recordings for two 
reasons. In the first place, all groups were able to digest the questions and then answer 
the questions simultaneously. Secondly, I was able to move from group to group, seek 
clarity and re-direct the line of discussion where issues and written responses were not 
clear. Consequently all the questions were answered in depth and within the time frame.  
The discussions canvassed the clan court members’ views on: trial process in clan 
courts; who may make representations on behalf of the defendant; any rituals 
performed as part of the sentencing process; criteria by which moral culpability and 
responsibility of the offender is assessed; factors considered during sentencing; 
satisfying wishes of the victim, offender and the community; procedure for review of 
decisions; similarities between the procedure in clan courts and the Local council or 
                                                 
150
 This was the most convenient day for most participants because other days are reserved for 
community activities like the Market day. A second brief follow-up interview was carried out on the 17
th
 
August 2008 with the two clan heads. 
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Magistrate’s courts; preventing bias in decision making and the challenges faced by 
clan courts.
151
 I transcribed all responses from the pre-visit interview and workshop into 
the English language since I am proficient in both Dhupadhola and English.  
Below are pictures of two discussion groups: 
 
Figure 3: © Maureen Owor (2006). The Gombolola Jo-Gem discussion group 
 
Figure 4: © Maureen Owor (2006). The Moriwa Guma P`Oriwa discussion group  
 
                                                 
151
 The semi structured questionnaire is in Appendix 2. 
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Thirdly, the study used a trial simulation in which two same-clan members were 
accused of having sexual relations (which is included within the definition of the crime 
of incest under Jopadhola clan laws). The simulation was by participants who are real 
clan court officials. This simulation was supplemented by a study of court records made 
available to me by the Namwaya Saza court of Morwa Guma. The success of the trial 
simulation depended on a high level of authenticity. Bearing in mind the inevitable 
constraints of trial simulation, in particular its verisimilitude to real clan court hearings, 
the findings suggest that there may nonetheless be some valuable lessons to be gleaned 
from the simulation about the application of human rights provisions in clan court 
trials. The plenary session followed, at which participants discussed the strengths and 
weaknesses of Jopadhola sentencing laws and issues concerning reconciliation of 
traditional with international trial process.  
There were three main limitations. First, the archival research was unable to plug 
all important holes in the oral narrative. For instance, a request for the number of cases 
handled from 2000-2005 by clan courts was not responded to.
152
 Additionally, the lack 
of a database of existing research studies meant I had to rely on individuals giving me 
their copies of documents or alerting me to the whereabouts of others. Secondly, some 
people were unavailable due to various commitments so I was unable to interview 
them. Thirdly, I was not able to attend and observe actual clan court hearings as none 
were scheduled during this time. However, I attended a ritual for removing a curse in 
Iyolwa.
153
 Despite these set backs I was able to get sufficient information about the 
sentencing process from both the respondents and study participants.  
While these limitations may arguably affect the reliability of the findings, the fact 
that all clan courts of Jo-Gem and Morwa Guma clans
 
in Budama North were 
represented, gives adequate information on practice in these courts. Together then, the 
incorporation of archival research, interviews, simulation of real time trial re-
enactments and a plenary discussion, mark out this study as ground breaking. I see this 
as an exploratory study that can contribute to the literature and expand the range of 
viewpoints and voices on consideration of traditional justice within international law. 
Significantly, these deliberations provide insight into the ways in which Article 76 
sentencing provisions in the Rome Statute may be applied in the African context.  
                                                 
152
 This is despite reminders by phone and email during July-August 2007, February-March 2008 and a 
visit in August 2008. 
153
 Chapter 7 infra S. 3 (v) (b). 
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Section 7: Layout of thesis  
 
The thesis is set out in 9 chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 
is where I start to develop the theoretical context within which this study is grounded. 
Here I discuss elements of traditional restorative justice and international sentencing 
procedure, and how human rights protections sit in relation to both. The ICC retributive 
procedural framework and traditional restorative justice processes; represent two 
different procedural paradigms with divergent philosophical underpinnings. 
Consequently, the notion of procedural rights is viewed differently in both paradigms: 
one is based on individual rights and the other on communitarian values. I conclude that 
for the ICC to bring these conflicting legal systems in harmony with human rights 
guarantees; there is need to consider competing arguments.   
Chapter 3 then sets out the debate among African and international scholars 
surrounding the question of reconciling the traditional with the international normative 
frameworks. I show that there is a pre-occupation by the scholars with the dichotomy 
between the two justice systems based on their different philosophical underpinnings. 
Furthermore both sides fail to consider human rights as a linchpin to bridge the 
normative gap between the two traditions. In seeking to reconcile these differences, I 
argue that there is need to apply a pluralist interpretation of rights, namely liberal rights 
and communitarian values within a redesigned theoretical model. I call this the 
Translation model.  
Chapter 4 investigates challenges to accommodating traditional restorative justice, 
through a critique of the sentencing practice and jurisprudence of the ICTR and SCSL. I 
show how the international sentencing framework exhibits a degree of normative 
rigidity. The challenge is more pronounced because of deference by the ICTR and 
SCSL to precedent from regional bodies like the European Court of Human Rights, 
whose decisions are inappropriate to local communities sentencing processes. I 
conclude that harmonisation is elusive, because of lack of legal guidance on an African 
notion of rights that is reconcilable with Article 14 ICCPR right to a fair trial. 
Chapter 5 considers the African regional human rights framework, particularly the 
efficacy of the African Charter and its Principles and Guidelines. I analyse whether the 
African Charter, expounded by interpretations by the African Commission, provides a 
definition of a traditional notion of rights: one that resonates with local values and 
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Article 14 ICCPR. I also examine the work of the Inter American Court of Human 
Rights (IACtHR) to demonstrate how ‘traditional’ conceptions of remedy and outcomes 
could be applied without infringing on the purity of human rights standards. I conclude 
that the newly created African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, ought to develop 
‘African’ human rights jurisprudence, perhaps by borrowing from experiences of the 
IACtHR.  
Chapter 6 analyses the first part of the empirical findings on the operation of the 
Jopadhola Jo-Gem and Morwa Guma clan courts. I examine what lessons the clan 
courts have for the ICC on how to ‘borrow’ structures and norms, without losing its 
universal protection of human rights. Although national courts have been superimposed 
over existing clan court structures, nonetheless clan courts have drawn from them to 
survive while retaining their normative values and clan laws. Areas of convergence and 
divergence are traced to the genealogy of the clans and the effect of colonialism on the 
clan ‘judicial’ system. I conclude that despite the structural transformations, mysticism 
plays a significant role in sentencing, exacerbating the challenges to protection of 
procedural rights.  
Chapter 7 presents the second part of the empirical study findings. I examine the 
manner in which the clan courts develop a wider construct of procedural rights to suit 
their communitarian setting. I also show how far international law is rationalised by 
clan courts in an attempt to reconcile two different paradigms. The issue investigated is 
whether the clan courts are able to offer better protection for procedural rights during 
sentencing. I find in the affirmative, but also point out instances where individual rights 
are abridged to cater for social responsibilities. I show how a traditional concept of 
precedent is used as a tool of interpretation by the clan court to reconcile traditional and 
national procedural approaches.  
Chapter 8 shows how Uganda’s state practice provides a salutary lesson for the 
ICC on the vexed question of accommodating traditional restorative features. 
Normative rigidity in legislation, retributive sentencing principles and an unimaginative 
application of precedent, influence this harmonisation process. This is particularly true 
of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article 126 (1) that fails to relate 
communitarian values to procedural rights in sentencing. This deprives the ICC of 
relevant ‘African’ jurisprudence on procedural rights during sentencing. I conclude that 
the ICC could do better to achieve local procedural legitimacy by adopting a translation 
theoretical model. 
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The concluding chapter recapitulates the harmonisation question. Through my 
theoretical model I attempt to reconcile competing interests using procedural rights 
during sentencing. I therefore set out a framework for an expanded notion of procedural 
rights using an integrated participatory approach. The first part of the model shows how 
a traditional participatory approach can be translated into the international sentencing 
framework. The second part of the model applies a liberal communitarian theory by 
translating an expanded construct of procedural rights. The model draws on the practice 
of Jopadhola clan courts. Although questions still remain on the capacity of 
international law to bend towards and assimilate African customary law, some tentative 
suggestions are made here. 
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CHAPTER TWO: TRANSLATING AFRICAN CUSTOMARY 
LAW: SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 
This Chapter attempts to answer the question whether the International 
Criminal Court‟s (ICC) normative sentencing framework could reconcile with the 
traditional one. This answer demands a critical appraisal of structural and doctrinal 
factors that would likely influence such reconciliation. I do this appraisal by setting 
out the theoretical context in which traditional and international normative 
frameworks operate, and how human rights sits in relation to both. I note that the ICC 
is based on a judge controlled procedural framework and traditional justice on a 
restorative participatory process, representing structurally divergent procedural 
paradigms. Then again, some features of the ICC like public pronouncement of 
sentence resonate with aspects of traditional participatory process. 
Cognisant of the central argument of the thesis, I analyse why the two 
paradigms as they currently operate, seem not capable of administering procedural 
justice in an integrated system. This is because their different philosophical 
underpinnings mean that the notion of procedural rights is viewed differently in both. 
One is based on individual rights, the other on communitarian values. Moreover, 
procedural rights are not regarded as a normative bridge that can reconcile the two 
paradigms. I conclude that in order to bring these conflicting legal systems in 
harmony using a pluralist interpretation of rights, the consideration of competing 
arguments is crucial. Following this introduction, I start by appraising the theoretical 
perspectives of traditional restorative justice (Section 2). I then discuss the theoretical 
framework of the ICC sentencing procedure (Section 3). I offer a brief conclusion in 
Section 4.  
Section 2: The Traditional Restorative justice model  
  
In this section, I examine the structural framework and underlying values of 
traditional restorative justice. Through an analysis of its processes, I show that 
traditional justice is premised on collective decision making, restorative philosophical 
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underpinnings and a protection of communitarian values. The outcome is public 
participatory justice using a „shared judicial approach‟.  
  
 (i) Restorative participatory justice   
 
The term „restorative justice‟ has no single, clear established meaning. It is 
described as internally complex and open. Although it continues to develop, it 
remains deeply contested and is used in different ways.
1
 Restorative justice has been 
defined by some as an attempt to view crime beyond law breaking and acknowledge 
the hurt to victims, the community and offenders.
2
 Others state that it emphasises the 
repair of harm and ruptured social bonds resulting from the crime, thereby focusing 
on the relationships between the crime, victim, offenders and society.
3
 Strong and 
Van Ness describe three conceptions of restorative justice: the encounter concept: a 
modern development where a facilitator enables the offender and victim to discuss the 
crime; the reparative concept: where the harm occasioned to the people and 
relationships must be repaired; and the transformative concept, that refers to changing 




African restorative justice reflects this overlap and tension within its 
framework.
5
 Its premise is aptly described by Elechi as participatory justice-making, 
based on ancient ways of settling disputes.
6
 Participatory justice-making incorporates 
restorative principles by creating opportunities for the „conflict property owners‟: 
victim, offender, their kin and community, to collectively define the harm, the repair 
and resolution to the conflict.
7
 African restorative justice is victim-centred in the 
sense that it enables the victim to express their hurt and loss, to understand the 
                                                 
1
 G. Johnstone and D. Van Ness, „The meaning of Restorative justice‟ in G. Johnstone and D. Van 
Ness (eds.) Handbook of Restorative Justice (Portland, Oregon: Willan Publishing, 2007) at 6-8. 
2
 N. Christie, „Conflict as property‟ (Oslo: 1976) no.23 cited in O. O Elechi, Doing Justice without the 
State: The Afikpo (Ehugbo) Nigeria Model (New York &London: Routledge, 2006) 24. 
3
 K. Daly and R. Immagirgeon, „The Past, Present And Future Of Restorative Justice: Some Critical 
Reflections‟ (1998) 1 Contemporary Justice Review 21-45, 22. 
4
 G. Johnstone and D. Van Ness op cit. See also R. Young and C. Hoyle for a discussion of the blend 
of three stages of retribution, restoration and rehabilitation in „Restorative Justice and Punishment‟ in 
S. McConville (ed.), The Use of Punishment (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2003) 221-222. 
5
 In using this term I am not of course saying that restorative justice and systems of justice are uniform 
in Africa, nor am I implying that there is such a thing as „African‟ justice. This is a term of art that is 
accepted by African writers about this notion of communitarian justice based on restoring the 
equilibrium. 
6
 O. Elechi op cit (2006) Chapter 2, 28 for a theoretical perspective on restorative justice. 
7
 Ibid, 18-19. 
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circumstances surrounding the offence and maybe even forgive the offender.
8
 The 
community can learn from the conflict and make changes to prevent a similar 
occurrence in future. Reconciliation follows, achieved through a process of harmony. 
Rehabilitation or healing, takes place after the offender expresses remorse, is publicly 
shamed and then reintegrated into society.
9
 Thus, equilibrium is restored once it is 
understood the offender has paid their dues to the victim and community. In ancient 
processes, victim‟s dues did not need to be in tangible form and could be symbolic: a 
demonstration of the offender‟s guilt through public ridicule; harm or other 
punishment could be publicly imposed. Michalowski describes this as „ritual 
satisfaction‟.10  
A much earlier and persuasive analysis of traditional justice was provided by 
the African jurist T.O Elias, on the difference between aims of the two models. Elias 
argued that African law tried to achieve equilibrium by repairing all breaches that 
disturb society. In his view, this orientation was consistent with Jeremy Bentham‟s 
utilitarian philosophy of the „greatest happiness for the greatest number.‟11 However, 
Elias saw an important difference in approach, in that African law strives to reconcile 
disputants, whereas English law limits itself to resolving the conflict: stopping at the 
apportionment of blame. For that reason, to avoid feuds that may unravel social order, 
the ceremonial reconciliation of parties followed payment of fines. Restoration of the 
parties to the status quo ante was the focus of this „judicial‟ process, so no property 
could be left with the one who did not legitimately own it.
12
 I agree with Elias, and 
make the standard point here that highly inter-dependent societies such as the clan 
will tend to prefer modes of justice aimed at reconciliation rather than blame, narrow 
conflict resolution and punishment. Accommodating such traditional modes of justice 
is arguably the most appropriate procedural approach for crimes of an international 
nature, because it gives communities a sense of participation and ownership; and 
achieves procedural legitimacy based on local culture.  
The main distinction between the two models, is the role (or absence) of 
procedural rules. In the international model, a judge adheres to strict rules of evidence 
                                                 
8
 D. Nsereko op cit (1992) 23. 
9
 O. Elechi op cit 19, 26-29. 
10
 R. Michalowski, Order, Law and Crime (1985) cited in Elechi ibid, 19. 
11
 T. Elias op cit 268-272. He identifies a similar trend of thought in Kant‟s definition of law in which 
the arbitrary will of an individual may be combined with that of another under a broader law of 
freedom and Roscoe Pound‟s regulation of conflicting claims in an effort to realise social justice. 
12
 Ibid, 271. 
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and procedure. By contrast, there is no emphasis on use of rules as a basis of 
resolving conflicts in the traditional model.
13
 In fact, traditional procedures have been 
described as informal and „flexible‟ because of both the absence of the burden of 
proof and the presence of „irrational‟ modes of proof and decision making.14 Dlamini 
describes how these „flexible‟ yet informal rules worked. Informality was inherent in 
the way the litigants were allowed to present their case and adduce evidence; and also 
in the role of the court. When presenting a case, a litigant was given great latitude to 
testify and even say things that may be irrelevant but may later turn out to be 
important. Such a flexible process instilled confidence in all parties and witnesses 
about the decision, which is essential for social stability.
15
 The proceedings were also 
in the local language.  
Historically, decision making included use of „precedent‟ to make oral 
jurisprudence. Elias suggests that precedent in pre-colonial Africa was applied more 
in deference to the authority of the elders and less as binding precedent.
16
 This is 
because there was no written jurisprudence, instead the elders or old chiefs were the 
repositories of folk lore and oral jurisprudence.
17
 This flexible character of law made 
it necessary for elders to refer to cases decided by themselves and their predecessors 
in much the same manner as modern precedent, though they did not regard 
themselves as under an obligation to follow precedent.
18
  
The judgement and sentence, arrived at by consensus, was pronounced 
publicly by senior elders or a chief. Both judgement and sentence were based on 
prevailing norms of the society. Norms and „folk wisdom‟ were reiterated in speeches 
by the elders or chiefs.
19
 The ratio decidendi was always in the socio-cultural context 
using a pragmatic approach to justice as „conceived and accepted in the society‟, of 
                                                 
13
 Penal Reform International, Traditional and Informal Justice Systems and Access to Justice in Sub-
Saharan Africa, (London: Penal Reform International, 2000), Chapter 8 123-124, available at 
http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/SSAJ4.pdf visited on 27/04/2007. 
14
 J. Van Velsen, „Procedural Information, Reconciliation and False Comparisons‟  in M. Gluckman 
(ed.) Ideas and procedures in African Customary Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969) 139-
143 and 22-37- introduction. 
15
 C. R. M Dlamini, „The role of customary Law in meeting social needs‟ (1991) Acta Juridica 71-85, 
83-34. 
16
 T. Elias op cit 257-8. 
17
 The elders are repositories of tradition and moral beliefs that contribute to unification of the 
community: P. Ikuenobe, „Moral Education and Moral Reasoning in Traditional African Cultures‟ 
(1998) 32 (1) Journal of Value Inquiry 25-42, 28.  
18
 T. Elias op cit 256-258. 
19
 Ibid, 249, 271-272.  
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which the judges were a part.
20
 Clearly then, this form of justice in traditional 
societies did not depend on the state, but on the social structures within the 
community.  
Accordingly, traditional restorative justice reflects a conflation of reparative 
and transformative concepts applied through collective decision making. As this 
thesis will demonstrate, these traditional modes of decision making still apply in 
contemporary Africa. Though traditional restorative justice is mooted as non-
adversarial, its philosophical underpinnings overlap somewhat with retributive aims. I 
explore this in the next sub section. 
 
 (ii)Restorative Philosophical underpinnings 
 
Concepts of reparation and transformation are strong within traditional 
restorative justice, based on what Elechi calls an „African philosophy of justice.‟21 
Here, I discuss only those philosophical issues that are relevant to the outstanding 
problems identified earlier,
22
 which relate to the international sentencing process. In 




African religions are central to people‟s lives, with each community having its 
own system of beliefs and practices manifested in every day activities, including the 
social and political.
24
 Culture is synonymous with religion and the line between the 
spiritual and sacred is thin. Consequently, belief in mystical power expressed through 
magic that could be used for good or evil, is an intrinsic part of African religion.
25
 
Historically, traditional law was used to punish crimes that were anti social-those 
involving the illegitimate use of magic and supernatural forces like witchcraft.
26
 This 
is because it was believed that witchcraft destroyed the fabric of society by creating 
disharmony and fear. Since its operations use magic, it was felt that witchcraft could 
                                                 
20
 Ibid, 259.  
21
 O. Elechi op cit 30-36. 
22
 Firstly, traditional communities view mysticism as part of the sentencing process. Secondly, 
international procedural regimes may fail to gain acceptance at the domestic level if they neglect issues 
of the supernatural and rituals that are part of the traditional sentencing process: Ch. 1 S. 1op cit. 
23
 O. Elechi op cit gives an excellent review of these philosophies at 30-36. 
24
 J. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy (London: Heinemann Educational books Ltd, 1970) at 9. 
O. Elechi ibid 30-31. 
25
 O. Elechi ibid, at 31-32 citing Gyekeye, 1996 at 4. 
26
 J. Driberg (1928) (1934) op cit and F. Burke op cit 64. 
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not be punishable by compensation like with ordinary offences. Therefore an extreme 
punishment like death was meted out on the offender.
27
 Hence, retributive 
underpinnings buttressed with supernatural beliefs, underpinned some traditional 
punishments. For instance, Driberg‟s account of West Africa secret societies like the 




On spiritualism, Gluckman underscores the role of ritual beliefs and practices 
in determining legal responsibility.
29
 Compensation or reparation was only complete 
after sacrifice followed by a „ceremonial purge‟, without which both offender and his 
community were in danger of spiritual retribution.
30
 This ritual was regarded as 
inseparable from restitution because „reparation satisfies the living but without 
sacrifice and oblation the wrath of the gods is not appeased.‟31 The community 
included the dead called „ancestors‟ or gods, and the unborn children, all of whom in 
one way or another are related to the „world of nature.‟32  
Communal values accord to the philosophy that community interests 
supersede that of the individual. In this respect, an individual must consider the 
consequences of his or her action on the community at large. Gyeke identifies ethical 
communal values as including: sharing, interdependence, reciprocal obligation and 
social harmony.
33
 Reciprocal obligation imposes responsibilities on the individual. 
Where an individual fails to show sensitivity towards such responsibilities, the 
community may take steps to protect its integrity and in so doing, may abridge the 
individual‟s rights.34 Equally, the community may take responsibility for its 
member‟s wrong doing by paying the reparation. This situation arises in societies 
holding beliefs that if a serious crime is committed by an individual, ill luck will 
befall the whole community. As my empirical study shall show, these aspects of 
African philosophy of justice still hold today. Against this backdrop, I now discuss 
the notion of „rights‟ that underpin traditional participatory restorative justice. 
                                                 
27
 J. Driberg (1934) ibid 236. 
28
 Ibid, 237-238, note 1. 
29
 M. Gluckman, (ed.), Ideas and procedures in African Customary Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1969) 22-37. 
30
 J. Driberg (1934) op cit 328. To that end there is no statute of limitations.  
31
 J. Driberg op cit (1928) 69-70.  
32
 J. Mbiti op cit 70-73, O. Elechi op cit 34. 
33
 K. Gyekye, African Cultural Values: An Introduction, (Accra: Sankofa Publishing Co, 1996) 35; 
(1997) op cit 67. 
34
 Ibid (1997) 65-66. 
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 (iii) Communitarian values   
 
Restorative justice is sometimes defined by exploring the rights of the victim. 
The rights of society are satisfied, some contend, when the rights of individual 
victims within it are vindicated through restitution‟.35 Others argue that some 
individual rights exist alongside this, for instance, that there is a victim‟s right to an 
effective remedy, because the compensation is dealt with in the same forum. Thus, 
there is no need for the victim to bring civil proceedings.
36
 
I instead refer to „rights‟ of a communitarian nature that underpin the 
traditional participatory decision-making process as communitarian values. Based on 
communal values identified above by Gyeke, these „rights‟ comprise duty to kin, 
restitution, reconciliation and the role of ritual. The philosophical foundations for this 
notion of human rights is found in the African variant of humanism called Ubuntu
37
 
that finds expression in the principle of reconciliation and group rights.  
Reconciliation restores societal equilibrium through principles similar to the 
rules of natural justice. Here, the traditional court system functioned within a 
framework of law, religion, kinship and culture.
38
 Group rights according to M`baye, 
applied to societies where individuals were users of collective rights by virtue of 
belonging to a clan, family or ethnic group.
39
 The principles of group rights 
encompassed firstly, procedural rights, where all parties were given an opportunity to 
state their case under the equivalent of rules of natural justice. Secondly, the 
proceedings were open to the general public. Finally, because traditional proceedings 
were not a product of jurists, there was no legal representation.
40
 Elechi also observes 
                                                 
35
 D. Van Ness and H. Strong, Restoring Justice (Cincinnati, Ohio: Anderson Publishing Company, 
Cincinnati: Ohio, 1997)19.   
36
 O. Elechi op cit 66. 
37
 R. B Mqeke, „Customary law and Human Rights‟ (1996) 113 (2) South African Law Journal 364-
369. Ubuntu was defined by Justice Mokgoro in S v Makwanyane [1995] 3 SA 391 at 308 as 
„humaneness‟. It is derived from the expression „umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu‟ [a person is a person 
because of other people/ a person can only be a person through others]: A. M Anderson, Restorative 
Justice, the African philosophy of Ubuntu and the Diversion of Criminal prosecution at 9. For 
Anderson, Ubuntu is a crucial factor in the shaping of perceptions that influence social conduct, for 
instance in the decision making reached by consensus: 10- available at http://www.isrcl. 
org/Papers/Anderson.pdf,  visited on 14/10/08. 
38
 R. Mqeke op cit at 365, citing M. Gluckman, „Natural Justice in Africa‟ (1964) 9 Natural Law 
Forum 22-44. 
39
 Ibid at 365 citing K. M`baye „The African Concept of Law‟ in R. David (ed.), International 
Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law Vol. II Chapter 1 (1975), para 225 page 138 and para 257 page 
148.  
40
 Ibid, 366 – 367 citing examples from Cape Nguni group in South Africa. 
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that the African system was democratic, allowing participation of adults in decision 
making so that everyone had a right to express their mind on public questions.
41
 All 
these principles apply in contemporary clan courts. In summary, in human rights 
parlance, communitarian values integrate aspects of rights to a public hearing, oral 
expression and the right to be heard; alongside reconciliation, restitution, duty to kin 
and role of ritual.  
When juxtaposed against individual rights, we see that the notion of 
procedural rights is viewed differently from the international procedural paradigm. 
Bennet sets out the points of conflict between the two philosophies: individual rights 
versus community values, rights versus duties; principle of patriarchy versus freedom 
of thought or speech.
42
 This is a precise statement of the normative divergence 
between the two concepts of rights.  
Some argue that the African concept of human rights is the superior one. They 
reject the primacy of international human rights, insisting that Africa cannot 
implement human rights instruments conceived and drafted in a western 
individualised context, incapable of being applied in a communitarian setting.
43
 The 
real problem from a liberal perspective is that individuals cannot be protected from 
violations due to the absence of negative rights. Some like Seidman see no place for 
African customary law regarding it as incongruent with human rights notions.
44
 The 
rejection of customary law by scholars like Seidman seems to be linked to the failure 
of customary laws to adopt the individualist approach to human rights. Also scholars 
of the liberal tradition like Gerwith emphasise the main principles of human rights as 
autonomy, equality and protection of these values for the individual.
45
 This emphasis 
on the individual exclusively, runs contrary to communitarian values and excludes the 
community as rights holders and party to a criminal case. This is because an 
individual is part of an extended family that forms a clan. The clan collectively 
                                                 
41
 O. Elechi op cit 66-67 referring also to Sithole as cited in K Gyeke (1996) 153.  
42 T. W Bennet, „The Compatibility of African Customary Law and Human Rights‟ (1991) Acta 
Juridica 18-35 at 23 citing works by Donnelley (1982), Howard (1986), Mbaye (1982) and  Mojweku 
(1982): notes 40-43. Also J. B Ojwang, „Laying a Basis for Rights: Towards a Jurisprudence of 
Development‟ in G. R Woodman and A. O Obilade (eds.), African Law and Legal Theory (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, 1995) 369.  
43
 These authors are listed by R. E. Howard, „Group versus individual identity in the African Debate on 
Human Rights‟ in A. An_Naim and F. Deng (eds.), Human Rights in Africa: Cross cultural 
perspectives (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution 1990), note 2 at 159. The list includes 
among others J. Cobbah, J. Ki Zerbo and C. C. Mojekwu.  
44
 R. Seidman, „Law and Economic Development‟ (1996) 999 Wisconsin Law Review, at 1027, 1029.  
45
 A. Gerwith op cit 5, 27-30, Ch.1 61-63. However the language of his work is in universal terms. 
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protects its interests, so rights of an individual must be balanced always against 
interests of the group.
46
 Accordingly, although traditional law protects individuals, 
they appear to have no negative rights under it as a member of the community.
47 
 
Other authors, however, argue that communitarian rights do not go against the 
ethic of individual rights so as to deny individual autonomy and equality. For 
instance, philosophers like Murungi argue that communal „rights‟ are human rights 
but with no hierarchical superiority over individual rights and they implicate each 
other but are not mutually exclusive.
48
 I find Mirungi‟s arguments valid. Although 
they do not address the legal challenge of bridging the two opposing normative 
frameworks, such views do affirm the fact that communitarian values have a place for 
individual rights.  
There are concerns that traditional systems based on restorative justice, 
neglect procedural protection especially for suspects. Some argue that traditional 
systems may view procedural safeguards as a stumbling block to restorative 
outcomes.
49
 Additionally, restorative justice presumes a voluntary waiver of rights, 
namely the presumption of innocence and the right to remain silent. This is because 
the starting point is that the offender must acknowledge responsibility. Another 
weakness is the non existence of the right to legal representation.
50
  However, once 
we acknowledge the „punitive bite‟ of restorative justice we see the need for 
procedural safeguards
51
 to ensure fair sentencing outcomes. 
Another area of concern is the patriarchal nature of African society, meaning 
the traditional justice system is sometimes prejudicial to women and children. 
Patriarchy undermines the right to equality before the law because of the power 
imbalance in society.
52
  Zedner argues convincingly, that though reparation and 
                                                 
46
 N. Sudarkasa, „African and Afro-American Family Structure‟ in J. B Cole, Anthropology for the 
Nineties: Introductory Readings (revised edition) (New York: The Free Press, 1988) at 197. Also N. 
Sudarkasa (1980) op cit 44 discussed in Ch. 1S. 4 op cit.  
47
 H. P Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable diversity in Law, 2
nd
 Ed, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004) 72. In his definition, chthonic people are traditionalists who live in harmony 
with the earth. Africans, who practice traditional modes of justice, arguably fall in this category.  
48
 J. Murungi, „The Question Of An African Jurisprudence: Some Hermeneutic Reflections‟ in K. 
Wiredu (ed.), A Companion To African Philosophy, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Limited, 2004) 
524.  
49
 A. Skelton and M. Sekhonyane, „Human Rights and Restorative Justice‟ in G. Johnstone and D. Van 
Ness (eds.), (2007) op cit 581 citing G. Johnstone, Restorative Justice: Ideas, Values, Debates (2002). 
50
 Ibid, 583. 
51
 R. Young and C. Hoyle op cit 226. 
52
B. Tshehla, Traditional Justice in Practice: A Limpopo Case study (Pretoria: Institute for Security 
Studies, 2005) Chapter 3 discusses these outcomes of a male-only court hearing cases involving 
women victims. S. Razack, „What Is to Be Gained by Looking White People in the Eye: Culture, Race 
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retribution are both predicated on individual autonomy, they ignore effects of power, 
social control and inequality within communities.
53
 There are equally valid concerns 
about coercion on consent to participate because of power relations.
54
 For instance, 
among Bantu groups in Rwanda or Burundi, there is evidence of male domination of 
the public participatory decision making process. In the Rwandese Gacaca courts, 
elderly men participated in and presided over these courts usually to the total 
exclusion of active participation of women and children.
55
 In Burundi, to become a 
Umishigantahe and therefore sit on the Bashingantahe (court) one had to be a married 
man, undergo training, a rite of passage and receive the Intahe (sacred wooden stick 
symbolising the rule of fairness).
56
 These examples underscore the social construction 
of roles in traditional restorative justice, revealing scant evidence of equality before 
the law, much less of equal participation. 
In summary, the process by which the community participates in restorative 
justice is through communal values like reciprocal obligation toward each other (duty 
of kin), buttressed by religious and spiritual beliefs; but with elements of retributive 
justice. Though communitarianism has a place for individual rights, due to power 
inequality there are concerns about neglect of individual procedural safeguards. 
Accordingly, the international model will remain incompatible with traditional 
restorative justice for as long as their sentencing frameworks are based on these 
normatively divergent premises. Let us now investigate to what extent traditional 
participatory restorative justice may be accommodated at the international level.  
Section 3: Locating Participatory Restorative justice in the ICC procedural 
model  
 
This section examines the procedural mechanisms of the ICC to assess the 
extent to which its sentencing framework could accommodate traditional restorative 
features. Through a legal analysis, I show that the ICC is premised on the dominance 
                                                                                                                                                        
and Gender in Cases of Sexual Violence‟ (1994) 19 Signs: Feminism and the Law 894-923: 906-910 
and T. W Bennet, Human Rights and African Customary Law (Cape Town: Juta, 1999). 
53
 L. Zedner „Reparation and Retribution: Are They Reconcilable?‟ (1994) 57 (2) Modern Law Review 
228-250, 228, 248-249. 
54
A. Skelton and M. Sekhonyane op cit 585 citing H. Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime 
and Justice (1990). 
55
 Goldstein –Bolocan, „Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional Justice‟ (2004) Journal of 
Dispute Resolution 355 cited in K. P Apuuli, Unpublished Thesis (2006) op cit at 152 and Chapter 6 in 
which he gives a historical account of the pre-colonial institutional set up of the Gacaca.  
56
 T. Nahimana, „The Burundi Bashingantahe Institution‟ (2002) 8 (1) EAJPHR 111-120, 114-115. 
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of the inquisitorial-adversarial prosecutorial model, largely retributive philosophical 
underpinnings and protection of individual human rights during the trial. I start with a 
brief overview of the theoretical context in which the Rome Statute and its procedure 
is grounded.  
 
 (i) Theoretical basis – a sketch 
 
The theoretical basis and justification of international criminal law, is in 
paragraph 3 of the Preamble to the Rome Statute that recognises that grave crimes 
„threaten peace, security and wellbeing of the world.‟57 This paragraph sets out the 
nature of legal values to be protected by the community of nations that are parties to 
the ICC.
58
 These values include protection of individuals by punishing perpetrators of 
war crimes and breaches of the Geneva Conventions against civilians. International 
criminal law protects these legal values that belong primarily to the national legal 
order, by giving additional protection to human rights provisions.
59
 For that reason, 
international criminal law compensates for deficiencies in national criminal justice. 
Besides, international criminal jurisdiction is applied only where national jurisdictions 
cannot guarantee independent and adequate prosecution [and sentencing] of crimes 
under international law. This principle of complementarity applies to diminish tension 




(ii) The sentencing framework 
 
The Rome Statute sets up the structure of the ICC and the basis for its 
procedure but does not create substantive law.
61
 The sentencing procedure is set out 
overleaf:  
 
                                                 
57
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998. 
58
 O. Triffterer, „Preamble‟ in O. Triffterer (ed.) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article,(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verl. Ges, 1999) para 9-
10, page 9. 
59
 Ibid, paras 20-24, pages 26-28. 
60
 Ibid, paras 50-52, pages 36-37. Rome statute op cit paragraph 5, the Preamble and Article 17. R. 
Cryer, H. Friman, D. Robinson and E. Wilmshurst, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and 
Procedure (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007) give a comprehensive account of the 
principle of complementarity on how it supplements, not supplants national judicial systems: 127-147. 
61
 O. Triffterer op cit para 60, page 40. The procedural rules are in the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of the International Criminal Court (2000).  
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Article 76:  
 
1. „In the event of a conviction, the Trial Chamber shall consider the 
appropriate sentence to be imposed and shall take into account the evidence 
presented and submissions made during the trial that are relevant to the 
sentence. 
2. Except where article 65 applies and before the completion of the trial, the 
Trial Chamber may on its own motion and shall, at the request of the 
Prosecutor or the accused, hold a further hearing to hear any additional 
evidence or submissions relevant to the sentence, in accordance with the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence. 
3. Where paragraph 2 applies, any representations under article 75 shall be 
heard during the further hearing referred to in paragraph 2 and, if necessary, 
during any additional hearing. 
4. The sentence shall be pronounced in public and, wherever possible in the 
presence of the accused.‟ 
 
Some distinct features in Article 76 demonstrate the limits and opportunities 
of the ICC in accommodating a traditional participatory restorative process. Limits 
are apparent, firstly in Article 76 (1) where judicial discretion in considering the 
appropriate sentence is solely for the Trial Chamber. Article 76 (1) read together with 
Articles 74(4) and 78(1) demonstrate the extent of judicial discretion. Article 74 (4) 
as expounded in Rule 142 (1) provides that following the closing statements, the Trial 
Chamber retires to deliberate in camera (in secret) before notifying parties of the date 
on which the decision will be pronounced. Article 78 (1) provides that in determining 
the sentence, the Trial Chamber will consider relevant factors listed in Rule 145, like 
impact of the crime on the victim and their families, or attempts by the defendant to 
compensate the victims.
62
 Secondly, the Trial Chamber has the discretion to decide 
whether to hold a separate sentencing hearing under Article 76 (2) and (3) for any 
additional evidence, submissions or a hearing on reparations.  
Opportunities may be found in Article 76(3) and (Rule 143), under which a 
hearing on reparations may be held. Read together with Article 75 (3) and Rule 97(2), 
the Trial Chamber under Article 76(3) may at its discretion invite representations 
from convicted offenders, victims, interested persons and state representatives. 
Furthermore, under Article 76 (4) the sentencing decision must be pronounced in 
public and where possible, in the presence of the accused. Under Rule 144 (1), this 
means that all decisions of the Trial Chamber including sentencing decisions shall be 
pronounced in public in the presence of the offender, the Prosecutor, victims or their 
legal representatives, and state representatives.  
                                                 
62
 On appeal, the Appeals Chamber in Article 81 (2) (a) Rome Statute op cit may vary a 
disproportionate sentence, or revise a sentence where new evidence is available under Article 84 (1). 
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Collectively, these distinct features reveal a fundamental structural difference 
from the traditional restorative model discussed in the preceding section. This is the 
centralisation of sentencing powers in the judges - not a single article on sentencing 
lacks judicial oversight. Hence, sole judicial discretion in sentencing marks the point 
at which international and traditional frameworks contrast sharply. This structural 
difference arises from three theoretical premises on which the ICC procedural 
framework is built: dominant adversarial-inquisitorial procedural model; retributive 
philosophical underpinnings and a normative framework based on the protection of 
individual human rights. I will discuss each in turn.  
 
 (iii) Adversarial-inquisitorial procedural model 
 
The ICC was created by treaty - the Rome Statute - that established it as a 
permanent international criminal court to try war crimes.
63
 The ICC developed after 
the World War II trials, following intense protracted negotiations between states.
64 
Safferling notes that apart from a vague framework, the Rome Statute does not 
provide much guidance on sentencing procedure.
65
 This may be because the ICC 
„hybrid‟ procedural model is a conflation of two major legal traditions of common 
law and civil law. Parts of the trial such as the pre-trial phase (Articles 56-58) lean 
towards the inquisitorial model by giving the judges powers to conduct an inquiry. 
Overall though, the trial procedure leans more towards the common law dispute 
approach.
66
 This bias towards common law is to protect procedural equality of arms 
during the trial, a feature of the adversarial model.
67
  
                                                 
63
 Rome Statute adopted by the Assembly of State Parties at New York, 3-10 September 2002 ICC-
ASP/1/3 and came into force on 1
st
 July 2002. A comprehensive account of the evolution of the Rome 
Statute is given by M. C Bassiouni Introduction to International Criminal Law (Ardsley, N.Y: 
Transnational, 2003) 444-489.  
64
 Ch. 1 S. 2 (1) op cit and D. McGoldrick op cit 13-14.  
65
 C. Safferling op cit 314-318.  
66
A. Orie, „Accusatorial v. Inquisitorial approach in International Criminal Proceedings prior to the 
Establishment of the ICC‟ in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. Jones (eds.) The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court- A Commentary Vol. II (Oxford: OUP, 2002) accent the inroads were 
made by the civil law in the pre-trial stage: 1439-1495; A. Cassese, International Criminal Law 2
nd
 ed. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) 370,373-374; G. K Sluiter, „The Law Of International 
Criminal Procedural And Domestic War Crimes Trials‟ (2006) 6 (4) International Criminal Law 
Review 605-635, 610-611; G. MacCarrick, „The Right To A Fair Trial In International Criminal Law 
(Rules Of Procedure And Evidence In Transition From Nuremberg To East Timor)‟ 13-20 at 
www.islcl.org/Papers/2005/Maccarrick.pdf visited on 20/06/2008; K. Ambos, „International Criminal 
Procedure: “Adversarial” “Inquisitorial” or mixed?‟ (2003) 3 International Criminal Law Review 1-37, 
19-20 underscores the dominant role of the Trial Chamber, and G. K McDonald and O. S Goldman 
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The common law system is based on an adversarial prosecutorial model 
conducted as a dispute that engages two adversaries before a dispassionate decision 
maker (judge), who reaches a verdict.
68
 The state appropriates the conflict from the 
parties, so the prosecutor represents the state‟s interests. The model is based on 
presumption of innocence and equality of arms between the prosecutor and the 
defendant.
69
 Throughout the trial the defendant must be protected from the state by a 
shield of rights whose breach is severely punished.
70
  
The Inquisitorial model (civil law) is structured as an official inquiry in which 
a dossier is prepared by the prosecutor who gathers evidence with the help of the 
police. The accused is indicted and the evidence is presented to court.
71
 The judge 
plays a dominant role in conducting this criminal inquiry,
72
 by examining witnesses 
to find the truth and supplementing the information in the dossier where necessary. 
Unlike in the adversarial trial, the truth is sought actively by the judge. Since the state 
is meant to be theoretically neutral in the investigation and trial, there is assumed to 
be little need for defence attorney or live testimony. At the end of the trial, the 
prosecutor submits his or her views on the evidence, the guilt of the defendant and the 
proposed sentence. Determination of guilt and sentence is by the judge without any 
input from the ordinary citizens or defence lawyer.
73
  
The sentencing phase in international criminal courts is the phase during 
which common law and civil law principles strongly conflict each other.
74
 In the 
inquisitorial model, there is one act of conviction and sentencing where the 
judgement contains both a finding of guilt and sentence. In the adversarial model are 
two acts: the first is the making of a finding that is delivered in a verdict. The second 
act is the determination of sentence following consideration of pre-sentence reports.
75
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Vol. I op cit 479-545, 556: shows that the ICC has elements of both the adversarial and inquisitorial 
models. 
67
 C. Safferling op cit 268. 
68
 M. Damaska, The Faces Of Justice And State Authority: A Comparative Approach To The Legal 
Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986) 3. Also M. Damaska, „Structures of Authority and 
Comparative Criminal Procedure‟ (1975) 84 (3) Yale Law Journal 480-544, 541-543.  
69
 C. Safferling op cit, 221, 265. 
70
 R. Volger, A World View of Criminal Justice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) 130. 
71
 C. Safferling op cit 222. 
72
 M. Damaska, (1986) op cit 3 and M. Damaska, „Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models 
of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study‟ (1973) 121 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
506-589, 517, 555-560.  
73
 C. Safferling op cit 223 and C. M Bradley, „Overview‟ in C. M Bradley (ed.), Criminal Procedure: 
A World wide Study, (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1999) xv, xvi.  
74
 C. Safferling ibid 371. 
75
 M. Findlay and R. Henham (2005) op cit 183 -185. 
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Thus, there is a clear separation of the finding of guilt from the passing of sentence. 
This separation occurred because the finding of guilt was originally considered by the 
jury and then the judge would determine the punishment.
76
 However, the ICC model 
is a hybrid, so it has the option of a separate sentencing hearing.
77
 Crucially, the 




This wide judicial discretion can be traced to the Nuremberg Charter.
79
 Under 
Article 27, sentencing was at the discretion of the Tribunal and there were no 
sentencing hearings. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals appeared to have a wider 
degree of discretion in determining the penalty than the ICC.
80
 The Nuremberg 
Charter in Article 26, provided that the Tribunal would give reasons on which the 
judgment was based, that the judgment was final and not subject to review. Crucially, 
even where the judges disagreed on the culpability of the offenders or the quantum of 
sentence, these deliberations were done behind closed doors to preserve unanimity. 
Sentences could be varied by the Control Council but there was no appeal against 
conviction or sentence.
81
 This implies that decision making was left to the judges and 
was arguably, not participatory. 
 The main model for the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) is the 
judge-made RPE, drawn from the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia (ICTY)
82
 and adopted wholesale by the ad hoc International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
83
 The ICC RPE differs from that of the ad hoc 
tribunals, firstly because the ICC under Article 51 (1) leaves control of the rule 
                                                 
76
 C. Safferling op cit, 269. 
77
 R. Henham (2004) op cit 187-188. He cites scholars like Zappala who argue that the ICC model is 
unclear on whether there should be one decision or two, with a separate verdict and sentence.  
78 M. Bagaric and J. Morss, „International Sentencing Law: In search of a Justification and Coherent 
Framework‟ (2006) 6 (2) International Criminal Law Review 191-255, 205-207.  
79
 Nuremberg Charter adopted 29 October 1945; reproduced in V. Morris and M. P Scharf, An 
Insider’s guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Vol. 2 (Irving-on 
Hudson, New York: Transnational Publishers, 1995) 687-691. 
80
 R. E Fife, „Part 7 on Penalties‟ in O. Triffterer (ed.) (1999) op cit 987-988. Penalties ranged from the 
death penalty, life imprisonment, and imprisonment to deprivation of property: note 11. 
81
 D. V Zyl Smit, „Punishment and Human Rights in International Criminal Justice‟ (2002) 2 (1) 
Human Rights Law Review 1-17 at 2 and D. McGoldrick op cit 18. Of the 19 convicted, 12 were 
sentenced to death, 3 were sentenced to life imprisonment and 4 to terms of imprisonment ranging 
from 10-20 years. The Tokyo Tribunal held in Japan has not been much publicised because it followed 
Nuremberg‟s path and was seen as less legitimate: L. Sadat, The ICC and the Transformation of 
International Law (Ardsley, New York: Transnational, 2002) 2. 
82
 UN Doc. IT/32/Rev.39 adopted on the 11
th
 February 1994, details in Chapter 4, infra.  
83
 UN Doc. IT/32/Rev.1 (1995) adopted on the 29
th
 June 1995, details in Chapter 4, infra. 
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making process in the hands of states.
84
 After the member states have adopted the 
rules, they become binding on the judges. This arose from the many changes made to 
the RPE of the ICTY and ICTR by the judges, giving rise for concern among state 
parties.
85
 Secondly, the ad hoc tribunals have applied their rules in practice, thus 
enabling (in their case) a more detailed assessment of which model (adversarial or 
inquisitorial) is to be preferred at the international level.
86
  
 The dominance of the adversarial-inquisitorial procedural model in international 
law can be explained as follows. Deciding on the procedural rules that regulate trial 
process is influenced by what courts believe to be the „proper‟ procedure for legal 
adjudication. Such beliefs are culturally determined with each legal system setting out 
its own set of normative standards to regulate the trial.
87
 G. Nice suggests that those 
in positions of power may want to have their national law dominate international 
courts perhaps for fear that if it did not, then some another system could do so for 
reasons that are „equally nationalistic‟.88 Such dominance of the common law-civil 
law legal traditions affects the legitimacy of international criminal procedure in the 
local context. This dominance, depicted in wide judicial discretion in sentencing, is 





-Negotiating history  
 
 The import of decisions taken during the preparatory process was that the Rome 
Statute must contain principles and rules that would ensure the highest standards of 
justice and due process. The task was left to the Preparatory Commission with the 
ILC Draft Statute (1994) as the basis of discussion. Still, difficulties emerged as 
                                                 
84
 M. C Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Court: Compilation of UN Documents and Draft ICC 
Statute before the Diplomatic Conference (Rome: No Peace without Justice, 1998) at 29. 
85
 D. McGoldrick op cit 44. Also D. Hunt, „The International Criminal Court: High Hopes, „Creative 
Ambiguity‟ And an Unfortunate Mistrust in International Judges‟ (2004) 2 (1) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 56-70 contends that such drafting of the procedural rules hinders judicial flexibility: 
62-63.  
86
 K. Ambos op cit 1-2. 
87
 G. MacCarrick op cit 13. 
88
 G. Nice, „Trials of Imperfection‟ (2001) 14 (2) Leiden Journal of International Law 383-397, 396. 
Nice refers to this normative domination as „cultural imperialism‟ that is expressed sometimes through 
the imposition of the English language in trials: 386-387.  
89
 As R. Cryer et al op cit at 123 point out, the absence of travaux preparatoires for the Rome Statute 
arose because of the informal preparatory meetings held sometimes in different countries. What exist 
are the accounts of those involved in the drafting and negotiation process on which I rely in this thesis. 
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delegates tried to include major criminal justice systems and considerable efforts 
were spent trying to reconcile common and civil law positions. France, for instance, 
prepared an alternative draft Statute that made discussions difficult as it was based 
solely on civil law.
90
 The Working Group on Procedural Matters nonetheless, 
consolidated proposals from different states in devising the present provisions on 
sentencing. 
 The upshot of these negotiations was that less attention was paid to the place of 
public engagement in decision making within the ICC sentencing framework. Rather, 
the focus during negotiations was on the question of capital punishment, omitting 
even setting objectives and standards for sentencing.
91
 Accordingly, the adaptation of 
Article 76 was perfunctory as the Preparatory Committee (Prep Com) dealt with it 
cursorily in 1996. Article 76 was not addressed by any of the Working Groups and 
was adopted in the Rome Statute intact.
92
  For example, Article 76 (1) derived from 
Article 46 (1) of the ILC Draft Statute:  
 
„(…) in the event of a conviction, the Trial Chamber shall hold a further 
hearing to hear any evidence relevant to sentence, to allow the Prosecutor and 





This wording was slightly modified in the final Article 76(1). The import is 
that determination of the appropriate sentence was left to the sole discretion of the 
Trial Chamber. Article 76 (2) also introduced the common law principle of a distinct 




 In a related context, the drafting in Article 74(4) on secrecy of deliberations 
predates World War II where under Article 41 of the 1926 Bellot draft, the 
                                                 
90
 S. A. F de Gurmendi, „Part 1: The Process of Negotiations‟ Chapter 8 in R. S Lee (ed.), The 
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations and Results, (The 
Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer International, 2002) 221-223.  
91
 R. Henham, „Some Issues for Sentencing in the International Criminal Court‟ (2003) 52 (1) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 81-114, 85. Also C. K. Hall, „The Fifth Session of the 
UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court‟ (1998) 92 (2) 
American Journal of International Law 331-339. 
92
 W. A Schabas, „Article 76- Sentencing‟ in O. Triffterer (ed.) (1999) op cit 979 commenting on the 
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
UNGAOR 51
st
 Sess., Supp No. 10 UN Doc. A/51/10, Vol. I, p. 46 and Vol. II p. 226; also Report of 
the Working Group on Procedural Matters, U.N Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.2/Add.2 (4 July) p. 
5.  
93
 Report of the International Law Commission (1994), Commentary on Article 46 op cit para.1 at 123. 
94
 It has been noted that the section envisages a two stage approach, even if this is not made explicit: 
W. Schabas in O. Triffterer (ed.) op cit, para 3, p. 980. 
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deliberations: „shall take place in private and remain secret‟. There appears to have 
been no debate on this provision. Apart from removing the words „shall take place in 
private‟, Article 74 (4) remains substantially the same as the 1926 Bellot draft. The 
drafters also intended that deliberations (including sentence) remain informal, but the 
judges must be present and take part in the decisive part of the deliberations and 
voting.
95
 Secrecy means the confidentiality of all arguments expressed during 
deliberations by judges, unless they agree to include the arguments in the reasoned 
judgement.
96
 The outcome is that from a traditional perspective, Article 76 is a 
product of common law principles that focus on a dispute between the two parties 
only with judges as sole arbitrators. 
 That is not to say there was no consideration of sentencing aspects that are 
„African‟. The sentencing hearing under Article 76 (3) may potentially become a 
„reparations hearing‟.97 As such, the court may invite representations from or on 
behalf of the convicted person, victims and other interested persons or states under 
Article 75 (3). During the deliberations, one of the contentious issues was whether the 
court should make a decision on the locus standi of persons other than direct victims 
to pursue claims for reparations.
98
 The Report of the Working Group on Procedural 
Matters noted that locus standi under Article 75 (3) could include the victim‟s family 
and successors as well as the victim.
99
 To Donat-Cattin, interested persons also 
include bona fide third parties, like owners of property formerly belonging to victims 
and the convicted person. He infers this from a combined reading of Article 75 (3) 
and Article 76(3),
100
 to which I subscribe. The provisions appear to incorporate the 
traditional notion of participatory decision making, but on closer scrutiny this is not 
so. Participation under Article 75 (3) was intended to be at the discretion of the court. 
The use of the words „court may invite‟ means that the court‟s discretion reduces the 
victim‟s intervention to a „mere faculty‟ to make representations at the invitation of 
the court.
101
 More so, discussions by the Prep Com show that the drafters intended 
                                                 
95
 O. Triffterer, „Requirements for the decision‟ in O. Triffterer (ed.) (1999) op cit para 1 pp. 953-4 n 1, 
para 10 at 958.  
96
 Ibid, 963. 
97
 D. Donat-Cattin, „Article 75: Reparation to Victims‟ in O. Triffterer (ed.) (1999) op cit para 19 page 
974.  
98
 C. Muttukumaru, „Part V: Reparation to Victims‟, Chapter 8 in R. S. Lee (ed.) op cit (2002) 263-
264.  
99
 A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/1.2/Add.7,13 July 1998. 
100
 Donnat-Cattin op cit, para 19 page 974.  
101
 ICC Draft Statute op cit margin No. 38 et seq ; Cattin, ibid, para 18, page 973.  
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victims to participate only in the „open‟ procedures of the Court.102 This arguably 
underscores wide judicial control over the sentencing phase where the deliberation of 
sentence is done by the Trial Chamber in camera.   
The procedure for obtaining remedies under Article 75 was not intended to 
replicate the traditional system where reparation is „automatic‟. In fact, the 
negotiations on Article 75 were largely driven by France and the United Kingdom 
(UK).
103
 France‟s draft for example, was based on individual victims being able to 
rely on the ICC judgements to pursue civil remedies of restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation in their nation courts under national law. 
104
 In the final text of Article 
75 (1) (2) (and Rule 97), the determination of the award remained in the hands of the 
court. In sum, Article 75 applies common law and civil law principles, where the 
victim‟s right to remedy must be applied for in a court of law, unlike traditional 
restorative justice where it is dealt with in the same forum.  
 Another „African‟ feature is the public pronouncement of sentence under Article 
76(4). The ILC Draft Statute contained no references to this, but the first proposals 
emerged during the 1996 sessions of the Prep Com. The Working Group on 
Procedural Matters later adopted the final text that intended that the accused be 
present during pronouncement of sentence.
105
 Read jointly with Article 74(5), the 
mode of delivery is in open court and reasons for every part of the decision or 
summary must be given. The origin of Article 74(5) is the 1926 Bello draft, in which 
a well reasoned judgement had to be read in open court. This provision was later 
modified and put in the Rome Statute.
106
 In sum, the text of Articles 76(4) and 74(5) 
bears some similarity to traditional process discussed above in Section 2, where 
judgement and sentence are pronounced in public and reasons given for the decision. 
 To conclude, preoccupation with reconciling common law and civil law 
positions, left little room for accommodating non state adjudication systems. Giving 
judges sole discretion over the sentencing phase, including determination of sentence 
                                                 
102
 Ibid, para 23, p. 880. ICC Draft Statute op cit note 16.  
103
 France and the UK‟s consolidated text of Article 75 were very influential: 
A/AC.249/1998/WG.4/DP.19. Democratic Republic of Congo was one of the African states on record 
to have submitted a textual proposal for the amendment of the article on reparations: U.N Doc. 
A/AC.249/1998/WG.4/DP.38 (27 March 1998). Other countries like Denmark, Sweden and Norway 
also put forth suggestions for reparation: C. K Hall op cit, at 338. 
104
 C. Muttukumaru op cit 265-266, 270. 
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 W. A Schabas, „Sentencing‟ in O. Triffterer (ed.) (1999) op cit at para 11 page 983. 
106
 O. Triffterer, „Requirements for decision‟ in O. Triffterer ibid paras 1-5 pp. 954-956. 
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therefore has broader implications in the context of participatory restorative justice. I 
now turn to the second premise on which the sentencing procedure is grounded.  
 
 (iv) Retributive philosophical foundations  
 
The philosophical foundations of the sentencing framework in the Rome 
Statute are difficult to discern in the absence of any provision setting out the purposes 
and principles that ought to guide the ICC judges.
107
 This is compounded by lack of a 
sentencing policy evidenced by the absence of sentencing guidelines to guide the 
application of human rights norms. The ICC statute and RPE Part III, for instance, are 
silent on the manner in which legal rules and procedures might provide guidance 
towards the achievement of a communitarian philosophy of punishment. This has led 
some to argue that the sentencing structure in the ICC is rendered legitimate by an 




The Preamble to the Rome Statute refers „vaguely‟ to retribution, deterrence 
and expressivism but does not state how these objectives could be actualised in the 
judgments.
109
 Yet explicit penal objectives would have helped in the process of 
structuring, imposing and implementing sentences.
110
 The purpose of sentencing, may 
however be gleaned from statements made by the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes 
tribunals that suggest that retribution is the main objective of such prosecutions.
111
 
Moreover, there is some confusion as to the scope and meaning of penal justifications 
in sentencing by the ad hoc international tribunals. For example, as Henham points 
out, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Erdemovic failed to define the purpose and explore 
the meaning of deterrence within the trial context.
112
  
                                                 
107
 R. Henham, „Some issues for Sentencing‟ (2003) op cit, 81, 85-86. This point is made by S. 
Beresford, „Unshackling the Paper Tiger: The Sentencing Practices of the Ad Hoc International 
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda‟ (2001) 1 International Criminal Law 
Review 33-90, 40-46. 
108
 R. Henham, „The Philosophical Foundations of International Sentencing‟ (2003) op cit 74-75.  
109
 M. Drumbl op cit at 52 and Chapter 6 explores what he calls the 3 central objectives of international 
punishment.   
110
 D. Smit, (2002) op cit 15. 
111
 R. Henham, „Some issues for Sentencing‟ (2003) op cit 85-86.  
112
 Prosecutor v Erdemovic (Case No.IT-96-22-T) Sentencing Judgment: 29 November 1996. R. 
Henham ibid 87-88, also gives the example of Prosecutor v G. A. N. Rutaganda (ICTR-96-3-T) where 
absence of principles led to unclear sentencing outcomes. For an in depth critique of the „lenient‟ 
sentences handed down by the ICTY see M. Harmon and F. Gaynor, „Ordinary Sentences for 
Extraordinary Crimes‟ (2007) 5 (3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 683-712. 
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Expressivism is a modern theory of denunciation delivered in form of judicial 
pronouncement. Under expressivism, criminal procedures and punishment are an 
opportunity for communicating with offender, victim and society the nature of the 
wrong; the objective being to engage offenders and help them to understand the 
wrong in their actions.
113
 The relevance of this educative function was stated by the 
ICTY in Kordic and Cerkez and accepted by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Krstic.
114
 
Expressivism resonates with the traditional restorative process, where norms and 
„folk wisdom‟ are reiterated by the elders or chiefs in their speeches.  
Other objectives like rehabilitation and reconciliation remain inconsistently 
applied by international tribunals.
115
 Tribunals for instance, are concerned that if 
given prominence, rehabilitation could violate the principle of proportionality and 
endanger other purposes of sentencing.
116
 Rehabilitation includes a guilty plea and 
coming face-to-face with the victims in the hope that this act may prevent the 
likelihood of the offender committing such atrocities again.
117
 Reconciliation, a key 
objective of the ICTY and ICTR, is usually invoked as a penal objective, but not put 
into effect in sentencing.
118
  
One criticism of the Rome Statute and its (RPE) - Section III, is that despite 
having provisions for restorative justice, problems remain in the definition of 
restorative justice and conceptualising the connection between rehabilitation and 
reconciliation.
119
 While I agree with these criticisms, I see the main problem as lack 
of engagement with traditional participatory restorative processes by drawing on 
similarities while mitigating divergence. Following from the analysis in Section 2, 
though largely retributive, international penal objectives including those 
inconsistently applied like reconciliation and rehabilitation; bear some similarity to 
traditional restorative objectives. What do not exist, are provisions in the international 
                                                 
113
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114
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sentencing framework for rituals that mark reconciliation (and rehabilitation) of the 
individual such as the Mato Oput described in Chapter 1. 
International criminal procedure does not encourage open public deliberations 
of sentence. Such lack of communal decision making is evident in Article 74(4) and 
Rule 142 where the judges deliberate on sentence in secret. This means that the 
justifications for punishment arguably do not need to go beyond limits imposed by 
philosophies of limited retribution and deterrence.
120
 Ultimately the procedure fails to 
take into consideration the contextual reality that the process of punishment could 
address, namely engaging with victim communities.
121
 Therefore, although the 
Statute and RPE provide for reparatory sentencing hearings in Article 76(3), the 
process by which reparative orders are arrived at remains in the sole control of the 
judge. The emphasis on retribution can be traced to negotiating history of the Statute.  
 
-Negotiating history  
 
In sub section (iii) above, we saw that the focus during negotiations was on 
capital punishment illustrated in the intense debates in the Prep Com on different 
national penal sanctions and their penal functions.
122
 This diversity of opinion 
mirrored the one that took place in the ILC on imprisonment.
123
 Eventually, as Fife 
explains, consensus emerged for a single provision in Article 77 on imprisonment (as 
the main penalty) aimed to give flexibility to judges in sentencing, consistent with the 
principle of legality.
124
 The upshot of these negotiations was that less attention was 
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paid to setting penal objectives and standards for sentencing. This does not mean 
there were no penalties that were „African‟.  
During negotiations there were disagreements over whether the right to 
reparations should prevail but it later became clear to delegates that victims had an 
interest in restorative justice in the form of compensation or restitution. According to 
Muttukumaru, it was hoped that reparation could contribute to reconciliation at the 
individual level and facilitate restoration of society. Even the merits of using 
reparation to pay for rehabilitation were discussed.
125
 In the final text, Article 75 (1) 
and (2) allowed judges to deploy a range of remedies. These remedies, however, did 
not include traditional forms of punishment like „ritualistic satisfaction‟ or any form 
of reconciliatory rituals. This arose from reliance on the influential texts by France 
and the UK that as we have seen, gave modern reparative justice perspectives. Non 
state indigenous philosophies of justice were not considered because the debates were 
focused on national penalties, particularly imprisonment. I now turn to the third 
premise of individual human rights protection.  
 
 (v) Human rights underpinnings  
 
We saw in the previous chapter, that the ICC normative sentencing framework 
is premised on protection of rights of the accused person. In this subsection, I show 
that victims only have „participatory rights‟. A communitarian notion of rights where 
the community are equally rights holders on behalf of their kin is excluded. This pre-
occupation with the individual accused‟s rights can be traced to the focus on 
substantive sentence; the replication of Article 14 ICCPR rights during the 
negotiations; and the evolution of due process guarantees.  
Some argue that the debate around standard setting in restorative justice needs 
to be widened to include communitarian interests.
126
 Nonetheless, the inclusion of a 
participatory restorative approach needs to be located within the broader question of 
how to meld the traditional with the international by drawing on procedural rights as a 
sort of normative bridge. This is important for, as Braithwaite maintains, the 
constraining values in restorative justice are procedural safeguards that take priority 
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when there is any sanction or violation of freedom.
127
 To deal with this question, we 
need to explore whether the ICC could apply international human rights standards (as 
obligated under Article 21(3)) to ensure that the sentence is arrived at through a 
procedure that is perceived as fair in a culturally diverse context.  
To start with, human rights issues have traditionally revolved round the 
substantive sentence itself. I contend that the lack of explicit procedural guarantees in 
Article 76 may be attributed to an emphasis on the philosophical notion that penalties 
should be limited by human rights guaranteed in the international instruments. As 
Smit rightly puts it, human rights concerns focus on determining what sentence would 
be regarded as compatible with human rights standards.
128
 The concerns are also 
about the enforcement of sentence to ensure due process principles are complied with, 
to protect the prisoner‟s rights.129 A handful of academics have grappled with the 
problem of rights in international sentencing procedure and I will draw on their work 
throughout the thesis.  
Henham, for example, describes the incorporation of human rights into rules 
and procedures of international criminal courts as „symbolic‟, because of the 
pervasiveness of retribution in international penal law. He then identifies gaps in 
procedural rights protection, for instance during the deliberation and pronouncement 
of sentence: like the right to be informed of the charges and the right to language of 
choice; all of which, he argues, ought to extend to separate sentencing hearings. There 
is no obligation on the ICC to give an account of the process by which the 
deliberations held in secret are arrived at. For Henham, the absence of a mandatory 
procedure for transparency in sentence decision-making, stems from systemic 
weaknesses that render procedural safeguards more „apparent than real‟ because there 
is no need for them to be otherwise. Henham rightly points out that there is a danger 
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of a purely individualistic approach to rights which arises in the context of a „mono‟ 
phase of sentencing where the presentation of evidence is not well regulated.
130
  
 Zappala argues for a policy based inclusion of rights for the defendant during 
sentencing.
131
 He favours the extension of human rights provisions on due process 
into international criminal proceedings, despite the ambiguity in the ICC sentencing 
phases concerning whether it embodies a one or two phase approach. Zappala argues 
that the right to give evidence protects the rights of the defendant better, particularly 
in a two stage sentencing process. Accused persons are able to present their evidence, 
knowing they have been convicted for well specified reasons and can effectively 
plead in mitigation.
132
 Zappala then focuses his excellent discussion of the rights of 
convicted persons on such matters as the right to individualisation of sentence, the 
right to rehabilitation, and the problem of multiple and concurrent versus consecutive 
sentences.
133
 However, Zappala‟ proposed rights, are not yet recognised under 
international human rights law. In any case, they apply only to the individual accused 
person. 
The emphasis on individual protection of accused‟s rights134 is best 
understood through an examination of the scope of victim rights on which the ICC 
model is based. Under Article 68 (3), the court shall permit the victim‟s personal 
interests to be presented at any stage of the proceedings as deemed appropriate, in a 
manner not prejudicial to the accused person‟s rights and the fairness of the trial. 
Scholars like Bassiouni rightly point to the ambiguity in the Rome Statute where the 
term „participant‟ and „party‟ are used alternatively, yet they have different role 
implications. A „party‟ would have certain procedural rights by implication and a 
„participant‟ has only those rights specified in the statute. The victim participant 
would have no rights to present evidence, examine or cross-examine witnesses for 
either side. In his view, the statute‟s legislative history does not indicate that a victim 
                                                 
130
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was meant to be anything more than a participant.
135
 Bassiouni‟s analysis is borne out 
by the ICC jurisprudence.  
In its early jurisprudence, Pre-Trial Chamber 1 in Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo dealt with the issue of whether victims could participate in the 
investigation stage of a situation under Article 68 (3). Considering that the debate by 
the drafters surrounding the purpose of victims‟ participation took place in the milieu 
of growing emphasis on the role of victims under the international human rights 
law;
136
 the Chamber found that Article 68(3) is applicable during the investigation 
stage of a situation.
137
 In short, victims could take part in the investigation stage 
though only as participants, not parties with inherent procedural rights. This decision 
was followed by the Pre Trial Chamber II in the Situation in Uganda.
138
 
The Appeals Chamber later in Prosecutor v T. Lubanga Dyilo
139
 also 
emphasised that the rights to lead evidence on guilt and to challenge its admissibility 
or relevance, lies with the parties, Prosecutor and Defence, in Article 69(3). However, 
victims are not precluded from doing so. Article 69(3) does not give unfettered right 
to victims to lead or challenge evidence. Rather, victims must demonstrate why their 
interests are affected by the evidence (or issue) then the Trial Chamber decides 
whether or not to permit such participation. The Trial Chamber will, or, at least, 
should, exercise this power in such a way as to achieve consistency with the rights of 
the accused and a fair trial.
140
  
The following points emerge from the ICC jurisprudence. Some like 
Hemptinne and Rindi have argued that the early decisions demonstrate that the judges 
intend to exercise constant sole judicial control over implementation of the victim‟s 
right to participation.
141
 The judges, however, view this control as part of their duty to 
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determine the modalities of victim participation.
142
 Still, others like Findlay and 
Henham describe the victim‟s rights as merely symbolic.143 Henham also suggests 
that victim‟s rights will not be given serious consideration; rather they will be equated 
with the notion of retributive justice with little thought given to what might be 
appropriate under a restorative or reparative paradigm.
144
 I agree with these views. I 
surmise that the Rome Statute does not guarantee victim‟s participation to the full 
extent possible because the victim has no „rights‟ to intervene as and when they wish 
like in a traditional context. 
However, there are also valid concerns about victim‟s participation in 
sentencing. In some countries like England, the objection to victim‟s participation at 
the sentencing stage is because of a fear that their subjectivity may tip the scales 
heavily against the offender. Ashworth questions to what extent the victim‟s view 
should play a role in sentencing in adversarial trials, arguing that their participation in 
determining the sentence does not render the trial fair.
145
 Ashworth examines victim 
participation in the context of the ECHR that applies the principle of a fair hearing to 
the sentencing stage. In his view, permitting the victim or their family to decide 
sentencing outcome goes against the tenets of an independent and impartial tribunal. 
The victim, Ashworth argues, is not impartial and cannot know the sentencing options 
available. Moreover, the state has a duty of fairness to see that similarly situated 
offenders (in terms of culpability) are treated alike.
146
 Besides, it would be unfair if 
sentences on offenders varied according to whether a particular victim is forgiving or 
vengeful.
147
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Some like Skelton and Frank would agree, and point to the possibility of 
variation in outcomes because the process is victim driven, though they suggest that 
this can be managed through standards ensuring restriction of penalties.
148
 Others like 
Smit rightly warn against the dangers of a politically driven victim‟s movement that 
may urge the ICC to continue to detain prisoners. Still, Smit makes an important point 
that the engagement of victims allows for the introduction of restorative processes 
that were never envisaged before in the context of international imprisonment.
149
 
Victims, however, may well be more lenient than the public might imagine. Indeed in 
New Zealand there is evidence that victims tend to demand less harsh punishments 
than just desert theorists expect.
150
  
 In response, I would say that based on our discussion of traditional restorative 
justice in Section 2 above, Ashworth‟s arguments would not hold in an African 
setting. This is because he places too much weight on equality in only one sense (that 
similarly culpable offenders should suffer likewise) and insufficient weight on other 
values (such as victim participation). In the African context, as we have discussed, a 
higher value is given to communal deliberation, participation and reconciliation, than 
to a formal notion of equal sentences and impartial tribunal. The defendants and their 
kin deliberate the sentence as much as the victim and their family, so they are placed 
in an equal position (a different sense of „equality‟). This is the underlying principle 
of traditional participatory justice. The reason the victim participates actively, is 
because the traditional model is focussed on vindicating the victim and his or her 
rights.
151
 This is not the same, as say the giving of a victim impact statement that does 
not involve a discussion of sentence by the victim, as would happen in the context 
discussed by Ashworth.  
International trials also do not permit full participation of offenders in 
negotiating sentence, despite calls from some for offenders to have participative 
„rights‟ in a negotiated sentence.152 Scholars like Henham disagree with any 
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suggestion that an offender should have any participative „rights‟ in negotiated 
sentence process.
153
 This disagreement, arises from the fact that having pleaded guilty 
or been proven guilty of an offence, an offender loses participative „rights‟. My 
arguments above apply equally here: the offender in a traditional setting would still 
retain their participative „right‟ to contest or deliberate the sentence, all the while 
supported by their kin. The same applies to the victim, and my empirical study 
illustrates how this works in practice. The point here is that both instances exemplify 
the tensions between the international and traditional normative models.  
With regards to accommodating community interests, there are no provisions 
in the Rome Statute on communitarian values. The international model, as Henham 
convincingly puts it, seems to defeat the purpose of a separate sentencing hearing that 
could encourage judicial transparency through public perception and rational 
evaluation of evidence.
154
 Such public perception would arguably integrate a 
communitarian concept of rights. The absence of provisions on community interests 
is because a „due process‟ model, stresses adherence to court room procedure and 
protection of the individual.
155
 This protection, that denotes a preoccupation with 
individual rights of the accused, is best understood from an appraisal of the 
negotiating history of the Rome Statute. 
 
(a) Negotiating history  
 
The ILC in its commentaries on Article 46 (1) of the Draft Statute stated that 
„(…) the fundamental procedural guarantees inherent in a fair trial, notably the right 
to counsel, also extend to the sentencing hearing.‟ Since the debates on Article 76 
were perfunctory, the ILC commentary on procedural guarantees in sentencing 
hearings was not considered because of the delegates‟ pre-occupation with accused‟s 
rights during pre-trial and the trial itself.  
One example is Article 67 on rights of the accused, which was modelled on 
Article 14 ICCPR and the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals. The method of drafting was 
to adopt Article 14 ICCPR and enlarge some of the provisions.
156
 This work was done 
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by the informal working group at the August 1996 Prep Com session
157
 and addressed 
in detail by the Prep Com in August 1997.
158
 The 1997 draft was reproduced in the 
Zutphen compilation and the final Draft of the Prep Com with little modification.
159
 
Intense debates arose on issues like the precise meaning of „language‟ of choice due 
to the different legal definitions in common law and civil law.
160
 The debates were 
not about the needs of the different local communities, rather the preferences of 
dominant legal systems. Unsurprisingly, in the drafting of the ICC RPE, the focus 
was on balancing interests of witnesses with the rights of suspects and the accused- 
due in part to the fact that the draft texts from Australia, France and The American 
Bar Association swayed the discussion.
161
 
Reaching an agreement on the victim‟s participatory „right‟ under Article 68 
(3) was prompted by severe criticisms of the manner in which victims were handled 
by the ICTR.
162
 Hence, the delegates thought it was morally proper to grant victims 
this right to enable the Court be appraised of their sufferings.
163
 However, victims‟ 
participation is without prejudice to the defendant‟s right to a fair trial. As we saw 
previously, the procedural norms of the Rome Statute emphasise that victims have the 
„faculty‟ (not the right)‟ to make representations in pre-trial, reparations and appeal 
stages. For Donnat-Cattin, these norms embrace two concepts. The first is rights of 
the accused as set out in Article 67 and the second is a fair trial that includes rights for 
the defendant and victims. This concept he calls „equitable justice‟ which underpins 
all procedural norms of the Rome Statute.
164
 While I do not fault his reasoning, I 
maintain that the intention of the drafters, as I pointed out earlier, was to allow 
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participation only in open procedures of the court. It follows from a traditional 
perspective, that determination of sentence, done as it is in secret, lacks local 
procedural legitimacy and would not be perceived as „equitable‟ justice. I now trace 
the historical development of due process and international human rights standards in 
the next subsection. 
 
(b) Evolution of due process guarantees 
 
Human rights are a „cultural and value laden concept‟ that symbolises rights a 
person is entitled to for no other reason than their humanity. Human rights are about 
limited government, the relationship between people and their political authority.
165 
In 
a Hohfeldian sense, rights are justified claims or entitlements to the carrying out of 
duties positive or negative.
166
 So human rights evolve from two broad conceptions of 
negative and positive rights. 
Negative rights protect the individual from interference from the state and 
other individuals.
167
 For instance, the state should refrain from meddling with the 
impartial execution of administration of justice by the courts. Positive rights doctrine, 
argues that there is a right to positive acts by the state. This right is based on the 
assumption that it is partly the role of the state to have overall responsibility to ensure 
that society is properly structured. A subset of positive rights according to Alexy
168 
is 
protective rights: a right against the state that protects individuals from interference 
from third parties. Among these protective rights are procedural rights. One example 




The protective role of positive procedural rights is manifested in the origins of 
due process that lie in the English Magna Carta of 1215, wherein the sovereign 
decreed that no free man would be imprisoned or deprived of liberty „except by legal 
judgement of his peers and by the law of the land‟.170 The 17th and 18th century 
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reformist theories from the English, American and French revolutions combined a 
political philosophy of liberal individualism with the economic and social doctrine of 
laissez-faire in the search for human dignity.
171
 The ideology of the Enlightenment 
influenced the principles of due process now common to both adversarial and 
inquisitorial legal systems.
172
 Citizens‟ status changed to that of subjects (rather than 
objects) of government‟s powers and there were limits on the power the state could 
have over the liberty and security of the person.
173 
Some of the rights that 
accompanied the duty to respect the person were the right to silence, presumption of 
innocence, to be informed of charges and to prepare a defence.
174 
One of the 
distinctive features of the criminal process was respect for defendant‟s rights.175 
Protecting defendant‟s rights permeated through western societies till the world wars. 
The first international prosecution appears to have been that of Conradin von 
Hofenstafen who was tried for waging aggressive war in 1268.
176
 Later in 1474, Peter 
von Hagenbaach was tried under the first known international court comprising 28 
judges: representatives of the hanseatic cities, sitting at Breisach in Germany. His 
crimes included murder and rape for which he was convicted and beheaded.
177 
Centuries later, following World War I, the Treaty of Versailles was entered into in 
1919.
178
 Article 227 thereof created an international criminal tribunal, comprising 5 
judges- one from each of the victors, to try Kaiser Wilhelm II for initiating the war. 
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This trial never took place because the Kaiser fled to the Netherlands and the idea of 
prosecuting him was abandoned.
179
  
After World War II came the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, both created by 
statute following the Moscow Declaration of 1943.
180
 The Nuremberg Charter set out 
a procedure to ensure that defendants received a fair trial. This included the right to 
legal representation, the right to information of charges in a language of choice; the 
right to cross examine witnesses and the right to adduce evidence.
181
 The judges then 
incorporated due process principles into international law. For example, Judge 
Rutledge in the Tomoyuki Yamasita trial at Tokyo held that the conviction would rest 
on proven fact and a fair chance to defend.
182
 The Goering verdict of 1946 at 
Nuremberg started the development of international tribunals and set the high moral 
ground on which human rights was grounded.
183 
  
 However, there were questions of procedural fairness that arose. For instance, 
Article 12 permitted trials in absentia which negated the right to be heard and to 
prepare a defence.
184 
Also, defendants were denied a right to confront witnesses 
through use of ex parte affidavits; were denied permission to use hearsay evidence; 
had no right to judicial appeal; and there was no prohibition of ex post facto laws.
185
 
This has led Zappala to conclude that the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials did not meet 
contemporary standards of procedural fairness.
186
 Despite this, Nuremberg is 
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regarded as the „precedent‟ that developed international human rights law by holding 
individuals responsible for violations of international law.
187
  
As we saw in Chapter 1, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials led to the 
development of procedural rights in Article 14 ICCPR by redressing the inequality of 
arms between the accused and the prosecution.
188
 Bassiouni notes how in earlier 
inquisitorial systems, defence counsel had no right of audience before the court 
during the trial, but that the human rights instruments marked a deliberate shift 
towards the common law-adversarial procedures.189
 
Common law-adversarial 
procedure ensures equal rights of audience between the prosecution and the defence- 
which feature is replicated in other hybrid international criminal tribunals.
190
 What is 
common to all these international tribunals is the adoption of a universal protection of 
individual human rights
191
 expounded by due process guarantees and underpinned by 
principles of autonomy and equality.   
 
(c) Law applicable   
 
The universal application of human rights is expressed in Article 21 (3) of the 
Rome Statute. There, international human rights standards provide the test of 
consistency for the applicable law of the ICC which includes principles of national 
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laws under Article 21 (1) (c). The ICC may also refer to its own previous decisions 
under Article 21 (2).  
The negotiating history shows that there was accord among delegates that 
interpretation of law „must be consistent with internationally recognised human 
rights‟ under Article 21 (3).192 This provision was proposed by New Zealand and 
Samoa, and developed by Canada. Once again the emphasis was on protecting rights 
of the accused.
193
 This general consistency test that also prohibited adverse distinction 
on grounds like gender and culture, proved to be highly contentious. Some countries, 
most notably China, wanted to shorten the paragraph to remove the distinctions so it 
would read: „The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be 
consistent with internationally recognised human rights.‟ Due to strong resistance by 
other countries, the article remained as it is.
194
 
This universal application of human rights norms cannot be easily replicated 
in African crises because most countries are culturally diverse. For instance, Uganda, 
as we saw in Chapter 1, has legal pluralism wherein a society has its own type of 
„government‟, to which it relates and recognises as the legitimate political authority 
that enforces a system of social control. The procedural model of the ICC does not, 
however, recognise traditional forms of government or their criminal jurisdiction. 
Firstly, as we saw in sub-section (i) above, the Rome Statute deals with 
matters concerning the community of nation states only. Secondly, the negotiating 
history reflects the divergent opinions that emerged in the debate over the 
applicability of national laws in Article 21 (1). Some countries like China and Israel 
were emphatic that national law was directly applicable. Others were strongly of the 
view that national law should only be an indirect source. A compromise was proposed 
by Norway in which national laws would be applied „as appropriate‟.195 Still, as the 
International Court of Justice has clarified, the role of the international judge is to 
regard features of general principles (in national laws) as indicative of legitimate 
policy and principles, rather than seek to import those rules and institutions.
196
 Thus 
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the judges will apply principles underlying laws of the legal systems of the world.
197
 
In this thesis, I show that some national legal principles may prove difficult to apply. 
In Uganda, for instance, traditional clan laws were abolished by legislation, yet 
national courts are mandated by the constitution to apply norms and values „of the 
people‟ as ratione materiae. 
The application of discretionary use of precedent under Article 21(2) signifies 
the „soft‟ case law approach proposed by Singapore. This arose out of a compromise 
between the common law approach to court decisions as binding precedent, and the 
civil law approach where judicial pronouncements bind only parties before the 
court.
198
 Thus, the ICC has no equivalent to the common law principle of stare decisis 
and is not bound by its previous decisions. This soft case law approach could 
arguably help the ICC deal with legal dilemmas of the sort surmised above. 
To sum up, the procedural model of the ICC is a hybrid of the adversarial-
inquisitorial model that is based largely on retributive philosophical underpinnings. 
However, despite strong procedural safeguards for the defendant and participatory 
measures for victims, the protection of human rights in the sentencing phase is not as 
clear as the ILC suggests. More so, the international framework is not mandated to 
apply traditional restorative processes and penalties. Still, to ignore traditional 
approaches is in my view, to risk further lack of legitimatisation, evidenced by 
attempts to evade international criminal justice as illustrated in the Kony saga.
199
  
Section 4: Conclusion 
 
I have undertaken here a critical appraisal of legal factors that could influence 
reconciliation between the two normative frameworks. This analysis shows the lack 
of a theoretical framework within which international sentencing procedure could 
accommodate traditional African normative standards to achieve fair culturally 
appropriate sentencing outcomes. One reason is opposing procedural traditions. The 
ICC‟s sentencing framework comprises a judicially controlled sentencing process, 
largely retributive philosophical origins and a preponderance of protection of 
individual defendant‟s rights. This contrasts the „shared‟ traditional restorative 
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approach to decision making. Additionally, communitarian values conflict with 
notions of autonomy and equality inherent in Article 14 ICCPR. This incompatibility 
is exacerbated because the international sentencing framework has no provisions that 
take into account features of traditional justice as part of the sentencing process. Yet 
Article 76 has similarities with the traditional model in terms of hearing 
representations from the parties and „interested persons‟ during reparations hearings; 
and the public pronouncement of sentence. International criminal justice through its 
penal objectives, may also find common ground with local communities‟ de facto 
sentencing regimes.  Significantly, the divergence is compounded by the haphazard 
growth of international criminal procedure that has hindered progress of a „cross 
cultural‟ discourse. So the community are vulnerable in the absence of communal 
participation in the sentencing process because they cannot reconcile the parties and 
their families. As a consequence the society is not in equilibrium. This needs to be 
addressed. 
The importance of rights in criminal trials is their propensity to influence 
structure and procedure as a result of extending the human rights provisions on due 
process to international criminal proceedings.
200
 Yet this chapter shows that human 
rights are not perceived as a normative bridge between the ICC and traditional 
process. Accordingly, complications arise where the disputes involve subjects of 
different cultural backgrounds due to a concern that bringing together two conflicting 
legal systems in cultural proximity may come into conflict with human rights 
guarantees.
201
 What remains is to explore the debate in academic circles to see how 
academics and legal practitioners view the problem. Specifically, I am interested in 
whether and how they are looking outside the established system for ways to bring 
these conflicting legal systems in harmony with human rights guarantees. I pursue 
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CHAPTER THREE:  INTERNATIONAL SENTENCING AND 
TRADITIONAL JUSTICE  
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2, we saw that the international and traditional procedural paradigms 
are portrayed as polar opposites. Firstly, because the ICC has a retributive procedural 
framework while the traditional model has a restorative participatory process.  
Secondly, the ICC protects an individual notion of human rights, while the traditional 
model protects communitarian values.
1
 The findings expose the need to examine views 
on the manner in which international sentencing can be made relevant in the local 
context.  
In this Chapter, I examine competing arguments among African and 
international scholars to bring the traditional restorative process and international 
criminal justice in harmony with human rights guarantees. The debate fails to resolve 
the question of melding the two systems because most academic interest is focused on 
the weaknesses of the traditional model, particularly communitarian values where the 
normative gap in human rights protections seems more pronounced. In terms of what 
communitarian values can bring to international sentencing justice there is relatively 
little research. This is curious given the recent flurry of academic research into 
transitional justice in Africa, more so since sentencing is the phase where international 
and traditional procedural systems robustly conflict each other.  
Given that the place of human rights has been overlooked by both African and 
international scholarship, I propose a translation model as a new framework to 
reconceptualise the two approaches- a judge centred (international) procedural 
approach with a participatory (traditional) one- grounded in a liberal-communitarian 
theory of rights. M. Langer‟s study of translation provides invaluable ideas and insights 
into structural and doctrinal transformation of procedural law, some of which are 
adopted here.  
Following this introduction, the layout of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 
examines the arguments of African scholars, while Section 3 sets out arguments from 
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international voices and examines proposals for harmonisation. In Section 4, I set out 
arguments for an application of a liberal-communitarian theory of rights. I affirm my 
commitment to a translation model in Section 5, and offer a brief conclusion in Section 
6. 
 
Section 2: The search for consensus: African voices 
 
African scholars have challenged the superiority of the international procedural 
model, arguing that the modern (national) and African legal systems cannot co-exist: 
one system will be subordinate to the other.
2
 For example, H. Bisimba, using the 
examples of the Sungusungu and Ritongo in Tanzania, provides evidence that local 
systems can succeed only where the formal system fails.
3
 Recent work has moved 
towards an exploration of which system is superior to the other, based on the divergent 
normative standards.  
Nyaba for instance, condemns western intellectuals for ignoring the African 
traditional justice system and claiming it cannot change.
4
 Moreover, Nabudere 
contends, there is evidence that national legal systems (based on modern models) are 
incomprehensible to local communities. For Nabudere, formal systems of justice do not 
provide solutions that are appropriate to poor people living in „face to face 
communities.‟5 Instead, he proposes a new „humanist‟ paradigm to be informed by „the 
dethroning of the Eurocentric World view through which the Enlightenment had 
„dethroned earlier civilisations‟. This new paradigm can only happen if there is equality 
of all peoples and abolition of monopoly over private property. Nabudere argues that 
the „African Renaissance‟ spawning a new research agenda will be built on this new 
paradigm.
6
 In my view, while Nabudere‟s proposals move the debate further - by giving 
reasons for equality amongst cultures, normative systems and the possibility of cross 
fertilization of ideas - they fail to address the structural and doctrinal issues at stake in 
integration.  
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T. Nahimana‟s proposals for reform, based on an existing traditional justice 
process seem less radical and therefore perhaps more likely to succeed. Nahimana 
argues for the retention of established African legal systems like the Burundi 
Bashingantahe institution. First of all, he points out that the Bashingantahe is based on 
non-negotiable interests which are articulated to form human dignity called Ubuntu.
7
 
Then he argues that Ubuntu should be preserved and the Bashingantahe procedures 
modernised, since it is the interface between traditional and formal judicial process. 
This nexus exists because the Bashingantahe use Intahe - the „rule of fairness‟, 
governed by principles of equality, truth, and reconciliation. Fairness is ultimately 
achieved by public consultations and once a settlement proposal is accepted by both 
sides it becomes as „binding as a court decision‟.8 Nahimana‟s description is neither 
accompanied by a proposal on how the Bashingantahe procedures should be 
modernised, nor coupled with an analysis that points out its weaknesses. But at least the 
author identifies normative features on which the procedure is built. 
There are criticisms of Nahimana‟s type of arguments from A. Garapon.9 He 
argues that the „universalisation‟ test for international criminal justice is its capacity to 
visualise forms of justice other than the Western style trials. He is justifiably concerned 
about the „westernising‟ of tradition. Garapon gives the example of Ubuntu being 
westernised in translation, thereby maintaining an ambiguous culturalism that 
romanticises the African past. International criminal justice, he maintains, should work 
as „reinterpretation‟ of tradition, aimed at giving new meaning to ancient traditions. 
Favouring cosmopolitism, Garapon argues for the possibility of intercultural dialogue 
where the West allows itself to be transformed and learn from societies that are 
different instead of „neo-colonialism under the guise of morality.‟10  
I find that all these academic arguments are unable to accommodate the 
contemporary African criminal justice within the international procedural context. The 
task has been taken up by those operating outside the formal academy including policy-
oriented social scientists. For example, the 3 year Roco Wait I Acoli study, documents 
existing practices of traditional justice in Acoli, so as to provide an assessment of how 
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the rituals and ceremonies could be adapted to address war crimes. Their findings are 
important because they reveal the state of the community‟s social regulatory regime. 
For instance, the study establishes that Acoli culture is in decline and that clan and 
other traditional courts have been taken over by the state‟s local council courts.11  
Another example is the work of E. Baines: a political scientist whose 2 year 
research draws on the Roco Wat I Acoli report and illustrates the potential and 
limitations of procedures like Mato Oput.
12
 Baines posits that international human 
rights standards can be met, but that it would take „years of discussion‟ for traditional 
mechanisms to be regarded as legitimate from an international perspective. Her single 
most important contribution as a western author is an acknowledgement that 
spiritualism is a critical area of reconciliation and reconstruction of the lives of 
offenders, victim and the community.
13
  
Three comments may be made about this body of work. Firstly, the writers all 
look at the problem from the transitional justice aspect. In other words, they are seeking 
solutions for conflict in the short term, but are not looking for a long term solution to 
the problem of reconciling different normative systems. Yet, as Rose and Sekandi 
argue, the role of the ICC in healing puts it in a strong position to try cases on the 
African conflict.
14
 For that reason, taking traditional restorative justice into account is 
necessary if the ICC is to achieve domestic validity. Indeed, the danger of forceful 
transformation of African customary law is the stifling of progressive integration 
between the traditional and international models. Secondly, there is a dearth of 
literature on the role of legal doctrine as a tool in integrating procedural rules across 
systems. The assumption appears to be that the differences are irreconcilable since 
African jurisprudence is largely oral and presumably subjective. This trend of thought 
is evidenced by the fact that scholars describe the traditional model as „informal 
mechanisms‟ or „dispute resolution forums‟, thereby weakening any doctrinal 
significance of its jurisprudence. Traditional courts cannot be regarded as courts of 
record whose decisions could set a ratio decidendi on customary sentencing as 
                                                 
11
 Liu Institute, Roco Wat I Acoli, op cit 17-19. Their recommendation is for an independent Commission 
on reintegration and restoration to be set up to investigate further possibilities of adapting traditional 
justice ibid, 75. Other examples are T. Allen op cit an expert in Development studies and S. Finnstrom a 
cultural anthropologist: Living with Bad Surroundings: War and Existential Uncertainty in Acholiland, 
Northern Uganda Studies in Cultural Anthropology No. 35 (Uppsala: Uppsala University Press, 2003). 
12
E. Baines op cit 91,103-108. The Mato Oput restorative process is discussed in Ch.1 S.1 op cit. 
13
 Ibid, 114.  
14
 C. Rose and F. Sekandi, „The pursuit of transitional justice and African traditional values: a clash of 
civilisations-the case of Uganda‟ (2007)1 International Journal on Human Rights 101-125,119. 
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precedent for international courts. However, as Nabudere argues, the failure of the state 
has fostered the revival of traditional institutions.
15
 For that reason, I maintain that their 
juridical worth needs to be reassessed, and their potential to support international 
procedural frameworks re-examined. Thirdly, for one to show that a system can change, 
you need to identify its features that facilitate that change. This is mentioned briefly in 
Nahimana‟s description of the Intahe model of fairness where the focus is on shared 
features on which the international model could be built. 
Overall, I find that the divergence in the normative frameworks and procedural 
approaches between the international and traditional model unfortunately are not 
reconciled in any of the scholars‟ paradigms. The scholarship also reveals that there is 
need for some sort of merger between communitarian values and individual rights. This 
too is not sought. Rather, as we saw in Chapter 2, the discourse continues to present 
communitarian values as antithetical to individualistic procedural rights. F. Jjuuko 
accurately describes this impasse when he says that this is a dilemma of reconciling 
individual rights with collective rights and responsibilities.
16
  
My argument is that human rights are not viewed (but ought to be) as the 
linchpin by which these divergent normative frameworks can be reconciled. The only 
study which takes anything like this approach is by Hovil and Quinn in which, 
focussing on Acoli customs, they attempt to reconcile customary procedures generally 
with international procedural rights in Article 14 ICCPR.
17
 The report acknowledges 
potential difficulties in using traditional mechanisms to achieve justice, in particular 
where the procedural rules are „imprecise, unwritten, democratic, flexible, ad hoc and 
pluralistic‟.18 Nevertheless, not much attention is paid to whether such procedural 
„rules‟ could be strengthened to achieve appropriate justice based on fairness. Rather, 
the conclusions suggest that Acoli traditional practices meet the conditions of Article 
14 ICCPR.  The authors claim that the Acoli traditional system ensures among others: 
                                                 
15
 D. Nabudere op cit 27. 
16
 F. Jjuuko cited in Report of the Regional Conference on Post-Traditional Justice, EAJPHR (2002) op 
cit 125-126. 
17
 L. Hovil and J. R Quinn, Peace First, Justice Later: Traditional justice in Northern Uganda, Refugee 
Law Project Working Paper No.17 (July 2005) Para 6.3 pages 40-45. 
18
 Ibid, para 6.3 page 40, notes 160-162 where they draw on the work of R. K Abel (ed.), The Politics of 
Informal Justice Vol. 2 (New York: Academic Press, 1982) 2. 
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equality, protection against undue delay, presence at trial, right to confront witnesses, 
the language of choice and a guaranteed promotion of rehabilitation.
19
  
I find the evidence on which this conclusion is drawn far from satisfactory 
because it is based on an interview with only one person, an executive secretary of the 
traditional elders association called Kwer Kwaro Acoli. Additionally, these conclusions 
are not the product of a legal analysis of the interplay between communitarian values 
and individual rights between the two models. Rather, Hovil and Quinn merely look for 
similarities between the two. In doing so, they too fail to discuss the manner in which  
individual rights may be „abridged‟ by social responsibilities, or how spiritualism could 
override rational thought and therefore erode individual autonomy. 
 
Section 3: International voices-the universality of international criminal 
procedure 
 
International law apologists continue to have the dominant voice on the 
universality and (superiority) of international criminal procedure. For example David 
Crane, a former Prosecutor to the SCSL, opined that: 
 
„Though we cannot, nor would I even suggest otherwise, substitute customary 
approaches for our international criminal procedures, practitioners should still 
seek ways to ensure that the victims, … and populace have a sense that what is 
being done is just and to the extent it will mesh with custom and culture so much 
the better. In West Africa we did not want this to seem as white man’s justice, a 
charge that the indictees levelled at us from time to time.‟20 
 
Crane is one of the few western scholars who have voiced his concern about African 
procedures being part of international procedure. Some dominant voices like Richard 
Goldstone insist on the supremacy of international criminal law in punishing leaders 
and those in superior positions, for international crimes.
21
 Others like Schabas respond 
to Oko‟s criticisms that criminal prosecutions at international tribunals are a western 
intrusion in African accountability mechanisms. Oko insists that such prosecutions do 
                                                 
19
 Ibid, 42. The authors assert that Acoli practices meet other conditions of Article 14 (1) (2) (3) a-g, (5) 
ICCPR like the presumption of innocence, full disclosure of charges and accusations, adequate 
preparation time, and prohibition of self incrimination. 
20
 D. Crane, former prosecutor to the SCSL: Discussion Topic 12 “Whose Justice Anyway?” Grotian 
Moment Blog at http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial, 55-56, 10
th
 October 2005, visited on 12/10/2005. 
Emphasis is mine.  
21
 R. Goldstone, „The International Tribunal For The Former Yugoslavia: A Case Study In Security 
Council Action‟ (1995) 6 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 5-10, 8-10. Goldstone 
was former Chief prosecutor at the ICTY and ICTR.  
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not automatically translate into respect for human rights.
22
 In response, Schabas 
maintains that international legal obligations require prosecution and punishment of 
perpetrators of serious violations of human rights violations.
23
 Yet others are concerned 
with the lack of procedural guarantees in traditional courts for the offenders. As we saw 
in Chapter 1, Ugandan academic M. Senyonjo argues that Mato Oput is not an 
alternative to the ICC because it does not afford due process rights to the offender.
24
 
What‟s more, organisations like Amnesty International interpret Article 14(1) ICCPR 
as excluding the jurisdiction of traditional justice mechanisms (including clan courts). 




These interrelated positions adopted by international lawyers fail to address a 
central concern. This is that the international procedural system and its values are 
predicated on a predominance of modern normative systems – a hybridization of 
common law and civil law – that is alien to affected populations.26 By not considering 
what neo-traditional normative systems have to offer, these voices imply that 
international procedure is static and incapable of adopting other normative standards. I 
am fully aware of the distinctive problems posed for the individual, particularly the 
neglect of protection of due process in traditional restorative justice. Some of these 
problems are well covered in Chapter 2. The objectors‟ concerns, however, are much 
more likely to be addressed satisfactorily if we actually explored the potential for a 
blending of international and customary law through the translation process I advocate.  
The assumption of procedural superiority in the international normative and 
human rights framework has nonetheless resulted in an impasse that seems to have 
influenced academic discourses on international sentencing. For example, Safferling 
has strenuously argued that the two stages of sentencing procedure under common law 
should be adhered to. That way, procedural rights and interests are balanced. He refers 
to the protection of the defendant‟s right to privacy, the pre-emption of negative 
                                                 
22
 O. Oko, „Confronting Transgressions of Prior Military Regimes: Towards a More Pragmatic 
Approach‟ (2003) 11 Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 89-142, 99. Oko prefers 
truth and reconciliation commissions. 
23
 W. A. Schabas rejects Oko‟s arguments in „Conjoined Twins of Transitional Justice-The Sierra Leone 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court‟ (2004) 2 (4) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, 1082-1099, 1083. 
24
 M. Senyonjo (2007) op cit 64-65 referred to in Ch.1 S.1 op cit. 
25
Amnesty International (2008) op cit 19-20, criticising the June 2007 Agreement and its 2008 Annexure 
for attempting to use traditional justice to replace the criminal justice process: Chapter 1, S.1 op cit. 
26
 M. Drumbl op cit 128. 
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inferences about guilt, and the protection of the public.
27
 Such writings clearly do not 
envisage imports from any other procedural system. Yet some may argue that since the 
ICC is itself a hybrid procedural model, it ought to be accommodative to other 
normative standards.  
Some of the international literature has proposed that the ICC should defer to 
the traditional restorative justice model. Within the context of transitional justice, some 
like L. Keller propose a theoretical framework to guide the ICC in evaluating local 
alternatives applicable to any case that may involve a negotiated settlement in an 
ongoing conflict.
28
 She proposes that the ICC defer to local restorative justice systems 
because, in her view, Mato Oput is capable of achieving reconciliation and restitution 
on a local level.
29
 Others like J. Quinn urge that traditional institutions be promoted to 




From the foregoing discussion, even these „moderate‟ international scholars do 
not adequately address one important question. That is whether international criminal 
courts could draw lessons from local processes to make sentencing outcomes 
acceptable in the customary African context, without undermining something important 
about the status of international law. Countering the internationalist voices, a growing 
number of academics suggest that accommodating traditional justice norms may be 
more effective in achieving international procedural legitimacy. For example J. 
Cockayne argues that an ICC process that permits local procedural norms to factor into 
international trials might not only have increased chances of legitimacy in localised 
communities, but also play a significant role in developing comparative criminal 
procedural jurisprudence.
31
 I agree with Cockayne‟s view because it reflects the need to 
locate traditional restorative justice in both the ICC procedural model and the 
international human rights framework at a theoretical level. The merits of this are to 
enable the ICC to offer a dialogic encounter between victims, offenders and the 
                                                 
27
 C. Safferling op cit, 268-272; 371-372. 
28
 L. M Keller, „Achieving Peace with Justice: The International Criminal Court and Ugandan 
Alternative Justice Mechanisms‟ (2008) 23 Connecticut Journal of International Law 209-279, 211-212.  
29
 Ibid, 275-278. J. I Turner, „Nationalising International Criminal Law: The International Criminal Court 
as a Roving Mixed Court‟, (2005) 41 Stanford Journal of International Law 1-52 calls for a less 
hierarchical ICC that relies on national governments: a sort of „roving mixed court.‟  
30
 J. R Quinn, „Social Reconstruction in Uganda: the Role of Customary Mechanisms in Transitional 
Justice‟ (2007) Human Rights Review 389-407, 401-402. 
31
 J. Cockayne, “Report on the International Conference, From a Culture of Immunity to a culture of 
Accountability: International Criminal Tribunals” the International Court and Human Rights Protections, 
University of Utretcht, Dec. 2001 page 20, cited in R. Henham (2004) op cit  210. 
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community. This encounter would in turn promote a wider construct of procedural 
rights. This is only possible if procedural rights become a kind of normative bridge 
between the aims of international justice and the values of localized communities.  
So far there are three proposals. Apuuli‟s integrated transitional justice model 
proposes a combined use of the adversarial, inquisitorial and „popular justice‟ (Gacaca) 
systems. During the trial, rights of the accused, victim and „affected population‟ would 
be protected. The judgement would take into account victim‟s interests like awarding 
compensation. Apuuli suggests that rights of the population could include access to the 
proceedings.
32
 In my view, although this model addresses integration at a national and 
international level, it does not address two questions. These are: whether access to 
proceedings includes participatory „rights‟ for all parties during sentencing; and if so 
how human rights could be used as a normative bridge between Apuuli‟s „combined‟ 
procedural systems. 
The second proposal is by Findlay and Henham. They propose a retributive-
restorative justice ICC model, based on wider discretion for the judge who is crucial to 
trial transformation. Restorative justice, they argue, is conceived clearly in the ICC 
during the pre-trial and post trial stage in the form of participatory rights of the victim, 
their right to information, consultation and legal representation. Thus, integrating 
restorative justice involves more than just expanding the range of sentencing options to 
the judge, but transforming power and authority between parties.
33
 They view the trial 
as a model for inclusive aspirations of international criminal justice within a human 
rights framework, while acknowledging the challenge of combining restorative and 
retributive agendas.
34
 The authors caution that conflicting interests will worsen in such 
conflation of trial frameworks. For them:   
 
„The answer to this is not to degenerate the „rights basis‟ of the trial into some 
relativist confusion but rather to incorporate an expanded notion of individual 
and collective rights centrally within a new normative framework for 
international criminal trials which better accommodates both paradigms of 
international criminal justice.‟35 
 
Despite putting forth these arguments to prevent a slide towards „relativist 
confusion‟, the authors fall short of properly developing their concept of integrating an 
                                                 
32
 K. Apuuli, Unpublished Thesis (2006) op cit 205-206. 
33 M. Findlay and R. Henham op cit, 284-285 citing D. Van Ness „Restorative Justice: International 
trends‟ (1998 at 7).  
34
 Ibid, 306.  
35
 Ibid, 331.The two paradigms referred to here are the retributive and restorative paradigms. 
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expanded notion of individual and collective rights within international criminal 
procedure. The authors observe that though international criminal courts are meant for 
communities in post conflict states, these very communities seem to avoid international 
trials in favour of their own types of justice.
36
 They acknowledge that where the formal 
state system is limited in its coverage, then indigenous justice is likely to retain its 
integrity. Therefore formal justice requires the legitimacy of indigenous (traditional) 
justice and is tied to its context and purpose. The Kony saga is an example where the 
Uganda government seeks the legitimacy of a traditional justice mechanism to try to 
achieve collaboration through the June Agreement in order to broker a peace 
agreement.
37
 The authors conclude that international criminal justice should collaborate 
with the traditional and the state, in order to achieve restorative justice.
38
 While this 
inter-relationship is not in doubt, the authors do not deal directly with how to reconcile 
incompatible aspects of the two frameworks in a way that could reduce incidences of 
communities avoiding trials under international justice. 
Findlay and Henham‟s proposal does not draw from the traditional normative 
system, presumably to avoid „relativist confusion‟. This is evident in their 
methodology. For instance, their work, though based on social theory, draws on 
empirical research from Italy and England. Experiences from these countries, especially 
England, are relevant to the extent that international criminal procedure comprises in 
part the English legal system. However, there are unique features of traditional African 
restorative justice that are not explored or discussed in the book, like the belief in 
mysticism as part of the sentence. Besides, their proposals neglect issues of the 
supernatural and rituals that are part of traditional sentencing process. Furthermore, 
there is no mention of how the ICC could achieve local procedural justice by borrowing 
from traditional systems themselves. By contrast, I maintain that to harmonise 
competing interests, accommodating traditional participatory procedures and 
communitarian values using an expanded notion of rights, is inevitable at some stage.  
A third equally relevant proposal is by M. Drumbl who adopts a sociological 
critique of the purposes of the substantive law of international punishment. He criticises 
                                                 
36
 Ibid, 337.  
37
 Ch. 1 S. 1 op cit.  
38
 M. Findlay and R. Henham op cit 337-338. The authors propose judicial collaboration in transformed 
trials that use formal state institutions to join community centred justice initiatives. They give the 
example of collaboration between the state sponsored institutions and community centred initiatives like 
restorative juvenile justice in England where the juvenile crime is handled under the patronage of the 
police in a restorative setting: citing M. Findlay (1997 at 145). 
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international institutions for assuming that „formulaic‟ reliance on due process 
standards alone will lead to legitimacy among populations transitioning from conflict.
39
 
He is dismissive of a process merely because it has become globalised and thereby 
assumes its own legitimacy and effectiveness. By this, Drumbl refers to international 
human rights instruments. At the same time, he rejects the input of local practices, 
asserting that there is „little advantage in venerating the local (…) simply to promote 
pluralistic difference as an end in itself.‟ Local punishment schemes, because of their 
communitarian nature he contends, may be prone to manipulation or abuse.
40
 Despite 
his misgivings, Drumbl urges international lawyers to accommodate the potential of the 
local practices, suggesting that the process of accountability should focus on 
acknowledgement of responsibility, reconciliation and reconstruction of social norms.
41
 
He then proposes a vertical bottom-up approach based on cosmopolitan pluralism 
model, where local justice systems are granted a presumption of deference subject to 
interpretive guidelines. Cosmopolitan pluralism supports censure at the global level 
while incorporating local control, process and sanction.
42
 
Drumbl‟s most important contribution is his extensive analysis of the problems 
of transplantation at the national and international level. He calls this „Legal Mimicry‟. 
He argues that there is no guarantee that international criminal tribunals will be 
legitimatised among the local communities. This is because of „externalisation of 
justice‟ where punishment and processes of punishment are considered alien from that 
of the local population.
43
 For instance, indigenous East Timorese view imprisonment as 
an „alien‟ punishment because their traditional justice system emphasises 
compensation, restoration and ritual.
44
 Drumbl also relies on research findings where 
Rwandese people complained that the ICTR trials were held far away; used „western-
style‟ judicial practices with emphasis on procedure, while giving minimal thought to 
local Rwandese adjudication process.
45
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 M. Drumbl op cit at 7. 
40
 Ibid, 13-14. 
41
 Ibid, 98-99. 
42
 Ibid, Ch. 7, especially 185-194. The interpretative guidelines are: good faith; democratic legitimacy of 
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 Ibid, 127-133, 145. 
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 Despite his excellent appraisal of the legal crisis, Drumbl‟s thesis has several 
shortcomings. First, he does not deal with sole judicial discretion in sentencing as a 
structural feature that is incompatible with traditional process. Secondly, procedural 
rights are mentioned briefly - they are not built into his theory, unlike Findlay and 
Henham who attempt to discuss it. Thirdly, though he delves extensively into the 
practices of Gacaca courts under Rwanda‟s Organic Law, Drumbl‟s approach only 
gives one side of the argument:  namely how the state may use traditional justice as a 
tool of social control and distort it. It leaves open the question of whether human rights 
could become a normative bridge between the opposing paradigms. Such an approach 
also aggregates traditional communities thereby missing the lessons from the micro 
level applications of traditional justice operating outside national legal frameworks.  
Yet as I show in Chapters 6 and 7 of the thesis, the interpretation and 
application of modern law by local communities gives salutary lessons on harmonising 
divergent normative standards. As Benda-Beckmann‟s empirical argument shows, such 
interpretations and applications attract little comment because this process takes place 
outside frameworks regarded as legal for state or „western‟ law application. Most 
analyses tend to focus on issues where social life and adjudication is governed by 
customary law under a national legal system.
46
 For example, recent academic studies in 
Uganda are those of the state-governed local council courts that apply only national 
penal laws using limited traditional processes.
47
 Yet, as Barya and Onyango point out, 
the local council courts were not created in an attempt to revert to traditions, but only to 
provide a semblance of a traditional approach to judicial power.
48
 Therefore, the 
legislative framework of the local council courts does not reflect all aspects of 
communitarian values in a traditional restorative justice context.
49
  
                                                 
46
 F. von Benda-Beckmann, „Law out of context: A comment on the creation of Traditional Law 
discussion‟ (1984) 28 (1&2) Journal of African Law 28-33, 31-32. 
47
 J. Barya and J. Oloka-Onyango, Popular Justice and Resistance Committee courts in Uganda  
(Kampala: New Vision Printing and Publishing Corporation, 1994); L. Khadiagala, „The failure of 
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and Local/Living Law (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) 295-346. 
48
 J. Barya and J. Oloka-Onyango op cit 46. 
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participatory rights of the community to deliberate sentence. Deliberation of sentence is done solely by 
the court officials under S. 8 (9). Also there are no provisions on rituals for reconciliation, restitution and 
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The foregoing review of academic scholarship highlights the challenges of 
finding legal ways to bring conflicting procedural systems into harmony with 
international procedural guarantees. For that reason there is much to learn about 
traditional normative frameworks to understand whether such harmonisation is 
possible. I contend that a liberal- communitarian theory is the starting point to the 
search for a workable solution. I take this up in the next section.  
 
Section 4: The Liberal-Communitarian theory 
 
A compelling reason for the ICC to use a liberal-communitarian theory to bring 
conflicting systems in harmony with procedural guarantees is as follows. Liberalism 
focuses on enactment of laws to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals, while 
communitarianism builds on empathy and altruistic feeling.
50
 However, liberal theory 
provides procedural safeguards to prevent any abuse of communitarian power by 
injecting liberalism through the procedural rules of trial. It is through such safeguards 
that one can prevent for example, discriminatory practices in such communitarian 
traditions. 
In this regard, the Regional Conference on Post-traditional Justice and Human 
Rights identified as a weakness of the African customary system, its inability to 
integrate equality of sexes and individual autonomy.
51
 To this end Nabudere‟s 
suggestion of a reconciliation of the individualisation of rights and liabilities with the 
traditional system of collective rights and responsibilities is apt. He posits that owing to 
the dynamism of traditional social relations, it might be desirable to „import individual 
liability into the traditional system‟ to fill in the gaps.52 Nabudere‟s proposition, 
however, is general and not specific to the procedural mechanisms and rights.  
R. Howard goes further, stressing that the notion of communitarian rights can 
accommodate individual rights. It would be a denial of social justice for Africans to fail 
to get protection of human rights against both the state and other members of society 
due to fear of individualism.
53
 In adopting her argument, I suggest that communitarian 
„rights‟ could be made part of the genre of procedural rights by incorporating 
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 D. A Masolo, „Western and African Communitarianism: A comparison‟ in K. Wiredu (ed.) A 
Companion to African Philosophy (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Company, 2004) 494.  
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 Report of the Conference in EAJPHR (2002) op cit 29-30. 
52
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communitarian values where they resonate with individual rights. This would form the 
basis of the normative bridge between the two systems. I will use a worked example of 
the right to a public hearing, to make this connection.  
A liberal like Alexy or Gerwith would view procedural safeguards as positive 
rights that are fulfilled only when the court performs its duty.
54
 The duty of court would 
be to prevent any interference with an individual‟s right to a public hearing. The right 
must be provided in enacted law, not set out in oral laws. Further, in considering any 
communitarian interests that are provided in law („balancing‟), Ashworth would caution 
that greater weight be put on protecting individual rights, not competing interests of the 
community.
55
 To this end, S. Greer‟s work on the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) is instructive. Greer would suggest a „structural balancing‟ of „priority-to-
rights principles‟ in which the court determines whether a competing communal goal 
should override a right, based on legislative (or Convention) provisions.
56
 Priority-to-
rights principles are apparent in procedural safeguards like the right to a public hearing. 
Any restrictions to this right, a liberal would argue, must among others, be permitted by 




An African communitarian like Cobbah, would view the right to a public 
hearing as inviolable under traditional oral laws. The right is protected by 
communitarian values, underpinned by group rights where entitlements and obligations 
form the basis of the kinship system.
58
 Therefore an individual‟s entitlement to a public 
hearing is reciprocated by his or her duty to enforce communitarian interests. Even 
where the individual carries out their social obligations to the community, this does not 
elevate protection of the individual. Rather, the individual is protected by the group; say 
the clan. The clan achieve the individual‟s entitlement to a public hearing, by 
participating in all aspects of the trial, including the deliberation of sentence, to ensure 
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op cit at 326.  
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a fair outcome for their kin. Hence, communal decision making by one‟s kin, prevents 
any interference with the individual‟s „right‟ to a public hearing. 
A liberal-communitarian would attempt to blend these rights together. Crucially, 
they would consider the need for individual procedural safeguards, but would also 
acknowledge that individual entitlements form part of community interests. To this end, 
M. Bayle‟s „inherent due process‟ approach based on principles of participation and 
fairness, may help bridge the gap.
59
 Under the principle of participation, all parties are 
heard before decisions affecting them are made. Their participation must be meaningful 
in the resolution of legal disputes because such parties who have participated will most 
likely accept the decision. Under the principle of fairness, all parties are treated justly, 
and individuals have an equal opportunity to participate,
60
 which arguably protects the 
right to a public hearing. 
A theory I find workable is An-N`aim‟s cross cultural dialogue, based on the 
principle of reciprocity.
61
 Reciprocity defines the criteria by which a given practice may 
be judged inhumane or objectionable: that one would not tolerate for another, any 
treatment they themselves would not accept. An-N`aim‟s argument for cross cultural 
dialogue has as its starting point a common denominator among all traditions: the 
inherent dignity and integrity of individuals. He uses this common denominator to gain 
legitimacy for protection of rights in all cultures. If the internal re-interpretation (where 
the community interpret rights in their own context) of the common denominator fails, 
then an appeal may be made to external standards like international human rights. An-
Na`im and F. Deng stress that local cultural values may be relied upon to check the 
leaders who shelter behind cultural relativism while violating citizen‟s human rights.62 
Then again, local systems share some norms with international models. So if the right 
to public hearing is viewed as a common denominator by both the community and 
international body, then cross cultural dialogue between the two models is feasible.  
                                                 
59
 M. Bayles, „Principles for Legal Procedure‟ (1986) 5 Law and Philosophy 33-57, 54-55. Although the 
principles were defined for mainly civil procedure they can be adapted for use in criminal matters 
because they have the flexibility necessary for a cross cultural dialogue. Bayles argues that the benefits of 
procedure are independent of their effect on the accuracy of outcomes. 
60
 Ibid, 54-55. Sub principles relate to principles of natural justice such as: both sides should present their 
story, court should not to be biased and each side should be aware of the information presented against 
them.  
61
 A. A An-Na`im, „Problems of Universal Cultural Legitimacy‟ in A. A An-Na`im and F. Deng (eds.), 
(1990) op cit, 344-345. 
62
 Ibid, Chapter 1 where the authors also restate the position that human rights are viewed as 
individualistic as contrasted with the African concept of communal or collective rights in which the 
rights of an individual are not above those of the community. 
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In summary, the liberal communitarian framework answers the first question in 
this thesis in the affirmative. It is possible for the ICC to adopt a theoretical model that 
attempts to reconcile international procedural law with the values of localized 
communities to help prevent offenders like Kony escaping liability on a long term 
basis. I note that some liberals and some communitarians would regard the liberal-
communitarian solution as unattractive. Still, this is perhaps the best way forward given 
the context of the ICC, which necessarily must operate in a way which brings different 
legal systems, and philosophical ideas, into close contact with one another. In other 
words, the melding of different positions seems particularly appropriate for such a 
body. I discuss this in section 5 below. 
 
Section 5: The Translation Theoretical model 
 
In this section, I illustrate how my argument moves the debate forward. I argue 
that the concept of translation could be used to apply a liberal-communitarian theory of 
rights using Bayle‟s principle of participation and fairness and An- Na`im‟s cross 
cultural dialogue. To do so, I suggest that distinctive procedural features are identified, 
and then legal ideas (norms) are transferred using judicial precedent as a doctrinal tool 
of legal interpretation. I outline the reasons for my rejection of transplantation and 
affirm my commitment to a model of translation with a focus on M. Langer‟s work.  
  The problem with the present transplantation
63
 or „importation‟ of 
international law must be underscored. Drumbl gives a persuasive analysis of this 
problem. His seminal work scrutinises legal transplants from international criminal 
institutions, giving an excellent assessment of why legal transplants are of concern in 
contemporary times. Firstly, local populations may not always see international law as 
legitimate even if it is viewed as such through „intergenerational socialisation‟. 
Secondly, international sentencing frameworks fall short of their aspirations namely the 
aims and purpose of punishment. Drumbl‟s most compelling argument, as we saw in 
Chapter 1, is that the international sentencing framework represents „externalisation of 
justice‟. Here, „liberal‟ criminal procedures are „mapped‟ onto cultural diverse 
                                                 
63
 Legal transplants were popularised by A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative 
Law (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1974 reprinted 1993) who analysed the international transfer, 
borrowing and imposition of legal rules, using comparative methods.   
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frameworks without consideration to local values.
64
 The outcome is a procedure that is 
alien to the local population and therefore does not resonate with their notions of 
procedural justice.   
Another problem is that transmigration of laws involves adaptation or 
transposition to the condition of recipient countries.
65
 This is achieved by a process 
known as „tuning‟ that aims to bridge the conceptual and analytical framework of law 
and the theories of convergence and divergence.
66
 The outcome is a new ius 
commune.
67
 Although the transplantation theory may be a useful analytical tool of 
comparative law, the vagaries of transplantation cannot, in my view, be dealt with 
through tuning alone. M. Langer rightly criticises the transplantation metaphor as 
inadequate to account for the transformation of structural features and legal ideas 
within institutions undergoing the transplantation process, leaving the effect of a „copy 
and paste model‟.68 
Take the example of Uganda‟s ICC Bill of 2006. Its objective is to give the 
force of law to the Rome Statute in Uganda.
69
 Under Clause 64, Ugandan courts may 
enforce reparation orders made under the Rome Statute using the Trial on Indictments 
Act (TIA). The TIA is itself a transplant of the 1951 Criminal Procedure Code based on 
procedure of the English Assize courts.
70
 The TIA reparation procedure thus depicts the 
phenomenon of a „copy and paste‟ model whose outcome is predictably „externalisation 
of justice‟. Clause 64 (2) (a) provides that where an order for monetary payment to the 
victim is made under Article 75 of the Rome Statute, the order shall be enforced as if it 
were a sentence for compensation under Section 126 of the TIA. Under Section 126 (1) 
TIA, if there is evidence that any person has suffered „material loss or personal injury,‟ 
the High Court may order the convicted person to pay compensation as the court deems 
                                                 
64
 M. Drumbl op cit Chapter 5 especially 126-138. 
65
 G. Ajani, „The role of Comparative law in the adoption of new codifications‟ in Italian National 
reports to the XVT International Congress of Comparative Law, Bristol 1998 (Milano: Giuffre Editore, 
1998) 70. 
66
 E. Orucu, „Law as Transposition‟ (2002) 51 (2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 205-
233, 221-223 and G. Teubner „Legal Irritants: Good faith in British Law or how unifying law ends up in 
new divergences‟ (1998) 61 (1) Modern Law Review 11-32. Others include: L. A Mistelis, „Regulatory 
Aspects: Globalization, Harmonisation, Legal Transplants and Law Reform-Some Fundamental 
Observations (2000) 34 International Law 1055-1069; F. Schauer, „The Politics and Incentives of Legal 
Transplantation‟ in J. S Nye and J. D Donahue (eds.) Governance in a Globalizing World (Washington, 
D.C: Brookings Institution, 2000).  
67
 E. Orucu op cit, 206. Ius Commune is part of the study of refining the legal transplant theory by 
replacing the concept of legal transplant with legal transposition so as to bring the laws in harmony. 
68
 M. Langer, (2004) op cit 5, 30-32.  
69
 Memorandum and clause 2 (a) of the Bill discussed in Ch.1 S.2 (ii) op cit. 
70
 H. Morris and J. Read op cit 264 and Ch. 1 S. 5 op cit and Ch. 8 infra. 
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fair and reasonable. In Section 127 (2), if a person defaults in payments, then a warrant 
of distress may be issued. In default of the warrant then the person may be sentenced to 
imprisonment.  
Three issues arise. Firstly, determination of compensation is solely at the 
discretion of the court and is not subject to deliberation by parties, their kin and the 
community. Secondly, ordering compensation in cash only, excludes traditional forms 
of compensation for murder like payment of cows or sheep. Crucially, it fails to 
consider that compensation may comprise what Michalowski describes as „ritual 
satisfaction‟.71 Traditionally, no compensation or reparation is complete without a 
„ceremonial purge‟ else both offender and the community are in danger of spiritual 
retribution.
72
 This means that enforcement ought to take into account the rituals 
following compensation, namely purification and reconciliation. Thirdly, imprisonment 
in default of payment fails to include the community who could pay the compensation 
on behalf of their errant kin. Excluding the community in payment of compensation, 
ignores core communal values based on reciprocal obligation toward each other (duty 
of kin).
73
 This point is taken up in Chapters 6 and 7. I will only make the point here that 
compensation under the traditional model is viewed as the responsibility of the 
individual‟s kin, who assume liability for any wrong doing on behalf of the group.  
Transplantation in such contexts is equivalent to standardisation of traditional 
restorative justice using a hybrid of common and civil law systems that embodies 
centrality of judicial discretion in sentencing. The danger of standardisation is to de-
legitimise indigenous social justice structures and impose a foreign procedural culture. 
This judicially inherited culture is strongly advocated against by international criminal 
lawyers who want reform. To this end, some suggest that hybrid tribunals and the ICC 
will have to depart from the conservative procedural approach adopted by the ICTY.
74
 I 
suggest that for such departure to make international sentencing appropriate to local 
communities, the ICC should take into account the peculiarities of traditional 
restorative justice as applied by traditional courts.   
To this end, in my quest to analyse the transfer of structural features and ideas 
between procedural systems, my thesis is influenced by Langer‟s translation metaphor 
                                                 
71
 R. Michalowski cited in O. Elechi (2006) op cit, 19. 
72
 J. Driberg (1934) op cit 328.  
73
 K. Gyekye (1996) op cit 35. 
74
 G. Nice op cit 358, 380. The ICTY is the forerunner of contemporary international criminal tribunals.  
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as a more adaptable heuristic device.
75
 In translation, procedural models (institutions) 
and legal norms or rules (ideas) are transformed through assimilation or borrowing of 
different concepts and theories from the „other‟ and melding them together. Translation 
takes into account changes effected during the transposition of legal frameworks from 
one procedural model to another. This means structural features of local institutions and 
local ideas of justice of the recipient country are drawn upon in order to take into 
consideration the values of localized communities. 
Let me explain the two aspects of translation. The first deals with structural 
transformations that occur when distinctive institutional features are transferred from 
one model to the next. Changes are effected through the disposition or procedural 
approach of key actors within the receiving model. Disposition of key actors- judicial 
officials, is nurtured through a „socialisation‟ process in legal training. Thus, the 
officials are predisposed to understand criminal procedure and their roles in a certain 
way. Any changes in their procedural approach and during transfer of norms from one 
procedural system to another are thus seen as translations effected through decisions 
taken by „translators‟ (legal reformers or judges). 76 
Structural transformations under the translation model may occur as follows. A 
judge‟s approach to sentencing is based firstly on sole judicial discretion over the 
sentencing process. Additionally, a judge‟s approach to sentencing is to adhere to the 
principles of legality-namely to apply only written penal law. This excludes an oral 
legal tradition (narrative). Furthermore, the role of supernaturalism in the international 
sentencing process is unknown. Yet all these features that are peculiar to African 
customary law will arguably be lost in transplantation. Thus, in a traditional context 
where decision making is done communally, sole judicial determination of sentence 
may seem arbitrary to the community. Also, the meaning of specific sentences within 
communities and the „extraneous‟ factors that they consider vital in sentencing, may be 
lost if the court fails to consider oral narrative as a valid source of information during 
trials.
77
 Besides, a sentencing process that excludes supernatural processes, like the 
                                                 
75
 M. Langer op cit 33-35. 
76
Ibid, 10-14. Although Langer‟s article refers specifically to plea bargaining (pages 35-62), his metaphor 
of translation arguably applies to all aspects of procedural law because of its measure of elasticity. As I 
explained in Ch.1 S.4 op cit, procedural powers or functions of judicial officials are another aspect of 
translation. However, since procedural powers are fixed under the Rome Statute, I investigate disposition 
of judges, where minor adjustments may arguably be made without infringing on statutory procedural 
powers. 
77
 This is exemplified in J. P. Akayesu v Prosecutor ICTR-96-4-A Judgement of 1
st
 June 2001, discussed 
in Ch. 4 S. 3 infra.  
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Mato Oput outlined in Chapter 1, appears to ignore social practices and beliefs are 
pivotal to reconciliation between parties and the community.   
The second aspect of translation takes into account the transformation to 
structures of interpretation and meaning, where concepts may exist in one procedural 
language and not the other.
78
 For instance, the meaning of „rights‟ as we have seen, 
differ in the liberal and communitarian contexts. In borrowing Langer‟s metaphor of 
translation, I adjust it to include the doctrine of judicial precedent because this is one 
method by which the translators (judges) interpret legal ideas, or explain how a 
procedural rule or system ought to work. For example, the Pre Trial Chamber 1 in 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo
79
 relied on precedent of the ECtHR and 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), in arriving at its decision that 
victims can participate in the investigation stage of the trial.
80
 This case shows how the 
judges transferred a legal idea of victim participation using judicial precedent from 
regional courts, to international criminal procedure. 
The concept of translation is therefore appropriate only if the procedural 
features and structure of interpretation can be adjusted to accommodate divergent 
procedural norms or notion of rights. Likewise, the new concept may need 
modification. As Ejidike in his study of human rights among the Igbo correctly 
surmises, „No culture can be transplanted in its pure form without alteration in another 
cultural environment.‟81 My theoretical framework will be useful in answering the 
second question in this thesis on how to modify („Africanise‟) international sentencing 
practice, for three reasons.  
Firstly, translation provides terms of reference in comparing differences 
between the international and traditional justice model and thereby evaluating whether 
the international can borrow from the traditional. Secondly, translation facilitates 
analysis of the transformations that could take place when procedural approaches and 
ideas are transferred from one model to the next. The transfer can be understood as 
translation because the structural differences are taken into account and mitigated, 
                                                 
78
 M. Langer op cit 10. 
79
Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr of 17 January 2006 discussed 
in Cap 2 S. (v) op cit.   
80
 Ibid paras 51-53: citing for example in ECHR Moreira de Azevdo v. Portugal „Judgement‟ 23 October 
1990 Series 241-A and ECtHR Grand Chamber Perez v. France, „Judgement‟12 February 2004 
Application No47287/99; IACtHR Blake v. Guatemala „Judgment‟, 24 January 1998, Series C No. 36. 
81
 O. M Ejidike, „Human Rights in the Cultural Traditions and Social Practice of the Igbo of South-
Eastern Nigeria‟ (1999) 43 Journal of African Law 71-98, 73. 
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drawing on the manner in which the community itself handles such difference. Any 
similarities are highlighted as common concepts that cement the two systems. Thirdly, 
translation involves rethinking the principles that govern legal ideas, particularly 
procedural rights as the bedrock of the sentencing process. 
I am aware of obvious objections to be raised at such attempts at 
accommodating traditional features. To illustrate: in the previous section, we saw how 
Findlay and Henham warn against relativist confusion; and Drumbl cautions against 
unqualified veneration of the local processes. Such assimilation may arguably serve to 
entrench collective rights to the disadvantage of individual autonomy and equality. 
Another objection is that such reconciliation may lead to differential sentencing 
outcomes arising from a relativist context in which the law is applied. A third objection 
could be proffered, that adopting such a translation approach is surrendering to the 
traditional, that will lead to lesser protection of rights in some instances. However, I 
counter these objections through a worked example of my translation model in Chapter 
9, in which I show what minor changes the ICC could make, while drawing from local 
experiences. Additionally, I show how human rights guarantees will provide the 
yardstick by which the proposed pluralist framework would operate, particularly since 
both international and traditional models currently lack sufficient procedural rights 
guarantees during sentencing.  
I posit that assimilating traditional features requires the creation of three phases 
during sentencing. The finding of guilt in Article 65 and 76 (1) Rome Statute is the first 
phase. The second phase is the sentencing hearings and the deliberation of sentence in 
Articles 76 (2)(3) and 78(1). The third phase of purification and reconciliation rituals 
follows thereafter. The outcome of such an approach would be a pluralist sentencing 
framework.  
To achieve such a model, we must recognise Bayle‟s principle of participation 
and fairness; and An_Na`im‟s principle of reciprocity as concomitant with that of 
equality of arms. This recognition is necessary if the sentencing outcome is to 
accommodate African customary processes. Both principles in themselves are 
nevertheless insufficient for international procedure, for they do not provide a yardstick 
by which sentencing decisions ought to be determined. Their value is in fostering cross 
cultural dialogue at a more general level. Therefore a third principle is needed - a 
notion of Ubuntu. I am convinced that excluding Ubuntu principles from the procedural 
narrative arguably, is a denial of an opportunity to be part of social justice. To deny 
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participation within an African normative context, may lead to a community failing to 
reintegrate the offender into their community if they perceive they had no participatory 
role in the offender‟s sentencing and therefore no co-ownership of it.82  
To achieve this mutual translation, we need to broaden the interpretation of 
procedural rights from the present narrow individualistic definition (that refers mainly 
to offender‟s rights) to a holistic communitarian one. This is possible because I posit 
that individual rights and communitarian values share principles like individual 
autonomy and therefore complement each other. However, I acknowledge that there are 
some areas of conflict between the two sets of values and not every area will be 
resolved to everyone‟s satisfaction. One clear example is the communitarian „right‟ to 
public participation that permits the victim, defendant and the community to deliberate 
sentence. This arguably infringes the defendant‟s right to be tried by an independent 
and impartial tribunal because the victim and community‟s views may not be impartial, 
even vengeful.
83
 Even so, I am convinced that the translation theory is best suited as a 
tool for dealing with such conflict of values. This is because translation leaves intact 
judicial discretion to deal with sentences on a case-by-case basis, while encouraging 
judges to engage in cross cultural dialogue with the affected community. This not only 
achieves local procedural legitimacy and a pluralistic translation of rights, but also 
enriches the normative framework of the two models. 
 
Section 6: Conclusion  
 
International scholars argue for the universality of international criminal 
procedure on the grounds that it provides a better protection for the offender and the 
victim. Nonetheless, their writings disregard the „African‟ problem and reinforce 
equality of defendant‟s rights (and increasingly victims‟ rights) but with little regard to 
communitarian „rights‟. They do not consider the possibility that local practices and 
values like reconciliation feasts are part of the sentencing process, benefiting not only 
the offender and victim, but also the community. With an inconclusive debate on the 
hierarchy of the procedural models especially from African scholars, we are denied the 
evidence needed to seek a legal solution to this problem.  
                                                 
82
 G. Townsend, „Current Developments in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda‟ (2005) 5 (1) International Criminal Law Review 147-160, 155-157. 
83
 A detailed discussion is in Ch. 2 S. 3 (v) op cit.  
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To ensure a fair, culturally appropriate sentencing outcome, principles of 
Ubuntu, reciprocity, participation and fairness could be linked to procedure and 
procedural rights and then applied in court. The task ahead is to create a dialogue that 
moves beyond this dualistic debate where traditional restorative justice and 
communitarian values are perceived as being in opposition to international procedural 
justice. The current study challenges the impulse of some to caricature Africanists and 
international moderates, as supportive of a strictly traditional restorative approach in 
the international model. The debate must seek to imagine whether the future of ICC 
sentencing may be shaped by a traditional restorative justice and a human rights 
engagement.  
Kony‟s case has paved the way for a rethink of competing interests within 
international procedural justice vis-à-vis traditional restorative justice. What remains to 
be worked out is how the ICC sentencing framework may be shaped by traditional 
restorative justice and in particular, taking stock of international transplantations in 
Africa that have gone before. This stock taking starts in the next chapter, with an 
appraisal of the failings of the internationalised criminal courts to draw on traditional 
law or structures during sentencing. This appraisal will provide lessons on what the 
ICC could avoid should it wish to draw lessons from the traditional model.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: LESSONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (ICTR) AND THE 
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE (SCSL) 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 
Previously in Chapter 3, we saw that the academic debate overlooks the 
important question: whether the international criminal paradigm could take into 
account incongruent normative differences so as to guarantee culturally appropriate 
sentencing outcomes. The neglect of this question is typified by D. Crane when he 
discounts the possibility of African customary procedures substituting for 
international ones. Nonetheless, Crane acknowledges that indictees before the SCSL 
have labelled the process: „white man‟s justice‟.1 I then propose a theoretical model to 
show how these differences may be accommodated in practice. In it, the structural 
features of local institutions and local ideas of justice are drawn upon. I see this as 
critical to achieving procedural legitimacy of the ICC among the local communities.  
In this chapter, I focus on the international sentencing practice of the ICTR 
and the SCSL. Both give crucial lessons for the ICC. First, because the ICTR‟s 
procedural regime is criticised for applying „western-style‟ judicial procedures that 
pay little attention to local interests.
2
 Yet local concepts of justice are important, more 
especially since the ICTR applies the Rwanda Organic law of the Gacaca jurisdiction- 
a blend of national and traditional procedure. For its part, the SCSL as a national-
international hybrid court has faced challenges in the trial and sentencing of the 




As far as I am aware, this chapter is the only legal analysis of why 
international tribunals seem incapable of integrating non western normative 
frameworks to achieve procedural legitimacy. Following this introduction, I begin 
with an overview of the ICTR sentencing paradigm (Section 2). This is followed by 
an appraisal of the ICTR sentencing practice in relation to the Organic Law and the 
Gacaca courts (Section 3). The rest of the chapter will examine the SCSL sentencing 
                                                 
1
 D. Crane- a former prosecutor to the SCSL cited in Ch.1 S.6 op cit. 
2
 M. Drumbl op cit at 133 discussed in Ch. 3 S. 2 op cit.   
3
 The Kamajors are traditional hunters who live in the forests of Sierra Leone. 
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procedure (Section 4) followed by an analysis of the SCSL sentencing practice and 
the tension with Kamajor traditions (Section 5). Next is an appraisal of the ICTR‟s 
and SCSL‟s application of precedent and lessons for the ICC (Section 6). I also offer 
a brief conclusion (section 7).  
Section 2: Sentencing paradigm of the ICTR   
 
In this section, I discuss the ICTR sentencing framework. Through a précis of 
the ICTR legislative origins, I show how the dominance of „western style‟ procedural 
rules and procedural rights occurred through transplantation of the procedural 
framework of the ICTY. The result of the „copy and paste‟ effect is that in the ICTR 
normative framework dealing with an African conflict, there is hardly a place for a 
traditional participatory restorative approach, or communitarian values.
4
  
(i) Sentencing procedures  
 
The ICC draws on the ICTY and ICTR frameworks. Indeed, during the 
negotiation process for the ICC, there was criticism that the ILC Draft Statute drew 
too heavily from the ICTY and the ICTR.
5
 Accordingly the ICTY and ICTR 
sentencing structure are central to an analysis of the ICC capacity to integrate non 
western normative standards.  
To begin with, provisions of the ICTR Statute are adopted almost verbatim 
from the ICTY Statute
6
 with minor changes. For example, the word „former 
Yugoslavia‟ is replaced with „Rwanda‟ in the ICTR Statute.7 The same applies to the 
ICTR RPE.
8
 The provisions on sentencing procedure in the ICTR statute are very 
brief. The only specific procedure is for sentencing on a plea of guilty in Rule 100 
(Rule 100 ICTY RPE):  
 
 
                                                 
4
 Communitarian values comprising the duty to kin, reconciliation, restitution and the role of ritual are 
defined in Ch. 1 S. 4 op cit. 
5
 S. F de Gurmendi, op cit, 220-224. Some of the differences and similarities between the ICC 
sentencing provisions and those of the ad hoc tribunals are sketched in Ch. 2 S.2 op cit.   
6
 The Statute setting up the ICTY UN Doc. IT/32 Rev. 39 (1994) is annexed to the Security Council 
Resolution 827 of 1993, adopted on 25
th
 May 1993. 
7
 The ICTR Statute was set up under S.C. Resolution 955 (Nov.8 1994) reprinted in 33 I.L.M 1602 
(1994). 
8
 ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence (1994) UN.Doc.ITR/3/Rev.2. 
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Rule 100: Sentencing Procedure on a Guilty Plea 
 
(A) „If the Trial Chamber convicts the accused on a guilty plea, the Prosecutor 
and the Defence may submit any relevant information that may assist the Trial 
Chamber in determining an appropriate sentence. 
(B) The sentence shall be pronounced in a judgement in public and in the 
presence of the convicted person subject to Rule 102 (B)‟.9  
 
At first blush there are similarities between the ICTR and the ICC sentencing 
provisions. Firstly, under Rule 86 (c) ICTR RPE, during a full hearing, „the parties 
shall also address matters of sentencing in closing arguments‟ (Rule 86 (c) ICTY 
RPE). Under Rule 100 (A) the parties may submit relevant information on sentencing. 
This has the same effect as Articles 76(1) and (2) of the Rome Statute. Secondly, 
Rule 87 (A) provides that after declaring the hearing closed, the Trial Chamber „shall 
deliberate in private.‟ The effect is the same as Article 74(4) of the Rome Statue. This 
feature was aptly surmised in Prosecutor v Paul Bisengimana: „the determination of 
the sentence is left to the discretion of the Chamber‟.10 Thirdly, under Article 22 (2) 
ICTR Statute (Article 23 (2) ICTY Statute) and Rule 100 (B), the Trial Chamber shall 
pronounce judgments in public. In practice, the tribunal‟s decisions are also posted on 
the tribunal‟s website for public access (by the literate).11 The text is similar to Article 
76 (4) of the Rome Statute.  
The main difference, however, is under Article 23 (1) expounded in Rule 101 
(B) (iii) ICTR RPE. There, the Trial Chamber while imposing sentence is enjoined to 
consider general practice on prison sentences in Rwanda. Consideration of state 
practice provides a uniform standard for determining sentences and protects the 
principle of nulla poena sine lege where punishments must be laid down in law.
12
 
Though Article 77 of the Rome Statute draws from Article 23, it makes no reference 
to recourse to local or national sentencing practices.
13
  
Overall, the ICTR sentencing provisions bear the hallmarks of the ICTY 
features namely: a sentencing process underpinned by a centrality of judicial 
                                                 
9
 Ibid, Rule 102 (B) provides that a warrant shall be issued for the arrest of the convicted person if he is 
not present in court for whatever reason. 
10
 Prosecutor v Paul Bisengimana ICTR-00-60-T: Judgement of 13
th
 April 2006, para 109. 
11
 ICTR decisions are available at http://www.trim.unictr.org visited on 21/11/2008. 
12
 V. Morris and M. P Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Vol. 1 (Irvington-on-
Hudson, New York: Transnational Publishers Inc., 1998) 584-585.  A discussion of punishment in the 
ad hoc tribunals and SCSL can be found in W. A. Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: 
The former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2006) 
Ch. 14.  
13
 M. Drumbl op cit 134-135. Punishments under the Rome Statute are set out Article 77 discussed in 
Ch. 2 S. 3 (ii) op cit.  
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authority. This reflects the common premises on which the ICTR, ICTY and the ICC 
procedural frameworks are built: the adversarial-inquisitorial procedural model and 
retributive philosophical underpinnings. This may lead some to argue that such a 
framework renders the ICTR unable to adapt to traditional participatory features.  I 
now turn to the third premise: individual human rights foundations. 
 
(ii) Human rights standards  
 
One feature of the dominant adversarial-inquisitorial model is the lack of 
explicit procedural safeguards during the in camera deliberation of sentence by 
judges. Henham has strenuously argued that the absence of these safeguards like the 
right to legal counsel arises from retributive philosophical underpinnings. This 
retributive philosophy may be attributed to the lack of a mandatory procedure for 
transparency in sentence decision-making.
14
 This may be because the principle of 
equality of arms: the bedrock of the adversarial model on which the ICTR is partly 
framed, does not apply to determination of sentence because at this point, evidence 
and representations have been heard from both prosecution and defence. Equality of 
arms is part of the right to a fair hearing as stated by the Human Rights Committee in 
Morael v France.
15
 Its scope has been interpreted by the ICTR Appeals Chamber in 
Prosecutor v Kayishema. There it was held that equality of arms relates to equality of 
rights by ensuring that the „list of rights must be respected‟.16 Later in Prosecutor v 
Aleksovski, the ICTY Appeals Chamber clarified that fairness of proceedings and 
equality of arms applied to both defence and prosecution, with the latter acting „on 




                                                 
14
 R. Henham (2004) op cit 190-191 arguing that public participation is excluded, therefore courts give 
no indication of how they arrive at their decision: discussed op cit Ch. 2 S. 3 (iv) op cit.  
15
 Morael v France, Communication No. 207/1986, 28 July 1989, U.N. Doc. CCPR/8/Add/1, 416: a 
fair hearing under Article 14 (1) must include equality as a bare minimum, expeditious procedure and 
respect for the principle of adversary proceedings at a suit at law as well. Other decisions include 
Robinson v Jamaica, Communication No. 223/1987, 30 March 1989, U.N. Doc. CCPR/8/Add.1, 426 
and Wolf v Panama, Communication No. 289/1988, 26 March 1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/11/Add.1, 399 
where violations of the right to a fair trial were affirmed. 
16
 Prosecutor v C. Kayishema and O. Ruzindana ICTR-95-1-A Appeal Judgement of 1
st
 June 2001. 
Also Tadic v Prosecutor (IT -94-1-A) Appeal judgment of 15
th
 July 1999 para 48 held that „equality of 
arms obligates a judicial body to ensure that neither party is put at a disadvantage when presenting its 
case‟. 
17
 Prosecutor v Aleksovski IT-95-14/1-AR73, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Prosecutor‟s Appeal on 
Admissibility of Evidence, 16
th
 February 1999 para 25. 
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It follows that the ICTR normative framework protects equality of arms, 
namely the protection of individual human rights of the defendant during the trial 
phase only. For example, rights of the accused under Article 20 ICTR Statute include: 
the right to equality before the tribunal and the right to a fair and public hearing.
18
 
These rights are adopted almost verbatim from Article 14(1)-(3) ICCPR. The ICTR 
RPE also protect individual rights like the right to a public hearing (Rule 78); the 
right to give and confront evidence (Rule 85(A)-(C)) and the right to be protected 
against self incriminating evidence (Rule 90 (E)). Article 19 (1) enjoin the Trial 
Chamber to ensure that the trial is „fair and expeditious‟ with full respect for rights of 
the accused.
19
 In other words, what we have here is a narrowly legalistic definition of 
individual accused‟s rights that do not incorporate communitarian values, yet the 
ICTR is an international tribunal handling an African conflict. This exclusion may be 
attributed to the development of international criminal law which has been described 
as rather „arbitrary, unstructured and incoherent‟, with a diverse body of rules.20 The 
legislative developments reflect this arbitrariness. I take this up in the next sub 
section.  
(iii) Legislative origins  
 
The legislative developments of the ICTR show two things. Firstly, that the 
ICTY framework was transplanted uncritically into the ICTR framework. Secondly, 
that the development of the ICTR was not based on a comprehensive consideration of 
the place of human rights in a local context. Rather there was a need to respect human 
rights standards, because the ICTR was an international tribunal
21
 modelled on the 
ICTY.  
The travaux preparatoires of the ICTY crucially show that developments of 
Article 14 ICCPR rights were restricted to the trial process that drew from the 
                                                 
18
 Other rights are the right to use of a language of choice; trial without undue delay; trial of the 
defendant in his presence with legal assistance; right to examine witnesses; the right to free assistance 
of an interpreter; the right not to give self incriminating evidence; adequate preparation and 
communication with counsel: ICTR Statute op cit Article 20 (1) (2) 3) and 4 (a)-(g). 
19
 The court must also give due regard for protection of victims and witnesses: Article 19(1) ICTR 
Statute op cit.  S. Negri notes that the consistent practice of the two ad hoc tribunals is to focus entirely 
on fairness and protection of the rights of the accused as set out in the statute: „The Principle of 
“Equality of Arms” and the Evolving law of International Criminal Procedure‟ (2005) 5 (4) 
International Criminal Law Review 513-571,543. 
20
 G. Sluiter (2006) op cit 617. 
21
 R. S Lee, „The Rwanda Tribunal‟ (1996) 9 (4) Leiden Journal of International Law 37-61, 57. 
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Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals.
22
 The travaux preparatoires also show that delegates 
were preoccupied with human rights concerns revolving round the sentence itself. To 
illustrate: the report proposing the establishment of the ICTY by Rapporteurs Corell-
Turk-Thune, dwelt at length on protecting the principle of nulla poena sine lege 
(under Article 15(1) ICCPR) to ensure that the punishment is legitimately provided 
for.
23
 By comparison, there was no proposal on human rights protection during the 
sentencing process. However, as Zappala rightly observes, it would have been 
inconsistent for the Security Council not to impose human rights standards on the ad 
hoc tribunals.
24
 After all, establishing ad hoc tribunals was tied in to state 
responsibilities to respect human rights.  
The setting up of the ICTR Tribunal by the Security Council was a response to 
genocide and other war crimes by the Hutu extremists in power in Rwanda, against 
the Tutsi minority. Up to a million people are estimated to have been killed.
25
 This 
followed shortly after the genocide in former Yugoslavia for which the ICTY 
Tribunal was set up. Article 21 of the ICTR Statute adopted the ICTY Statute 
wholesale, without regard to the different normative standards. Additionally, Article 
14 ICTR statute, enjoined the judges to adopt the ICTY RPE mutatis mutandis. 
Eventually the rules were adopted with necessary modifications (amended five times 
by the time of adoption in June 1995)
26
 despite the clear distinction between the 
mandates of the two bodies. This replication was a consequence of two factors.  
                                                 
22
 W. A. Schabas, „Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach‟ (1999) 7 (2) 
Duke Journal of Comparative and International law 461- 517, 467-468. 
23
 Proposal for an International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia under the 
Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe Moscow Human Dimension Mechanism to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (February 9 1993) reproduced in V. Morris and M. Scharf An 
Insider’s guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (1995) op cit Part 8 
263-264. Contributions by Italy: U.N. SCOR, art.7 UN Doc. S/25300 (1993), Russia: U.N. SCOR, art 
22, U.N. Doc. S/25537 (1993) and The Netherlands: UN SCOR, art 5, U.N Doc. A/25716 (1993) 
followed this line of argument: reproduced ibid at 377, 445 and 475-476. A comprehensive account of 
the ICTY travaux preparatoires on sentencing is in W. Schabas ibid 469-474. 
24
 S. Zappala, (2003) op cit, 5. The only comprehensive proposal on rights during the trial was by 
Amnesty International: Morris and Scharf ibid 409-434: SC/CO/PG/PO, AI Index: Eur 48/02/93, para 
IX. Their proposal was on the rights to compensation, restitution and rehabilitation: S. 11 and the right 
for victim‟s participation during the trial in S. 10, but this was not incorporated in the final draft. 
25
 Final Report Of The Commission Of Experts Established Pursuant To Paragraph 1 of Security 
Council Resolution 935(1994) U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405(1994) para 57. D. Shraga and R. Zacklin, „The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda‟ (1996) 7 (4) European Journal of International Law 501-
518, examine the legislative history of the ICTR, focussing on statutory provisions that are „Rwanda 
specific‟ including the system of penalties. P. Akhavan examines its political underpinnings: „The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment‟ (1996) 90 (3) 
American Journal of International Law 501-510. 
26
 The ICTR RPE op cit adopted 29 June 1995 last amended on the 14
th
 March 2008- UN Doc. IT/32 
Rev. 39. Available at http://www.trim.unictr.org/ENGLISH/rules/080314/080314.pdf last visited on 
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Firstly, apart from desiring unity of legal approach, efficiency of resources 
was suggested as part of a pragmatic political move based on the co-existence of the 
ICTR with the ICTY.
27
 The proposal submitted by the United States and New 
Zealand for the ICTR Statute, was drawn entirely from the ICTY Statute and adopted 
with some changes.
28
 It has been suggested by P. Akhavan that the Rwanda Tribunal 
was established because of the precedential effect of the Yugoslavia Tribunal and that 
otherwise it would not have been set up.
29
 In this respect, the ICTR has been likened 
to the Nuremberg trials that resounded of „Victor‟s justice‟30 particularly since its 
procedural framework is similar in many respects. The Security Council Resolution 
955 (1994) setting up the ICTR and drafted with Rwanda‟s active participation, is a 
„Chapter-VII-negotiated- resolution‟. It drew heavily from the Secretary General‟s 
Report on Yugoslavia that was deemed to be a „blue print‟. China abstained in the 
voting on the Resolution because in its opinion, the Council should have engaged in 
further consultations with Rwanda.
31
 China‟s proposition was not followed up. If it 
had been, perhaps a more integrative procedural model could have evolved. 
Accordingly, the ICTR procedural framework merely „copied and pasted‟ that of the 
ICTY, resulting in a statutory framework that bore little resemblance to traditional 
restorative procedure and the Rwandan sense of justice.  
Secondly, the greatest limitation during the adoption process was that the 
ICTR rules were not subjected to scrutiny or debate; unlike the ICTY rules where 
countries and organisations contributed to their amendment.
32
 The drafting of the 
ICTY rules took into account circumstances of the internecine strife and its 
aggravating factors like ethnic and religious conflict relating to a specific context in 
                                                                                                                                            
21/11/2008. V. Morris and M. Scharf, (1998) op cit 417-418 sketch the process of adoption of the 
Rules.  
27
  S. C. Res.  955 (1994) op cit at 3, para 9.  
28
 V. Morris and M. Scharf (1998) op cit 101; D. Shraga and R. Zacklin op cit, 504. 
29
 P. Akhvan (1996) op cit 501.  
30
 L. Reydams, „The ICTR Ten Years On: Back to the Nuremberg Paradigm?‟ (2005) 3 (4) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 977-988, 979-981 argues that because the Security Council has not 
broadened its power to prosecute the Rwandese Patriotic Front that are now in government, the ICTR 
trials can be likened to victor‟s justice. 
31
 U.N SCOR 49
th
 Session, 3453rd meeting, U.N.Doc S/PV.3453 reprinted in V. Morris and M. Scharf, 
The International Tribunal for Rwanda Vol. II (Irving-on-Hudson, New York: Transnational 
Publishers Inc., 1995) 305. China decried the „hurried‟ voting on the SC Resolution as an „incautious 
act‟ given that Rwanda had wanted to carry out further consultations. 
32
 The ICTY adopted its rules on 11
th
 February 1994 after thorough scrutiny and debate. Submissions 
from mainly western countries like United Kingdom, France and United States are reprinted in V. 
Morris and M. Scharf (1995) op cit 481-637. 




 The rules adopted the adversarial approach of the common law systems 
but drew from the inquisitorial civil law approach.
34
 By contrast, the ICTR rules did 
not take into account the specific context of Rwanda because it was applied mutatis 
mutandis thereby creating a framework that was not relevant to the community‟s 
normative structure.
35
 According to Morris and Scharf, the aim was to ensure 
consistency in the RPE of the two tribunals and also give expediency in adaptation of 
the rules.
36
 Also, the ICTY procedural rules are regarded by May and Wierda as an 
international criminal code because they are based on general principles underlying 
the major legal systems of the world and strike a balance between the common law 
and civil law systems.
37
 My thesis does not fault this view, but only shows the 
dangers of uncritical acceptance that the two systems are the only ones on offer.  
In conclusion, these „copy and paste‟ rules distort traditional African 
procedure, losing some of its interactive characteristics in the process. Arguably the 
ICTR‟s practices based on the judge‟s role as sole arbiters, give minimal thought to 
local interests. This adversarial approach as I have put forth in Chapters 2 and 3, lacks 
characteristics that enables parties and the community to be part of social justice by 
participating in decision making. Given the marked similarities between the ICTR 
and ICC sentencing framework, it is imperative that we understand how the ICTR 
applies its sentencing procedures within the African context. I examine this in the 









                                                 
33
  Statement by the President made at a briefing to Members of Diplomatic Missions IT/29 11
th
 
February 1994: ibid 651. Also G. Boas, „Creating Laws of Evidence for International Criminal Law: 
The ICTY and the Principle of Flexibility‟ (2001) 12 (1) Criminal Law Forum 41-90, 72-73. 
34
 V. Morris and M. Scharf (1998) op cit 416-417. 
35
 I grant that both situations involved calamities but I maintain that the context within which the 
calamities took place was different and warranted a different procedural approach to the trial. 
36
 V. Morris and M. Scharf (1998) op cit 413. 
37
 R. May and M. Wierda (1998-1999) op cit 727, 745. 
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Section 3: Applying Rwanda’s Organic Law 
 
  The Rwanda Organic law setting up Gacaca jurisdiction
38
 melds 
international and national law with traditional Gacaca customary law to deal with a 
prosecution crisis of sheer numbers.
39
 Gacaca jurisdiction is therefore a hybrid 
procedural model.
40
 I am cognisant of the shortcomings of Gacaca jurisdiction when 
appraised against Article 14 ICCPR. These are discussed at length elsewhere.
41
 In this 
section, I investigate instead why the ICTR has failed to integrate Gacaca traditional 
justice and communitarian values in its jurisprudence. Primarily, the capacity of the 
ICTR normative structure to achieve procedural legitimacy at the local level, exhibits 
a degree of normative rigidity that excludes public participation and thus 
communitarian values. The outcome is a failure of the tribunal to draw upon 
similarity with local ideas of justice and to reconcile the divergence between the two 





                                                 
38
 There have been several enactments after the first Organic Law 8/96. These are Organic Law No. 
40/2000 of 26/01/2000 on which most judgements are based. This has been amended by Organic Law 
No. 33/2001 of 22/6/2001. Next was a revision of the 2000 law by Organic Law No.16/2004 of 
19/6/2004. This too was recently amended by Organic Law No. 10/2007 of 01/03/2007. However, the 
articles I comment on remain unchanged in the last update of 2007. K. Apuuli Unpublished Thesis 
(2006) op cit 166-169 gives an overview of the amendments up to 2007. For an account of trials under 
the early Organic Laws see W. A. Schabas, „Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts‟ (2005) 3 (4) Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 879-895, 886-890. A more recent extensive study is by M. Drumbl 
op cit 85-99.  
39
 K. Apuuli ibid Chapter 6 citing Meirhenrich (2002) at 150, note 5.  
40
 Ibid, 80-81.These Gacaca courts are based on the popular justice tribunals like those in 
Mozambique. 
41
 Ibid, Chapter Six, 186-190. Other analysts include: D. Haile, „Rwanda‟s Experiment In People‟s 
Courts (Gacaca) And The Tragedy Of Unexamined Humanitarianism: A Normative/Ethical 
Perspective‟ Discussion Paper/2008.01, University of Antwerp 20-32; A. Meyerstein (2007) op cit 
492-497,500-502; L. D Tully, „Human Rights Compliance and the Gacaca jurisdictions in Rwanda‟ 
(2003) 26 British Columbia International and Comparative Law Review 385-414, 401-413; J. Fierens, 
„Gacaca Courts: Between Fantasy and Reality‟ (2005) 3 (4) JICJ 896-916, 910-912; and J. Sarkin, 
„The tension between justice and reconciliation in Rwanda; Politics, Human Rights, Due Process and 
the role of the Gacaca courts in dealing with the genocide‟ (2001) 45 (2) Journal of African Law 143-
172, 164-166. I. T Gaparayi concludes that Rwanda must act in consonance with international human 
rights, contending that the law on Gacaca jurisdictions should be amended to ensure conformity with 
standards for fair trial: „Justice and Social Reconstruction in the aftermath of genocide in Rwanda: An 
evaluation of the possible role of the Gacaca tribunals‟ (2001) 1 African Human Rights Law Journal 
78-106, 88-99,101. The authors all discuss the lack of impartiality and independence of the Gacaca 
courts; lack of provisions on legal representation; and the lack of procedural equality of arms in a 
modern sense, among other shortcomings. 
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(i) Integrating Gacaca traditional justice  
 
In the early jurisprudence of the ICTR, the position of the Trial Chamber in 
Prosecutor v Rutaganda was that Organic Law is for guidance.
42
 Later in Musema, 
the Appeals Chamber stated that the Organic Law is for guidance on the practice of 
sentencing.
43
 Yet no further reference was made to the Organic Law in the ICTR 
judgments. Neither was there any reference to the traditional Gacaca processes on 
which the Organic Law is based. This pattern is replicated in other sentencing 
decisions.
44
 To understand the ICTR‟s inability to apply the Organic Law as 
guidance, I will set out the Gacaca participatory process from which the Organic Law 
draws in part. 
Evergreen grass called Urucaca grows in front of the homesteads belonging to 
clusters of clan and family.
45
 Members of the community sit on this Urucaca or 
„lawn‟ to consider the cases. Gacaca is the name of this court.46 In contrast with other 
African laws, Rwandese customary law distinguishes civil from criminal matters. 
Initially, Gacaca was only used in a local setting to handle mainly civil wrongs but 
would sometimes try and punish criminal offences like murder and theft.
47
 This non- 
permanent judicial institution led by wise old men, sought to restore social order. 
Even though the outcome of the decision threatened the unity of the group, the court 
                                                 
42
 Prosecutor v Georges Rutaganda ICTR-96-3-T Judgement of 6
 
/12/99 paras. 453-454 and 
Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda ICTR-97-23, Judgment and Sentence of 4/09/1988 paras 27,37. 
43
 Alfred Musema v Prosecutor ICTR-96-13-A Judgement of 27/1/2000 para 984. 
44
 This reasoning had been followed in Serushago ICTR-98-39-S Judgement of 5/2/1999 para 17, 
Ruggiu ICTR-97-32-I Judgement of 1/6/2000 para 28,31; trial chambers are only obliged to take 
account to sentencing provisions under the Organic Law, Ntakirutimana Judgement of 21/2/2003 
ICTR-96-10& ICTR-96-17-T para 885, Semanza ICTR-97-20-T Judgement of 15/5/2003 para 560-
561, S. Imanishimwe Case No. ICTR-99-46-T: Judgement of 25
th
 February 2004 para. 810-811 on 
Organic Law No 8/96, Rutaganira ICT-95-IC-T Judgement of 14/3/2005 para. 165-166, Muhimana 
ICTR-95-1B-T Judgement of 28/4/2005 para 592, Bisengimana ICTR-00-60-T: Judgement of 13
th
 
April 2006, para 194, Nzabirinda ICT-2001-77-T Judgement of 23-2-2007
 
para 104 referring to the 
2004 law for comparison. Others like Kayishema and Ruzindana ICTR-95-I-T Judgment of 2/5/1999 
do not explicitly refer to the Organic Law, para 5-7. 
45
 J. Sarkin op cit 159 and E. Kamuhangire, „African Traditional Methods in Rwanda: A Case Study of 
the Agacaca Method of Conflict Resolution amongst the Banyarwanda‟ African Traditional Methods 
in Conflict Resolution, Reconciliation and Forgiveness, A Resource Handbook, (Kampala: Centre for 
Conflict Resolution, 2000) 7-8.  
46
 I. Gaparayi op cit 81 notes that defining Gacaca is difficult because of its informal and non 
permanent nature. 
47
 Ibid, 81-82: n. 11, 12-13. Other matters included land rights, marriage, and business transactions of a 
civil or commercial nature. 
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had to strive to achieve consensus.
48
 Gacaca operations are aptly described by C. 
Ntampaka as interconnected to the family unit; deferred to the head of the family; had 
no written rules of procedure; gave priority to community interests over individual 
rights and drew upon the supernatural and religious.
49
 
Gacaca is premised on collective decision making, restorative philosophical 
underpinnings and a protection of communitarian values. Other features akin to 
Ubuntu, discussed in Chapter 2, are that the community are judge and jury of both 
fact and law, although the elders guide the process of public admissibility and 
weighing of evidence. It is worth noting that Gacaca procedure has no provision for 
written evidence. The emphasis is on oral evidence. Ultimately, Gacaca is often 




The Chamber‟s rigid interpretation of the „general practice of Rwanda courts‟ 
in Article 23 (1) and Rule 101 (B) (iii) conversely, neglects legal opportunities for the 
ICTR to harness the similarities with Gacaca normative structure (including Gacaca 
under the Organic Law), and inquire into possible reconciliation of divergent features. 
The latter include limitation on parties‟ representations, judicial control over 
deliberation of sentence, the role of ritual and oral narrative. The similarity is in the 
public pronunciation of sentence. The consequences of this neglect in normative 
terms will become clearer after I examine how the ICTR applies Organic Law in its 
decisions. I focus on the jurisprudence up to 2007 to illustrate my arguments. 
 
(ii) Limitation on parties’ representations and the ‘right’ to be heard   
 
Within traditional Gacaca courts, each member of the community has an 
obligation to confront or adduce evidence when necessary, as contrasted with ICTR 
procedure. Take the example of sentencing agreements, a feature originating from the 
common law model, where judges consider negotiations on an agreed sentence made 
                                                 
48
 Ibid, 81-82. Kamuhangire‟s view is that the matter is resolved amicably to the satisfaction of the 
parties involved. I find Gaparyi‟s explanation more acceptable as it does not present a romanticised 
view of customary law as free from tensions in reaching consensus. 
49
 C. Ntampaka (2002) cited in J. Fierens op cit 913 and note 58.  
50J. N Maogoto, „The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: A Paper Umbrella in the Rain? 
Initial Pitfalls and Brighter Prospects‟ (2004) 73 Nordic Journal of International Law 187-221, 
discussing arguments for traditional Gacaca in allowing individuals to participate in the creation of 
justice: 218-219. 
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outside court inter partes.
51
 Sentence agreements are not binding on the Trial 
Chamber under Rule 62 bis (B). They are a form of plea bargaining where procedural 
rights are waived by the defendant, like the right to call defence witnesses.
52
 The 
effect of the waiver of rights is aptly depicted in Bisengimana’s case. Following a 
plea of guilty, the Trial Chamber considered Bisengimana‟s assistance to victims as a 
mitigating factor. The court heard the testimony of one witness, Claudine Uwera 
Bisengimana, his daughter. She testified as to how her father gave refuge to Tutsi 
refugees and tried to save them.
53
 The Chamber also heard evidence that the 
defendant fled and left these people behind and some were killed. In considering the 
totality of this testimony, the Chamber rejected the defence‟s assertion that these facts 
constituted a mitigating factor
54
 under Rule 101 (B). Their reasoning was that no 
other witness gave evidence on the defendant‟s assistance to the Tutsi refugees, and 




In fact, Bisengimana’s judgement cited five instances where submissions of 
mitigating or aggravating factors went unchallenged by either side.
56
 Despite these 
gaps, the Chamber made its own findings, suggesting that they were unable to apply 
traditional Gacaca procedures to fill in the gaps, for instance by inviting the 
community to give information. Moreover, Organic Law also restricts the parties who 
may give information during sentencing. Following a plea of guilty (Article 64(11)) 
                                                 
51
 A sentence agreement forms part of plea bargaining - a generic term for negotiations in the criminal 
justice process: M. Freely, „Perspectives on Plea Bargaining‟ (1979) 13 Law and Society Review 199-
209,199-200. Plea bargaining is an example of procedural innovations by judges to fill the gap in 
Article 62 ICTR Statute, on the guilty plea procedure. This lacuna was filled in Bisengimana op cit, 
para 18. Some sentence agreements include: Kambanda op cit, Serushago op cit, Ruggiu op cit, 
Prosecutor v J. Serugendo ICTR-2005-84-I Judgment and Sentence of 12/06/06, and Nzabirinda op 
cit. 
52
 Bisengimana op cit at para 20 applied the definition in Prosecutor v Todorovic Case No IT-95-99/1-
S, Sentencing Judgement 31 July 2001 para 4, 10, of procedural rights that are waived in plea 
bargaining: the right not to plead guilty, the right to be presumed innocent, the right to a trial before the 
International Tribunal, the right to compel and subpoena witnesses to appear on the accused‟s behalf, 
the right to testify or to remain silent at trial, the right to cross examine prosecution witnesses, the right 
to testify in one‟s own defence and the right to appeal a finding of guilt or appeal any pre-trial rulings. 
53
 Ibid, para.154, 157. 
54
 Ibid, para 159. 
55
 Ibid, para. 158. 
56 Ibid paras. 161-177. The factors included influence of the offender, personal and family situation, 
lack of previous convictions, health and lack of personal participation in the offence. Also in 
Muhimana op cit, the defence counsel did not address issues of mitigating circumstances in accordance 
with Rule 86(C) stating in closing arguments that he was relying on the Chamber‟s „high sense of 
justice‟: para 602. Likewise in Prosecutor v Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda ICTR-99-54A-T Judgment of 
22
nd
 January 2004, the defence counsel did not address the court on matters relating to sentencing 
under Rule 86 (c): para 756. 
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and a full hearing after a plea of not guilty (Article 65(5) (h)): „The Seat asks the 
plaintiff and the defendant if they have additional information.‟57 The effect of these 
provisions is to limit who may make representations on sentencing, just like Rule 100 
(A) ICTR RPE. Clearly then, both the ICTR and Organic Law procedures subvert 
individual and communitarian rights by denying the individual and community an 
opportunity to be heard on sentencing. Notably, the ICTR did not reconcile this 
divergence. The upshot is that the ICTR may have come to a sentencing decision that 
was inappropriate because of the lack of sufficient information.  
(iii) Deliberation of sentence and the ‘right’ to a public hearing  
 
      A second divergent feature is the communitarian „right‟ to participate in the 
deliberation of sentence, synonymous with a right to a public hearing. Under Article 
21 Organic Law, 2004: „the decisions and deliberations of judges are made in secret‟. 
The decisions are arrived at by consensus of the Seat of the Gacaca (comprising 9 
persons of integrity and 5 deputies) and if that fails, then by a majority vote (Article 
24). Even so, these provisions are a distortion of the traditional Gacaca process. For 
although the Organic Law creates a hybrid of national law and international law
58
 
„melded‟ with Rwandese customary procedure, the deliberation of sentence is devised 
without regard to the African situation. Article 21 Organic Law has the same wording 
as Article 23 (2) ICTR Statute. Therefore, even if the ICTR were to apply Article 21, 
its deliberations would still be in private. This would circumscribe the unlimited locus 
standi of the parties and community to deliberate sentence and inevitably upset the 
balance of a notion of traditional „equality of arms‟. Such sentencing decisions 
arrived at unilaterally by the ICTR, may entrench feelings of alienation and 
inappropriateness of decisions. 
  
(iv) Restitution, compensation and the role of ritual  
 
   A third divergent feature is the role of ritual in restitution and compensation 
(reparations). It has been correctly argued that the lack of confidence in the role of the 
ICTR by the affected populations is attributable to the lack of compensation to 
                                                 
57
 Organic Law No. 16 of 2004. 
58
 Under the Preamble to the Organic Law ibid, the Penal Code of Rwanda and the Geneva 
Conventions form the substantive penal law.  
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families (as is done in customary trials).
59
 Less has been said about the failure of 
international procedural justice to use traditionally preferred forms of reparation in 
accordance with accepted rituals. In traditional Gacaca courts, reparation involves 
payment of a fine as compensation to the wronged party, but of equal importance is 
reconciliation in the form of a ritual or feast.
60
  
Under Article 75 of the 2004 Organic Law, persons convicted of offences 
relating to property are sentenced to „civil reparation.‟61 Crucially, both Article 23 (3) 
ICTR Statute and Article 75 Organic Law do not provide for a reconciliation feast. 
Consequently, both laws exclude traditionally accepted rituals that are as important as 
the reparation. A related problem is that of the procedure for obtaining the reparation. 
Traditionally, the community takes responsibility for its member‟s wrong doing and 
for paying the reparation. Yet as Kamatali observes, the victim is left in a weaker 
position due to lack of resources to file a suit in court to claim the reparation; quite 
unlike the traditional system.
62
  
Notably, the ICTR Statute lacks a victim‟s right to claim for reparation, yet 
Rwandans‟ definition of justice for the genocide is that victims have a right to 
compensation.
63
 Moreover, the ICTR exemplified in Ndindabahizi, tend to focus on 
imprisonment as if it is the only penalty that can be imposed by the Tribunal.
64
 
According to Shelton, reparation was not considered by the ICTR because it was 
assumed that the defendants were indigent.
65
 Apuuli has since established that the 




                                                 
59
 R. Zacklin, „The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals‟ (2004) 2 (2) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 541-545 n. 86. 
60
 E. Kamuhangire op cit 7-8. The culprit is fined or reprimanded and has to buy a pot of local brew for 
the communal reconciliatory feast. This is similar to the Acoli Mato Oput ceremony described in Ch. 1 
S. 1op cit.   
61
 Organic Law 2004 op cit Chapter VII: Articles 94, 95 and 96. The court determines the methods, 
period of payment, and forms of compensation under national law. 
62
 J. M Kamatali, „The Challenge Of Linking International Criminal Justice And National 
Reconciliation: The Case Of The ICTR‟ (2003) 16 (1) Leiden International Journal 115-133, 130-132. 
63
 F. Nsanzuwera, „The ICTR Contribution to National Reconciliation‟ (2005) 3 (4) Journal of 
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 Prosecutor v Ndindabahizi ICTR-2001-71-I Judgement of 15/7/2004 para 496. Kambanda op cit 
para 41, Ruggiu op cit para 26, Musema op cit, para 978, Ntakirutimana op cit para 880 are other 
examples. 
65
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nd
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Although I agree with these views, the authors draw no linkage between 
international procedural rules and the community sense of disparate justice. The rules 
lack a mechanism by which the community can develop a shared perspective that 
offenders have been tried, denounced and held accountable in a fair process. In other 
words, ownership of the process is lacking because success in sanctioning at the local 
level, is measured by the degree of reparation for the victims and their participation.
67
 
Since international rules are grounded in a retributive philosophy, they seem not to 
accommodate restorative justice.  
  
(v) Reconciliation, Rehabilitation and ritual  
 
Let us examine how the international aims of reconciliation and rehabilitation 
are realised while taking into consideration restorative values and the role of ritual. 
The Security Council‟s resolution setting up the ICTR emphasised that the aim of the 
ICTR prosecutions was to contribute to „national reconciliation and restoration and 
maintenance of peace‟.68 Notably, no provisions exist to guide the court on how to 
apply African communitarian values, for as Maogoto argues, the ICTR penal process 
was focused on deterrence and retribution without much effort to incorporate 
rehabilitation and restoration into its overall strategy.
69
 For instance, there is no 
mention of rituals or obligatory reconciliatory feasts as part of the sentencing process. 
Likewise, there is no reference to the communitarian values that should underpin this 
process. 
The Organic Law provides under Article 54 (3), that the defendant must 
apologise for the offences they have committed. Despite this sparse provision, 
Gaparayi‟s definition of reconciliation as demanding a positive action from the 
perpetrators is instructive.
70
 In this regard, Kamatali argues, rightly in my view, that 
where the defendant expresses remorse to the victim face to face, this forms part of 
the reconciliatory restorative process. If however, remorse is expressed during the 
sentencing hearing several miles away from the local population, this thwarts 
                                                 
67
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 Preamble, S. C. Res.  955/94, op cit. 
69
 J. Maogoto op cit 197; also Kamatali op cit 116. 
70
 I. Gaparayi op cit 101. 




 Some have correctly observed that the strong sense of 
injustice and inequity among individual victims is replicated by experiences of victim 
communities with regards to the inability of the tribunals to promote reconciliation.
72
 
The ICTR has also in the past been blamed for failing to promote reconciliation due 
to the fact that it is preoccupied with applying an individual level of justice to 
promote social order, and thereby fails to appreciate that: 
 
„There must be collective catharsis for reconciliation to be realised. (…) the 
structural distance of the tribunal from the Rwandan social process [has] made it 
difficult for its work to be relevant and it is even more unlikely that it will address 
the root causes of the genocide.‟73  
 
The sentencing decisions of the ICTR are evidence of this thinking. In Jean 
Kambanda for example, the Chambers analysed the penalties under the 1996 Organic 
law and concluded that the ICTR sentences must be directed at retribution and 
deterrence.   
Even so, there are other types of judicial responses to traditional values of 
reconciliation that can be discerned from the ICTR jurisprudence. For example, in 
Prosecutor v Eliézer Niyitegeka, the Trial Chambers considered the protection of 
society as fundamental to sentencing.
74
 In Kamuhanda, the Chamber also considered 




Significantly, in his dissenting opinion, Judge Maqtu in Kamuhanda, 
explained that the ICTR‟s purpose „in a traditional judicial fashion‟ is to robustly 
punish the offenders with the object „hopefully‟ of helping reconciliation.76 He 
distinguished this from the aim of traditional Gacaca courts where neighbours and 
peer groups participate in the judicial process and by them the accused is heard. Only 
after the latter has shown penance can moral restitution be worked out.
 
Maqtu quite 
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nd
 January 2004 op cit, para 754. 
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 M. Owor Page 114 
 
rightly observed that this normative framework belongs to the indigenous Rwandan 
culture; and concludes: „The International Tribunal has no system or guidelines of the 
nature that Gacaca courts have, to actually put into effect the reconciliation 
element.‟77 Maqtu‟s views, though not echoed in any other ICTR judgment, are a 
clear testament to the impotence of the ICTR procedural framework in promoting 
reconciliation.  
More recently in Bisengimana, the Trial Chamber construed its role in 
contributing to national reconciliation differently, observing that „in the event of a 
conviction, a just sentence contributes towards these goals.‟78 The Chamber rejected a 
proposed agreed sentence of 14 years imprisonment and enhanced it to 15 years 
imprisonment with credit for time on detention.
79
 While I accept that the process for 
arriving at the sentence may be fair by international standards, the Chamber did not 
elaborate the rationale for this relationship between the enhanced imprisonment term 
and reconciliation. In other words, there is no explanation of how imprisonment in 
itself promotes reconciliation. The Chamber did not consider the difficulties of 
promoting reconciliation in the context of traditional Gacaca procedures, nor relate it 
to Judge Maqtu‟s observations.  
The Organic Law and ICTR Statute lack express provisions on rehabilitation. 
Moreover, as we saw in Chapter 2, international tribunals are reluctant to pursue 
rehabilitation for fear of infringing the principle of proportionality and weakening 
other sentencing purposes.
80
 Even if rehabilitation was pursued as a legitimate 
purpose in sentencing, it is unlikely the ICTR would take cognisance of local rituals 
or ceremonies of reintegration.  
The foregoing discussion shows that maintaining societal equilibrium through 
reconciliation and rehabilitation, are not intrinsic values upheld by the ICTR, because 
its sentencing procedures do not incorporate restorative aspects of African customary 
law and ritual. 
 
 




 Bisengimana, op cit, Judgment of 13
th
 April 2006 at para 106. 
79
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80
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(vi) The oral narrative   
 
   The case of Prosecutor v Akayesu portrays how the ICTR dealt with the 
divergence between traditional oral narrative and international procedure.
81
 Dr. 
Mathias Ruzindana, the prosecution‟s Socio-Linguist Expert, pointed out that in 
African criminal procedure; oral tradition is where facts are reported as perceived by 
the witness, sometimes through secondary listeners. People are not direct when 
answering questions particularly on a sensitive matter, so answers have to be decoded 
and rely on the context. In particular, decoding must take account of the 
characteristics of the particular speech community, the identity of and relation 
between the orator and the listener as well as the subject matter of the question.
82
 
  The Trial Chambers grappled with the problem of accommodating these 
linguistic and cultural factors in weighing evidence. Friman cautions that such factors 
may lead to misunderstanding and misinterpretation or even affect the court‟s ability 
to correctly assess the probative value of evidence.
83
 To their credit, although the 
Chamber described witnesses‟ testimony as „circuitous‟, they did not draw any 
adverse conclusions regarding the credibility of witnesses based on these 
peculiarities.
84
 Arguably, this shows the strength of the ICTR in overcoming a 
„cultural‟ divide. Nevertheless, this strength may be diminished somewhat through 
use of a foreign working language. In Article 31 ICTR Statute, the working language 
is English or French. The imposition of foreign languages as Nice aptly puts it, 
expresses a form of „cultural imperialism‟.85 Notably, a large number of witnesses 
before the ICTR testified in Kinyarwanda creating a major setback where there were 
Kinyarwanda words that could not be translated into English and French, and vice 
versa.
86
 Since the Rwandese culture is one of an oral „legal‟ tradition; arguably the 
inability to communicate in a local working language makes the international process 
less legitimate. This is more so because parties and their communities may not 
understand the proceedings and why a particular sentence was given.
87
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 (vii) Similarities: public pronouncement of sentence 
 
Under Article 70 of the 2004 Organic Law: „The judgement or decision taken 
are (sic) pronounced publicly in the meeting or next hearing (…)‟. This public 
pronouncement of judgment is the same as that in traditional Gacaca courts and 
Article 22 (2) of the ICTR Statute. The Chamber has not however drawn on this 
similarity to make its sentencing practice more legitimate to the Rwandan population. 
The Chamber could for instance, give reasons in its judgement (as Judge Maqtu did in 
Kamuhanda) on whether aspects of traditional justice may be legitimately 
accommodated in international sentencing practice or not. The Chamber could also 
use expressivism to educate the community on these issues.
88
 In sum, the ICTR 
missed an opportunity to link both the international and traditional models using a 
common feature.  
To conclude, the present approach of the judges towards application of the 
Organic Law is unlikely to change because arguably the differences seem 
irreconcilable. I have argued that the differences are such that traditional procedures 
are „appropriated‟ by the Organic Law. This influences judicial practice particularly 
since the ad hoc tribunals have been described as a „laboratory‟ for the ICC.89 The 
outcome is a legalistic application of principles and a failure to adopt a community 
centred approach. On the plus side, this prevents weakening of legal certainty through 
variable interpretation of law. On the negative side, African customary law is 
excluded, with all that that implies for the court‟s legitimacy in the eyes of the 
community it is arguably supposed to be serving. This is despite having a common 
feature namely the public pronouncement of sentence and similar aims like 
reconciliation and reparation. I now evaluate the sentencing practices of the SCSL in 
the next section. 
                                                                                                                                            
and human rights bodies like the European Court for Human Rights. Even so, I maintain that language 
barriers alienate illiterate and semi- literate communities that the courts are meant to serve. 
88
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Section 4: Sentencing framework of the SCSL  
 
This section investigates the sentencing practices of the SCSL. I demonstrate 
that the sentencing regime is inadequate to reconcile competing procedural interests 
as exemplified in the CDF trial, because its framework is similar that of its 
predecessor- the ICTR. Nonetheless, the SCSL regime has some unique provisions 
that could be used to harness African customary procedures and values into the 
international paradigm.  
(i) The sentencing procedural regime 
 
The SCSL procedural regime is an excellent example of an international-
national hybrid court
90
 that draws heavily from the ICTR: Article 14(1) SCSL Statute 
applies the ICTR RPE „mutatis mutandis’ to its proceedings.91 The SCSL also has the 
option of applying Sierra Leonean law where appropriate (Article 14(2)). The 
principle of legality in Article 19(1) provides that the Trial Chamber shall have 
recourse to practice on prison sentences of the ICTR and the courts of Sierra Leone. 
The detailed procedure on sentencing is set out below:  
Rule 100 SCSL: 
 
(A) „If the Trial Chamber convicts the accused or the accused enters a guilty 
plea, the prosecutor shall submit any relevant information that may assist the 
Trial Chamber in determining an appropriate sentence no more than 14 days 
after such conviction or guilty plea. The defendant shall thereafter, but no 
more than 21 days after the Prosecutor‟s filing submit any relevant 
information that may assist the Trial Chamber in determining an appropriate 
sentence. 
(B) Where the accused has entered a guilty plea, the Trial Chamber shall hear 
submissions of the parties at a sentencing hearing. Where the accused has 
been convicted by a Trial Chamber, the Trial Chamber may hear submissions 
of the parties at a sentencing hearing. 
(C) The sentence may be pronounced in a judgement in public and in the 
presence of the convicted person, subject to Rule 102 (B).‟ 
 
Rule 100 above has similar features to the ICTR RPE. Both sides may submit 
relevant information to assist the Trial Chamber determine an appropriate sentence 
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and judgment may be pronounced in public and in the presence of the accused. In 
practice, the SCSL delivers its judgements in public and also posts them on their 
website.
92
 Most importantly, under Rule 87 (A), all deliberations of the Trial 
Chamber shall be in private.  
A notable distinction is the margin of „appreciation‟ in Article 14 (2), where 
judges may adopt rules to provide for a „specific situation‟ not covered by the existing 
ones. In so doing the judges are guided by the Criminal Procedure Act 1965 of Sierra 
Leone.  There are no amendments to the provisions on sentencing. Still, the potential 
for accommodating traditional justice exists because judges have in the past used their 
powers to amend Rule 100. They have for example, specified time frames within 
which information for sentencing should be submitted.
93
 However, the Criminal 
Procedure Act may not provide sufficient guidance on traditional justice, because its 
origins are of the common law tradition.
94
 A look at the drafting history shows that 
the amendments following Article 14 (2) were made during the judges‟ plenary 
sessions, but most were motivated by procedural expediency. The court also seems to 
have minimised civil law oriented amendments because most judges are from a 
common law background, therefore the rules essentially resemble common law.
95
 
Since the court has international oversight, arguably, any amendments to Rule 100 
would still leave unaddressed, the question of the assimilation of traditional 
restorative process and communitarian values.  
The SCSL procedural rights framework has been lauded for having a „high 
standard of procedural protection, in line with international human rights 
instruments.‟96 Despite this, it does not provide explicitly for rights during the 
sentencing process. What exists is Article 17 providing rights for the accused during 
the trial. Both the Trial and Appeal Chambers are enjoined under Rule 26bis, to 
ensure that the trial is fair and expeditious with full respect for rights of accused and 
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due regard for protection of witnesses.
97
 This emphasis on individual rights, with no 
mention of communitarian values can be traced to the SCSL legislative origins.  
(ii) Legislative Origins  
 
Let me give a brief background of the facts that led to creation of the SCSL. 
The civil war in Sierra Leone was begun in 1991 by the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) – a political movement against corruption and monopoly of power.98 RUF 
overthrew the government but later their activities degenerated into a culture of 
violence as they tried to control the country‟s diamond and mineral wealth.99 There 
was an invasion of Freetown (the capital city of Sierra Leone), by the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) who in January 1997 took over power. AFRC even 
formed a junta government with the RUF but this did not last. Another warring 
faction was the CDF (largest, most powerful pro-government militia force)
100
 that 
was made up of citizen‟s militia. The militia was based on traditional hunting 
societies called the Kamajors under the leadership of Chief Sam Hinga Norman.
101
 
Kamajor traditions comprised two stages. The „immunisation‟ process involved 
smearing initiates with mystical herbs rendering people immune to bullet wounds.
102
 
The „initiation‟ ceremonies gave hunters powers to turn into an animal to catch their 
prey.
103
 There were even rules prohibiting crimes like killing of civilians, women or 
the surrendered enemy.
104
 However, the Kamajor hunting tradition was usurped and 
turned into criminal acts of mutilation and cannibalism by the CDF, including its 
Kamajor initiates.
105
 This turn of events arose because the initiation process was 
truncated and proscriptions were not taught to the fighters who were hastily recruited 
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due to the need to increase the numbers. Children some even as young as 11, were 
taken through these rituals.
106
  
Following an Agreement between the UN and the government, the SCSL was 
established.
107
 The court was part of the UN model of „internationalised jurisdiction‟, 
the first of its kind set up by a treaty based agreement between the UN and a state.
108
 
In this respect, the SCSL differs from the ICTR that is set up by a Security Council 
Resolution. The jurisdiction of the SCSL is sometimes described as „mixed‟ 
jurisdiction of dual subject matter, because some crimes that it can try are national in 
character. For instance, Article 5 provides for crimes under Sierra Leonean law, 
whereas other crimes are violations of international law.
109
 The Statute does not refer 
to traditional customary laws, for as B. Dougherty puts forth, the political aim was to 




The preceding analysis of the SCSL sentencing framework reflects centralised 
judicial control, a predominantly retributive ideology, strengthened by protection of 
individual accused‟s rights. It follows that the SCSL framework is in keeping with the 
international justice paradigm as exemplified in the jurisprudence of the SCSL. 
Section 5: Sentencing jurisprudence of the SCSL  
 
In this section, I examine the SCSL sentencing jurisprudence. The SCSL lacks 
legislation along the lines of Rwanda‟s Organic law which complicates matters 
somewhat because without it traditional procedures can not be easily introduced into 
the international arena. As the CDF trial illustrates, this renders the SCSL sentencing 
process bereft of any reference point concerning traditional procedure or 
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communitarian values. I conclude that there is need for innovative interpretation to 
mitigate this divergence.  
The CDF accused did not overtly ask to be tried under traditional customary 
laws. Rather, they used traditional customary practices to their advantage and viewed 
the international criminal proceedings as „white man‟s justice‟. For example, Rev. 
SamForay a supporter of the CDF has castigated D. Crane and his „cohorts‟-the 
SCSL, of being: 
 „engaged in a dizzying array of legal gymnastics all aimed at further humiliating 
Chief Sam Hinga Norman and making life for him and his colleagues …a bit more 
hellish.‟111  
 
SamForay accuses the government and the UN of using „racist and tribal‟ statements 
by identifying the Kamajors, Mendes and Poro society as cannibals. He has gone on 
to exhort Sierra Leonean people to redeem themselves from this „madness called the 
Special Court.‟112 SamForay‟s criticism takes us back to my first line of argument that 
questions the effectiveness of international procedural justice. How effective is a 
global system that so distances itself from the local norms, that it can be characterised 
as engaging in „legal gymnastics‟?  
This „distance‟ is clear from Cockayne‟s observation of judges and personnel 
at international courts.
 
They find local social practices incomprehensible and then 
either exclude them from their narratives, or use the trial as an opportunity to 
denounce those very practices. This strategy reinforces tribal and other group 
solidarities that lies at the root of the conflict, and only serves to distance the local 
community from the international tribunals.
113
 C. Sriram likewise comments that the 
„notable failure of international tribunals has been their inability to communicate with 
the affected society‟.114 These comments illustrate how integrating African customary 
procedural standards are thwarted particularly where the court has an impoverished 
view of traditional procedures and communitarian values. 
There is a misplaced belief that effective outreach programmes avoid the 
pitfalls of the ICTR whose sentencing outcomes are viewed by Rwandans as 
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inappropriate. Crane‟s praise of the outreach programmes is similar to Scharf and 
Kang
115
 but they all fail to appreciate the weakness of this approach. Outreach 
programmes are spearheaded by the court itself to make its mission and procedures 
accessible to those in rural areas. The mandate is not to integrate African customary 
procedures into the trial but rather it is an advocacy crusade for the tribunal. 
Therefore the local communities have no input in the way the court functions, but are 
mere recipients of information. The sentencing practices of the court mirror outreach 
programmes. As a result, the goal of harmonisation becomes even more elusive 
because of the primacy of international bodies that exclude indigenous trial 
frameworks. This leads to a „democratic deficit‟ in international law,116 one that lacks 
an understanding of the traditional sentencing process. 
(i) Kamajor traditional sentencing process   
 
The traditional processes of justice have not been explored to their full 
potential by the SCSL.
117
 Sierra Leone‟s existing chieftaincy system applies both 
customary and national law. Chiefs are nominated under customary law, elected by 
the government and their decisions are officially recognised alongside those of the 
courts of law.
118
 However, operating outside these legally recognised court settings, 
are the secret societies to which many in the rural areas belong.
119
 Of the 16 ethnic 
groups in Sierra Leone, 3 are secret societies: Poro of the Mende, Temne and 
Sherbro.
120
 The Poro instigated the Kamajor movement in Kenema district. Secret 
societies have their own „legal‟ system with its own laws, procedures, punishments 
and criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed „out of the bush‟.121 The secrecy 
arises from the belief that giving any information to outsiders may invite curses to the 
individual and his immediate family. As Judge Itoe pointed out, there was little 
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evidence in the CDF trial to prove the accused persons‟ direct involvement because of 
the secrecy and mythology that characterises Kamajor activities.
122
 
Despite the mystery surrounding their practices there are earlier accounts of 
secret societies processes. For example, Driberg‟s anthropological study of secret 
societies like the Poro found that they had special tribunals that applied automatic 
spiritual sanctions for breaking the law, reflective of punitive tribal justice.
123
 Elias‟s 
appraisal of the Poro established that the secret societies administered justice in 
certain categories of political offences in the local communities.
124
 Trials involving 
influential dignitaries „notables‟ for offences like treason, took place behind closed 




With regards to contemporary trial and sentencing procedures there is little to 
go by. Even so, according to the Manifesto 99 Report, some of these secret society 
ceremonies involve rehabilitation and purification and therefore could play a role in 
reconciliation.
126
 For example, the purification ritual, a major form of reconciliation 
among the Mende, involves symbolic cleansing and spiritual intervention that 
expiates perpetrator‟s sins by „washing‟ away any curse that may be incurred.127 
Libation may be offered to the ancestors whereby baagobi (red rice) and njalei (cool 
water) is offered in a shrine in a sacred bush, followed by a feast. For crimes like 
theft, offenders are made to dance publicly and subjected to treatment that may 
qualify as torture.
128
 Such treatment underpins the punitive philosophy of the 
adjudicatory process. Invoking the supernatural intervention of sprits known as 
„Swearing‟ is used where the case remains unresolved. Invocation of specific spirits 
among the Mende and Sherbro brings a curse on the suspected offender to cause 
death or bring ill luck. It gives some satisfaction to victims but also reflects the 
punitive aspect of their traditional law.
129
  
                                                 
122
 Dissenting Opinion of Judge B. Itoe op cit at para 34.  
123
 J. Driberg (1934) op cit 237-238 and note 1. 
124
 T. Elias op cit at 216-217. 
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 Ibid, 227, 228, referring to F. W Butt-Thompson, West African Secret Societies (London: Witherby, 
1929).  
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 The Law People See op cit at 32, citing Manifesto Report 99: „Report for the study of Traditional 
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 S. Rodella op cit Annex 7 at 156 citing Manifesto 99 report.  B. Dougherty op cit 324 note 60. 
128
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129
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popular; The Law People See op cit at 33. 
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A study by E. Sawyer in 2005 established that secret societies were ranked as 
very good, much higher than the courts of law in terms of their ability to resolve 
conflict.
130
 Rodella also established that the Kamajors prefer to continue with their 
duty of protection of their community and have not expressed much willingness to 
counter the SCSL indictments.
131
 Sawyer‟s and Rodella‟s research strongly suggests 
that the Kamajor’s reluctance to get involved is because the SCSL trial and 
sentencing procedure is vastly divergent from their secret societies processes. This 
point becomes clearer in the sub section below, where I examine how the Trial 
Chamber grappled with Kamajor practices in their sentencing jurisprudence. 
(ii) The Civilian Defence Forces Trial  
 
The trial of Fofana and Kondewa illustrates the complexities of taking into 
consideration Kamajor practices. The two accused were indicted on 24
th
 June 2003 
for war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.
132
 The 
Trial Chamber on 2
nd





 October 2007, the Trial Chamber sentenced them to terms ranging from three 
to eight years imprisonment, with the sentences to run concurrently.
134
 On appeal by 
Kondewa and the Prosecution,
135
 the sentences were enhanced. Fofana was ordered to 
serve a total of 15 years imprisonment and Kondewa a total of 20 years 
imprisonment.
136
 I now explore the legal issues that influenced the SCSL during the 
sentencing process. 
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 E. Sawyer, „Remove or Reform? A Case for (Restructuring) Chiefdom Governance in Post Conflict 
Sierra Leone‟ (2008) 107 (428) African Affairs 387-403, 394-398. 
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28
th
 May 2008: Part V Disposition pages 187-191 with Judge R. Winter dissenting in part. 
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 Ibid page 191 with Judge G. King and Judge J. Kamanda dissenting on sentence. The acquittals 
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and 8. Likewise Fofana was found guilty on counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 but not guilty of counts 5, in part and 
not guilty on counts 6, 7, 8, Judge R. Winter dissenting in part: pages 187-191. 
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(a) Public participation and the ‘right’ to be heard 
  
We saw in Chapter 2, that public participation is a process in traditional 
systems that protect group rights to be heard. Conversely, under the SCSL Statute, the 
Trial Chamber has sole discretion to decide who will be heard. For example, during 
the sentencing hearing, the Trial Chamber dismissed an application by the defence to 
call a witness -Frances Fortune- to attest to the good character of Fofana. The grounds 
given by the Chamber was that it was not necessary to call the witness at that stage.
137
 
From a legal point of view, the Chamber were within their discretion to decline to 
hear Fortune‟s evidence, although we do not know the reasons why they declined to 
do so. From a traditional point of view, this suggests that the Chambers were more 
concerned with the legalistic issue of whether the testimony was of evidential value to 
the sentence. What the judges failed to appreciate was that this refusal denied them an 
opportunity to hear what mitigating factors might be availed to the defence. 
Theoretically, the refusal also denied the convicted persons the right to be heard by 
letting relatives give evidence on their behalf. For that reason, the sentence of 
imprisonment was entirely within the law, although the procedure by which it was 
arrived at is at variance with the communitarian „right‟ of every adult expressing their 
mind on such a public issue.   
(b) Reparation, compensation and ritual  
 
In view of the previous experiences of the ICTR, it is perhaps not surprising that 
the SCSL has not applied its provisions on reparation (Rule 104) and compensation 
(Rule 105) in its judgements. Yet as some like Sriram point out, victims before the 
SCSL expressed the expectation that they would receive compensation.
138
 Apart from 
denying victims an opportunity to get reparation, the sentencing procedure excludes 
any possibility of applying local rituals that follow compensation. As I pointed out in 
Chapter 2, restitution is inseparable from ritual because of the need to appease the 
wrath of the gods through sacrifice even after reparation satisfies the living. Yet the 
philosophy inherent in international procedure means that the court puts emphasis on 
retribution rather than restitution. This is evident when the Trial Chamber, using 
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Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa Sentencing Judgment of 9th October 2007 op cit: paras 12-13 
note 19, citing the transcript of the sentencing hearing.   
138
 C. Sriram op cit at 103.  
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expressivism, affirmed that the primary objective of sentencing includes retribution 
and deterrence, and the sentence of the tribunal should: 
„…Make plain the condemnation of the international community of the 
behaviour in question and show that the international community was not 
ready to tolerate serious violations of international humanitarian law and 
human rights.‟139  
 
The emphasis here is on the international community, with little mention of 
the local audience who are supposed to benefit from the sentence. Drumbl 
persuasively argues that fear of involving locals in international „operations‟ arises 
from a misplaced national or ethnic bias.
140
 Such bias as we can see, excludes those 
with the greatest interest from participating in the sentencing procedures. More so, 
international procedure excludes deliberation of sentence which means that judges 
have no opportunity to engage with the community and inquire into acceptable 
reparation and any rituals that may accompany them.  
In spite of this, the judges are alive to these traditional practices and have even 
discussed them in their judgements. Nonetheless, they appear to be dismissive of 
traditional practices. Judge Winter, for instance, argued that the SCSL, not being a 
domestic court could not accept „any cultural considerations as excuses for criminal 
conduct‟.141 This in my view excludes the more positive cultural considerations like 
processes of reparation that do exist. No questions were raised during the trial on 
what these positive traditional practices might be. This lends credence to Cockayne‟s 
earlier comments on the negative attitude of the judges and personnel towards 
traditional practices, and explains why the SCSL remains remote from the local 
experience.    
(c) Reconciliation and ritual    
 
The principle of reconciliation is found in the key Security Council Resolution 
which states that a credible system of justice and accountability would contribute to 
national reconciliation in Sierra Leone.
142
 Arguably the sentencing judgment in 
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 CDF Sentencing Judgment op cit para 26 citing Aleksovksi Appeal Judgment op cit para 185, 
Kambanda  Trial Judgment op cit para 28 and Nikolic IT-02-2-60/I-S (TC) Sentencing Judgment 2 
December 2003, para 86.  
140
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141 Prosecutor v M. Fofana and A. Kondewa (SCSL-04-14-A), Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
R. Winter op cit para 4.  
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 Preamble, S.C. Resolution 1513 (2000) op cit.  
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Fofana and Kondewa, shows the failure to integrate reconciliation as part of the 
sentencing process. The sentencing hearing shows how the Trial Chamber grappled 
with the question of reconciliation. The Chamber‟s approach was based on the 
international model of gathering information from the defendants and the prosecutor 
only.
143
 It did not gather any information from the community on how best to achieve 
reconciliation in their context. Rather, the debate was on the severity or leniency of 
the sentence in relation to the mitigating factor of remorse.
144
 No mention was made 
of the role of ritual in reconciliation. Moreover, the Appeals Chamber declined to 
enter into a discussion of whether the appellant‟s subsequent post conflict behaviour 
showed remorse and therefore signified attempts at reconciliation.
145
 Only Judge 
Winter in her dissenting opinion held that the statements by the two appellants did not 
show remorse because they were made after the conviction.
146
 Be that as it may, there 
was no attempt to accommodate Kamajor reconciliation processes, thereby 
undermining the very objective of reconciliation expressed in the Security Council 
resolution.  
(d) Other Trials: The AFRC and RUF sentencing procedure 
 
It is instructive that in the earlier judgment of the AFRC accused, an attempt 
was made to integrate traditional elements of crime into international law. This failed 
because of a procedural error in a defective indictment which meant that crucial 
evidence was excluded. The excluded evidence could have determined whether the 
accused were guilty of „forced marriage‟, or had married the girls under traditional 
marriages.
147
 The Trial Chamber decided that „forced marriage‟ is subsumed in the 
crime against humanity of sexual slavery, despite the lack of evidence (caused by the 
rejection of the count) and found them guilty of that instead. Justice J. Sebutinde in a 
separate concurring judgment argued that: 
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 Sentencing Judgment of 9
th
 October 2007 op cit paras 12-13.  
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th
 May 2008 op cit paras 536-541, 541. 
146
 Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge R. Winter of 28
th
 May 2008, op cit Part E, paras 90-104, 102-
103. 
147
 Prosecutor v Alex T Brima,  Brima B. Kamara and Santigie B. Kanu SCSL-04-16-T, Judgement of 
20
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„To throw out the overwhelming body of evidence of „forced marriage‟ as a 
consequence of the Prosecution‟s procedural error, would in my opinion be 
doing a great injustice to the hundreds of victims of „forced marriage‟ who 
look to this court for redress.‟ 148 
 
In the event, the sentencing hearing followed the CDF sentencing procedure. 
Brima and Kanu were each given 50 year jail terms and Kamara a 45 year jail term.
149
 
These terms were upheld on appeal.
150
 Did such stiff sentences in the AFRC case 
mean that the court had avoided doing a „great injustice‟ to the victims? It is difficult 
to see how such sentences secure „redress‟. The „great injustice‟ in my opinion is the 
lack of a communitarian participative „right‟ for the victim and community to give 
evidence on their preferred sentence. As Rule 100 stands, this must be routed through 
the Prosecutor or Defence. Likewise in the RUF judgement, Sesay, Kallon and Gbao 
were found guilty among others, of inhumane acts-forceful marriages, and given long 
sentences of 52, 40 and 25 years.
151
 Since the SCSL procedural regime does not 
recognise communitarian values, it cannot order as part of the sentence, traditional 
compensation or reconciliation rituals, as neither outcome is provided for in the SCSL 
RPE.  
In summary, the preceding audit of the sentencing jurisprudence of the SCSL 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the normative rigidity in the structural 
framework. It is also an indicator that international sentencing practice has failed to 
consider local norms and practice, due to a narrow judicial approach. This reflects the 
related problems of lack of guidelines on the application of non state criminal 
procedures in international trials, transplanted international law, and a failure to apply 
precedent expansively.
152
 Ultimately, the interpretation of the neo-traditional 
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customary procedure into international law is not possible in a framework that regards 
African procedural law as separate and indivisible.  
Section 6: Applying precedent: the challenges  
  
Some have argued that increasingly international law is becoming case law, 





precedent is very influential in the development of 
international criminal jurisprudence. This section will highlight the lessons on 
precedent for the ICC in the context of dealing with African conflict. 
 Jurisprudence of the ICTY,
154
 ICTR and SCSL are of limited precedential 
value to the ICC with regards to integration of traditional restorative justice and 
protection of communitarian values. Even if we argue that procedural rights ought to 
apply to sentencing, there remains the problem that the normative scope of procedural 
rights does not accord rights to the victim or community as such. Individual rights are 
a „culturally specific‟ concept in international law, so although the rise of rights in the 
West seems irresistible, in African customary law it does not receive much 
prominence in this sense.
155
 To even apply an expanded construct of rights is not so 
straightforward, because the doctrine of precedent is applied within narrow legal 
confines. Such an approach fails to take into account the differences with restorative 
justice practices and the implications for protection of communitarian values.  
A good example is from the ICTR Appeals Chamber. In Jean Kambanda v 
Prosecutor, the Chamber applied a textual and systematic interpretation of the right to 
legal assistance.
156
 The Chamber relied on decisions of the Human Rights Committee 
and the ECtHR. The Chamber applied Article 6 (3) ECHR, and arrived at the 
conclusion that the right to legal assistance is not absolute when the assistance is free. 
Further, that Article 6 (3) does not guarantee the right to choose the defence counsel 
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who may therefore be assigned by the court.
157
 The Chamber even distinguished 
between authoritative and persuasive decisions of European regional and national 
tribunals. In justifying their conclusion, the Chamber relied on a book on the 
ECHR
158
 and precedents from Europe.
159
 Clearly, the ICTR applies the doctrine of 
precedent within narrow legal confines by not distinguishing the normative context 
within which the application is being made. Additionally, criticisms about the 
incapacity of international law to adopt a restorative justice approach are few.
160
  
Another example is the AFRC sentencing judgment where the SCSL Trial 
Chamber justified its adherence to the sentencing practice of the ICTY and ICTR. Its 
reason was that their statutory provisions were analogous to those for the SCSL so it 
would be guided by them.
161
 Clearly, both ICTR and SCSL view statutory provisions 
as a crucial factor in determining whether the judges can be interventionist or not. 
This is surprising given that international courts have the option of departing from 
their previous decisions, although they have not used this option. The ICTY Appeals 
Chamber in Prosecutor v Aleksovksi, held that a court should be free to depart from 
its previous decisions for cogent reasons in the interests of justice.
162
 Circumstances 
justifying the „departure rule‟ include where the previous decision was based on a 
wrong principle of law or given per incuriam, for instance where the judge(s) were ill 
informed about the applicable law.
163
 The „interests of justice‟ test is not defined in 
Alekvoski.
164
 The Appeals Chamber in Semanza v Prosecutor followed the Aleksovski 
decision but likewise failed to define the „interests of justice‟.165  
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Even if they had, N. Miller‟s survey on precedent suggests that the ICTR is 
unlikely to distinguish decisions of the ICTY, and other regional bodies, because of 
predictability in the manner with which precedent is applied. Miller‟s findings show 
that the ICTR cited decisions of other tribunals as binding precedent and was 
reluctant to disagree with or distinguish them.
166
 In Baragywiza v Prosecutor, the 
ICTR Appeals Chamber pointed out that:  
‘Regional human rights treaties (…) and the jurisprudence developed there 
under, are persuasive authority which may be of assistance in applying and 
interpreting the Tribunal‟s applicable law….They are however authoritative as 
evidence of international custom.‟167 
 
This excerpt illustrates the greatest weakness of the doctrine of precedent: it is 
established by written case law only
168
 from „enlightened‟ legal systems. In other 
words, the ICTR would not consider traditional Gacaca decisions as a source of 
precedent in the absence of some sort of guideline from other tribunals. That is why 
the ICTR Chambers refer throughout to Rwandan Organic law in arriving at sentence 
but do not cite any decisions of the traditional Gacaca courts that operate outside the 
legal boundaries recognised by international tribunals. Traditional Gacaca 
jurisprudence does not meet the criteria of consistency and predictability that are 
advanced through a centralised national court system because they apply largely oral 
African jurisprudence whose decisions are not in writing. Equally, Organic Law 
Gacaca courts are not courts of record. Appeals only lie from the Organic Law 
Gacaca jurisdiction to the Gacaca Court of Appeal which is the last court of instance, 
but not to the superior Court of Cassation which is a court of record.
169
   
Still, judges are not using their powers to modify their procedural rules to fit the 
African conflict. For example, the manipulation of Kamajor traditions to commit 
crimes like cannibalism, could arguably qualify as a „special‟ situation that would 
need special rules of procedure under Article 14(2) SCSL Statute. Yet such special 
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rules have not been adopted by the SCSL. This could be because of the lack of 
transparency of the Kamajor secret society trial processes and bias by the judges of 
the SCSL. Still, there is also a lack of guidance on how this may be achieved. 
The real challenge then is that the ICTR and SCSL fail to use judicial 
precedent creatively, yet precedents from regional bodies like the ECtHR are 
inappropriate for local circumstances. The deductive and inductive reasoning that 
follows a hierarchy of decisions from „superior‟ tribunals, accentuates the problem. 
The ratio decidendi is developed based on analytical discussion of principles and 
factual application, but excludes the local socio-cultural context. Precedent also fails 
to give legitimacy to customary procedure because of the narrow legalistic 
interpretation. As a consequence, divergences between traditional and international 
normative frameworks are not mitigated, but stand in contradistinction to each other. 
It may not be unreasonable to suggest that judges will continue to rely heavily on 
jurisprudence from international tribunals and Western jurisdictions. The ICC will 
need to be creative in its use of precedent to avoid the pitfalls of the ICTR and SCSL 
in deciding cases relating to African conflict. By this I mean that the ICC should 
eschew an uncritical application of precedent. 
Section 7: Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I established that traditional restorative processes and 
communitarian values have no place in the international normative sentencing 
framework. This is not surprising given that the procedural regimes of the ICTR, 
SCSL and ICC, are grounded in the adversarial-inquisitorial model and based on a 
primarily retributive philosophy. Such philosophy places little emphasis on localised 
communitarian values and participatory approaches. The ICTR sentencing practice 
demonstrates the legal difficulties in applying traditional Gacaca values, despite the 
Rwanda Organic law, and the ICTR‟s very own aims.  
The SCSL is the first internationalised tribunal with a strengthened procedural 
framework to try cases involving traditional African practices. Yet its judgements 
exhibit an inability to accommodate features from traditional process, despite a 
governing provision which allows the judges to respond creatively to a „special 
situation‟. If anything, procedural errors have resulted in vital evidence on traditional 
 M. Owor Page 133 
 
practices being discarded even when this evidence could have affected positively the 
sentencing outcome.  
The sentencing practice of the ICTR and SCSL shows that although these 
normative differences could be mitigated through judge made rules, this has not 
happened in practice. I suggest some reasons why this is so. Firstly, the courts do not 
draw points of commonality from traditional African customary practices. Secondly, 
communitarian values have no place in a sentencing procedure that is inherently 
individualistic. Thirdly, the lack of guidelines prevents the tribunals from applying 
non state criminal procedures to international law. Fourthly, the tribunals seem to be 
inextricably bound by the precedents of the international criminal bodies like the 
ICTY and regional human rights bodies like the ECtHR even though theoretically 
there is room to consider other court decisions.  
This process may be interpreted as unfair by African standards because it 
reflects the failure of the international paradigm to accommodate competing 
procedural and human rights paradigms. Analysis of the sentencing practice of the 
courts shows that procedural legitimacy cannot be secured in a way which Africans 
would see as legitimate without accommodating African norms. Therefore the ICC 
may need to seek guidance from the African Human rights regional mechanism on 
how to engage directly with localised concepts of procedural justice. The next 
question is to establish whether the regional human rights mechanism gives guidance 
on an African notion of procedural rights that can be reconciled with Article 14 
ICCPR right to a fair trial. This is taken up in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE AFRICAN REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
FRAMEWORK 
Section 1: Introduction  
  
Previously we established that the sentencing jurisprudence of the ICTR and the 
SCSL is of limited precedential value to the ICC because it does not engage with 
competing procedural standards and divergent notions of rights like communitarian 
values.
1
 Notably absent in the framework and jurisprudence of the ICTR and SCSL, is 
any reference to an African notion of procedural fairness in the regional human rights 
framework. The framework encompasses the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (hereafter ‘the Charter’)2 and decisions of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (hereafter ‘the Commission’).3 Arguably, the absence of an African 
notion of procedural rights might be taken to imply the marginal position in 
international human rights law of the Charter and Commission decisions. Then again, 
the Charter is important because it accommodates African values and international 
procedural rights.  
This chapter sets out to assess the extent to which the Charter (and decisions 
made under it) brings into harmony conflicting normative frameworks. In doing so, this 
chapter provides, as far as I am aware, the only legal analysis of the Charter’s guidance 
on an African concept of procedural fairness. This analysis arises from moves to 
broaden the Charter obligations to cover traditional courts, through the passing of the 
Dakar Declaration on Fair Trial and the Principles and Guidelines on the right to a 
Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (hereinafter ‘the Guidelines’). I argue that 
these instruments may not adequately resolve the tension between communitarian 
values and the individualistic parameters of Article 14 ICCPR because of normative 
rigidity within the Charter provisions and a narrow interpretation of the right to a fair 
trial by the African Commission. I show how the Inter American Court of Human 
Rights (IACtHR) may provide lessons on accommodating distinct traditional features 
                                                 
1
 Communitarian values defined in Ch.1 S.4 op cit are duty to kin, reconciliation, restitution, and role of 
ritual. 
2
 The Charter was adopted by the 18
th
 Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African 
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Doc.CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5, (1981) reprinted in 21 I.L.M 58 (1982).  
3
 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights was established under Article 30 of the Charter. 
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and communitarian values in judicial decisions, within the parameters of international 
human rights law. The appropriate solution, I conclude, lies with the clan courts 
themselves.  
Following this introduction, I consider the tensions between Article 7 on a fair 
trial and communitarian values (Section 2), followed by an appraisal of the Guidelines 
(Section 3). Next, I investigate the application of the Charter to traditional courts 
(Section 4). I then appraise the jurisprudence of the Commission (Section 5) and 
examine lessons for the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights from the IACtHR 
(Section 6). I offer a conclusion in Section 7.  
Section 2: The Charter and Communitarian values 
 
This section contains the first part of my argument that evaluates the potential of 
the Charter to harmonise conflicting normative frameworks. Article 7 guarantees an 
individual the right to a fair trial. Then again, Article 7 competes with Articles 17, 27 
and 29 that recognise traditional and cultural values, impose duties on the individual 
and consider the rights of others. In the end, the Charter does not adequately define an 
African notion of procedural rights: one that engages with both procedural rights and 
communitarian values. 
 
(i) Article 7 (1):  The right to a fair trial  
 
The Charter enjoins member states who are parties to the Charter to recognise 
‘rights, duties and freedoms’ enshrined in it.4 Among these is the right to a fair trial: 
Article 7: 
1. ‘Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This 
comprises:  
(a) The right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of 
violating his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, 
laws, regulations and customs in force;  
(b) The right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent 
court or tribunal;  
(c) The right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his 
choice;  
                                                 
4
 The Charter op cit Article 1. For a commentary on the Charter: M. L Balanda, ‘African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in K. Ginther and W. Benedek (eds.) New perspectives in Perspectives and 
Conceptions of International Law: An Afro European Dialogue, (Wien and New York: Springer-
Verlag,1983) 134-146 and U. O Umozurike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (The 
Hague, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1997) Chapters 2, 5, 8, 9. 
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(d) The right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or 
tribunal.  
2. No one may be condemned for an act or omission which did not constitute a 
legally punishable offence at the time it was committed. No penalty may be 
inflicted for an offence for which no provision was made at the time it was 
committed. Punishment is personal and can be imposed only on the offender.’  
 
Article 7 is lauded by some as containing due process rights.
5
 These due process rights 
do exist in Article 7 (1) (a)-(d) namely the right to appeal, the presumption of 
innocence, the right to defence counsel and the right to be tried within a reasonable 
time. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that Article 7(1) is inadequate both from an 
international and traditional perspective. From the international perspective, the Charter 
has been criticised for excluding the concept of procedural fairness in Article 7.
6
  This 
has led Heyns to suggest that the absence of Article 14 ICCPR rights such as the right 
to a public hearing may indicate that their observation will be left to the ‘creative’ 
interpretation of the Commissioners.
7
 In Free Legal Assistance Group v Zaire
8
 the 
Commission decided that trials should be fair as a whole, indicating that Article 7 
includes all the rights in Article 14 ICCPR, even those not explicitly defined. Still, 
Article 7 (1) does not explicitly extend procedural rights to the sentencing phase. 
From a traditional perspective, the Preamble to the Charter takes into 
consideration the ‘values of African civilisation’ that ought to exert their ‘influence’ on 
the concept of human and peoples’ rights (Paragraph 4). However, the Charter does not 
spell out anywhere what these ‘African’ values are, nor does Article 7 (1) refer to them. 
The Commission has likewise failed to link the African values to the right to a fair trial, 
which it still interprets in an international context. For example in Krischna Achutan 
and Amnesty International v Malawi, the Commission heard that Vera and Orton 
Chirwa were tried for treason before a Malawian Southern Region Traditional Court, 
but both were denied legal representation. Their sentences of death were upheld by the 
national Traditional Appeals Court despite its criticism of aspects of the trial procedure 
                                                 
5
 J. C Mubangizi, ‘Towards A New Approach to the Classification of Human Rights with Specific 
Reference to the African Context’ (2004) 4 (1) African Human Rights Journal 93-107, 102. A full 
examination of Article 7 is undertaken by F. Ouguergouz, The African Charter of Human and People’s 
Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa (The Hague, 
New York: Kluwer Law International, 2003) 132-152 . 
6
 M. C Bassiouni (1992-1993) op cit 268. 
7
 C. Heyns, ‘Civil and Political Rights’ in M. D Evans and R. Murray (eds.), The African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System In Practice, 1986-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002) 155-163. Others are the right to an interpreter and the right against self incrimination.  
8
 Free Legal Assistance Group v Zaire Communication 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93 (1995) also cited ibid 
at 156. 
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followed in the lower court.
9
 The Commission found that the applicants were not 
accorded a fair hearing because they were denied legal representation and thus the trial 
was a violation of Article 7 (1).
10
 Clearly the Commission’s decision did not take into 
account the African value of Ubuntu where traditional proceedings do not have legal 
representation because they are not a product of jurists.
11
 Then again, Krischna Achutan 
referred to statutory traditional courts regulated by national legislation.
12
 Nonetheless, 
Achutan shows the Commission did not engage in ‘creative’ interpretation, by drawing 
on ‘values of African civilisation’ on which statutory traditional courts are grounded. 
This lack of clarity concerning ‘values of African civilisation’ in the Charter and the 
Commission decisions is evident in the travaux preparatoires.  
(ii) The travaux preparatoires 
 
From the outset, the travaux preparatoires of the Charter reflected the lack of 
direct engagement with African values. Though couched in ‘Africanist’ terms, the 
Charter appeared to curtail African values in favour of provisions that stress 
international ‘Western’ values. The outcome was a weakened Article 7(1) arising from 
a combination of factors, both political and pragmatic. 
The Charter was a creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) - an 
assembly of African Heads of Government. The OAU was formed in 1963 by African 
states fighting for independence from colonial rule.
13
 One of the principles of the 
Charter was a struggle to protect their hard won political independence.
14
 The 
                                                 
9
 Krischna Achutan (on behalf of Banda) and Amnesty International (on behalf of Orton and Vera 
Chirwa) v Malawi, Communication Nos. 64/92, 68/92, and 78/92 (1995) para. 2.  
10
 Ibid, para 10. 
11
 R. Mqeke referred to in Ch. 2 S. 2 (iii) op cit. 
12
 B. Wanda’s phrase: ‘statutory traditional courts’ concisely distinguishes traditional courts created by 
statute, from indigenous traditional courts that still operate in local communities but without legal 
recognition: B. P Wanda, ‘The Role of Traditional Courts in Malawi’ in P. N Takirambudde (ed.), The 
Individual under African Law, Proceedings of the first All Africa Law Conference (October 11-16, 1981, 
Kwasuluseni: University of Swaziland, 1982) 79. Emphasis is mine. 
13
 R. Murray, Human Rights in Africa: From the OAU to the African Union (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) 7-9.   
14
 Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39, 2 I.L.M 766 (OAU 
Charter) Article III (2) stating the principles of the OAU. The OAU was superseded by the African 
Union (AU) and the provisions of the Charter were adopted wholesale in the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union under Article 3 (h): The Constitutive Act CAB/LEG/23.15 adopted by the 36
th
 Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government of the OAU in Lome, Togo, 11 July June 2000, came into force on 
26
th
 May 2001. Reprinted in 1 (2000) African Human Rights Law Journal 315.. The African Union 
eventually replaced the OAU in July 2000. For a historical analysis of the African Union and protection 
of human rights: R. Murray ibid chapters 1 and 2; also K. D Magliveras and G. J Naldi ‘The African 
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subversion of African values was not the intention of the drafters of the Charter. On the 
contrary, the drafters (a Committee of Experts) were guided by a desire to reflect the 
‘African conception of human rights’ that should ‘take as a pattern the African 
philosophy of law and meet the needs of Africa’.15 A similar statement appears in the 
Preamble to the Charter. President Senghor in his opening address also urged the 
drafters to draw inspiration from African traditions, requesting that a provision be made 
for duties in harmony with rights granted to the individual.
16
 The drafters, however, 
recognised that it was ‘prudent not to deviate too much from the international norms 
adopted in various universal instruments’ by member states.17 This explains why in its 




The drafting history also shows that the Charter’s content was based on other 
international instruments like the ICCPR and ICESCR.
19
 There were also transplants 
from the American and European Conventions for Human Rights, like the right to a fair 
trial.
20
 Interestingly, African heads of government argued that these ‘western’ 
principles were drafted without their participation, were not representative of an 
African version of human rights; representing instead another form of colonisation.
21
 
The fact that they acquiesced to these principles being incorporated in the Charter was 
pragmatic, arguably a result of external pressure.
22
 Desiring to be part of the 
international community, African states bowed to the international voice championed 
                                                                                                                                                    
Union- A New Dawn for Africa?’ 51 (2002) ICLQ 415-425. 
15
 OAU Doc.CAB/LEG/67/3, rev.1, at 1. An exhaustive account of the drafting is found in Ch. 1 in F. 
Ouguergouz op cit. 
16
 OAU Doc.CAB/LEG/67/5. This request was honoured and appears in Article 27 discussed infra. 
17
 Ibid at 2. 
18
 The Charter op cit para. 3 of the Preamble. 
19
 E. Kannyo, ‘The Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Genesis and political background,’ in 
C. E Welch and R. I Meltzer (eds.), Human Rights and Development in Africa (Albany: State University 
of New York, 1984) 128-151. 
20
 B. O Okere, ‘The protection of Human Rights in Africa and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: A Comparative Analysis with the European and American Systems’ (1984) 6 (2) 
Human Rights Quarterly 141-159, 153-154; Article 6 ECHR and Article 8 ACHR. 
21
 N. J Udombana, ‘Can the Leopard change its spots? The African Union Treaty and Human Rights’ 
(2002) 17 American University International Law Review 1177-1261, 1209-1210. 
22
 G. Bekker, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Safeguarding the Interests of African 
States’ (2007) 51 (1) Journal of African Law, 151-172, 151-152. She argues that the European states had 
a great desire for the African system to resemble the European model in a ‘new civilising project in 
Africa’. J. Donnelly, ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’ (2007) 29 (2) Human Rights 
Quarterly 281-306, 291 makes an important point that states may be vulnerable to external pressure from 
‘culturally dominant powers’ like the United States or Western Europe. They may be tempted or 
compelled to offer formal endorsements of international norms advocated by these powers. He describes 
this concisely as a hypocritical endorsement of international norms. 
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by the UN for a regional human rights mechanism.
23
 The Charter’s exhortation to states 
to consider the virtues of their historical tradition and values of African civilization was 
something of a forlorn rearguard action to assert their African identity.
24
 
External pressure is only partly to blame. The combination of political problems, 
pragmatism and fear of deviating from international norms also resulted in a failure to 
incorporate communitarian values and reflect an African conception of rights in Article 
7. In fact, the Charter has been criticised for assuming a static African culture and 
disregarding the fact that cultural values are socially and historically constructed in 
response to power relations and political struggles.
25
 Such static construction has 
contributed in part to the absence of an African concept of rights as a ‘living law’ in its 
own right.  
Another contributory fact was that in the drafting, the Commission was given a 
whittled down scope of oversight in keeping with the political imperative to minimise 
‘extreme interference’ in the internal affairs of other states. In the first draft of the 
Charter, the Commission’s role was limited to reporting communications to the Heads 
of Government who would decide what action to take on the recommendations.
26
 This 
weak oversight was retained in the Charter provisions on the procedure of the 
Commission.
27
 In Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia the Commission even 
affirmed that its jurisdiction is to examine domestic law and practice in the light of the 
Charter, but not to adjudicate on the legality or constitutionality of national laws.
28
 The 
lack of support for the Charter as a regional human rights mechanism depicts how 
African States disregard their legal obligations to protect the rights of their citizens.
29
 
That notwithstanding, there is a lack of direct engagement with African values, 
specifically communitarian values, in the Charter that I discuss next.  
                                                 
23
 G. Bekker ibid 154 note 11.  
24
 Preamble op cit para.4. Assertion of African identity can be found in instruments like the Grand Bay 
(Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action (1999) in which the 1
st
 OAU Ministers Conference call for 
integration of positive traditional and cultural values into the human rights debate: Para 5. 
25
 M. Mutua, ‘The African Human Rights System in a Comparative Perspective: The Need for Urgent 
Reformulation’ (1993) 5 Legal Forum 31, reproduced in (1993) 3 Review African Commission of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights 5, 7.  
26O.A.U Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Introductory Statement: 
CAB/LEG/67/3.II 3. 
27
 Charter op cit Articles 46-59. A. V Der Mei, ‘The New African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
Towards an Effective Human Rights Protection Mechanism for Africa?’ (2005) 18 (1) Leiden Journal of 
International Law 113-129, 116-117. 
28
 Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia Communication 211/98 (2001) para. 59. 
29
 C. A Odinkalu, ‘Back to the future: The imperative of prioritizing for the protection of human rights in 
Africa’ (2003) 47 Journal of African Law 1-37, 25-26. 
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(iii) Balancing duties and protection of individual rights  
 
As we saw in Chapter 1, my definition of procedural rights that apply in 
sentencing
30
 is intended to encompass both individual rights and communitarian values. 
Communitarian values in my thesis comprise a legal dimension as ‘rights’ that are 
intrinsic to the holder but exercised communally, like the duty of kin and reconciliation. 
I argue here that the Charter is not grounded in the philosophical foundations that 
underpin communitarian values namely the African notion of human rights- Ubuntu. 
The result is a tenuous relationship between individual rights, duties and 
communitarian values.  
 (a) Duty toward family and society  
 
Communitarian values are alluded to in Article 27(1) where an individual has 
duties towards his family and society (among other entities). This provision replicates 
the duty of the individual in Article 29 UDHR. At first blush, Article 27(1) stresses an 
incontrovertible duty to kin by the individual. On closer scrutiny, Article 27(1) is of 
minimal legal importance. It does not set out the precise duties owed by the individual, 
towards these entities listed.
31
 Equally, Article 27(1) does not specify the manner in 
which duties could be balanced with individual rights during trials. Moreover, it leaves 
the concept of duty open to abuse.
32
 For instance, some argue that the concept of duties 
raises the theoretical danger that states might capitalise on it to violate individual 
rights.
33
 These fears are discounted by Mutua who points out that states violate rights 
because of insecure regimes.
34
 He argues, rightly in my view, that criticism should 
instead focus on the meaning of duties, and clarify their moral and legal dimension in 
                                                 
30
 My definition is inclusive of S. Zappala’s proposal (2003) op cit, for specific procedural rights in 
sentencing, discussed in Ch. 2 S.3 (v) op cit. 
31
 F. Ouguergouz op cit at 401, 413.  
32
 R. Gittleman, ‘The African Charter on Human Rights’: A Legal Analysis’ (1982) 22 Virginia Journal 
of International Law 667-714. 
33
  H. W Okoth-Ogendo, ‘Human and Peoples’ Rights: What Point is Africa Trying to Make?’ 74, 78-79; 
and R. Cohen ‘Endless Teardrops: Prolegomena to the study of Human Rights in Africa’ in R. Cohen, G. 
Hyden and W. Nagan (eds.),  Human Rights and Governance (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 
1993) at 15. E. G Bello, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Legal Analysis’ (1985-
V) Vol. 194 Recueil des Cours  9-268, 161. 
34
 M. Mutua, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An evaluation of the language of 
duties’ (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of International Law 339-380 note 13, 14.  Also M. Mutua ‘The 
African Human Rights System: A Critical Evaluation’ (2000) at 12, available at 
www.hdr.undp.org/docs/publications/background_papers/MUTUA.PDF visited on 25/10/2005. 
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the enforcement of rights.
35 
I take the view that both dimensions must be understood as 
part of trial procedure. Still, the Commission has not given guidance on the scope of 
duties. Without such a definition, it is difficult to resolve the tension between principles 
of autonomy and equality that underpin Article 7 (1) and principles of group rights and 
reconciliation that underpin the duty to society in Article 27(1).  
 
(b) Safeguarding rights of others  
  
Article 27 (2) provides that the rights and freedoms of individuals shall be 
exercised: ‘with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and 
common interest.’36 For Mutua, this means that individual rights may only be exercised 
after ‘balancing’ them with rights of the community and in conjunction with duties of 
the individual and community.
37 
The Commission in Constitutional Rights Project, et al 
v Nigeria has interpreted Article 27 (2) to mean that any limits placed on an 
individual’s right to protect the rights of others, must be strictly proportionate to the 
advantages that follow.
38
 In Media Rights Agenda and another v Nigeria the 
Commission clarified that restrictions should be based on a legitimate public interest. 
Moreover, the rights should not be rendered illusory.
39
 This decision has been followed 
in Interrights, et al v Mauritania.
40
 The Commission’s decisions are based on the 
liberal approach discussed previously in Chapter 3. However, the Commission has not 
stated what safeguards exist to protect an individual from duties that may subvert 
individual rights in favour of the rights of ‘others’.  
                                                 
35
 Ibid. C. Heyns and F. Viljoen concur, pointing out that the concept of duties requires re-formulation 
and rethinking the scope of the content: ‘The Regional Protection of Human Rights’ in P. T Zeleza and P. 
J McConnaughay (eds.), Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and Development in Africa, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) 140.   
36
 Duties of the individual are meant to be enjoyed in association with others under Article 9: UN 
Declaration On The Rights And Responsibilities Of Individuals, Groups And Organs Of Society To 
Promote And Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms: General 
Assembly Res 53/144, 8 March 1999.  
37
 M. Mutua (2000) op cit 8. Community is used here by Mutua in a wider context to include the state, 
other communities and the individual community. 
38
 Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties Organisation and Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria 
Communications 140/94, 141/94 and 145/95, (1999) paras. 41-42. 
39
Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria Communication 105/93,128/94, 
130/94 and 152/96 (1998) paras. 67-70 adding that infringement of the right cannot be justified by 
emergencies or special circumstances. 
40
 Interights, Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa, and Association Mauritanienne des 
Droits de l’Homme v Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Communication 242/2001, (2003) para 78. 
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(c) Traditional, cultural, spiritual values 
 
The term ‘traditional’ and ‘cultural’ values, used in Articles 17(3) and Article 
29(7) are not synonymous with communitarian values. This is because both articles 
lack a clear definition of what these values are. Article 17 (3) only places a duty on the 
state to promote and protect traditional values recognised by the community but does 
not define traditional values in the communitarian context where the clan collectively 
protects its interests and that of the individual. So the disparity with Article 7 (1) 
remains. The Commission on its part in Malawi African Association and others v 
Mauritania emphasised the value of language as an integral part of culture and a 
cultural right under Article 17.
41
 According to Murray and Wheatley, the Commission 
interpreted Article 17(3) to include protection of language where such rights did not 
exist.
42
 This decision is important given the problems inherent in the non-use of local 
language in a trial.  
Under Article 29 (7), the individual has to ‘preserve and strengthen positive 
African cultural values in his relations with other members of the society (…)’. 
However, the positive cultural values are not defined. Ouguergouz offers an expansive 
reading of Article 29 (7). For him, Article 29 (7) should not defeat the aims of the 
Charter by limiting an individual’s rights. Ouguergouz singles out the real danger in 
Article 29 (7): it does not specify the content of positive values, in light of negative 
traditional practices.
43
 If we extrapolate his reasoning to Article 7 (1), then this 
provision leaves open the question of protection of individuals from abuse under 
traditional justice processes.  
Pityana argues that duties, like those spelt out in Article 29 (7), are moral rules 
not legal norms.
44
 Nonetheless, I view these duties as part of the Charter though of a 
different normative order because of the moral rules they encompass. Moral duties are 
quite separate from communitarian values in sentencing. They are moral safeguards in 
                                                 
41
Malawi African Association and Others v. Mauritania, African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights, Comm. Nos. 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 à 196/97 and 210/98 (2000) paras 136-137.  
42
 R. Murray and S. Wheatley, ‘Groups and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2003) 
25 Human Rights Quarterly 213-236, 224-225. 
43
 F. Ouguergouz op cit at 407, 415-416. He also gives the example of female excision as a negative 
traditional practice. M. Senyonjo, ‘Culture and the Human Rights of Women in Africa: Between Light 
and Shadow’ (2008) 5 (1) Journal of African Law 39-67 at 44 points out that positive African values 
under Article 29(7) are consonant with principles of equality and non-discrimination. 
44
 N. Pityana, ‘The Challenge of Culture for Human Rights in Africa: The African Charter in a 
Comparative Context’ in M. Evans and R. Murray (eds.), (2002) op cit 230-231.  
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the sentencing process. In this sense, duty to the community in Article 29 (7) could be 
construed expansively to include a duty to participate in trials in a manner that 
promotes societal equilibrium. Such an interpretation, however suggests giving 
preference to the moral duty to preserve the cultural values and wellbeing of society, 
while arguably removing individual choice and autonomy.  
Mubangizi points out another weakness in the Charter, namely that there is no 
direct reference to spiritual ‘rights’. Certain cultural practices, he argues, are expressed 
in spirituality that is enjoyed in connectedness with others.
45
 In fact, Article 29 (7) 
gives little guidance on how spiritualism and the role of ritual are applicable as a 
procedural safeguard. In the absence of explicit provisions in Article 7 (1), it is difficult 
to argue that cultural values are meant to have a more direct connection to trial 
procedure. However, to achieve an overarching merger of two paradigms, Pityana and 
Ouguergouz’s arguments seem convincing that duties should be understood as 
reinforcing rights.
46
 This could give individual rights prominence over duties and the 
criteria for applying duties would ensure it does not infringe on individual rights. 
Nonetheless, I must emphasise that the dilemma of reconciling individual rights with 
collective rights and responsibilities has not been resolved in the Charter and is not 
unique to the African human rights mechanism as I demonstrate in Section 5 (ii).
47
 
The above analysis shows the Charter’s unclear position on protecting 
communitarian values during trials. The Charter does not define traditional and cultural 
values in the context of the trial. Furthermore, Article 7 (1) does not harmonise 
individual rights, duties (Article 27) and the rights of others (the clan) under Article 29 
(7). Lack of guidance from the Commission exacerbates the problem. This may 
arguably place communitarian values in a stronger position in relation to individual 
rights, thus creating a problem of conflict of interests. Let us see how the Guidelines 
have addressed this problem in Section 3. 
                                                 
45
 J. Mubangizi op cit 105-106.  
46
 N. Pityana op cit 229 and F. Ouguergouz op cit 420-421. 
47
 S. Greer op cit for example, gives an exhaustive account of the legal challenges faced by the European 
Court of Human Rights in attempting to reconcile individual rights and collective or public interests: 
passim. Also S. Greer, ‘What’s wrong with the European Convention on Human Rights?’ (2008) 30 
Human Rights Quarterly 680-702, 696-701.    




Section 3: The Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal 
Assistance in Africa  
 
The Guidelines are a critical part of the African human rights framework, 
described as an ‘important normative reference and interpretation aid’ on the right to a 
fair trial.
48
 I argue in this section that though the Guidelines adequately discharge this 
mandate, since international human rights norms continue to dominate its provisions, 
the underlying tensions between individual rights and communitarian values are not 
resolved.   
(i) The Negotiation process  
  
The Commission adopted the Guidelines in order to strengthen Article 7 and 
reflect international standards. This was based on the Commission’s mandate to 
formulate principles to solve legal problems relating to human rights and freedoms.
49
 
Upon these principles African states could base their legislation. From here the 
Guidelines evolved. 
The history of the Guidelines can be traced to a workshop in October 1992. The 
recommendations therein were that the right to a fair trial in Article 7 needed to have its 
content changed to conform to other international instruments.
50
 This was taken up and 
subsequently the Commission adopted the Resolution on the Right to Recourse and 
Fair Trial in March 1992.
51
 In it the Commission considered that Article 7 included 
                                                 
48
 M. Baderin, ‘Recent Developments in the African Regional Human Rights System’ (2005) 5 (1) 
Human Rights Law Review 117-149, 125.  
49
 Paragraph 1 of the Guidelines op cit on the Commission’s mandate in Article 45 (1) (b) of the Charter, 
and Paragraph 3 of the Preamble to the Guidelines op cit. 
50
 This workshop was organised by the International Commission of Lawyers. The Fifth Annual Activity 
Report states briefly that at the 11th Session, the Commission considered the ‘Right to Recourse 
Procedure and Fair Trial’ (Article 7): para.22 (1). It also states that at the 10th Session, the Commission 
decided to organise some seminars that included ‘The right to a fair trial with special reference to legal 
assistance’: para.13 (3). The 5th Activity Report is available in R. Murray and M. D Evans (eds.) 
Documents of The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Oxford-Portland Oregon: Hart 
Publishing, 2001) 216-217.  
51
 Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial ACHPR /Res.4 (XI) 92:11th Session in Tunis, 
Tunisia 2-9 March 1992. 
 M. Owor  Page 145 
 
other elements of a fair trial like equality before the courts. The Resolution also 
recognised that the right to a fair trial is ‘essential for the protection of fundamental 
human rights and freedoms’.52 The Commission then organised an international 
seminar on the Right to a Fair Trial in 1995.
53
 Shortly thereafter, the Resolution on the 
Respect and Strengthening of the Independence of the Judiciary was adopted in March 
1996.
54
 In it the Commission exhorted African states to safeguard the independence of 
the judiciary. As we shall see, both Resolutions were highly influential in the 
subsequent seminar on the Right to a Fair Trial in Africa. This seminar was organised 
by the Commission in collaboration with International Non Governmental 




The outcome was the Dakar Declaration on the Right to a Fair Trial in Africa
56
 
that was adopted by the Resolution on the Right to Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in 
Africa in 1999.
57
 This Resolution recalled previous Resolutions of 1992 and 1996 and 
noted the recommendations of the Seminar on the Right to a Fair Trial.
58
 A Working 
Group on Fair Trial was then set up, comprising members of the Commission and Non 
governmental organisations. Its mandate was to prepare a draft of general principles 
and guidelines on the right to a fair trial and legal assistance to be presented for 




 After several years, the Working Group presented 
its report, and the Guidelines were adopted by the Commission in 2003.
60
 
The Dakar Declaration is instructive because it set down the normative standard 
for the transplantation of fair trial rights to traditional courts: the principle of 
universality and non derogation of the right to a fair trial.
61
 Of significance is paragraph 
                                                 
52
 Ibid, Preamble paras 1, 2 and 5. The Commission undertook to further elaborate the right to a fair trial. 
53
 Cairo, December 1995. This was in collaboration with the Arab Lawyers Union. The 
Recommendations are not available. 
54
 Resolution on the Respect and Strengthening of the Independence of the Judiciary ACHPR/Res.21 
(XIX) 96 adopted at the Nineteenth Ordinary Session in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso March 1996.  
55
 The seminar was held in Dakar, Senegal (9-11 September 1999). 
56
 The text of the Dakar Declaration can be found in (2001) 45 Journal of African Law 140-142.  
57
 Resolution on the Right to Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa ACHPR/Res.41 (XXVI) 99 
adopted at the 26
th
 Ordinary Session Kigali, Rwanda 15 November 1999 and appended in Annex IV, 13
th
 
Annual Activity Report of the Commission (1999) pages 43-44. 
58
 Preamble of the Resolution on the Right to Fair Trial op cit. 
59
 Ibid paras. 3, 4 and 5. 
60
 The Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, DOC/OS 
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4: 
‘It is recognised that traditional courts are capable of playing a role in the 
achievement of peaceful societies and exercise authority over a significant 
proportion of the population in African countries. However, these courts also 
have serious shortcomings, which result in many instances in a denial of a fair 
trial. Traditional Courts are not exempt from the provisions of the African 
Charter relating to fair trial’.62  
  
The principle of universality and non derogation on which the Dakar Declaration is 
grounded, is suggestive of an inherited normative standard that excludes any possibility 
of integration with communitarian values. This inherited normative standard, reflected 
in paragraph 4 is based on the superiority of international procedural law. The 
proclamation that traditional courts are not exempt from the Charter depicts the 
superimposition of one normative standard on another. Paragraph 4 also portrays a lack 
of appreciation of African values and procedures as legitimate in themselves. This point 
is exemplified in the resolutions accompanying the Declaration where for example, 
state parties are enjoined to work with local communities to address issues within 
traditional courts that are ‘obstacles to the realisation of the right to a fair trial’.63 
Defining traditional procedures as ‘obstacles’, arguably reflects a lack of appreciation 
of its positive values that could be harnessed to achieve an expanded notion of 
international procedural rights. This contradicts the acknowledgement in paragraph 4, 
of the pervasive jurisdiction of traditional courts in Africa.  
The participants at the Dakar Seminar relied on the 1992 Tunis Resolution, the 
1996 Ouagadougou Resolution and the 1995 Cairo Recommendations as a basis for 
their deliberations.
64
 Yet these resolutions are devoid of references to communitarian 
values, so reliance on them suggests that the participant’s deliberations were not 
informed by empirical work on the strengths of traditional restorative justice. A 
subsequent study by the Institute for Security Studies, examined access to justice in 
legally recognised religious and traditional courts in Africa. Although the basis of the 
investigation was paragraph 4 of the Dakar Declaration, the study cited only one 
instance where these traditional courts do not follow procedural requirements for fair 
trials. This was the absence of legal counsel in Sharia (religious) courts in Nigeria.
65
 
                                                 
62
 Ibid, para.4. 
63
 Dakar Declaration and Recommendations available at: 
http://www.chr.up.acza/hr_docs/african/docs/achpr/achpr2.doc (visited on 6/11/2007). 
64
 Ibid, Explanatory notes on the Recommendations. 
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The study however acknowledged that the formality and bureaucracy of national court 
procedures encourages people to use traditional courts. In Ghana, for instance, the 
village and traditional chiefs carry out mediation and enforcement of tribal laws.
66
 This 
suggests that the reverse is true: national courts may themselves be obstacles to 
procedural justice, by failing to engage with traditional restorative processes and 
communitarian values. This is one of the reasons why the locals prefer traditional 
courts.   
Resolutions such as that on fair trial overlook the fact that in some countries, 
traditional or clan courts are not legally recognised by the state as a ‘structure’ capable 
of providing redress for violations of rights. This lack of legal recognition is 
compounded by the Commission’s stance. For example, in defining the positive 
obligations of states in Dawda Jawara v The Gambia, the Commission held that rights 
and freedoms of individuals can only be fully realised if the government provides 
structures for redress.
67
 Furthermore, the deliberations at Dakar on factors affecting the 
realisation of fair trial show that participants considered only political, social and 
economic factors. Participants did not specifically refer to communitarian values or 
traditional clan law. Therefore they do not appear to consider indigenous traditional 
courts as part of the national legal structures. 
        Let us elaborate further on the imposition of international normative standards in 
the Dakar Declaration. The drafting process reveals that during the deliberations, there 
was emphasis on international law only. In particular, the influence of international 
Non Governmental organisations steered the discussions towards protection of 
international rights.
68
  For example, at the 31
st
 Session in 2002, Interrights presented 
guidelines on access to justice and fair trial from which the Commission prepared its 
final draft.
69
 This sequence of events suggests that the Commission had limited 
influence on the outcome of the seminar. They do not seem to have strongly advocated 
for an African notion of procedural rights to a fair trial. In their report, Interrights 
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surmise the success of the Fair Trial seminar: ‘with the Commission fully taking up the 
recommendations we made and consulting with the Working Group we set up to ensure 
those recommendations were implemented.’70 Deliberations of the Working Group are 
not available for scrutiny, so the extent to which the Commission considered African 
communitarian values for inclusion in fair trial rights is unknown. Still, the drafting 
process depicts the external pressure the Commission was under to promote 
international rights. This may explain why the final document makes no mention of 
communitarian values or traditional restorative processes.
71
 This is not surprising given 
the fact that right from the evolution of the Charter, the human rights agenda in Africa 




The promotion of an international procedural rights paradigm that appears to 
‘sideline’ African normative standards arises where the latter are out of line with 
international procedural standards. In that situation international law, typically tries to 
get it to conform. In that respect, the adaptation of the Guidelines is typical of the 
modus operandi of the Commission.
73
  
(ii) A critique of the Guidelines: Underlying tensions 
 
I now set out the context within which my critique of the Guidelines is made.
74
 
Section A for instance, incorporates all of Article 14 ICCPR provisions, setting out the 
general principles applicable to a fair and public hearing.
75
 Section N (6) relates more 
specifically to criminal charges and largely replicates Article 14 (3) ICCPR rights like 
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the right to equality of arms and the right to be tried in the accused’s presence.76 
Section N also prescribes rights pertaining to the sentence itself like the right to benefit 
from a lighter sentence, but not rights to the deliberation of sentence.
77
 Additionally, 
there are provisions on the sentencing of children, expectant mothers and mothers of 
infants.
78
 The right of appeal is in Section N (10). That notwithstanding, the right to a 
fair trial is restricted to presentation of pleas and indictment during trial.
79
 Section P (g) 
recognises ‘informal’ mechanisms like traditional practices that may be applied.  
Finally, Section Q (a)–(e) gives guidelines to traditional courts on the application of 
due process safeguards based largely on the provisions of Article 14 ICCPR.  
The drafting background helps us understand why communitarian values have 
not been imported into the Guidelines. This is not surprising give the fact that the 
Guidelines are meant primarily to bolster provisions on the fair trial in the Charter ‘and 
to reflect international standards’.80 Their secondary function is to attempt to broaden 
state obligations to cover traditional courts. To this end, the Guidelines are to be 
incorporated into domestic legislation by State parties to the Charter.
81
 Although the 
targeted audience are African states and its peoples, the influence of international 
human rights on the Guidelines is pervasive.  
 
(a) Pervasiveness of international procedural rights  
 
The Guidelines have no explicit provision for the application of communitarian 
values. This raises the question of how a court can ensure procedural justice if it wishes 
to apply an expanded notion of rights. The only provision that refers to traditional 
restorative processes, albeit tangentially, is Section P that largely incorporates the text 
of the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power.
82
 Section P recognises informal mechanisms, including traditional or customary 
                                                 
76 Ibid, Section N (6) (a)-(g).  
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practices that seek conciliation and redress for victims.
83
 On a first reading such 
wording adequately describes the aims of traditional restorative justice with its 
emphasis on reparation for victims.
84
 On a second reading, two issues emerge.  
First, the use of the term ‘informal’ mischaracterises the traditional model 
where evidence is adduced, evaluated and offenders punished in what is a recognized 
local process. Furthermore, that traditional mechanisms may be applied ‘where 
appropriate’ under Section P (g), implies a discretionary process, quite unrepresentative 
of the traditional restorative process. Second, and most crucially, there is no mention of 
the community’s role. This is because the scope of procedural equality is defined in yet 
another section: Section N (6) (a) as between the accused and prosecutor only. This 
adherence to the international notion of equality of arms subjugates the principle of 
participation on which communitarian values are grounded. So Section N (6) (a) 
excludes public participation in the sentencing procedure.  
The Commission’s decisions reflect the international emphasis on the individual 
right to a fair trial, and equality of arms as between two parties. For example, the 
definition of rights to equal treatment during the trial was explained in earlier decisions 
of the Commission, notably in Avocats sans Frontieres v Burundi:  
 
‘The right to equal treatment by a jurisdiction, especially in criminal matters, 
means in the first place that both the defence and the public prosecutor shall 
have equal opportunity to prepare and present their pleas and indictment 
during the trial. Simply put, they should argue their cases before the 
jurisdiction on an equal footing.’85  
 
There, the discriminatory granting of adjournments by the court for grave offences 
against the accused was found to have violated the rights to equality of arms and fair 
trial.
86
 This interpretation of equality of arms appears to ‘emasculate’ communitarian 
values and an ‘African’ concept of procedural fairness, because it is based on 
individualist legal definition of equality of arms.  
The Commission has made few inroads in resolving this conundrum. For 
example, in the Constitutional Rights Project case, it decided that the Charter should be 
                                                 
83
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interpreted in a culturally sensitive manner taking into consideration the divergent 
African legal traditions.
87
 This decision is important given the problems inherent in the 
Charter, though there is no guidance from the Commission in respect of communitarian 
values as part of the right to a fair hearing. So if a broader interpretation of the 
Guidelines is given, the Commission would not negate the universality of international 
procedural rights.  
Pityana argues that all cultures have distinct values of rights but these are 
expressed in Westernised language and ideas.
88
 Although I agree with him, I must point 
out that a distinct African value of rights (couched in any language) is absent from the 
Guidelines (and the Charter). Moreover, the Commission’s decisions reflect the 
international position on the right to a fair trial. For example, in Zegveld and Ephrem v 
Eritrea, the Commission decided that the state must initiate legal proceedings that 
comply with fair trials standards as elaborated in the Guidelines.
89
 This gives no leeway 
to take into account communitarian values or to reconcile the divergent normative 
standards. 
 
(b) Failure to reconcile divergent normative paradigms  
 
The challenge of protecting African values without trumping individual rights is 
well illustrated in Section Q that enjoins traditional courts to respect international 
standards on the right to a fair trial.
90
 Traditional courts are also bound by the 
provisions in Section N on the rights during a trial and Article 14 ICCPR. A traditional 
court is defined under Section S (1) as: 
‘a body which in a particular locality, is recognised as having the power to 
resolve disputes in accordance with local customs, cultural or ethnic values, 
religious norms or tradition.’91  
  
A first reading of this definitional section has led some to argue that its scope includes 
lower local and traditional courts in rural Africa.
92
 This could include clan courts. A 
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second reading in my view, implies that traditional courts under the Guidelines are 
those legally recognised by national judicial systems, but excludes those local courts 
that were abolished by law and continue to operate outside its parameters. This applies 
to countries like Uganda where the state usurped the jurisdiction of indigenous 
traditional courts and declared them illegal because of the uncertainty of the unwritten 
traditional customary criminal law.
93
  
To prevent legal uncertainty, all traditional courts need to be brought within the 
ambit of national legislation. Moreover, it would be erroneous to assume that the earlier 
decisions of Krischna Achutan, is applicable to indigenous traditional courts operating 
outside national laws. The Achutan decision (made prior to the adoption of the 
Guidelines) strongly suggests that the Commission may only accept the validity of 
statutory traditional courts that are legally recognized by the state and bound to follow 
national trial procedures. 
In a related matter, states are urged by the Guidelines to review their laws and 
practices to consider restorative and reparative sentencing options and ‘restoration of 
rights’. As we saw in the previous section, traditional mechanisms or customary 
practices may be applied where appropriate.
94
 The intention here is clearly to do more 
than protect international procedural rights as provided in Section N and Q. Still, some 
problems remain. The Guidelines are silent on how rights can be ‘restored’ within the 
context of restorative process, while protecting individual procedural guarantees before 
the traditional court. For example, under Section Q (b) (8) a defendant should be 
represented in all proceedings before the traditional court. This wording is in pari 
materia to Article 14 (3d) ICCPR and affirms the earlier decision of Krishna Achutan. 
The underlying challenge, as we discussed in previous chapters, is that traditional 
restorative process includes communitarian values of duty to kin. The Guidelines 
contra, treat the principles of equality of arms as pertaining solely to the relationship 
between the prosecutor and accused. Consequently, legal representation is for the 
defendant only and cannot be extended to give participative ‘rights’ of representation to 
a defendant’s kin, or the community.  
The Guidelines are also not clear on whether traditional rules of procedure and 
                                                 
93
 Ch. 1 S.5 op cit and Ch. 6 and 7 infra.  
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 Guidelines op cit S. P (g) (h) (i).  




 For example, Section Q (b) (9) states that individual rights 
and obligations can only be affected by a decision based solely on evidence presented 
to the traditional court. Yet there are marked differences between the international and 
traditional justice models on such issues as the mode of presentation, admissibility of 
evidence and standard of proof. There is no provision in the Guidelines prescribing 
which law should prevail in the event of a conflict or inconsistency, so in the absence of 
a Commission’s decision, the issue is moot. 
In sum, the place for communitarian values within the regional rights 
framework and in the context of sentencing remains unclear. The travaux preparatoires 
gives insight into the politics, judicially inherited cultures and pragmatism that 
governed the drafting process and explains the Commission’s weak oversight. Still, the 
wholesale transplantation of international procedural safeguards into the Guidelines 
strengthens its original purpose as an interpretative and normative guide on the right to 
a fair trial. The Guidelines, all the same, give little guidance on an African notion of 
procedural rights thereby failing to achieve a normative balance that promotes 
procedural justice acceptable to both systems. Two solutions exist. One option is for the 
state to legitimise traditional courts to bring them within the ambit of the Charter.
96
 The 
other is for the Commission to interpret the Guidelines expansively using a doctrinal 
approach.  
Section 4: The African Commission under the Microscope: Adherence to 
Precedent 
  
In this section, I come to the second part of my argument. I argue that the 
African Commission has not given guidance (in its decisions) on resolving the 
normative contradictions because of a slavish adherence to the doctrine of precedent. 
This is despite the fact that sources of law available to the Commission include 
‘African practices that are consistent with international norms; customs generally 
accepted as law’; legal precedents and doctrine.97 Deference to precedent leaves little 
                                                 
95
 Traditional courts do not apply national rules of evidence and procedure but their own customary rules:  
M. Baderin op cit, 126. 
96
 This point is pursued further in Ch. 6 and 8 infra.  
97
 The Charter op cit, Article 61. Article 45 (1) (c) also enjoins the Commission to co-operate with 
international institutions on promotion and protection of rights. I suggest that both provisions are 
permissive so the Commission may apply them to give guidance on how African communitarian values 
 M. Owor  Page 154 
 
room to apply these other sources of law. Some argue that the Commission’s decisions 
are binding on nation states.
98
 Whatever their formal standing, at the very least the 
Commission’s decisions are expected to give guidance on an African notion of 
procedural rights. 
When it was set up in 1987, the Commission’s mandate was inter alia to interpret 
the Charter on its initiative, or adopt Resolutions on specific provisions of the Charter.
99
 
The Guidelines are one example of a Resolution it has adopted. On the issue of 
interpretation, Odinkalu suggests that the Charter rights are formulated in broad terms 
giving the Commission unfettered discretion to interpret them.
100
 However, there is 
little evidence that the Commission has used its discretion to draw on communitarian 
values that conform to the Charter.
101
  
For example, in the Civil Liberties case the Commission claimed that in 
interpreting and applying the Charter, it relies on its own body of precedents and the 
provisions in Article 60 and 61.
102
 The evidence instead shows the Commission’s 
deference to precedent and doctrines from international and regional bodies like the 
Human Rights Committee, the ECtHR and the IACtHR. In this respect the 
jurisprudence of the Commission is conservative, following a trend identified by N. 
Miller’s survey of application of precedent by international tribunals.103  
It may seem disappointing that the Commission’s decisions are hardly ever cited 
as precedent in international tribunals handling African conflict. This is not surprising 
given the uncritical manner in which it applies precedent. One such example is 
Interrights (on behalf of Mariette Sonjaleen Bosch) v Botswana. In discussing the 
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103
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procedural requirements of the right to a fair trial the Commission relied extensively on 
Archbold’s book and decisions of the ECtHR.104 Yet another example is Krishna 
Achutan that does not discuss the conflict between traditional and international notions 
of the right to legal representation. Both decisions fail to give guidance on the 
conundrum of the hierarchy of rights and duties in the two divergent procedural 
frameworks. The Commission’s decisions have been justifiably described as formulaic 
and lacking innovation because they do not refer to jurisprudence from national and 
international courts.
105
 Their decisions rely even less on judgements of statutory 
traditional courts and certainly none from the ‘unrecognised’ traditional courts. 
Consequently, the Commission is blamed for failing to develop a truly African 
conception of human rights in its jurisprudence,
106
 and its findings have been described 
as remote and virtually meaningless to those affected.
107
  
       R. Murray argues, quite rightly, that the Commission has made ground-breaking 
decisions in its interpretation of the Charter, for instance, holding that Article 7 on the 
right to a fair trial should apply to mental health patients.
108
 In her view, the 
international law discourse is dominated by a Western perspective that is dismissive of 
the contribution of the Commission’s jurisprudence.109 While this is not in doubt, I 
maintain that the Commission’s deference to influences from other legal and human 
rights traditions has resulted in a failure to develop a truly African jurisprudence. While 
it is true that sometimes the Commission exhibits an ability to apply procedural rights 
in a broad rather than narrow legalist sense, this type of ‘overarching’ interpretation is 
not extended to an African notion of procedural rights. This may be symptomatic of a 
desire to be in line with international laws so as not to seem recalcitrant.  
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 I have argued that deference to influence from international tribunals and other 
legal traditions has robbed the Commission of an opportunity to shape African 
jurisprudence and depicts the lack of innovation in formulating guidance on grey areas 
like procedural rights in sentencing. It remains to be seen what doctrinal solutions may 
be available from the newly created African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
Section 5: Challenges to the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
The third part of my argument explains the challenge to the African Court of 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), to develop a truly African jurisprudence.  In this 
section, I suggest that the ACHPR could draw lessons on reconciling divergent 
normative standards in conformity with international human rights law from the 
IACtHR: a court whose composition is closest to it and which faces similar challenges.  
Let me start with a brief background.  The ACHPR was established as 
complementary to the Commission, by a Protocol to the Charter in 1998.
110
 Following 




came into force on 25
th
 January 2004, 
with the seat of the court established in Arusha, Tanzania. The Court of Justice of the 
African Union was later established in 2000, by the Constitutive Act that replaced the 
OAU Charter.
112
 The Executive Council in 2005, then decided to merge the two courts, 
though the unification would not affect the coming into force and operations of the 
ACHPR. The merger following ‘financial constraints’,113 took place in May 2006 after 
consultations among member states.
114
 Finally a single court- the African Court of 
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Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) was set up in 2008.
115
 However, despite the fact 
that the ACJHR is not set up due to lack of sufficient ratifications, the ACHPR is now 
operational. The ACHPR has yet to hear any cases, but in July 2008, a second set of 
judges was appointed.
116
 I now examine the law applicable.  
(i) Law applicable  
  
Under Article 7 of the Protocol establishing the ACHPR, the law applicable are 
the Charter and human rights instruments ratified by states.
117
 The challenge to the 
judges, following my preceding analysis, is the sparse provisions of the Charter that fail 
to give a definitive concept of the ‘African’ procedural rights. Kane and Motala suggest 
that the jurisprudence of the merged ACJHR would better protect human rights, as it 
would be enriched through integration.
118
 I agree with these views, and make the point 
here that both the ACJHR and the ACHPR should apply ‘African practices consistent 
with international norms on human and people's rights’ under Article 61 of the Charter.  
The main doctrinal challenge will be the absence of relevant national 
jurisprudence.
119
 The judges could build on the collected wisdom of traditional courts 
to prevent a ‘copy and paste’ of international human rights provisions. A better 
approach in my view is for the ACHPR (and the ACJHR) to draw lessons from the 
experience of the IACtHR based on similarities in the legal challenges they face.  
                                                 
115
 Article 2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, adopted by 
the 11
th
 Ordinary Session of the Assembly held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt on 1
st
 July 2008. A 
comprehensive account of the creation of the merged court is given by I. Kane and A. Motala op cit, 
passim. 
116
 The Judges were elected for a term of 6 years by the 13
th
 Ordinary Session of the Executive Council 
in July 2008. Among them is a Ugandan Judge Mr. Joseph T. Mulenga: Ref: BC/OLC/66.5. 
117
 Article 3 of the ACHPR Protocol provides that the ACHPR’s jurisdiction ratione materiae, extends to 
cases and disputes relating to the interpretation and application of the Charter and human rights 
instruments ratified by states. Under Article 28 (c) of the Protocol of the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights, the ACJHR shall have jurisdiction over inter alia, the interpretation and 
application of the African Charter; the Charter on Rights and Welfare of the Child, the Protocol to the 
Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa and other relevant human rights instruments ratifies by the 
States concerned. An in-depth appraisal of the draft statute is undertaken by I. Kane and A. Motala op cit 
418-437. 
118
 Ibid, 439-440. The authors also suggest that the ACPHR jurisprudence could encourage regional 
courts jurisprudence. However such courts like the East African Court of Justice set up under Ch. 8 of the 
East African Treaty (2000), have only indirect jurisdiction over human rights issues and therefore are of 
limited value in terms of human rights protection. A comprehensive legal analysis of the re-emergence of 
the East African Court since its demise in the 1970s is given by S. Mvungi, ‘Legal Analysis of the Draft 
Treaty for the establishment of the East African Community’ in S. Mvungi (ed.), The Draft Treaty for the 
establishment of the EAC: A Critical Review (Dar Es Salaam: Dar Es Salaam University Press: Dar Es 
Salaam, 2002) 65-82. Also B. Tusasirwe, The East African Community (EAC) and Constitutional 
Development in 2002 found at http://www.kituochakatiba.co.ug/publication.htm (visited on 14/11/2007). 
119
 This point is canvassed in Ch. 8 infra.  





(ii) Experiences from the Inter American Court of Human Rights  
 
The first similarity between the experiences of the ACHPR and the IACtHR is 
the existence of communities within member states that apply their own traditional laws 
and normative standards. In this regard, the situation in many American countries 
closely resembles that of African countries like Uganda, Rwanda or Sierra Leone. As 
M. Guzman points out, North and South America combined, have one of the largest 
numbers of indigenous peoples and ethnic groups in the world, with over 400 
identifiable ethnic groups and peoples.
120
 Each group applies their own customary laws. 
Guzman notes the challenge that this creates, of recognising that national and 




The second area of similarity is in the human rights provisions. For example the 
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) has Article 32 that is similar to 




Article 32(1): ‘Every person has responsibilities to his family, his community, 
and mankind. 
Article 32 (2): The rights or each person are limited by the rights of others, by 
the security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare in a 
democratic society.’ 
 
In interpreting the ACHR, the IACtHR has held that human rights are universal rather 
than culturally relative. To decide otherwise would deny the existence of core human 
rights.
123
 The ACHR has no provisions equivalent to Section Q (a) in the Guidelines 
                                                 
120
 M. Guzman, ‘Legal pluralism as an approach to Indigenous and Tribal peoples’ rights’ in L. Lindholt 
and S. Schaumburg-Muller (eds.), Human Rights in Development Yearbook 2003: Human Rights and 
Local/Living Law (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) 47-103 at 71 citing ‘The Human 
Rights Situation Of The Indigenous Peoples In The Americas’: Organisation of American States 
document OEA/Serv/LV/II.I.08 (2000). 
121
 Ibid, 72. 
122
 Article 32 on Relationships between Duties and Rights in the ACHR, entered into force 18 July 1978, 
9. I. L. M 673. The similarity with the African Charter is noted by B. Okere op cit 153-156.  
123
 ‘Other Treaties’ Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Article 64 American 
Convention) IACtHR Advisory Opinion: OC-1/82, 24 September 1982, (Ser. A) No.1, para. 40. J. M 
Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) submits that adhering to cultural relativism could support human 
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that applies international rights to a fair trial on traditional courts. The IACtHR’s 
jurisprudence, however, demonstrates how traditional (non state) laws can be integrated 
in awarding remedies to parties whose rights have been violated. This is an innovative 
approach to harmonising divergent normative standards. The IACtHR has made ground 
breaking decisions on rights of indigenous peoples.
124
 Three principles in the IACtHR 
jurisprudence are of significance: participation of peoples in decisions affecting them; 
observance of indigenous customary law and cultural values; and application of 
indigenous case law to tribal and other peoples.
125
 
A celebrated judgement on participatory rights is Mayagna Awas Tigni 
Community v Nicaragua.
126
 The Awas Tingni people filed a case alleging that the 
government had violated among others, their rights to cultural integrity by logging 
timber in their native lands. In awarding their collective claim, the court recognised that 
indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decisions affecting them, observing 
that court decisions must reflect their customary law and culture.
127
 In arriving at this 
decision, the court applied the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention that provides 
that any action taken by a state should be with the participation of the people 
concerned.
128
 Consultations on any action, some have persuasively argued, should be 
culturally appropriate and procedurally adequate by providing sufficient information to 
enable effective participation by the indigenous peoples.
129
  
A second principle is that the court should consider the observance of 
customary law and cultural values.
130
 For example, in the Plan de Sanchez v. 
Guatemala women and the elderly who were the repositories of the Mayan Achi culture 
                                                                                                                                                    
rights violations: 329.  
124
 J. M Pasqualucci, ‘The Evolution of International Indigenous Rights in the Inter American Human 
Rights System’ (2006) 6 (2) Human Rights Law Review 281-322, 281-282. The decisions relate to: where 
there are no domestic laws recognising indigenous peoples rights; where their rights are not protected; or 
where the state or third parties act with impunity and have taken away their land or committed other 
atrocities. 
125
 Ibid, 287-291. 
126
 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua Inter Amer. Ct. H. R (Ser. C) 79 (2001) Inter-
Am. Ct, H. R. (Series C) Judgment of August 31, 2001. Hereafter ‘Awas Tingni’ case. 
127
 Ibid, para 164. 
128
 Applying Articles 2 and 5 of The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 169) concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries. The Convention was adopted on 27
th
 June 1989 
by the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation at its 67
th
 Session and entered into 
force on 5
th
 September 1991. 
129
J. Pasqualucci (2006) op cit 288 also citing J. Anaya, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Participatory Rights in 
Relation to Decisions about Natural Resource Extraction: The More Fundamental Issue of What Rights 
Indigenous Peoples Have in Lands and Resources’ (2005) 22 Arizona Journal of Intentional and 
Comparative Law 7 at 16, in note 36. 
130 Awas Tingni case, op cit at para. 151. 
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were massacred. This interrupted the transmission of cultural knowledge to younger 
generations, and the survivors could not freely practice their tradition due to control of 
their activities by the Guatemalan military.
131
 The court recognised the importance and 
value of Mayan Achi culture to its people’s identity. As a form of reparation, it ordered 
that the culture be re-instated in the affected communities. The court also ordered the 
state to carry out a public act of apology in accordance with traditions and customs of 
the communities, translate the ACHR as well as the Merits and Reparations judgments 
into the Maya-Achi language, and disseminate the Maya-Achi culture through language 
institutes.
132
 Also in Aloeboetoe et al v Suriname, the IACtHR ordered reparation in 
accordance with local cultural law of succession.
133
 
The court has also established a third principle of applying indigenous case law 
to tribal and other peoples who have long held customs and traditions similar to those 
of indigenous people. In particular, the court has protected those groups who hold land 
communally and have a close spiritual and cultural relationship with their land. In 
Moiwana v Suriname
134
 for example, the court applied case law it had developed in 
relation to the N`djuka Maroon community who were forced out of their tribal land by 
the Suriname army. The juridical worth of this decision is that where people have 
common customs, religious and spiritual practices, the court has granted protection 
under international law. These decisions have been justly hailed as progressive in 
protecting the rights of indigenous peoples.
135
  
The IACtHR has also made ground breaking decisions in restorative justice. As 
D. Shelton points out, the procedural aspect of restorative justice in international law is 
in the bringing together of offenders and those affected by the harm as well as 
encompassing reintegration based on healing. Reparation is closer to restorative justice 
as a transformative social action because, she argues, the claimants view it as a 
                                                 
131
 Plan de Sanchez Massacre v. Guatemala (Reparations) Inter-Amer. Ct H.R. (Ser. C) 116 (2004) 
Judgement of November 19 2004 (Reparations) paras. 49 (12)-(13). 
132
 Ibid paras. 6-9 taking into account considerations of the court in paras. 104-117.  
133
 Aloeboetoe et al v. Suriname Inter. Am. Ct. H. R (Ser. C) No.15 Judgement of 10
th
 September 1993, 
(Reparations) para. 66. Details are in the discussion on moral damages infra. 
134
 Moiwana village  v Suriname Inter.  Amer. Ct.  H. R.  (Ser. C) 124 (Judgement of June 15, 2005).  
135
 J. Pasqualucci (2006) op cit at 291 analysing the Moiwana case. She points out that the jurisprudence 
of the IACtHR, forces states to recognise and enforce rights of indigenous peoples to maintain their 
communal lands, culture and traditions: 321. M. Guzman op cit 74 also views decisions like Aloeboetoe 
and Awas Tingni as a major breakthrough in recognising legal pluralism in the region and protecting 
individual and collective indigenous people’s rights. 
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commitment to acknowledge the wrong and redress the injury.
136
 The substantive 
aspect is in redress like non monetary remedies that may include punishment, symbolic 
compensation, reconciliation including apologies, and ritual.
137
 I agree with her 
reasoning and give some examples here. 
The IACtHR has applied non monetary remedies like prosecution and 
punishment as a form of satisfaction and guarantee of non repetition. Claimants before 
the IACtHR have complained that their rights to a fair trial in Article 8 are violated 
when they (as victims) are not permitted to be a party to filing the criminal charges. 
Shelton doubts that the drafters intended this interpretation.
138
 Nonetheless, the 
IACtHR has interpreted Article 8 ACHR to mean that victims have the right to have the 
violation investigated, offenders prosecuted and if found guilty, punished. Significantly, 
the proceedings must be procedurally fair.
139
 For example, in Plan de Sanchez it was 
established that the victims had requested the state to investigate and prosecute the 
Army and police officers who carried out the massacre.
140
 Nothing was done and the 
status of the criminal proceedings was not known even at the time of delivering the 




Other remedies recognised by the IACtHR that give satisfaction to the victims 
include official condemnations and the erection of a monument in honour of the 
deceased.
142
 In the Plan de Sanchez Massacre, the state was ordered to publicly honour 
the memory of the deceased who were Mayayan indigenous people and to take into 
account the traditions and customs of the affected communities in doing so.
143
 Truth 
telling is another remedy. The IACtHR held in Velasquez Rodriguez that although 
human rights treaties do not provide for a ‘right’ to know the truth, such right is part of 
the duty of the state to protect citizen’s rights.144 This decision is particularly relevant to 
                                                 
136
 D. Shelton (2005) op cit. The substantive aspect is in redress including reconciliation and 
compensation, although the latter can be symbolic: 14-16, 464. 
137
 Ibid, 16, 35-47. 
138
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 For example, Paniagua Morales et al v Guatemala (1998) 37 Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (Ser. C) Judgement 
of March 8, 1998 paras. 155-6 and Genie Lacayo (1997) 30 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) Judgement of 
January 29, 1997 para. 76.   
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 Plan de Sanchez op cit Judgement of November 19 2004 (Reparations).  
141
 Ibid, paras 49 (9) and 94-99.  
142
 Ibid, 277, citing Aloeboetoe op cit (Reparations) 1993 and Cantoral Benavides Case (2001) 88 Inter-
Am. Ct .H. R. (Ser. C) para 43. 
143
 Ibid, para 100 -101. 
144
 Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras, Judgement of July 29, 1988 4 Inter Am-Ct-H-R (Ser. C), No.4 
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the African context because it resonates with the values of traditional restorative justice 
of establishing the truth before seeking societal equilibrium.  
There is also the award of moral damages as a type of compensation.
145
 The 
IACtHR coined the phrase ‘moral damages’ to include damages for emotional distress 
and changes to the life of victims and family.
146
 In awarding moral damages, the 
IACtHR integrates cultural practices with international law in a manner that resonates 
with local communities. For example, in Aloeboetoe v Suriname, the Inter American 
Commission of Human Rights argued that the Saramaca tribe had suffered moral 
damage and were entitled to compensation:  
 
‘(…) in the traditional Maroon society, a person is not only a member of his own 
family group, but also a member of the village community and of the tribal 
group. In this case, the damages suffered by the villagers due to the loss of 
certain members of its group must be redressed.’147   
 
On the question of allocation of the damages, the IACtHR grappled with the 
problem of which law to apply in order to identify who would qualify for the 
compensation. The Court decided to apply a ‘choice of law principle’ in which the 
traditional customary law of the Saramakas tribe that accepts polygamy was used to 
determine the beneficiaries. This was because some deceased victims of the Saramakas 
tribe had practiced polygamy, a practice that was illegal in Suriname. The marriages 
and births from these unions were not recognized as they had not been registered with 
the state under Suriname law.
148
 In its judgment, the court found that since national law 
did not apply to the Saramakas, the determination of the beneficiaries would be in 
accordance with local (tribal) family law.
149
 The decision was based on the fact that the 
Saramakas were not aware of state law and lived by their traditional rules under a treaty 
granting them permission to be so governed.
150
 Furthermore, their customary law was 
                                                                                                                                                    
(1988), para. 174. Another recent decision is Plan de Sanchez Massacre (Merits) Judgment of April 29, 
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recognised by the Suriname Government.
151
 All these remedies resonate with African 
‘traditional’ restorative justice because in the process of granting the remedy, the court 
hears evidence from all sides including the community.  
I urge caution, however, in borrowing from IACtHR jurisprudence and give 
three caveats. Firstly, the situation giving rise to these cases can be distinguished from 
the legal dilemma in Uganda. Although the ACHR does not address rights of 
peoples,
152
 indigenous systems have legitimacy within the constitutional framework, 
particularly in Latin America. For example, in Aloeboetoe customary law was 
recognised by treaty in Suriname. This epitomises the trend of constitutional 
recognition and the grant of specific rights to indigenous peoples in Latin America.
153
 
As Guzman puts forth, constitutions of Latin American countries have attempted to 
consolidate the two normative frameworks by recognising traditional systems as 
legitimate.
154
 For example, the 1991 Columbian constitution provides that:  
‘The authorities of the indigenous peoples may exercise judicial functions 
within their territories according to their own norms and procedures, provided 
that they are not contrary to the Constitution and the laws of the Republic. The 
law shall establish the forms of co-ordination of this special jurisdiction with 
the national judicial system.’155 
 
As we have seen in chapters 1 and 4, such legislation is absent from African countries 
that abolished traditional jurisdiction. The ACHPR therefore will have to deal with the 
question of non legal recognition of traditional criminal restorative justice systems in 
some African states.  
Secondly, these are civil suits seeking quantifiable damages against the state as 
the aggressor, not against non state actors like rebel groups or individuals. They are not 
criminal cases in which the community are seeking to impose sanctions against an 
individual who has committed offences under traditional clan laws.  
                                                 
151
 Ibid, para 58. Secondly, the state did not provide facilities for registration of the births. This decision 
is discussed in J. Pasqualucci (2003) op cit 269. 
152
 J. Pasqualucci op cit (2006) argues that it has no equivalent of Articles 20 and 22 in the African 
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 M. Guzman op cit 76. 
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 Ibid, 76-77, citing the 1991 Constitution of Columbia (article 246), the 1993 Constitution of Peru 
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1917 Constitution of Mexico as amended in 2001 (article 2.A.II). Four common features emerge. First is 
recognition of the indigenous peoples as legal entities and their authorities as having judicial functions; 
second: the authorities may exercise judicial functions within their territories in compliance with their 
norms and procedures. Thirdly, these norms and procedures should be respected when in compliance 
with the constitutions and laws in force in the states, and finally the law should establish the method of 
co-ordination between the special indigenous jurisdictions and the national judicial system. 
155
 Article 246 translated ibid, 80. 
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Finally, there are differing opinions with regard to the position of individual rights 
and rights of ‘collective persons’. This is articulated by Judge S. Ramirez in his 
separate opinion in Plan de Sanchez Massacre v Guatemala (Reparations) case.
156
 
Ramirez maintains that the spiritual aspects of each member of the indigenous 
community are intricately linked to those of the community. Rights that arise from 
membership in the community can be exercised, like the right to receive benefits of a 
culture. In his view, however, each category of collective and individual rights retains 
their autonomy and entity and although interrelated they are both subject to protection 
by the court.
157
 The ACHPR would likewise need to make a distinction between the 
two competing interests of individual and communitarian values, then attempt to 
reconcile them. 
To conclude, the jurisprudential worth of the IACtHR’s is in attempting to 
reconcile local norms and practices with international law while protecting the rights of 
the individual. The IACtHR broad approach enables consideration of wider issues such 
as whether the victims (including the community) have been deprived of something that 
only a specific type of restitution can remedy.
158
 Such specific restitution could 
arguably include reconciliation and spiritual rituals.  
Section 6: Conclusion   
 
In this Chapter I have argued that although the Charter and its associated 
Guidelines are meant to give guidance on an African notion of procedural rights, their 
capacity to do so is limited for several reasons. First, the wording of the Charter on 
concepts like duties and ‘rights of others’ is not intended to include communitarian 
values. Next is the lack of clarity of the scope of traditional courts. The biggest 
weakness though, is its failure to provide for procedural rights that encompasses duties 
and communitarian values, while protecting principles of equality and individual 
autonomy. I also argue that the Commission’s decisions do not give much guidance 
because they are bogged down by an unimaginative application of precedent.  
Even if the newly established ACHPR is liberal in its approach, it may not be able 
                                                 
156
 Separate Opinion of Judge S. Ramirez in the Judgement on Reparations in the Plan de Sanchez 
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158
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to overcome the hurdle of Article 7 (2) of the Charter that protects the principle of nulla 
peona sine lege to ensure that punishments are provided in written law.
159
 Without 
national laws that recognise traditional clan law, African criminal processes remain 
outside the ambit of international penal laws and international human rights. It remains 
a matter of speculation whether the ACHPR will depart from the precedents of the 
Commission and adopt a more expansive interpretation of Article 60 and 61 to 
encompass traditional courts operating outside national legal frameworks. The 
challenge for the ACHPR is to avoid slavishly following European or ‘western’ 
practice. Instead, it should critically evaluate Inter American jurisprudence and be 
innovative about making a case for African normative standards. Ultimately, decisions 
of the ACHPR ought to guide the ICC on an African concept of procedural fairness. 
This is imperative because the ICC is obliged to interpret law in a manner that is 
consistent with ‘internationally recognised human rights’.160 These rights include those 
in the Charter. 
Internationally, some cases raise questions of culturally appropriate procedural 
justice in sentencing. For example, Ugandan Kony and his rebel commanders- indicted 
before the ICC are seeking to use traditional justice based on mysticism and 
reconciliation, for trials for war crimes.
161
 Also, the CDF trial before the SCSL depicts 
the challenge of dealing with Kamajor traditions during sentencing.
162
 In both 
scenarios, the dilemma of reconciling communitarian values with Article 14 ICCPR is 
apparent. Therefore, there is need for relevant African jurisprudence especially on the 
protection of the right to a fair trial in the sentencing process. What is of equal 
importance to this thesis is an investigation of how indigenous traditional courts not 
legally recognised by the state, protect rights of the individual and the community. 
Their experience may give valuable lessons on what approach international courts 
could adopt in accommodating African concepts of procedural justice. This is discussed 
in the next chapter.  
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 The Charter op cit Article 7(2) whose full text is in S. 2 (i) op cit. 
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 Prosecutor v Joseph Kony and 5 others ICC-02/04-01/05 discussed in Cap 1 S.1 op cit.  
162
 Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa SCSL-04-14-Tdiscussed in Cap 2 S.5 op cit. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE JOPADHOLA CLAN COURT SYSTEM: A 
NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE   
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 
As we saw in Chapter 5, the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights has 
not clearly defined an African notion of procedural rights. The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples‟ Rights likewise, has not translated African values into its 
decisions in the way the Inter American Court of Human Rights does in relation to 
indigenous Latin American values. Accordingly, the Charter and the Commission 
decisions provide insufficient guidance on communitarian values.
1
  
How then should one go about integrating the values and structures of what 
would seem to be distinctively different court systems? This is the crux of the second 
question examined in this thesis. The first step is in understanding the workings of the 
clan courts
2
 which makes traditional restorative practice more „visible‟ at the 
international level. As Benda-Beckmann argues, when faced with imposition of alien 
laws on traditional systems, the locals reproduce what they consider to be their 
normative system in the processes of their decision making („law out of context‟).3 
Scant literature exists on the manner in which this reproduction is actually done and the 
factors that drive it. Most scholarship tends to concentrate on issues where adjudication 
is governed by customary law under a national legal system.
4
  
This thesis is designed to remedy this omission in the literature, as there is no 
doubt that clan courts merit the same depth of analysis. This is more so because the 
usual outcome of clan court justice is an imposition of sanctions as a consequence of 
breaching traditional law. Therefore their procedures should not deprive any party 
(including the community) of the right to a fair trial. This chapter is intended to 
illustrate how useful lessons may be drawn from the relationship between national and 
clan courts in the Ugandan context by providing a case study. I refer throughout the 
                                                 
1
 Communitarian values are duty to kin, reconciliation, restitution and ritual as defined in Ch. 1 S.1 op 
cit.  
2
 Clan courts are defined in Ch.1 S.4 ibid as kinship adjudicatory bodies. 
3
 F. von Benda-Beckmann (1984) op cit, 29 discussed in Ch. 3 S. 3 op cit.  
4
 Ibid, 31-32. Academic studies on Uganda‟s state-managed local council courts are mentioned in Ch. 3 
ibid.  
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chapter to the empirical study whose methodology is described in Chapter 1.
5
 My 
analysis is presented through the lens of two clans: Morwa Guma and Jo-Gem, both of 
the Jopadhola ethnic group.  
As far as I am aware, this chapter is the only legal investigation of Jopadhola 
clan adjudicatory structures. Following this brief introduction, I give a demographic 
description of the Jopadhola (Section 2) and their genealogy (Section 3). Next is an 
examination of the metamorphosis of the clan courts following legislative abolition 
(Section 4). The present clan court set up is discussed in Section 5, followed by a study 
of Jopadhola criminal law and sanctions (Section 6). I offer a brief conclusion in 
Section 7.   
Section 2: The Jopadhola  
 
In this section, I present the first part of my argument that clan cohesion is 
important in understanding the clan courts ability to transform their structures without 
compromising their own normative framework.  I start by sketching the demography of 
the Jopadhola people in terms of population structure, geographical location and the 
political context in which they operate.  
The selection of Jo- Gem and Morwa Guma clans, as I explained in Chapter 1, 
is because they are a good archetypal sample of how clan courts in „stateless‟ societies 
achieve appropriate sentencing outcomes. The Jo-Gem, a smaller clan, is an example of 
good practice at a micro level. The practice of the Morwa Guma as an older, better 
established clan, illustrates translation of „law out of context‟ at a more advanced level. 
Inquiring into these different clan experiences will unearth any similarities and 
divergence in each clan courts‟ composition, procedure and in their notion of rights. 
Such features would be missed if one were to aggregate their practices as being a single 
approach, as is the case in other studies.
6
 Yet these differences and similarities explain 
in part why traditional experience has not been taken up as a different conceptual model 
in the international framework. 
The Jopadhola ethnic group are from the Nilotic linguistic cluster. The language 
spoken is Dhupadhola which is similar to two other Nilotic languages of Alur and 
                                                 
5
 Ch. 1 S. 6 op cit and Appendix 1. 
6
 Studies like those on the Gacaca courts, the Bashigantahe and to some extent the Mato Oput discussed 
in Chs. 1, 3, and 4 op cit, are based on conclusions drawn from aggregate studies. 




 Jopadhola refer to the land they live in as Padhola, which according to 
renowned historian B. Ogot, is an elliptic form of „Par Adhola‟ meaning the „place of 
Adhola‟. Officially the land of the Jopadhola is called Budama but according to 
tradition, this is the Kiganda version of „Widooma‟ a Jopadhola war cry „You are in 
trouble.‟8  
The Jopadhola live mainly in West Budama county, Tororo district in Eastern 
Uganda on the border with Kenya. Tororo district comprises Tororo county (former 
East Budama county), West Budama county and Tororo Municipality. The 
geographical location of West Budama in Tororo district is shown here in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5: Map of Tororo district. Source: ©Tororo District Planning Unit (2003). 
 
Surrounding the Jopadhola are the Bantu linguistic group, with the Banyole to the 
North West, the Bagisu to the North East, the Samia to the South and the Basoga to the 
                                                 
7
 B. Ogot (1967) op cit 32. Figure 1 is a map showing the distribution of linguistic groups in Uganda. The 
other Nilotics are the Alur, Acoli, Langi and Kenyan Luo discussed in Ch. 1 S. 6 (i) op cit.  Singular: 
Japadhola. 
8
 Ibid, 85. The war cry was against the Baganda who invaded Padhola and were vanquished. 
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West. The Itesot are the only ethnic group of Nilo Hamitic origin that live with the 
Jopadhola in Tororo district.
9
 This reflects the Jopadhola‟s resilience and ability to 




  According to the last 2002 census, the Jopadhola are 359,659 of which males 
are 176,438 and females 183,221, comprising 1.5 % of Uganda‟s population of 24.4 
million.
11
 Jopadhola are not considered an ethnic minority group because they are more 
than 25,000 people.
12
 With regards to religion, most Jopadhola are Christians, with 
Catholics making up 58.7% of the population; Anglicans 30.6% and the rest belonging 
to other religions. None of the Jopadhola who took part in the census stated their 
religion as „Traditional‟.13 In terms of economic development, large proportions (70-
80%) of the Jopadhola live below the poverty line.
14
 Their activities are mainly 
subsistence agricultural farming that takes place on land held under customary land 




  The Jopadhola have 52 clans registered with the Tieng Adhola.
16
 My study 
focused on two of the clans in Budama North constituency. The Morwa Guma, one of 
the largest Jopadhola clans, live scattered in all the sub counties and are estimated to 
number in thousands.
17
 For example, the Namwaya Ssaza census of 1996 registered a 
total of 2,417 adults above 18 years.
18
 The Jo-Gem by contrast is a very small clan that 
was recognised by the Tieng Adhola in 2006. They are considered to be „jo-woko‟- 
„those from the outside‟, because they migrated from Kenya. They live in Kisoko sub-
county numbering 396: 44 men, 49 women, 43 women married into Jo-Gem, and 260 
                                                 
9
 The Banyole live in Butaleja district; the Bagisu in Mbale and Bubuulo districts; the Samia in Busia 
district; the Basoga in Iganga and Bugiri districts and the Itesot live mainly in Tororo County. Appendix 
5- Map of Tororo district shows these neighbouring districts.  
10
  B. Ogot op cit 70. 
11
 The 2002 Population report, op cit Table A12, Chapter 5.  
12
 Ibid, 24-26.  
13
 Ibid, Table A14. These include Pentecostal (5.6%), Moslem (2.2%), Seventh Day Adventists (0.5%), 
Orthodox (0.1%), Others (2.2%) and Traditional (0%). 
14
 Uganda Bureau of Statistics and International Livestock Research Institute, Where are the Poor? 
Mapping Patterns of Well-Being in Uganda (Nairobi: Regal Press, Kenya Ltd, 2003), Table 4.11A 
showing County-level poverty incidence in Eastern Region including West Budama in Tororo district.      
15
 Field interview notes of pre-visit meeting with Mr. A. O and Mr. Y.O on 12
th
 August 2006. 
16
 Tieng Adhola is the cultural union of the Jopadhola. The clans are listed in Appendix III to the 2006 
Tieng Adhola constitution. A description of the original clans is given by A. Oboth- Ofumbi, Lwo 
(Ludama) Uganda: History and Customs of the Jo Padhola (Nairobi: Eagle Press, 1960) 15-63 and B. 
Ogot op cit Ch 2 and 3, 109. 
17
 Pre-visit meeting op cit, with Mr. Y. O, Namwaya Saza chief on 12
th
 August 2006. 
18
 Namwaya Saza clan members register: August 2006. 
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youth. The higher figure for youth includes those aged 18 – 25 who are not married.19 
The figures for both clans exclude babies and children. 
     Figure 6 overleaf, shows the administrative divisions of West Budama County 
that is divided into two electoral constituencies: North and South. Budama North 
comprises the sub-counties of Paya, Petta, Nagongera, Kirewa and Kisoko. The study 
participants were from all the sub counties of Budama North. Budama South comprises 
the sub-counties of Nabuyoga, Mulanda, Iyolwa and Rubongi. The two clans have 
followed the old administrative divisions of Kisoko (village), Miluka (Parish), 
Gombolola (sub-county) and Saza (County)
20
 to demarcate the territorial jurisdiction of 
their courts. These vary within the clan. For example, the Morwa Guma Namwaya Saza 
court has one of the largest territorial jurisdictions covering Mulanda, Nabuyoga, 
Pajwenda, Kisoko, Morkiswa and Namwaya; combining present parish and sub-county 
administrative divisions.
21
 The Jo-Gem territorial jurisdiction follows the old 
administrative divisions up to the Gombolola level. 
         To sum up, the Jopadhola are a community whose social structure is governed 
very much by the clan. Features like communal land allocation and tenure are but one 
example of this. This cohesion is also bolstered by their poor economic status where 
wealth is shared among families. The significance of these characteristics and how they 
shape court structures becomes more apparent from the genealogy that is discussed in 
section 3. 
Section 3: Historical background: Genealogy of the Jopadhola  
 
             In this section, I trace the historical events that led to the formation of the 
Jopadhola. Through their genealogy, I demonstrate that clan cohesion aided the process 
of integrating new normative features. The nine original clans assimilated other groups. 
This led to growth of the clans and brought unity among previously unrelated 
communities. Features like communal ownership of property and fictional agnation 
enabled the Jopadhola to assimilate foreign concepts like a common belief in 
mysticism. Equally, the Jopadhola resisted external pressure to transform their 
normative standards.  
                                                 
19
 Jo-Gem clan member register: August 2006. 
20
 S. 45 (a) Local Governments Act Cap 243 provides for county, parish and village administrative 
divisions in Uganda. The Jopadhola have applied the present structure while retaining the old colonial 
divisions of sub-county (Gombolola) and the village (Kisoko). 
21
 Pre-visit interview with Mr. Y. O op cit on 12/08/06 and interview with Mr. R. O on 16/08/08.  
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(i) Luo origins: a study of diversity and assimilation 
 
            The genealogy of the Jopadhola is a study of assimilation and resistance. They 
were part of the Luo groups circa 1000 AD who migrated from the Western Nilotic 
cradle land, west of the Nile in Bahr-el-Ghazal in Sudan, downwards to Western 
Uganda.
22
 Circa 1750, the Luo groups migrated from Pawir in Bunyoro-Western 




  The origins of the Jopadhola are the subject of conflicting accounts. Two 
brothers Adhola and Owiny were probably descendants of Labong‟o the son of Olum 
who lived in Acoli. The brothers migrated from Acoli and moved together to Padhola 
but parted company under unclear circumstances. One version suggests that the two 
quarrelled, leading to a split. Owiny then went to Kenya, leaving his brother Adhola in 
Padhola.24 Another version is that Adhola had an ulcer on his leg that took a long time 
to heal. His brother Owiny became impatient and moved on to Kenya leaving Adhola 
behind to nurse his wound.
25
 He was named after this affliction because Adhola in the 
local language refers to an ulcer. Yet a third version is that Adhola‟s wife Nyajura was 
so heavy with child that she could not move, so Adhola decided to stay with her till she 
gave birth. Nyajura‟s children and those of Adhola‟s other wife Oryang are the present 
day Jopadhola.
26
 What is not in dispute is that the Jopadhola are descendants of Adhola 
and that Owiny migrated to Kenya where he later formed the Ja-Luo. 
From 1650 to 1700 the first nine original clans moved into present day Padhola 
that was empty virgin territory. These clans are the Amor, Ramogi, P‟Agoya, Biranga, 
Loli, Nyapolo, J‟Ode, Lakwar and Sule. They believed this land was preserved for them 
by their gods and it was the duty of every person to develop the land and protect it from 
invasion. This land was a forest (lul) so it took a while for it to be tamed. Having done 
so, land belonged to every person because they had all taken part in improving it „for 
the benefit of life‟. Any Japadhola could own land anywhere, but an outsider (ja-wiloka 
                                                 
22
 B. Ogot op cit 41, citing J. P. Crazzolara, The Lwoo, Part 1 (Verona, 1950) 31-32 and H. McMichael A 
History of the Arabs in the Sudan Vol.1 (1922) 16.  
23
 Ibid, 46-47 citing Bere „An outline of Acoli History‟ (1947) Uganda Journal 1-8, A. Southhall „Alur 
Tradition and Its Historical Significance,‟ Uganda Journal (1954) 18, 137-165 and J. P Crazzolara The 
Lwoo, part II (Verona, 1951) 157,174-5. 
24
 B. Ogot op cit 67-69.  
25
 A. Oboth-Ofumbi op cit 2.  
26
 Ibid. Also F. Burke op cit 184-185. The Nyapolo clan are descendants of Nyajura‟s sons. 
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or ja-path) had no rights so could not buy, sell or inherit the land allocated to him.
27
 A 
distinguishing feature of the Jopadhola was their willingness to let non Nilotic groups 
live with them and absorb them into their clans. They did so by according them 
„fictional agnation‟ (relations through the male line).28 This led to a growth of clans to 
the present 54. Some neighbouring groups that were absorbed included the Iteso of Nilo 
Hamitic origin, and the Banyole, Bagwere, Bagungu, Basoga and Samia, all of Bantu 
origin.
29
 To illustrate how this fictional agnation took place I will use the example of 
the Morwa Guma and the Jo-Gem clans.  
(ii) Origins of the Morwa Guma clan  
 
There are two conflicting versions about the origin of the Morwa Guma. The 
first is by Ogot who argues that from 1750 to 1800, there was a major invasion by the 
Iteso into present day Padhola land. The first Iteso families who migrated to Padhola 
included that of an Etesot called Guma who was adopted by the Jopadhola Sule clan 
and given fictional agnation. Ogot bases his argument on the fact that Morwa Guma 
clan have their own kunu (shrine) and clan names like Omoroko, Okimat and Atawuti, 
of Iteso extract, which are signs of long residence and original clan status.
30
 Original 
clans are distinguishable because they possess clan emblems like the sacred spear 
(tong) used for ceremonial purposes like rain making, the sacred drums (achiel) and 
shrine (kunu).
31
 The Morwa Guma have a kunu at Maundo on a hill called Tawo 
Jwok,
32
 and possess their own spear, ceremonial staff and sacred drums which 
reinforces Ogot‟s claims. 
The second version by Oboth-Ofumbi argues that the Morwa Guma clan are 
descendants of Napakere the son of Nwango alias Morwa, who was a son of Adhola.
33
 
Napakere had two sons Guma and Sule who settled in Matindi (Nagongera sub-county). 
According to legend, one day during a party, Guma denied his brother Sule some beef 
(a taboo in Jopadhola culture) so a disagreement arose. Sule disowned his brother and 
                                                 
27
 B. Ogot op cit 87-88. 
28
 Ibid, 111 citing A. Southall „Lineage Formation among the Luo‟ International African Institute 
Memorandum XXVI (1952) 5-6.   
29
 Ibid, Ch. 2 and 3, giving details of the origins of these other clans and A. Oboth Ofumbi op cit 15-64. 
30
 Ibid, Ch. 3, 116-117. Another list is given by A. Oboth-Ofumbi ibid 45. 
31
 B. Ogot op cit 79. 
32
 A. Oboth- Ofumbi op cit 46. 
33
 Ibid, 44-45. 
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started his own clan: Morwa Sule.
34 
This is one of the worst cases of Kwero degi 
(refusing to eat together) ever known, because it led to a permanent split among 
siblings.
35
 Thus the Morwa Guma was formed.  
Nevertheless, the fact that the two clans can intermarry, have clan emblems and 
clan names of Iteso extract, lends credence to Ogot‟s assertion that Morwa Guma clan 
was accorded fictional agnation and later recognised as an original Padhola clan. 
Notably, during the pre-visit interview and the clan workshop, no reference was made 
by the study participants from the Morwa Guma clan to their Iteso origin: they insist 
they are one of the original clans of Padhola.  
(iii) Origins of the Jo-Gem clan 
 
The origins of the Jo-Gem clan are not very clear. They appear to be part of the 
Luo group that migrated through Acoli land to Kenya; for there is evidence to suggest 
they share some names in common with Acoli clans.
36
 The Luo claim to have 
descended from a deity called Podho (fall down) with Jok (spirit) as their eponym.
37
 
Podho‟s descendants comprise 4 divisions including the Jok-Omolo of which Jo-Gem 
was a sub group.
38
 From Acoli, the Jo-Gem group migrated to Busoga and lived for two 
generations in Samia. Circa 1760 and 1860 they settled in Kenya, eastern Alego on 
both sides of River Yala, under the leadership of Rading Omolo.
39
   
The Jo-Gem („people of Gem‟) comprised several sub clans. Among them, 
political unity was based not entirely on kinship, but rather occupation of particular 
settled territories (pinje). The leader (a sort of chief) of each clan was a Ruoth: the jural-
political leader of the pinje - an influential person.
40
 Beyond this there is no historical 
documentation of the Jo-Gem movement back into Uganda.
41
  
The second version of their origin as a splinter group of the Kenyan Jo-Gem is 
from the Jopadhola Jo-Gem clan themselves.
42
 They maintain their leader Owere led 
them from Yala in Kenya, to Samia (EasternUganda) where they lived for some 




 Field notes of pre-visit interview of 12
th
 August 2006. 
36
 B. Ogot op cit 61. Examples are the Acoli clans of Bobi, Alero and Pader. Jo means „people of‟. 
37
 Ibid, 143-144. Ogot suggests that Podho may have also referred to „mother earth‟. 
38
 Ibid, 144: the other divisions were Joka-Jok, Jok‟Owiny and a smaller group of the Suba, Sakwa, 
Asembo, Uyomba and Kano. 
39
 Ibid, 166 -167, 221. 
40
 Ibid, 170-171. 
41
 A. Oboth-Ofumbi, who discusses the Jopadhola clans in great detail, does not mention the Jo-Gem.  
42
 Document by the Jo-Gem officials, on file and given to me by Mr. A.O- supreme head of the Jo-Gem. 
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decades before migrating to Gwaragwara in Kisoko sub-county.
43
  Owere married 
Namuyaga and they had one son: Kiraba. After Owere‟s death, Kiraba married Achola 
Nyaparombo and they begot five sons and three daughters. The Jo-Gem clan, 
descendants of Kiraba, were absorbed possibly under fictional agnation and given the 
land they own by the Jopadhola Oruwa Pa Demba clan.
44
 This claim is supported by the 
fact unlike the original Padhola clans; the Jo-Gem clan have no sacred spear or drum. 
However, they have their own kunu at Sigulu in the neighbouring Bugiri district.
45
 In 
1996, Jo-Gem broke away from Oruwa Pa Demba clan because they wished to run their 
clan independently. They were recognised as a separate clan by the Tieng Adhola in 
2006.
46
    
Despite diverse origins, by the 18
th
 century, the Jopadhola consciousness as a 
distinct ethnic group had developed because they regarded themselves as the children 
of Adhola, reducing inter-clan wars.
47
 The reason for this unity is also attributed to the 
belief in mysticism and Bura in particular.  
(iv)Mysticism among the Jopadhola 
 
Jopadhola traditional belief comprised four entities: family gods, (Were) clan 
shrines (kuni), ancestors (jwogi) and a religion (Bura). At the family level, each home 
had two gods: Were ma diodipo (God of the compound) protected all the people in the 
home and their wealth. Were Othin and his wife Nyalike protected family members 
going out farming, on any journey; and protected the livestock. Were Othin had a shrine 
in each home. In rituals to thank these Gods for good harvests (misia), a feast of millet 
and chicken stew was eaten in each home and the local brew (kongo) was drunk.
48
   
The shrines (kuni) served two purposes. The first was to mark the permanent 
settlement of the original clans: there were 16 kuni throughout Padhola.
49
 The second 
was to provide spiritual guidance to the clan members from a fixed place. The gods of 
kuni speaking through a designated clan leader would reveal what actions needed to be 
                                                 
43
 Ibid. Mr. A.O pointed out that it has been wrongly asserted that the Jopadhola Jo-Gem originated from 
Samia. He stressed that they migrated from Kenya, lived for a while in Samia then migrated to Padhola. 
44
 Oruwa Pa Demba are descendants of Demba, son of Oruwa- a son of Adhola: A. Oboth-Ofumbi op cit 
59-60. 
45
 Interview with Mr. A. O on 16
th
 August 2008. 
46
 Jo-Gem clan court officials. 
47
 B. Ogot op cit 104. 
48
 A. Oboth-Ofumbi op cit 65-69. 
49
 B. Ogot op cit 88-90. 
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taken to protect the clan if attacked by enemies. The clan leader then prepared a 
sacrifice and a meal was shared by the community at the shrine and in the village.
50
  
Jwogi were spirits of the dead relatives (ancestors) both young and old, who it 
was believed would always protect the home from harm.
51
 Little huts (migam) were 
built in the homestead for each ancestor. At the end of the year a feast was held in their 
honour at which local brew kongo was drunk and chickens were sacrificed: one for the 
most senior ancestors- Jo Dhongo, the second for other relatives and children.  
A new religion of Bura is believed to have originated from the Bagwere clans of 
Jo- Pa- Gembe and Olomole of Bantu origin who settled between 1700 and 1760 in 
Padhola.
52
 These „outsiders‟ lived amicably as neighbours before some migrated to the 
area inhabited by the Jopadhola and were eventually absorbed by them. They seem to 
have influenced the Jopadhola tremendously in matters of religion. During this time, 
the Bagwere introduced the Bura that eventually became established as a common 
religion to all Padhola clans. The chief priest and custodian of the Bura was a man 
called Majanga of the Nyapolo clan.
53
 Majanga relocated the place of Bura from 
Nyawiyoga to the present day Nyakiriga.
54
 Women were not allowed into the 
Nyakiriga, a tradition which is still followed to date.
55
 There within the temple of Bura 
each original clan built its own shrine. Majanga‟s power of divination derived from his 
association with the Bura and gave him de facto authority over all Jopadhola. He was in 




Although the rituals have undergone transformation and been abandoned by 
some,
57
 belief in mysticism is still deep rooted among the Jopadhola, but to varying 
degrees. A person may believe in an omnipresent Christian god (Were) and 
simultaneously believe in the protective power of their individual gods (Were pere) and 
                                                 
50
 A. Oboth-Ofumbi op cit 67. 
51
 Ibid. Singular: Jwok. 
52
  B. Ogot op cit 107; A. Oboth Ofumbi op cit 68-69.  
53
 B. Ogot ibid, 123- 124. 
54
 A. Oboth-Ofumbi op cit, at 8; F. Burke op cit, 197. 
55
 A. Oboth-Ofumbi ibid 68. In an interview with Mr. M Owor Kwar Adhola, the Jopadhola cultural 
leader on 15
th
 August 2008, Mr. Owor said he had recently visited the Nyakiriga and observed this. Also 
a lady M. O, who visited the shrine in 2006, told me she was denied entry because she is a woman: 
interview on 17
th
 August 2008.  
56
 Ibid 8-9; F. Burke op cit 196-197 and B. Ogot op cit 124.  
57
 A. Oboth-Ofumbi rightly attributes this change to the coming of Christian missionaries, ibid 65. The 
missionaries branded African religions as pagan and satanic.  
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the ancestors (Jwogi). There is continued use of the kunu, belief in Bura,
58
 as well as a 
deep rooted fear of evil spirits,
59
 all of which contradicts the earlier census figure of 0% 
belief in traditional religion. The historical background shows why pervasive belief in 
mysticism feeds into and reinforces customary law and remains an integral part of 
Jopadhola life as a means of social control. This point is taken up in section 6. 
I have argued that historical events shaped the features of the two clans. These 
features include the assimilation of mysticism; independence of clan units and the 
collective land tenure system. Still, scant information exists on societal power relations 
particularly those involving women and children. In due course, there emerged a 
communitarian framework in which the clan was the central unifying force. This does 
not mean the clan system was static; it was in fact subjected to external pressure to 
transform its structures during the colonial and post colonial era. The next section 
considers the clan‟s ability to survive this external pressure while adjusting to the 
structural changes. 
Section 4: Metamorphosis of Clan courts  
  
In this section, I develop the second part of my argument. Following the 
transposition of English criminal law, clan courts responded by adopting those 
structures they could not resist (or found beneficial) resulting in a metamorphosis of 
their court structures. I argue that in this metamorphosis, clan courts retained their 
normative standards, buttressed by communitarian values and a participatory approach - 
with no single dominant actor. Consequently, national structures had to compete for 
legitimacy at the local level.  
(i) Pre-colonial era 
 
As we saw in Chapter 1, during the pre-colonial era (circa 1500-1890) Uganda 
comprised a diversity of kingdoms, chiefdoms and „stateless‟ communities each with 
their own system of social control.
60
 The Jopadhola ethnic group is an example of a 
„stateless‟ community. Their adjudication system was well institutionalised and intra-
                                                 
58
 Interviews with Kwar Adhola (15/08/08); Mr. R. P. O (16/08/08); Mr. A. O (16/08/08) and the 
discussions at the 1 day workshop on 15
th
 August 2006. 
59
 H. O Mogensen, „The resilience of Juok: Confronting suffering in Eastern Uganda‟ (2002) 72 (3) 
Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 420-436, gives an anthropological analysis of the 
belief among the Jopadhola in Christianity and illnesses caused by use of evil spirits: also called jwogi. 
60
 G. Kanyeihamba op cit Chapter 1, 1-4. 
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clan disputes were handled by the clan leaders and elders.
61
 This fits the description of 
an acephalous or segmented society. Though segmented societies lacked centralised 
control, their social organisation was kin-based in which conflicts and law breaking 
were resolved using restorative justice. To some, this type of organisation was effective 
because it lacked a single source of overall authority. Therefore conformity with the 
law meant the leaders had to woo the clan because the members bore little loyalty to the 
leaders.
62
 This was the backbone of the trial process among these segmented groups. 
Scant literature exists on the conduct of criminal trials among the Jopadhola. In 
this regard, Elias‟s observations about the process of criminal trials depending on the 
type of society: Group A or B, are very instructive. The Jopadhola fell in Group B type, 
an „un-centralised political community‟ in contrast with Group A that was based on the 
rule of chiefs or kings.
63
 In Group B types, the community fully engaged in 
deliberations in a seemingly „casual‟ manner, particularly in the giving of evidence. 
Most importantly, „anyone and everyone who knows about the case would be allowed 
or encouraged to testify‟. At the opening of the case some elders would permit people 
to speak on the issues in dispute between the parties. This „elasticity‟ of the procedure 
did not degenerate into a free-for-all, but was orderly, following the rigidity of custom. 
The wide latitude given by the judge or elders was intended to show absolute 
impartiality during the hearing. The verdict was normally pronounced by the most 
senior of the elders and based not on theories, but on moral assumptions implicit in 
norms known to the entire community. The judgements were therefore a „pragmatic‟ 
approach to societal justice of which the adjudicators and other parties were part.
64
 
Verdicts were arrived at after all adults present had expressed their opinions on the 




The aim of the traditional criminal justice system was to restore the community 
to a near equilibrium. Nsereko argues that traditional justice focussed on vindicating the 
victim and their rights, so the sanction was compensatory rather than punitive. There 
was no need for imprisonment.
66
 Even for the most serious crime of murder, the 
                                                 
61
 Inter clan disputes were arbitrated by leaders of a specified third clan. F. Burke op cit 192. 
62
 J. M. N Kakooza, „Uganda‟s legal history in a nutshell‟ (1993) cited in E. Beyaraza (2003) op cit 112.  
63
 T. Elias op cit: Chapter XII, 214-215.  
64
 Ibid, 244-245, 248, 258-259. Discussed in Ch. 2 S. 2 (i) op cit.  
65
 O. Elechi op cit 66 on the right to participate in deliberations.  
66
 D. Nsereko (2002) op cit, 22-25. The first government prison in Uganda was established in 1903: D. 
Nsereko (1995) op cit para 58 at 36. J. Roscoe, The Baganda: An account of their native customs and 
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punishment was compensatory because the elders regarded the destitute position of the 
victim‟s family as more important than the manner of death. To this end, compensation 
was in accordance with a customary tariff of a graduated scale of compensation or 
fine.
67
 The punishments imposed depended on the gravity of the offence and 
extenuating circumstances. There was also belief in the healing force of ritual.
68
  
The literature on procedural safeguards in traditional societies shows that group 
rights under Ubuntu gave all parties an opportunity to state their case under the 
equivalent of rules of natural justice.
69
 Still, the individual depended on the kinship 
group who were obliged to assist in protecting these group rights.
70
 Elias notes that 
Group A societies, like the Baganda, had legal representation in their trials and the 
chief could represent the community in all cases with other communities. By contrast, 
among Group B societies (like the Jopadhola), the clan controlled and regularised an 
individual‟s relationship with his or her kin, and also represented the community in 
relation to neighbouring communities.
71
  
So far, this account appears to present a rosy picture of structures that applied a 
communitarian notion of equality of arms, permitting all parties to deliberate in 
proceedings and determination of the verdict and sentence. In this patriarchal setting, 
however, there is scant evidence of women and children‟s rights to participate or hold 
„judicial‟ posts in these trials. In the absence of evidence on the Jopadhola, I will rely 
on accounts of trials in other communities with similar patriarchal heritage.  
Driberg‟s account of the legal status of women, established that Nilotic women 
were less independent than Nilo-Hamitics because of lesser economic empowerment. 
Among the Nilo Hamitics, women were allowed to plead in person and even institute 
proceedings in a traditional tribunal. This was not the case among the Nilotics. There, a 
male relative or other male would represent the woman. For example, among the 
Shilluk (Luo of Nilotic origin), a woman could not plead her case but was represented 
by her husband or chief.
72
 This is convincing evidence of women‟s inferior position in 
the trial structures.  
                                                                                                                         
beliefs, 2nd Edition (Frank Cass and Co Ltd: London, 1965) at 259, 264-266 gives an account of pre-
colonial Buganda where offenders were put in stocks and confined on orders of the King or chief.  
67
 T. Elias op cit 142, 143. 
68
 M. Gluckman, Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965) Chapter 6. 
69
 Ch. 2 S. 2 (iii) op cit, referring to K. M`baye (1975) as cited by R. Mqeke op cit at 365.   
70
 E. Ankumah op cit 160-170.  
71
 T. Elias op cit 240-242. 
72
 J. H Driberg, „The Status of Women among the Nilotics and Nilo-Hamitics‟ (1932) 5Africa: Journal of 
the International African Institute 404-421, 419 citing W. Hofmayr. 
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With regards to the position of children in clan courts there is a dearth of 
literature. This may be, as Bennet points out, because children‟s rights were not seen as 
an issue since children were regarded as a welcome addition to a home and were 
assured of social welfare. Therefore no formal mechanisms were thought to be needed 
to protect children.
73
 More pertinently, deliberations and decision making was done 
only by adults.
74
 It follows that children had no locus standi in courts. Any cases that 
touched on their interests were handled on their behalf by a male relative. Clearly they 
occupied an inferior position like women. 
In summary, in pre-colonial times, trial procedures emphasised public 
deliberations where decisions were arrived at by consensus. However, it is clear that 
women and children were not on an equal standing because the „judicial‟ structures 
were located in a patriarchal society where male elders controlled the adjudication 
process.  
(ii) Colonial rule: the sub imperialism of Buganda  
 
In this subsection I show how clan institutions survived despite imposition by 
the colonial administration of foreign structures- Assessors, prosecutor and independent 
judge, on their adjudication framework. In the process, clan institutions retained their 
communitarian values within a transformed structure.  
Under the 1889 African Order-in-Council, the colonial administration 
introduced a legal system based on English criminal law. This legislation established a 
Protectorate in Uganda with jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters over British 
subjects.
75
 Later, the 1902 Order-in-Council introduced the Indian Code of Criminal 
Procedure (1898) that applied English rules of procedure (Section 15(2)). Lewin 
describes these rules as so fundamental as to be obligatory on every court of law, 
because they were based on principles of natural justice: the essence of British justice.
76
 
The 1902 Order-in-Council also established an administrative framework extending to 
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 T. W Bennet, „Human Rights and the African Cultural Tradition‟ (1993) 22 Transformation 30-40, 33. 
74
 K. Gyekye (1996) op cit at 153, O. Elechi op cit 66, and Z. Motala, „Human Rights in Africa: a 
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Press, 1972). 
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the rest of the country. Under Article 20 (1) clan law- referred to as „native law‟, was 
applicable in criminal matters so long as it was „not repugnant to justice and 
morality‟.77 In a later enactment, Article 20 of the 1920 Order in Council retained this 
„repugnancy‟ clause on the application of native law. In effect, this created a dual 
system of law where national courts existed alongside the traditional ones, each with a 
separate judicial framework. Article 20 has been rightly criticised as an attempt to rid 
traditional law of procedures that conflicted with English procedural justice.
78
  
Initially these laws covered only the Buganda kingdom because it had a pre-
existing centralised judicial system. The highest administrators-cum-judges were the 
district chiefs called Abamasaza and their chieftaincies were Amazasa.
79
 Under Section 
2 of the Uganda (Judicial) Agreement 1905, the Kabaka (King) of Buganda could 
constitute native courts in addition to the Abamasaza courts to try cases between locals. 
The Kabaka’s powers were expanded under the Buganda Courts Ordinance allowing 
him to prescribe the composition of other courts.
80
 This eventually covered all the 
chiefs operating in the lower councils of saza, gombolola and muluka.
81
  
Buganda‟s judicial structure was later imposed on other parts of Uganda. Some 
maintain that this was a pragmatic move by the colonial administration because of the 




However, Mamdani argues 
convincingly that the scarcity of European administrators made the recognition of 
existing chieftainship beyond the village level inevitable.
83
 In Padhola, Buganda‟s 
structure was enforced using a Muganda statesman: Semei Kakungulu, who hoped to 
become the king (Kabaka) of Bukedi.
84
 Bukedi was a big province bringing together 
different ethnic groups: Jopadhola, Bagisu, Banyole, Bagwere, Iteso and Samia. Each 
group had their own system of governance, so implementing colonial rules through a 
                                                 
77
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78
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unified customary structure and law was impracticable (unlike in Buganda with its 
centralised system).
85
 Kakungulu ruthlessly imposed the Buganda chieftaincy and 
administrative hierarchy by subdividing Bukedi into twenty saza based on the pattern 




The chief imposed by the state had legislative and judicial powers to preside 
over the clan courts.
87
 This changed the decision making process from intra-clan 
arbitration to that of a chief imposed by the colonial administration. This structure was 
legalised in the Native Courts Ordinance that provided for the establishment of native 
courts in the Protectorate outside Buganda. Native courts could apply native law and 
custom provided it was not repugnant to natural justice or morality.
88
 They could also 
apply native customary practice and procedure.
89
  
The Jopadhola had to cope with two things: first the administrative changes at 
the unit level and secondly, the imposed judicial structures. With regards to the 
administrative changes, the clan leader was now elected at the funeral of his 
predecessor unlike the past where it was hereditary. Additionally, though each clan 
segment had its own leader, collectively the whole hierarchy of leaders adopted the 
official administrative system.
90
 However, this organisation of Budama along 
administrative units of pecho (village), miluka (parishes), gombolola (sub-county) and 
saza (county) came only after Majanga‟s defeat by Kakungulu‟s forces in 1901.91 
Kakungulu then tried to reorganise the existing social structure of Bukedi, but the 
Jopadhola clans fiercely resisted (unlike their neighbours) and the attempt was 
abandoned.
92
 This is because the Jopadhola lacked any central authority but were held 
together by a tribal consciousness: the worship of Bura and an emphasis on 
responsibility to the clan.
93
 Through using survey methods, Southall and Burke 
established that Jopadhola clan colonies were independent politically of their original 
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settlements although they may have regarded them and their leaders as seniors. The 
more localised clan segments were autonomous and retained exogamy, so even where 
the clan was living in different parts of Padhola they acted as one unit.
94
 Evidently the 
Jopadhola were unaccustomed to the system of chief hierarchy and exhibited strong 
anti-authority and anti-chief attitudes towards Kakungulu. The resistance reached its 
tipping point with massive riots in the early 1960s.
95
 
With regards to the judicial structure, there were two major changes. One was 
the introduction of the Buganda centralised system in which a chief (judge) had powers 
to try cases and determine sentence.
96
 The second was the introduction of assessors to 
help the court arrive at a decision. A third change, on which there is inconclusive 
evidence, was the introduction of the prosecutor. 
In the case of the judge, the Jopadhola adjudicatory system, as we have seen, 
had no place for a dominant court official, only elders who pronounced the decision 
after public deliberations. The only change noted during this period is that the 
Jopadhola in isolated instances left the power of determining guilt to be exercised by 
one individual.
97
 However, there is no evidence to suggest this was a widespread 
practice, particularly since the clan courts could apply customary practice and 
procedure under the existing laws.
98
 On the contrary, the newly re-constituted state 
courts like the saza and gombolola courts could not exact public coercion in the form of 
sanctions, because remedial sanctions depended more on the relationship between 
parties than universal explicit laws.
99
 
Assessors were introduced in the Indian Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. 
Their use started with the Courts Ordinance (1909), by District courts and the High 
Court, in civil cases involving natives.
100
 This was extended to criminal cases by the 
Native Courts Act 1941, giving the option for courts to sit with the help of assessors 
appointed by the Senior Courts Advisor.
101
 Apart from assisting the court to arrive at a 
decision, there were no other specified powers for the assessors. Following the repeal of 
the Native Courts Act by the African Courts Act 1957, the Chief Justice controlled the 
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composition of the District African Courts
 
set up at sub-counties.
102
  The courts could 




District African courts, whose officials were appointed by the colonial 
administration, were now moving away from the flexibility in the delivery of justice 
that was facilitated when all parties (litigants, assessors and judge) were personally 
acquainted.
104
 By now the scope of native law- renamed customary law, was 
simultaneously being whittled down. The sentences passed by the District African 
Courts were by law, limited to imprisonment, corporal punishment, fines, forfeiture or 
compensation in cash (Section 16). This attempt at legal centrism
105
 robbed clan courts 
of the jurisdiction to apply restorative justice within their context.  
The Jopadhola fought to protect their diminishing jurisdiction. Clan courts 
continued to operate because they still wielded authority over crimes like witchcraft, 
warfare and criminal violence.
106
 Although they adopted structures like assessors, clan 
courts continued to use a participatory approach in decision making. The outcome was 
the operation of clan courts „conjoined‟ with the District African courts. Most 
Jopadhola believed kinship organisation was everyday government responsible for 
sanctioning certain behaviour and prohibiting others. They did not differentiate between 
the official government system and the clan courts. 
The official chiefs found that they had to rely on the authority of the clan 
leaders to do their work. To indulge them, the official chiefs would sometimes imprison 
individuals handed over to them by the clan leaders. This led the people to believe that 
clan courts possessed the power of official imprisonment which was a contradiction 
given that clan courts traditionally had no powers of imprisonment. They only took 
advantage of the available state penalty. Failure to comply with the order of the clan 
court could result in litigation in a formal court, although the decision of the clan court 
was rarely overturned.
107
 In addition, each clan court protected communitarian values 
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like restitution, by exacting compensatory tariffs in the form of money and cattle. 
Compensation was the responsibility of the individual‟s kin.108 
The Morwa Guma clan assert that the position of prosecutor existed since the 
1960s and was probably present in pre colonial times.
109
 There is, nonetheless, little 
evidence to confirm the latter aspect of this claim. I suggest that this structure was 
assimilated in the 1960s but not before. That said, the Jopadhola probably used it in 
much the same way as they did the Assessors and judge: integrating the prosecutor in a 
participatory process of adjudication.  
This discussion shows how the state manipulated traditional justice to keep it 
abreast with „westernised justice‟ as part of modernisation. As Oloka-Onyango puts it 
concisely, the emerging customary law was suited to retaining social cohesion, law and 
order, and economic production, rather than promotion of individual equity and 
rights.
110
 The cost was a weakening of traditional normative standards. In spite of this, 
clan courts were able to sidestep the legislative changes by retaining their normative 
structures for resolving social problems. So strong was their influence that national 
courts even integrated some of their structures and procedures, during the post 
independence period.  
(iii) Post independence 
 
The post independence government sounded the death knell to the clan courts at 
a constitutional and statutory level. Firstly, the 1962 Independence constitution 
provided that offenders could only be convicted for offences defined and penalties 
prescribed in written law.
111
 Secondly, the Magistrates Courts Act created a single 
hierarchy of courts with powers to administer customary law in their areas of 
jurisdiction
112
 in so far as customary law was not „repugnant to natural justice, equity 
and good conscience‟.113 Lastly, the District African courts ceased to operate.114 As 
Oloka-Onyango concludes, both constitutional and statutory developments meant that 
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the state had taken over the adjudication of criminal matters irrespective of whether or 
not they had a customary element.
115
 This effectively transferred the adjudication of 
clan criminal law from clan leaders to formal courts.  
Legislative abolition did not end the role of clan courts. They continued to 
operate filling in the gap left in the adjudication of clan criminal law. Their significance 
re-emerged, when in 1987 the National Resistance Movement government established 
Resistance Committee Councils replacing the previous local administrative units. These 
councils that also had women and youth representation
116
 were later granted judicial 
powers because magistrates‟ courts were allegedly corrupt. The resistance committee 




As Barya and Oloka-Onyango argue, local council courts were only created to 
provide a semblance of a traditional approach to judicial power. In fact, the courts were 
based on the model that was transplanted from the popular justice models of 
Mozambique, and elsewhere.
118
 To this end, some structural features were borrowed 
from traditional courts but with modifications. For instance, the Local Council Courts 
Act (2006) prohibits legal representation (like in clan courts), but simultaneously 
enjoins local council courts to apply principles of natural justice.
119
 Additionally, there 
are no provisions on communitarian participatory „rights‟, or rituals for reconciliation, 
restitution and purification. 
These legal developments are significant because they show yet another attempt 
at standardisation of customary process,
120
 but the evidence strongly suggests that this 
may not be feasible. Take the example of a survey on user perceptions of local council 
courts in Tororo district (including Kisoko sub-county within the study area) in 2005.
121
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The survey established that a „working relationship‟ exists between the clan leaders and 
local council courts, and there is a pervasive influence of customs in decision 
making.
122
 This finding illustrates the ability of clan leaders to influence the decision 
making processes in national court systems.  
In sum, the belief that the centralised Buganda model of social control could be 
imposed on a society that lacked a central authority, proved to be too optimistic. The 
Jopadhola adopted some of the structures, but retained their processes that allowed for 
debate and checking of any abuse of power by court officials. Therefore government 
legislation did little to change the fundamental characteristics of public participation, 
accountability and collective decision making. Let us now explore the extent to which 
the present clan court set up accommodates distinct features of national structures.    
Section 5: The present clan court framework 
 
In this section, the third part of my argument analyses the clan courts set-up to 
establish the extent to which national procedural structures
123are „borrowed‟. I illustrate 
how on the one hand, assimilation of national structures has not whittled down the 
participatory approach and communitarian values, thus indicating the resilient nature of 
traditional clan law. On the other hand, the assimilation process highlights the ability of 
the clan courts to reproduce national structures and adapt them to suit their values. I 
conclude that the transfer of national structures has not distorted the normative 
framework of the clan courts. Rather, it has enriched their composition with, among 
others, wider representation and quasi judicial oversight.   
 
(i) The Jo-Gem courts 
 
The Jopadhola word for court: „koti‟ is from the English word „court‟. Study 
participants explained that a koti hears cases affecting only clan members, who all have 
a stake in decision making. The Jo-Gem clan have three clan courts as illustrated in 
Figure 7.  
                                                 
122
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representatives; the prosecutor and judge. 
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Figure 7: Jo-Gem clan court set up 
 
The highest court is the Gombolola court. Lower down is the Miluka court, then the 
Kisoko court. Each clan court has unlimited original and local territorial „jurisdiction‟ 
over all criminal matters in the clan. The only exception is the Kisoko court that lacks 
the jurisdiction to hear a matter where the offender pleads not guilty. In such a case, the 
matter is automatically referred to the Miluka court. The courts all have the same 
composition: 
„Each court has four people: the chairman and three helpers. All the courts have at 
least one woman in each court. This started in 1986 with the Movement Government. 
Each court has the Local Council 1 chairman sitting as a government official. The 
three officials are called “Ja Kony pa chairman” meaning “helper of the chairman” 
but also called an Assessor, a title borrowed from the courts of law. They may ask 
questions and cross examine witnesses together with the chairman. The Local 
Council chairman may also ask questions: that is his role.‟124 
 
The English word „chairman‟ is sometimes used interchangeably with Woni Komi 
literally „the owner of the chair‟ and refers here to a clan head who sits as the ex officio 
chair of the clan court. The „helpers‟ or Jo-Kony, (called Assessors), give advice on 
clan law and participate in decision making. Each court has a secretary (Ja-Kalani) to 
take minutes.  
Two structural transformations can be discerned. The first is the adaptation of 
Assessor as a „helper‟ to the court and the second is the inclusion of the chairman of the 
Local Council 1. In the magistrates‟ courts, the role of Assessors is to advise the lay 
magistrate on customary law in civil proceedings,
125
 while in the High Court, assessors 
give advice on issues relating to criminal trials though not necessarily of a customary 
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 Assessors (Magistrates‟ courts and the High Court) take an oath to 
impartially advise to their best knowledge, skill and ability on the issues before the 
court.
127
 For trials in the High court, assessors are pre-selected for appointment from a 
list prepared by the Chief Magistrate. Only those who are proficient in English - the 
language of court -are selected so that they can follow proceedings.
128
 In the 
Magistrates courts, assessors are selected by the Chief magistrate in consultation with 
government sub county chiefs.
129
 By contrast, the assessors in the clan courts are 
selected by adult suffrage: they must be proficient in the local language and need not 
have formal education. Among the study participants, for instance, it emerged that all 
the assessors were semi-literate farmers while all the secretaries were teachers.
130
  
In the Magistrates‟ courts and the High Court, assessors may ask questions for 
clarification. Still, assessors do not participate actively in the deliberations although 
they do give a non binding opinion to the judge.
131
 By contrast, as the quote above 
shows, the Jo-Kony (Assessors) are elders whose role, apart from examination of 
witnesses, is to determine the moral culpability of the offender, give advice on the 
sentence and rituals in accordance with clan law.
132
 Clearly their role bears little 
resemblance to their non clan-court counterparts.  
The role of the Local Council 1 chairman was described as follows: 
„The clan call a representative of government like the Local Council 1 Chairman, 
the clan chair of the area then they sit during that time to hear the case. The Local 
Council Chairman helps the clan to ensure that they decide the case without 
breaking the law of the government.‟133 
 
This excerpt points to quasi- governmental oversight during clan court decision 
making, through the appointment of the Local Council chairman. At first glance the 
chairman‟s role in the clan court does not seem to be much different from the official 
one performed ordinarily. The Local Council 1 chairman is head of the lowest 
government administrative unit and functions as the political head of the council.
134
 The 
chairman sits ex officio as part of the executive committee and chairs the local council 
                                                 
126
 TIA op cit under S. 3(1) there can be two or more assessors but in practice only two sit in a trial. 
Under S. 68, assessors may give advice to the court. 
127
 Ibid, S. 67 TIA and Rule 26 (6) MCA op cit. 
128
 Assessors Rules in the Schedule to the TIA: Rule 2(1).  
129
  Ibid, Rule 1. Also MCA op cit Rule 26(4). 
130
 Attendance sheets for the clan workshop. Details are in Appendix 3-List of study participants. 
131
 MCA op cit Rule 28 (2) and TIA op cit S. 82 (2). 
132
 Kisoko, Miluka and Gombolola Jo-Gem court groups. The title Jamich rieko (the giver of knowledge) 
is used interchangeably. 
133
 Gombolola Jo-Gem group. Emphasis is mine.  
134
 Local Governments Act Cap 243, S.50 




 Other committee members include women and youth representatives (who also 
sit on the local council court) and participate in the deliberation of court cases.
136
  
Theoretically, the chairman is very well placed to enforce government laws and protect 




All appointments are done by the supreme governing body of the clan called 
Nono which endorses decisions of the -whole clan (Jo Nono). No campaigns are 
permitted as one must demonstrate the ability to serve the community selflessly. As Jo-
Gem leader Mr. A. O put it concisely: “You cannot simply want this job.”138 The 
elections, though not held at regular intervals, are based on adult suffrage. The Jo-Gem 
clan do not have specific posts for youth, but they ensure that all courts have a woman 
representative. Reason being: “The government laws do not permit women to be denied 
representation in anything nowadays”.139  
To summarise, we can see that structures adapted from the national courts have 
been assimilated, but only insofar as they fit within participatory process and 
communitarian values. I now turn to the Morwa Guma courts. 
(ii) The Morwa Guma courts 
 
    Morwa Guma has a different set of structures to Jo-Gem clan. Figure 8 
overleaf, depicts the lower Kisoko and Miluka courts; both presided over by a clan head 
(Ja Kisoko and Ja Miluka).
140
 Other members are: a Secretary (Ja Kalani), a women 
representative, youth representative (Soye) and two helpers or Assessors. 
   The Morwa Guma higher courts comprise a Gombolola court is presided over 
by the clan head: Ja Gombolola. Others include: deputy chairman (Ja kony pere), 
secretary, women and youth representatives, funeral chairman (Ja Kika or Jadwong 
Ywaki)
141
 and assistant (Ja kony pere), treasurer (Ja Kani) and a prosecutor (Ja kiosa). 
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Figure 8: Morwa Guma clan court set up 
 
Higher up is the Saza court (Koti pa Ja Saza) chaired by the Ja Saza. Although 
there is no deputy chair, there is a secretary, women and youth representatives, funeral 
chair and assistant, treasurer and prosecutor. The Saza court also has a judge (Ja thumi 
banja) who presides over court sessions.  
The highest court is the P`Oriwa
142
 chaired by the supreme clan elder (Kwar 
nono)- also the custodian of the Morwa Guma ceremonial staff. Other members include 
the Grandmother of the clan (Adha nono), judge, prosecutor, secretary, treasurer, all 
assessors from the lower courts, the speaker (Ja Luwo), publicity secretary (Ja Kowi 
wachi) and a person in charge of rituals (Ja Chowiroki). The latter‟s job is to ensure 
that purification or reconciliation rituals are performed properly. This composition 
reflects a conflation of executive and judicial functions where a clan leader can equally 
preside over court cases as the judge, while other members represent their 
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Koti pa Ja Kisoko 




Koti pa Ja Miluka 
Chairman, Secretary, Women and Youth representatives, and 
2 assessors 
 
 Koti pa Ja Gombolola 
Chairman, deputy chairman, Secretary, Women and youth 
representatives, Prosecutor, 2 assessors, Funeral chairman 
and assistant funeral chairman and Treasurer 
 
 
Koti pa Ja Saza 
Chairman, Secretary, Women and youth representatives, 
Judge, Prosecutor, Treasurer, 2 assessors, Funeral chairman 




Koti P’Oriwa/Kwar Nono 
Chairman, Grandmother of clan, Secretary, In charge 
rituals, Judge, Prosecutor, Treasurer, Speaker, Publicity 
Secretary; all 8 assessors from lower courts 
 




 The Morwa Guma constitution likewise provides for the judge as a 
position in leadership, but not as a separate judicial entity.
144
  
Three structural transformations are evident here: representation of women and 
youth; and the inclusion of a judge and prosecutor in the higher courts. Unlike the Jo-
Gem, there is no ex officio post for the Local Council chairman. Local council officials 
participate in decision making like any other clan member.  
The Morwa Guma clan have positions for women and youth in all the clan 
courts. Youth positions are excluded only from the final appellate court of P`Oriwa. 
Women and Youth representation is a recent development in this patriarchal society, 
one that is aimed to ensure equality of representation in clan courts, previously lacking. 
According to the respondents, women and youth representation was adopted in 1992 
because of the government‟s emphasis on equal representation in all forms of 
governance.
145
 Whether this is translated in real terms will be explored in the next 
chapter.  
The judge and prosecutor go through a different appointment process from their 
counterparts in the national courts of law. Firstly, as I have stated above, all 
appointments to the clan court are through adult suffrage and based on meritocracy. 
The constitution provides that: „leaders who rule the clan must be people who are good 
clans‟ [sic] people‟. However, what makes a „good‟ clan member is not defined.146 
Elections by adult suffrage are held by the governing body (Nono) every 5 years with 
no term limits. The last elections were held in June 2007.
147
 Canvassing and campaigns 
are permitted, but personal attributes like: “The contribution of the individual to the 
community, their ability and behaviour,”148 count more. This is similar to appointment 
criteria of the Jo-Gem. This contrasts with national courts where selection, nomination 
and appointment are based on an individual‟s legal qualifications and experience,149 not 
                                                 
143
 Mr. Y.O, at the pre-visit interview op cit. This was confirmed by Morwa Guma members in the clan 
workshop and in an interview with Mr. R Odongo on 16/08/08. 
144
 Constitution of the Morwa Guma clan (24
th
 August 1985, edition), Chapter 13 (34)(vii).  
145
 Pre-visit interview, with Mr. Y.O op cit. 
146
 Morwa Guma constitution op cit Chapter 11. 
147
 Ibid, Chapter 11 S. 31. Elections are held at all the clan units of Kisoko, Miluka, Gombolola, Saza and 
Kwar Nono: interview with R. Odongo op cit.  
148
 Pre-visit interview, op cit, with Mr. Y. O.    
149
 Appointment criteria is spelt out in Article 143 (1) (c) (d) and (e) of the Uganda constitution op cit. 
For the High Court and Court of Appeal, appointees should be advocates of a minimum 10 years 
standing. For the Supreme Court, one must be an advocate of 15 years standing. For both the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeal, the appointee may alternatively have served as a Judge of the High Court, 
or be a distinguished jurist (for Court of Appeal).  An advocate is a person qualified to practice law and 
entered on the Roll of Advocates under S.1 and S.8 of the Advocates Act Cap 267. 
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contributions made to the community and certainly not by adult suffrage. The 
appointment of Magistrates and Judges is by the Judicial Service Commission.
150
 
Judges are nominated by the Commission, vetted by the Parliamentary Legal 
Committee and appointed by the President.
151
 The judiciary is also subject to executive 
oversight of the Ministry of Justice.
152
 Secondly, youth (aged 18+) may be appointed to 
the clan court. By contrast, in the judiciary, youth in their late teens, early twenties or 
thereabouts, cannot be appointed to serve as judicial officers on a superior court.  
With regard to the role of the judge, there is a stark difference. In the clan court, 
the judge has no powers of judicial oversight but only chairs the court proceedings and 
does not make unilateral decisions in sentencing. Even where the judge has powers to 
come to a verdict, for instance in the P`Oriwa court, this is subject to deliberation by Jo 
piny (the people). By contrast in the court of law, a judge or magistrate makes a 
unilateral verdict and decides on sentence.
153
 Both verdict and sentencing decision is 
not open to public deliberation.  
The prosecutor in the Morwa Guma court is appointed by adult suffrage based 
on meritocracy. Conversely, the appointment of the national Director of Public 
Prosecutions is not by adult suffrage nor is it based on contribution to the community. 
The nomination is by the Public Service Commission; the nominee is vetted by 
Parliament, and appointed by the President.
154
 The Director heads the Directorate of 
Public Prosecutions (DPP) made up of state attorneys (qualified advocates) assisted by 
lay prosecutors. All staff perform under delegated powers.
155
 The staff are selected and 
appointed by the Public Service. 
Under the Directorate of Public Prosecution Policy, a prosecutor does not 
involve the community as a party to the prosecution.
156
 Rather, the Policy provides 
safeguards for the protection of the victim (and offender) while representing society‟s 
                                                 
150
 S. 5 Judicial Service Act (Cap 14) refers to the constitution Article 147 (3) ibid on the appointment of 
judges and Article 148 for appointment of other judicial officers (including magistrates). 
151
Ibid, Article 142.  
152
 N. Bazaara fittingly points out that control over finances and general decisions regarding the welfare 
of judicial officers is a mechanism used by the executive to erode independence of the judiciary: „Mixed 
results in Uganda‟s Constitutional Development: An assessment of the year 1999‟ in K. Kibwana, C. 
Maina and N. Bazaara (eds.) Constitutionalism in East Africa: Progress, Challenges and Prospects in 
1999 (Fountain Publishers: Kampala, 2001) op cit, 19-20. 
153
 S. 133 MCA and S. 82 TIA op cit. The mode of adjudication is also discussed in Ch.1 S.5 (iii) op cit.  
154
 Uganda constitution op cit Article 120 (1). 
155
 Ibid, Article 120 (4) except for discontinuance of cases. Details of the district offices are available on 
their website at http://www. dpp.go.ug. 
156
 Interview with Assistant Directors of Public Prosecutions (Commissioners) on 22/08/06. The 
Prosecution Policy 2002 is on the file with the author. 




 To the contrary, in Morwa Guma clan courts, the prosecutor only presents 
an opening statement and announces the witnesses to the court. The prosecutor does not 
present the case on behalf of society, represent the victims‟ interests, or cross examine 
the defendant. This is done collectively by jo piny (locals).
158
  
Like the Jo-Gem, the role of the Assessors (Jo-Kony) is to give advice on 
punishments under clan law, rituals to be followed and the effects of non compliance. 
This ability of clan courts to retain their normative framework arises from the type of 
policy making bodies that exist within the clans.  
(iii) The Nono 
 
The lack of uniformity in the structures of clan courts demonstrates their 
independence. Each clan has a supreme governing body called Nono comprising the 
leaders of all clan units. All adult clan members are collectively called Jo-Nono. This 
type of traditional government is described by some as government by discussion and 
consent, because it does whatever possible to ensure cohesion of the group. Its legal 
proceedings are a community affair aimed at reconciling parties.
159
  
The findings support the literature. The study participants explained that Nono 
is a policy making body that passes regulations for coherence of the clan. Nono has 
more executive and judicial, than legislative functions. Their role is executed by 
facilitating discussion, arriving at a consensus on all issues and ultimately submitting to 
the decision of the majority clan members.
160
 The Nono organise elections of court 
office bearers, clan heads and other officials;
161
 decide the amount of court fees and 
funeral dues; oversee allocation of land; organise funerals and register clan members. 
Voting at all clan gatherings and elections is organised by Nono. The study participants 
explained that though they were part of Nono; they lacked the jurisdiction to make or 
change penal laws, procedures and rituals, as clan law is fixed and rarely changes. 
Within this context, the setting up of the Tieng Adhola as an overarching body raises 
interesting issues. 
                                                 
157
 Ibid. This is standard practice. 
158
 My observations in the trial simulation on the 15
th
 August 2006 and field notes from the groups op cit.  
159
 A. J. G. M Sanders, „Comparative Law and law Reform in Africa, with special reference to the law of 
criminal justice‟ in P. Takirambudde (ed.) (1981) op cit 150-151.  
160
 Field notes of plenary discussion in clan court workshop.  
161
 Morwa Guma constitution op cit S. 31 even provides for an electoral committee to handle elections. 
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(iv) The role of Tieng Adhola 
 
Despite individual clan autonomy, the establishment of the cultural union – 
Tieng Adhola („lots of people‟) – as a body corporate in 1992; was an attempt to unify 
the clans under one umbrella body.
162
 After an interim leadership for 2 years, in 
September 1998, elections took place at which Kwar Adhola: the head of all the clan 
leaders was elected.
163
 The Kwar Adhola is recognised nationally as the cultural leader 
of the Jopadhola.
164
 This unity was not without contention. The Nyapolo clan have in 
the past contended that such an institution circumscribed clan autonomy, and in any 
case as descendants of Majanga they were the rightful heads of this union.
165
 The 
Nyapolo refused to recognise the union, but later recanted.
166
  
There is little evidence that Tieng Adhola has sufficient social legitimacy to 
influence the structures of clan courts due to its lack of historical ties to the clan. For 
example, one of the functions of the union is to „advise and settle all disputes of a 
cultural nature‟ and set up institutions to effect this.167 In this respect, a legal 
department was established, but it seems to have little power to give legal advice to 
clan courts on their jurisdiction. The legal department instead handles land disputes and 
minor criminal matters, acting as a quasi-review body whose mandate appears to 
interfere with the independence of the clan courts. Subsequently, this renders the Tieng 
Adhola ineffective in ensuring that there are procedural safeguards in clan courts trial 




To conclude, the process of translating legal structures into clan courts has been 
a deliberate one. The structures absorbed were selectively reproduced to suit the 
traditional functions of clan court as decision makers, preserve a communitarian 
approach to adjudication and retain local methods of resolving of social problems. 
These social problems are defined under Jopadhola clan law, replete with punishments.  
                                                 
162
 The Tieng Adhola was registered in 1995. Interview with the Kwar Adhola also called Kwar Nono- 
Mr. M. Owor on 17
th
 August 2006.  
163
 Kwar Adhola is established under Article 9.05 of the Constitution of Tieng Adhola (2006). A copy of 
the constitution given by Mr. M. Owor is in my file. 
164
 The Kwar Adhola is also entitled to all benefits listed in Article 246 constitution op cit. Interview with 
Mr. M. Owor conducted on 15
th
 August 2008. 
165
 F. Burke op cit 196 suggests that before the arrival of the British, the Jopadhola were moving towards 
a centralised system where the Nyapolo clan led by Majanga had pre-eminence among the rest. 
166
 Interview with Mr. M. Owor on 15
th
 August 2008. 
167
 Constitution of Tieng Adhola op cit, Article 6.05. 
168
 Interview with Mr. M. Owor on 17/08/06 op cit. 
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Section 6: Overview of Jopadhola criminal law and punishments   
 
     I give a brief background in this section, to Jopadhola criminal laws and sentences 
as a tool of social control. The law combines transplanted penalties as well as 
traditional ones. In this respect, Jopadhola substantive law represents Nabudere‟s „New 




(i) Jopadhola criminal laws  
 
We saw in Chapter 3 that scholars like Drumbl discount traditional punishment 
schemes because they are seen as prone to manipulation or arbitrary application. Yet 
local practices are arguably vital to the process of reconstruction of social norms, and to 
avoid „externalisation of justice‟.170 Moreover, traditional clan law is not altogether 
irrelevant, because under Article 126(1) of Uganda‟s constitution, local norms and 
values must be applied by national courts in arriving at their decisions. Jopadhola law 
has survived social engineering by reproducing some state punishments into their own 
context while retaining traditional ones. National laws have also reproduced aspects of 
clan penal law, yet little is known about precisely what aspects have been adopted. An 
overview of the contemporary laws of the Jopadhola will demonstrate my point. 
The nature of Jo-Gem law is oral laws. Conversely, the Morwa Guma‟s written 
constitution provides for some crimes, taboos, and penalties- Matemwa.
171
 In both 
clans, there is no distinction between civil and criminal matters: a characteristic of 
segmented societies that remains unchanged from pre-colonial times.
172
 This 
characteristic may be attributed to the restorative inclinations of the clan, for both civil 
and criminal matters, which made such a distinction largely pointless. There was no 
need for a penal code or procedural rules setting a burden of proof. The law was not 
debated or legislated upon, but was derived from custom that was in turn related to the 
supernatural.
173
 Deviation from community values was viewed as a sin against the 
supernatural force of law, so supernatural devices were used as a means of social 
                                                 
169
 D. Nabudere (2002) op cit 4, referred to in Ch. 1 S. 4, op cit. 
170
 M. Drumbl op cit referred to in Ch. 3 S. 3 op cit.  
171
 Morwa Guma constitution op cit: Chapter 7 on Incest and Chapter 8 on murder. 
172
 L. P Shaidi, „Traditional, colonial and present day administration of criminal justice‟ in T. Mwene-
Mushanga (ed.) (2002) op cit 2 and T. Elias discussed in Ch. 2 S. 2 op cit. 
173
 F. Burke op cit 242. 
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control to ensure conformity within the traditional sector.
174
 Rituals are an example of 
supernatural devices that were reinforced by belief in ancestors and gods.  
Some writers suggest that traditional African communities categorise crimes 
either as „ordinary‟ or „anti-social‟.175 Responses from the study participants, show that 
Jopadhola law comprises ordinary crimes, anti social crimes and a host of taboos; all 
tempered with mystical beliefs. So in practice, the two categories of crime are not 
strictly distinguished. Ordinary crimes like murder, theft, sexual assaults and assault, 
have no supernatural causes because it is deemed that the individual had mens rea to 
carry out the actus reus.  
Anti-social crimes, like witchcraft are considered grave firstly because of its use 
of magic. Secondly, the use of such supernatural powers brings misfortune to the entire 
clan or neighbourhood. Ekirikubinza notes that legislation was first passed in 1957 
recognising witchcraft as an anti-social crime. Since then Uganda‟s superior courts 
have taken judicial notice of people‟s fears and belief that misfortune is caused by 
witchcraft.
176
 In Attorney General v Salvatorio Abuki the offence of witchcraft as 
defined in Sections 2, 3 and 6 of the Witchcraft Act, was interpreted by the Supreme 
Court to be the „exercise of supernatural powers by a person in league with the devil or 
evil spirits‟.177 Though the appellant, Abuki did not challenge his conviction on 
witchcraft, Judge A. Oder found that under the Witchcraft Act, punishing persons 
practising witchcraft was a „laudable objective‟.178 Ultimately, both the legislature and 
the courts have adopted traditional standards of social control to gain social legitimacy. 
Taboos, as Beyaraza explains, are comparable to crimes attracting punishment 
in positive law, where norms of the do‟s and don‟ts are clearly prescribed.179 Examples 
of taboos among the Jopadhola are: incest, (nywomo wat) beating a daughter-in-law; 
abusing parents, son or daughter-in-law (yeti manya ori); lying down on the bed of a 
                                                 
174
 Ibid, 64-65. 
175
 H. Driberg (1932) op cit and L. Shaidi op cit. I adopt Driberg‟s definition of anti-social crimes as 
those crimes that cannot be dealt with by normal methods because of the illegitimate use of magic and 
supernatural powers as discussed in Ch. 2 S.3 op cit. 
176
 L. T Ekirikubinza, Women’s Violent Crime in Uganda: More sinned against than sinning (Kampala: 
Fountain Publishers, 1999) 191-195. She also gives an analysis of witchcraft as a motive and defence.  
177
 Attorney General v Salvatorio Abuki Supreme Court Constitutional Appeal 1 of 1998, per Wambuzi 
C.J, Lead Judgement of 25
th
 May 1999 at 263, citing the Witchcraft Act Cap 108 (1964 Edition) now 
Cap 124 (2000 Edition). 
178
 Ibid, at 289-290.  
179
 E. Beyaraza, Contemporary Relativism with Special Reference to Culture and Africa (Makerere 
University Printers: Kampala, 2004) 165, persuasively argues that these taboos were to maintain respect 
and decency within communities. Taboos were also intended to train people to gain spiritual and moral 
adulthood: P. Ikuenobe op cit 32-33.  
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child by the parents, or on a parent‟s or in-law‟s bed by a married person; and refusing 
to share a meal because of a bitter quarrel between two people (kwero degi).
180
 These 
taboos are based on mystical beliefs intended to instil morals and respect in the 
community. Consequently, breaching taboos particularly in familial or marital 
relationships is believed to bring bad luck (lusiwa).  
Incest, for example, is defined under traditional clan law as having sexual 
relations with someone from the same clan.
181
 The actual meaning of nywomo wat is 
„marrying a relative‟. This definition is wider than the prohibited degrees of kinship set 
out in the offence of incest in the state‟s Penal Code,182 because it includes all members 
of the same clan. Clan members are regarded as close as blood relatives. To the 
Jopadhola, such relationships are believed to bring extreme bad luck (lusiwa) to the 
individuals, their family and their clan, unless the offenders are purified. The rationale 
for the taboo against such relationships is to prevent hereditary diseases from being 
passed on through inbreeding, but this is buttressed with mystical beliefs.
183
 This 
traditional definition of incest was affirmed in 2006 in Kiwuwa v Serunkuma and 
Namazzi.
184
 There, the High Court declared that an intending marriage in the Church of 
Uganda, between two people from the same clan (Ndiga) of Buganda, was null and 
void under Buganda customary law.
185
 This shows that national law (albeit relating to 
marriage) has reproduced elements of traditional law so as to compete for local 
legitimacy.   
In sum, Jopadhola criminal laws are socially constructed to maintain family and 
clan cohesion, by stressing deference towards one another. In some ways the 
punishments reflect this social control.  
                                                 
180
 Pre-visit interview, group and plenary discussions op cit. 
181
 Morwa Guma constitution op cit Ch. 7 para 17 proscribes sexual relationship among clan members. 
182
 Under S. 149 (1) Penal Code op cit, incest is a sexual relationship between parents, siblings, children 
and in-laws. 
183
 E. Beyaraza op cit 165-166 discusses a similar taboo among the Bakiga of Western Uganda, and 
suggests that taboos also reflect a desire to maintain group unity.  
184
Bruno L. Kiwuwa v Ivan Serunkuma & Juliet Namazzi, High Court civil suit No. 52 of 2006.  
185
 Ibid, per Kasule J, at page 35. This decision is in respect of customary marriages that are legally 
recognised under the Customary Marriages (Registration) Act Cap 248.  




(ii) Punishments under Jopadhola laws  
 
Most literature refers to traditional punishments being restorative in nature, 
largely compensatory with fixed tariffs, fines, and an obligatory reconciliation feast to 
conclude the sentencing process.
186
 The Jopadhola are no different. Sentences under 
Jopadhola law for taboos and ordinary crimes are largely compensatory with fixed 
tariffs. Likewise, requirements for reconciliation rituals are fixed and none may be 
changed, not even by Nono.  
The Morwa Guma constitution for example, provides that offenders will be 
given a suitable punishment like paying money, a cow, a sheep, a chicken, whipping, or 
payment of other items in the specified colours (pieso).‟187 Take the case of marrying a 
relative (incest). The punishment for comprises a fixed tariff of one cow (dhiang luk), a 
sheep, one white and one red cockerel and local beer payable by the father of the male 
offender to the woman‟s family. Apart from the cow, the rest of the items are given to 
the maternal nephew (Okewo) who performs the purification ritual.
188
 For beating of a 
spouse, the offender pays cash compensation and takes an oath (kwongiroki) never to 
do it again. If a tooth is broken, the offender must pay for it. In short, punishments are 
clearly prescribed under traditional clan law. 
Some punishments like imprisonment and whipping (chwado powo), however, 
reveal the retributive element of traditional law. Both punishments as we discussed 
earlier, were assimilated by the Jopadhola following their imposition during 
Kakungulu‟s rule under the colonial administration.189  
With regards to imprisonment, the Morwa Guma constitution provides that 
whoever breaks the law may suffer „imprisonment at the hands of the government‟ 
(Chapter 15: Paragraph 36). Study participants explained that imprisonment may occur 
when the clan court convict a person of witchcraft, or where an offender fails to honour 
                                                 
186
 The restorative philosophy is discussed in Ch. 2 s. 3(iii) op cit. The definition of a fine in a 
communitarian sense is regarded as a compensation to both the victim (and their family) and as we shall 
see, sometimes to the community.  
187
 Morwa Guma constitution op cit Chapter 9 para 23. Pieso are used in purification rituals. 
188
 Ibid, para 17. Also stated by the clan groups and in the plenary discussion. .  
189
 Under S. 16 African Courts Act op cit. 
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the sentence agreements made before the court.
190
 Although imprisonment may seem 
an appropriate alternative sentence in such circumstances, it shows that clan courts can 
manipulate the system thereby inflicting punishments unknown to traditional clan law. 
As we saw in section 4 above, imprisonment is a relic from the colonial era when local 
government courts imprisoned offenders sent to them by the clan courts. However, it 
was difficult to ascertain the frequency with which this imprisonment was taking place. 
Whipping (Corporal punishment) is another punishment retained from colonial 
legislation.
191
 According to the study participants, whipping is administered to instil 
respect among the youth for clan court decisions, as a punishment for theft and for 
removing bad luck.
192
 In the trial simulation, for example, two adult Morwa Guma 
offenders, Ms. N and Mr. O, pleaded guilty to living together for a year. They were 
convicted on their pleas of marrying a relative (incest) and sentenced. The man in 
charge of rituals (Ja-Chowiroki) outlined the purification process that follows: 
„The Okewo will build a grass hut (kayindi) and the couple will strip naked, leave 
their clothes in the hut, and remain in the hut with a dog. The hut is set alight and 
they all run out naked where Okewo will be waiting to whip them. As they run out 
the lusiwa is removed and they are cleansed.‟ 
 
 
The act of whipping (and stripping naked) underpins the punitive philosophy of the 
purification process, even when aimed at removing bad luck from the perpetrators- 
ostensibly to protect the clan.
193
  
          To conclude, I have shown how Jopadhola laws retain restorative underpinnings, 
but may manipulate the state‟s penal system to take advantage of existing retributive 
punishments like imprisonment. Equally, the state has recognised traditional anti social 
crimes like witchcraft in its legislation and judicial decisions. Even so, some Jopadhola 
sanctions and purification rituals are in violation of substantive international human 
rights. The outcome is a „melded‟ structure with a potential for protecting some 
individual rights, while maintaining a parochial approach to communitarian values. I 
take up this point in the next chapter.  
 
                                                 
190
 Saza and P`Oriwa Morwa Guma groups. Study participants cited refusal to pay the fines or taking 
their time to pay them as reasons for imprisonment. A. Skelton and M. Sekhoyane fear that under 
restorative justice, victims may not achieve the right to a punitive remedy if the offender refuses to 
honour the agreement: op cit 582. The Jopadhola appear to have found a „legal‟ solution to this problem. 
191
 S. 16 African Courts Act op cit.  
192
 Mr. C. O an elder in Jo-Gem and the Saza Morwa Guma group. 
193
 This is similar to rituals among the Mende in Sierra Leone, where offenders found guilty of theft are 
subjected to treatment that may be qualified as torture Ch. 4  S. 5 (i) op cit.  Retributive philosophy in 
sentencing is discussed in Ch. 2 op cit. 
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Section 7:  Conclusion 
 
I have shown in this chapter how clan courts have adopted features of national 
courts, while maintaining local legitimacy and social control without compromising on 
their normative standards. This innovative approach seems more integrative than that 
pursued by national and international tribunals. For example, gender and age 
representation within the clan courts are non-traditional features. Their integration has 
done much to blunt the critique that customary justice often turns out, on inspection, to 
be patriarchal justice. Yet this is no procedural accident. The historical evolution of 
clan courts reveals clan cohesion and adaptation to survive, which explains the creation 
of a semi-regulatory framework and quasi-governmental oversight. This is tempered by 
mysticism and communitarian values.   
The re-constituted structure is a result of a democratic process of participation 
developed within a framework that may protect the right to a fair trial during 
sentencing. The clan court structure has metamorphosed over the centuries through the 
pre-colonial to colonial and post colonial times. Despite these changes, the supreme 
governing body of each clan: the Nono, has no mandate to direct the lower clan courts 
to develop a procedural structural framework. Therefore each clan unit has their own 
unique structures. The Tieng Adhola appears to be equally ineffective in promoting a 
translation of structures from national to clan courts, perhaps due to weak grass-roots 
support. The state has even passed legislation that adopts traditional crimes. This is 
evidence of the robustness of the non centralised system. 
This chapter provides insights into the nature of adaptations that international 
law may have to follow if it is to have local legitimacy. Most important is the question 
how these „reproduced‟ structures can act as a mechanism of accountability in a strict 
legal sense, by protecting procedural guarantees. Against this backdrop, the next 
chapter examines how the clan courts grapple with interpreting the right to a fair trial 
during the sentencing process without distorting their traditional normative standards.  
 M. Owor  Page 202 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: TRANSLATING PROCEDURAL RIGHTS IN 
JOPADHOLA CLAN COURTS 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 
Previously we saw that the Jopadhola have assimilated national court 
structures into traditional ones,
1
 without compromising on their normative standards.  
The issue which this chapter addresses is how Jopadhola clan courts use this 
„integrated‟ procedural model to harness similarities and blend divergent normative 
standards. Other African studies have examined the practice of traditional courts, 
mostly in post- conflict societies, but have not gone into great detail on the protection 
of procedural rights during sentencing.
2
 
Skelton and Sekhonyane maintain that restorative justice processes that are 
less closely linked to the criminal justice system, may find informal ways of ensuring 
human rights protection.
3
 I support their view. This chapter is intended to illustrate 
the „informal ways‟ in which clan courts protect individual procedural rights in a 
communitarian setting. I refer throughout to the findings from my empirical study and 
clan court transcripts.
4
 I argue that clan courts apply an expanded notion of rights that 
includes individual autonomy and equality, abridged by social obligations. Lack of a 
prescriptive framework from the Nono (governing body), Tieng Adhola (cultural 
union) and higher traditional courts, nonetheless leaves interpretation of rights to the 
vagaries of individual clan courts that apply traditional „precedent‟. This 
interpretation process is dependent upon a participatory approach, influenced 
somewhat by the rules of natural justice adopted from local council courts, with 
which clan courts are familiar. Either way, the protection of communitarian values is 
                                                 
1
 The national structures assimilated are: Assessors, judge, prosecutor, women and youth 
representatives and the Local Council chairman of zone 1 (hereafter „Local Council 1 Chairman‟) - Ch 
6 op cit. 
2
 Contemporary studies exist like Roco Wati I Acoli op cit, a study of clan courts in Acoli, and Hovel 
and Quinn‟s précis of procedural rights in Acoli customary law; both discussed in Ch. 3 S. 2 op cit. 
There is The Law People See op cit on communities in Sierra Leone discussed in Ch. 4 S.5 op cit. 
Other studies focus on traditional courts operating under national law in accordance with prescribed 
procedural rules and procedural rights: K. Apuuli, Unpublished Thesis (2006) op cit; B. Tshehla 
(2005) op cit and F. Kayitare, Respect of the right to a fair trial in indigenous African Criminal justice 
systems: the case of Rwanda and South Africa Unpublished LLM thesis (University of Ghana, 2004) 
studying Gacaca courts and the South African Chief‟s Courts.  
3
 A. Skelton and M. Sekhonyane op cit at 593. 
4
 The detailed methodology is in Appendix One and Ch.1 S. 6 op cit. 




 I conclude that clan court practices offer salutary lessons on making 
sentencing outcomes fair and culturally relevant.  
To the best of my knowledge, this chapter is the only empirical work on the 
protection of procedural rights within Jopadhola sentencing processes. Following this 
brief introduction, my arguments are presented in 5 sections. First, I give an overview 
of the traditional notion of procedural rights (Section 2). Next is a discussion of legal 
tensions arising from its application and attempts by clan courts to reconcile 
divergence and harness similarities (Section 3). I then consider why traditional 
institutions have failed to formulate a prescriptive procedural rights framework 
(Section 4). The use of precedent is discussed in Section 5.  Finally, I offer a brief 
conclusion (Section 6).   
Section 2: Protecting due process rights in ‘stateless societies’ 
 
Skelton and Sekhonyane rightly observe that there is broad agreement that 
rights should be protected within the restorative system.
6
 In this section, I investigate 
the protection of procedural rights within the Jopadhola non-state justice system. 
Specifically, I show how a traditional notion of participatory rights protects the 
individual and community jointly as rights holders and party to a criminal case.  
 (i) Jopadhola definition of procedural rights   
 
In this analysis, I adopt the legal position that traditional courts are enjoined 
under the Guidelines to the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ rights (hereafter 
African Charter‟) to adhere to principles of fair trial.7 Traditional courts under Section 
S (1) include clan courts. Clan courts therefore interpret or „translate‟ legal norms. 
Their interpretation of individual autonomy and equality produces a specific 
procedural language
8
 that influences the application of procedural rights. The issue 
then, is what the Jopadhola procedural language of rights is. This point is of 
                                                 
5
 Communitarian values namely the duty of kin; reconciliation, restitution and role of ritual are defined 
in Ch.1 S.4 and Ch. 2 S.2 op cit. 
6
 A. Skelton and M. Sekhonyane op cit, 588. 
7
 Section Q (a) of the Principles and Guidelines on the right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in 
Africa (hereafter „the Guidelines‟) enjoin traditional courts to respect international standards on the 
right to a fair trial, and expound Article 7 of the African Charter: discussed in Ch. 5 S. 3 op cit.  
8
 M. Langer op cit 9-11, argues that legal terms may have different meaning in a different procedural 
language or structure of interpretation. I suggest that clan courts give different meaning to legal terms 
within their procedural language.  
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importance because as Baderin rightly observes, it may be ambitious to expect 
traditional courts to apply international rights standards when they are not subject to 
formal rules of evidence and procedure.
9
 Still, as my study shows, Jopadhola clan 
courts have been able to apply to apply human rights standards in the absence of 
written procedural rules, thus circumnavigating such points of conflict.  
Linguist S. Byakutaga explains that local languages do not have a „one-to-one 
correspondence in lexica semantic aspects,‟10 rendering words like „law‟, „rule‟ and 
„regulation‟ difficult to translate into Ugandan languages. The equivalent for all three 
words is „law‟.11 Similarly, in the Jopadhola language there is no difference in 
meaning between these three words: „Law,‟ „Rules‟ and „Human Rights‟. They are all 
„Chik‟: a law.  A suffix: ma (belonging to) or pa (theirs) defines whose laws or rights. 
For example state laws are chik ma gavumenti and human rights are Chik ma yiko 
kwo pa ji jie: „laws that protect the lives of all people‟.12 The use of the word jie 
denotes „everybody‟ as contrasted with dhano-a person, or ani: „Me‟. This reflects a 
communitarian nature of autonomy which, according to Ikuenobe, connotes a 




The Jopadhola meaning of rights is more in line with the definitions of 
Gyekye and Cobbah although it draws somewhat on a convergence with the notion of 
individual rights as a claim to something. Cobbah maintains that entitlements and 
obligations form the basis of the kinship system. As Gyeke puts forth, communitarian 
values do not go against the ethic of individual rights, but the latter may be abridged 
by social responsibilities in so far as is necessary to maintain the integrity and 
stability of the group.
14
 The Morwa Guma constitution for instance, sets out social 
responsibilities (duties) like observance of rituals,
15
 but there is no provision on the 
protection of individual interests. In fact the word „right‟ is a misnomer, for in 
Dhupadhola, this translates as: „oyeyi go’ –„one is allowed to do or obtain something‟, 
meaning a person may have a claim to something. Still, as Ikuenobe would put it, an 
                                                 
9
 Guidelines op cit S. Q (1), M. Baderin op cit 126 discussed in Ch. S. 3 (iii) (b) op cit.  
10
 S. Byakutaga „The need to demystify legal language in Uganda,‟ in P. G Okoth, M. Muranga and E. 




 Gombolola Jo-Gem: „The laws of the clan and that of the government both protect people‟s lives.‟ 
13
 P. Ikuenobe op cit 40-41. 
14
 K. Gyekye (1997) op cit 65-66. J. Cobbah op cit at 320-321. See discussion in Ch. 1 and 3 op cit. 
15
 Morwa Guma constitution op cit Ch. 9 para 22 on performing rituals and visiting shrines. Other 
responsibilities include payment of funeral dues under Ch. 3 para 7 and on payment of dowry in Ch. 6. 
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Individuality is however reflected in the notion of „parties‟ to a case. Thus, 
study participants defined the victim as ngata owumiya -‘the one who has been hurt‟ 
and the complainant as: ja kiosa: „the one who has reported‟. The prosecutor-also ja 
kiosa, reports the case to the court. The defendant is Ja banja „the one who has a 
problem‟, or won banja, the owner of the problem‟. The judge is won kom „the owner 
of the chair‟. The pre-fix „Ja‟ and „Won‟ are singular and refer to the individual 
attributes of the conflict. Plural is „Jo‟: „people‟. „Parties‟ include the victim, 
defendant and community (Jo piny). Collectively, all have a broader role than in 
international courts, for they have participatory „rights‟ at all stages of the trial, 
including the deliberation of sentence.
17
  To understand the ways in which 
participatory „rights‟ are translated into the communitarian system, I start with an 
investigation of how prosecutorial and judicial functions are exercised communally.  
(ii) A participatory approach to sentencing 
 
 We saw previously (Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 6) that at the structural level, the 
participatory approach competes with the judge controlled approach. This is 
exemplified in the functions of key actors in Jopadhola sentencing process that bear a 
communal meaning in relation to power structure. The shared procedural function of 
key actors puts all parties on an equal footing. Every person may participate in giving 
and examination of evidence and adjudication. This portrays informality of procedure 
and public participation, characteristic of traditional restorative justice discussed in 
previous chapters. Excerpts from the trial simulation on incest between members of 
the same clan, illustrates my point:  
 
ASSESSOR 1: Madam, what is your Clan? 
Ms.N (accused): I don‟t know. 
PROSECUTOR: Let us then call the father of the girl to give evidence on her clan. 
(Father of the girl is fetched by the Askari-court official)  
JUDGE: Thank you for coming. Could you please tell us who these two people are? 
                                                 
16
 A definition of international procedural rights as absolute entitlements by C. Safferling op cit and H. 
Friman op cit (2004) is given in Ch. 1 S. 4 op cit. 
17
 In terms of Bassiouni‟s distinction between parties and participants to a conflict (2006 op cit) 
discussed in Ch. 2 S. 3 (v) op cit, the Jopadhola notion of rights makes the victim, offender and 
community, all parties to the conflict with substantive participative rights.  
 M. Owor  Page 206 
 
FATHER OF GIRL: They are my father, daughter and brother. 
ASSESOR 2: Please don‟t confuse us. We need to know the exact relationship. 
FATHER OF THE GIRL: It is true he is my brother. 
COMMUNITY (IN CHOROUS): He is lying. That is his son-in-law and he lives with his daughter. 
JUDGE: Is there any witness to this? 
MS O: Yes, I live next to them and they have lived together for more than a year now. You can even 
ask the other village mates. 
 
The excerpt shows how a participatory approach differs from the judge 
controlled approach in the international model. Traditional proceedings have no 
separate structured sentencing hearing. Rather, the judge is actively assisted by the 
assessors and the community during the trial. Evidently, the assessors are more active 
in examining of witnesses than the prosecutor. Further, the community may comment 
on the veracity of evidence because the judge is more like a chairman, permitting 
interjections from any one. By giving every person locus standi in judicio, the judge 
is perceived as being absolute impartial during the hearing.
18
 
There are other differences in approach that are striking. Firstly, there are no 
secret deliberations in light of the open nature of proceedings. Study participants 
emphasised that the parties and the community must be fully involved in deliberation 
of sentence: a task left to judges in international trials. The parties or their kin, 
participants argued, must be free to support either party and even negotiate the 
sentence on their behalf. Secondly, in using the participatory approach, the courts 
apply principles of group rights and reconciliation, akin to social fairness.
19
 Social 
fairness provides accountability, commands public confidence and is achieved by 
having every adult engage in independent fact finding and adjudication. Participants 
explained the process of arriving at the sentence as follows:  
 
„When giving the sentence, the chair asks the offender is he is in agreement 
with the punishment given to him. Then he also asks the one who has won 
the case if he agrees with the punishment given. If they agree then an 
agreement is made preventing the offender committing the offence again. 
However, this is after asking the rest of the people present if they agree with 
the punishment.‟20  
 
                                                 
18
 This point is made by T. Elias op cit, 248. 
19
 Social fairness is a phrase I borrow from A. Sanders and R. Young, Criminal Justice (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007) 480-510 to amplify fairness as a principle in collegiate decision 
making. Its opposite is legal fairness.  
20
 Gombolola Jo-Gem. 
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This quote shows that both verdict and sentence are arrived at collectively by 
all present- a situation not envisaged in international procedural rules.
21
 This contrasts 
with legal fairness in international tribunals where judges as sole arbiters, make a 
dispassionate application of the law, focusing on the legal issue of establishing guilt 
or innocence. By deliberating in secret, international judges apply procedural rules to 
arrive at a verdict and sentence that are not subject to public discussion or scrutiny.
22
 
Although the international judges‟ knowledge assists in efficiency, public deliberation 
makes the system accountable to the community and commands public confidence. 
Social fairness is reinforced through other features: the Jo-Gem arrangement where 
the local council chairman sits in a quasi judicial capacity,
23
 and the sitting 
arrangements.  
-The sitting arrangements  
 
 
Figure 9: © Maureen Owor (2006). Trial simulation depicts the semi circular sitting 
arrangement.   
 
                                                 
21
 This finding contrasts with Driberg‟s account that there was no verdict delivered by traditional 
courts, rather the parties „sensed‟ public feeling in matter: H. Driberg (1928) 70 op cit. 
22
 R. Henham, Punishment and Process (2005) op cit 94, criticising deliberation of sentence in camera 
that excludes participation by interested parties.  
23
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Figure 9 illustrates the Jopadhola sitting arrangement, which was reconstructed 
during the trial simulation. According to Elias, sitting arrangements in traditional 
courts were casual, semi-circular, or horse-shoe: the latter two designed to enable 
parties to view proceedings and allow easy access and exit.
24
 Figure 9 depicts the 
semi circular arrangement. The smaller semi circle has the judge in the middle, with 
the secretary to his right and Assessors (Jo-Kony) on either side. Other officials 
include the prosecutor, person in charge of rituals and the women and youth 
representatives. The bigger semi circle comprises the community: neighbours, family, 
friends, witnesses; even people from other clans. There is an opening at the sides to 
let people walk through. As shown in Figure 10 below, witnesses stand in a row 
facing the adjudicating panel with their backs to the audience. Whoever wishes to 
speak puts their hand up to get permission from the judge and does so while standing. 
 
 
Figure 10: © Maureen Owor (2006). Trial simulation showing the taking of evidence.   
 
During plea taking (Figure 9) and the trial (Figure 10), the female offender 
kneels or sits, while the male offender stands throughout. The Jopadhola have no 
age grade societies where people sit according to their ages, rather sitting is 
                                                 
24





Witness Male defendant Witness Grandma of clan 
Secretary Female 
defendant 
In charge of 
rituals Prosecutor 
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according to individual preference.
25
 This sitting arrangement demonstrates that the 
judge and court officials are on a par with the clan members, and therefore are not 
infallible.  
Wiredu cautions against the danger in judicious thinking of confusing 
certainty with infallibility.
26
 Such infallibility in my view can also be expressed in 
other ways including the sitting arrangement. In courts of law, often the judge sits at 
the front of the room on a raised dais with lawyers facing the front,
27
 which denotes 
superiority and infallibility over those present. In explaining these features called 
„judge-craft‟, Mulcahy persuasively argues that court room designs in England keep 
the judge separate, enabling them to maintain control over whom and what will be 
heard. Space for the public is more peripheral and as public space has reduced, so has 
their role in participatory justice.
28
 Mulchay‟s reasoning applies equally to 
international and national courts. Some may even argue, that the wearing of wigs and 
gowns by judges separates them even further from the locals whose clan court 
officials wear ordinary dress in court. 
In sum, the Jopadhola model uses a participatory approach to determination of 
sentence comprising shared procedural functions, fortified by a semi-circular sitting 
arrangement. Within this context, decision making is underpinned by judicial 
fallibility. This approach appears to protect what Ikuenobe aptly describes as a 
„moderate‟ sense of individual autonomy. Ultimately, tensions arise because of 
normative divergence between individual rights and communitarian values. 






                                                 
25
 F. Burke op cit 215 points out that the Jopadhola had no age grade system like the neighbouring 
Iteso.  
26
 K. Wiredu, Conceptual Decolonisation in African Philosophy: Four Essays (Hope Publications: 
Ibadan, 1995) 27. 
27
 S. Byakutaga op cit 132.  
28
 L. Mulcahy, „Architects of Justice: The Politics of Court Room Design‟ (2007) 16 (3) Social and 
Legal Studies 383-403, 390-396. Court room designs in England, she observes, seem to echo the 1884 
designs that limited public access on grounds that the public were „dirty‟. „Judge Craft‟: a phrase 
coined by Flemming et al, The Craft of Justice: Politics and Work in Criminal Court Communities, 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992) at 3, 4 describes how judicial officers go about 
their tasks in the court room.  
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Section 3: Managing divergence-harnessing similarities  
 
This section analyses at the doctrinal level, the question whether „moderate‟ 
individual autonomy protects a person sufficiently from abuse within the participatory 
process. The answer depends in part on whether clan courts have adequately 
assimilated rules of natural justice from the Local Council court, with which they are 
more closely associated. It also depends to what extent individual rights are 
„abridged‟ by social responsibilities and communitarian values. I conclude that clan 
courts attempt to mitigate any abuse through the participatory process itself.  
 According to study participants, clan courts; local council courts and courts of law 
have in common, laws that govern trials: 
„Local Council or government have a book containing laws, like the clan who 
also have their by laws. Our laws start as a customary law of the clan from down 
in the Kisoko, Miluka, Gombolola, Saza to P`Oriwa. The government magistrate 
emphasised that this is proper and that is what is applied in the clan courts.‟29  
 
Despite this claim to similarity between the systems, there are some marked 
differences identified in the literature.
30
 I use Bennet‟s categorisation of points of 
conflict
31
 to undertake a thematic appraisal of the participants‟ views on reconciling 
these marked differences under the following sub themes: patriarchy versus equality, 
punishment and human rights, guaranteeing impartiality of the tribunal, rights versus 
duty to protect kin, rights versus communitarian values and judicial discretion versus 
freedom of expression. I also examine participants‟ views on enhancing similarities in 
language of choice and conducting trials without undue delay. 
 
(i) Patriarchy v equality for women and youth  
 
From the outset, study participants were willing to find ways of reconciling 
the traditional with the international notion of procedural rights. One significant 
finding was the transformation of clan courts from bastions of patriarchy to courts 
that are representative of women and the youth. Participants spoke of how 
transplanted law may not address power imbalances between victim and offenders. 
                                                 
29
 Saza Morwa Guma.  
30 T. Bennet (1991) op cit at 23 notes 40-43 citing works by Donnelley (1982), Howard (1986), Mbaye 
(1982) and Mojweku (1982).  
31
 Bennet‟s points of conflict outlined in Ch. 3 S. 3 (iii) op cit are: individual rights versus community 
values, rights versus duties; principle of patriarchy versus freedom of thought or speech. 
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Traditional process, participants reasoned, gives the offender a voice, allows the 
victim to say everything on their mind and the court ensures that there are no hard 
feelings. More importantly, women and youth representatives ensure their 
constituents are protected. This is in clear opposition to widely held legalist critique
32
 
that the traditional processes exacerbate power imbalances by denying the offender, 
women or children a voice.  
Traditional restorative justice as applied by the clan courts appears to hold 
promise in addressing the desires of women and youth (including children) to be 
heard, to have the victim‟s suffering acknowledged, and to hold perpetrators 
accountable. I am mindful of the limits of this potential because not all parties may 
have an equal opportunity to participate because of power inequalities. In other 
words, procedural equality may exist only within the dominant group. This can be 
explored further by using the example of the right to equality before the courts. Under 
Article 14 (1) ICCPR, all persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. 




Some have lauded the kinship system as promoting equality for all before the 
courts.
34
 Others like Bennet, are more cautious, arguing that the patriarchal nature of 
society may reinforce inequality before the law because of power imbalance, 
especially where women and children are concerned.
35
 I agree with Bennet‟s position 
because women and youth representatives, participating both as spokespersons for 
their constituents and as individuals, have no equality in real terms. As Skelton and 




                                                 
32
 The critiques include works by T. Bennet and A. Skelton and M. Sekhonyane op cit. 
33
 S. Q (4) Guidelines op cit and African Charter op cit Article 3. Article 21 (1) Uganda constitution op 
cit provides for equality before the law in all spheres of cultural life and enjoyment of equal protection 
of the law.  
34
 O. Elechi op cit 63-67gives an expose of these views. 
35
 T. W Bennet, Human Rights and African Customary Law (Cape Town: Juta publishers, 1999). In 
Human Rights and African Customary Law under the South African Constitution (Cape Town: Juta 
publishers, 1995), Bennet persuasively argues that attaining procedural equality does not tackle the 
cause and conditions of inequality: 88. 
36
 A. Skelton and M. Sekhonyane op cit 585, citing Skelton and Frank (2004). Other power imbalances 
may include disabled, learning disabled and other vulnerable groups. 
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Let me illustrate using the Re O. Odoi and L. Okongo case from Morwa 
Guma, Saza Namwaya (hereafter „the Odoi case‟).37  The facts are that sometime in 
2002, Olweny, son of L. Okongo, eloped with Awor, the daughter of K. Onyango. 
Olweny and Awor, both minors from the Morwa Guma clan, started living together at 
the home of Okongo. This act contravened the Morwa Guma law on „marrying a 
relative‟ (incest).38 The case was heard by the Namwaya Saza court. Direct evidence 
was given by Onyango (the father) on behalf of Awor (accused) and her mother: 
„I went and found L. Okongo with his son and they admitted to me that they 
had married my daughter. I came back and I told the mother, then the mother 
said “The daughter of my sister is at that home therefore let my daughter 
stay.”‟39  
 
Apart from the husband giving testimony on behalf of his wife, the transcript shows 
that deliberations on sentence were between parents, other relatives and clan 
members: all male.  
Likewise, during the trial simulation, only three women and one youth spoke, 
not to interpose, but only when called upon to speak by the chairman-cum-judge.
40
 
This suggests that although none of the women or youth participants cited gender or 
age inequality as a problem, power relations among the Jopadhola may not have 
changed much since the pre-colonial times. As Bennet argues, patriarchy denies 
women (and youth) the locus standi in judicio, because of the assumption in 
customary law that they are not „versed in the forensic arts and accordingly need 
someone to argue their cases for them‟. Though they are not denied their action, they 
need assistance to bring it through a guardian
41
- in our case, the father and husband. 
In the event, although the boy exercised his participatory „right‟ as an offender by 
querying the payment of a bull to the girl‟s side,42 the girl herself said nothing. 
The sentence „agreed‟ involved removing the girl from the boy‟s home. It is 
questionable whether this was an appropriate sentence especially since there is no 
                                                 
37
 Re O. Odoi and L .Okongo, Decision of 24/02/2002 (Ssaza Namwaya, Morwa Guma Court). 
Transcript is on the file with the author. 
38
 The Morwa Guma constitution op cit, Chapter 17 para.13 analysed in Ch. 6 (i) op cit. 
39
 Transcript of Odoi case, op cit, para 5.  
40
 These were: the secretary who cited the law contravened; grandmother of the clan calling for 
purification; and the mother of the girl calling for a stiff punishment. The youth (Okewo) only spoke to 
affirm his readiness to perform the purification ceremony. The only exception was the female 
eyewitness who interjected to give evidence as a neighbour. 
41
 T. Bennet (1995) op cit 89-90: citing Mashinini 1947 NAC (N&T) 25 and Ngcamu v Majozi 1959 
NAC 74 (NE). 
42
Transcript op cit para.16: „The boy who is married to the relative asked that “This cow, why is it 
being paid?”‟ 
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record of her saying anything about it. In the interests of justice, her opinion ought to 
have been sought because there was evidence that she was pregnant. This would in 
turn affect decisions on her welfare and where she would prefer to live after giving 
birth. The decision to forcibly remove her from her lover‟s home left these issues 
unaddressed.  
In sum, the Odoi case exemplifies Bennet‟s argument that power inequality 
within society affects equality before the law. The clans may argue that this is a 
misunderstanding of tradition because the law is there to protect women and youth 
which is why taboos and criminal laws proscribe acts against the dignity of the 
individual.
43
 Although there is something in this position, I suggest that the process 
by which the sentence is arrived at is parochial. This undermines the rights of women, 
youth or vulnerable groups, by inadvertently „abridging‟ the individual right to 
participation in the proceedings. 
 
(ii) Traditional punishments and human rights law   
 
One surprise finding was that most participants believed international human 
rights had something positive to offer when compared with communitarian values. 
Study participants were not oblivious to the conflicts with human rights law which 
they identified during the plenary discussion. Their views reflected their concerns, 
particularly regarding the purification rituals for incest: 
„Some punishments like burning and running through thorns are harsh. 
There is cruelty to animals. For instance, the innocent dog is punished. 
Stripping an offender naked is a violation of their dignity. 
If one is running naked and meets relatives or in laws, this increases their 
chances of getting lusiwa (bad luck).‟ 44 
 
These statements are significant because they illustrate the extent to which clan 
court members view the notion of autonomy of the individual, even in mandatory 
purification rituals. Aspects of the purification rituals identified where human rights 
could be violated included stripping naked of the offenders. Ironically, purification 
rituals may also result in yet another potential breach of taboos: if the naked offenders 
met in-laws or relatives that could attract more lusiwa. The participants‟ orientation 
towards human rights awareness was shaped by their exposure to the local council 
                                                 
43
 Plenary discussion, field notes. 
44
 The purification ritual for incest is described in Ch. 6 S. 6 (ii) op cit. 
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courts and national courts, and following of debates on radio, television and in 
newspapers (the latter two, for the more educated, affluent participants).  
Participants‟ views quoted above also highlight two conflicting issues in 
substantive human rights law. Firstly, some punishments and rituals violate 
international human rights despite their legitimacy under Jopadhola clan law. 
Punishments like whipping and rituals that involve stripping offenders naked and 
burning with fire, are prohibited by international law as cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment under Article 7 ICCPR, and Article 5 African Charter. In Kyamanywa 
Simon v Uganda,
45
 corporal punishment (whipping) was also declared a violation of 
Article 24 of Uganda‟s constitution that prohibits cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment, by the Constitutional Court. The decision followed a referral from the 
Supreme Court on the question whether mandatory strokes of the cane for the offence 




Another punishment is banishment. Where offenders are found guilty of 
witchcraft under Jopadhola law, a woman may be banished from her home, a man 
from his clan, or both from the village.
47
 The rationale is to prevent further acts of 
witchcraft that may harm people. Still, banishment from one‟s home violates the right 
to property contrary to Article 17 (1) ICCPR and Article 14 of the African Charter. In 
Uganda v Salvatorio Abuki, the appellant was convicted of witchcraft under Section 3 
(3) of Witchcraft Act for causing illness to three of his neighbours. The Grade II 
Magistrates‟ court sentenced Abuki to 22 months imprisonment and issued an 
exclusion order banning him from „that home‟ for 10 years.48 On appeal, the Supreme 
Court in Attorney General v Salvatorio Abuki declared that a banishment order under 
the Witchcraft Act was cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 24, 
because an offender is deprived of shelter and means of earning a living from their 
land. Banishment was also declared to be a violation of the right to property under 
Article 27 (2).
49
 Arguably, the Supreme Court decision viewed in the context of 
                                                 
45
 Kyamanywa Simon v Uganda Constitutional Reference 10 of 2000. 
46
 Kyamanywa Simon v Uganda Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. 16 of 1999. Kyamanywa (2000 
decision) was applied in Oryem Richard and another v. Uganda S.C Criminal Appeal No.2 of 2002. 
47
 Morwa Guma. 
48
 Uganda v Salvatorio Abuki Grade II Magistrate Ct Cr Case No. 105 of 1995. Under S. 7 (3) ibid, 10 
years is the maximum term of banishment. 
49
 Attorney General v Salvatorio Abuki S. C Cr App No.1 of 1998 op cit: per Wambuzi C.J., 277, 280. 
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Section Q of the Guidelines on traditional courts, applies mutatis mutandis to clan 
courts‟ sentencing decisions.  
A second conflicting issue is that under Jopadhola normative standards, 
compensatory sanctions are considered more restorative than the international penalty 
of imprisonment. This poses a significant challenge to international law. The study 
participants stressed that imprisonment is not recognised as a punishment under clan 
laws. This is because the rationale for punishments for all crimes (including murder) 
is not to deprive an offender of their liberty, an inalienable right in Jopadhola clan 
law, but to restore the equilibrium. By contrast, participants viewed imprisonment as 
retributive and inhumane because it deprived an offender of their right to liberty. As 
we saw in Chapter 6, although offenders may be imprisoned on the orders of a clan 
court, this is allegedly done by Magistrates‟ courts in connivance with some clan 
courts.
50
 Additionally, the Jopadhola do not have the death penalty so the right to life 
is well protected.
51
 There remains an impasse between international and traditional 
purposes and types of punishment, with implications from a substantial rights 
perspective. Even so, an acknowledgment by clan court officials that some 
punishments are inhumane, indicates a willingness to apply international human 
rights in their own normative context.
52
 
(iii) Guaranteeing impartiality of tribunals 
 
One component of the right to procedural fairness is institutional guarantees 
of independence and impartiality within the structure of tribunals. The question of 
independence of traditional courts is for national legislation under Section Q (c) of 
the Guidelines, but no legislation is in place yet in Uganda. The guarantee on 
impartiality provided in Section Q (d), nevertheless enjoins traditional courts to 
decide cases without any „restrictions, improper influence, inducements, pressure, 
threats or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter.‟53 
                                                 
50
 Only 2 out of the 7 groups mentioned using Magistrates courts to imprison offenders: Ch. 6 S.6 op 
cit.  
51
 This is unlike the Karamojong (Nilo Hamitic group) who still apply the death penalty in their clan 
courts: Human Rights and the Search for Peace in Karamoja, Uganda Human Rights Commission 
2004 Special Report paras 5.25-5.27. 
52
 This draws parallels with An-Na`im‟s „internal re-interpretation‟ of tradition, discussed in Ch. 3 op 
cit. 
53
 S. Q (d) Guidelines op cit adopts Article 14 (1) ICCPR op cit. The impartiality of a traditional court 
may also be undermined if a member has: 
1.1 expressed an opinion which would influence the decision-making;  
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 Does the working of the structures guarantee impartiality as provided in the 
Guidelines? Impartiality was discussed as part of the challenges faced by clan courts. 
There were no complaints about officials having a pecuniary interest in matters before 
clan courts. However, study participants identified threats to clan courts by the 
government, the parties, and the partiality of court officials in cases involving their 
relatives.  
A growing problem of executive and judicial interference was identified where 
the national courts send the police to arrest officials. National courts were also 
accused of not responding to the pleas from clan courts to return cases that involve 
purification and reconciliation rituals, where the national courts lack appropriate 
„jurisdiction‟: 
„There are cases like cursing, lusiwa of a clan nature that have to be heard by the 
clan. The government cannot perform all the details of the rituals.‟54  
 
This hostility from the national judiciary was viewed with regret, but the study 
participants were determined to deliver justice impartially and carry on their work. 
The Tororo Chief Magistrate acknowledged this impasse, noting the authoritative 
power of the clan court was such that they ignored judicial orders that reversed their 
decisions, and stood by their previous ones.
55
 
Threats to clan court officials by individuals are exemplified in the Odoi case:  
„Mr. Okongo M of Namwaya stood to speak and said “I have said lots of words 
but the Ja Kisoko, Ja Muluka, Ja Gombolola, what are they doing in this matter 
so that we sit as a clan to correct or discuss this?” The Ja Ssaza answered “Since 
it was said that Okongo L is angry nobody could sit and hear the matter. That is 
why I had the power to say we sit and determine the matter.”‟56 
 
In this exchange, Mr. M. Okongo is demanding to know why all the chairpersons of 
the lower court bench were hearing the case. The Saza chief‟s response is that the 
lower courts‟ impartiality was compromised by the offender‟s father‟s confrontational 
behaviour. Accordingly, the Saza court would hear the case with a „mixed‟ bench to 
ensure impartiality.   
                                                                                                                            
1.2 some connection or involvement with the case or a party to the case;  
1.3 a pecuniary or other interest linked to the outcome of the case. 
2. Any party to proceedings before a traditional court shall be entitled to challenge its impartiality on 
the basis of ascertainable facts that the fairness of any of its members or the traditional court appears to 
be in doubt. 
54
Gombolola Morwa Guma.  
55
 Interview on 16
th
 August 2006 with Mr. P. Rutakirwah, who pointed out that the decisions he 
overturned related only to land disputes. 
56
 Transcript op cit, para 7.  
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Study participants did not accept that adjudicators hearing cases involving their 
own relatives negated the guarantee of an impartial tribunal. Nonetheless, their 
comments indicate that partiality can be an issue in fact: 
„If the matter affects relatives of the court elders, they do not want to sit in the 
hearing of the case and when they do they usually sympathise or forgive their 
relatives.‟57  
 
Arguably this dilemma could be addressed by reference to the rules of natural justice 
contained in the LCC Act, where a local council court in exercising its jurisdiction „is 
guided by the principle of impartiality without fear or favour‟ (Section 24). 
Additionally, any member with an interest of whatever nature in the issue is 
disqualified from hearing the case (Section 24(d)). Applying this provision is not so 
straight forward. Previously, I outlined the correlation between membership of clan 
courts and local council courts, as well as their close working relationship.
58
 Studies 
have shown that it is not always the case that local council officials enforce 
government laws because it is established that these officials are chosen from people 
who respect local traditions.
59
 Still, these studies do not investigate what proportion 
of clan court officials also sit on the Local Council court and are therefore arguably in 
a stronger position to apply „foreign‟ norms like natural justice in clan courts. I 
established that of the 25 study participants- all of whom sit in the clan court, 7 from 
both clans indicated that they were Local Council 1 officials.
60
 It follows that in 
theory, some clan court members ought to know the rules of natural justice applicable 
in the local council courts, especially since the role of the Local Council 1 chairman 
in Jo-Gem courts is to provide some sort of legal oversight in such a dilemma.
61
 
 Despite a lack of evidence on the frequency of such occurrences, the quote 
above of the Jo-Gem respondents indicates a failure to apply this principle of 
impartiality. It may be argued that adopting a participatory approach acts as a check 
against such violation, especially since the chairman and other clan court officials 
                                                 
57
 Kisoko Jo-Gem. 
58
 Ch. 6 S. 5 (1) op cit. The Jo-Gem courts have the Local Council 1 Chairman sitting as a member of 
the court. Although the Morwa Guma courts invite the Local Council officials to participate as 
ordinary clan members in clan court cases.  
59
 B. Baker op cit 342, J. Barya and J. Oloka-Onyango op cit part IV, also citing J. M.N Kakooza and J. 
Okumu-Wengi,  A review of literature and basic data on the LC Court system in Uganda, Judiciary 
Programme Danida (Kampala, 1997). 
60
 Self description in attendance sheets: details in Appendix 3-List of study participants. 
61
 Rules of natural justice are set out under S. 24 LCC Act discussed in Ch. 6 S.5 (i) op cit. The 
dilemma could be whether participation in the adjudication of a relative‟s case comprises an interest in 
the context of duty to kin under S. 24 (d). 
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may be corrected if they err on procedure. This enables any party including the 
audience, to identify instances of partiality that may compromise the sentencing 
process so they are dealt with immediately.  
   
(iv) Individual rights v duties  
 
I stressed in Chapter 5 that the dilemma of reconciling individual rights with 
duties and rights of others, has not been resolved in the African Charter. These 
concerns have been addressed in the literature but it is the manner in which clan 
courts handle this normative divergence that is not well understood. 
 
(a) Right to legal representation v duty to protect kin 
 
There is a dearth of literature on the right to legal representation in 
international sentencing hearings, which may be because of an assumption that legal 
representation is guaranteed in the sentencing stage of the trial. As Bassiouni 
observes, representation by counsel is „paramount to the due process of law and to the 
integrity of the judicial process.‟62 The Guidelines provide that in proceedings before 
traditional courts an offender may seek assistance and may be represented by a 
representative of choice. This incorporates the ICCPR due process guarantee for a 
defendant to have legal assistance or counsel of choice.
63
 The principle behind this is 
to ensure that the interests of the accused are fully protected during trial.
64
  
Lack of legal representation is seen as a major obstacle to attaining standards 
of international procedural justice in kinship and state-managed traditional courts.
65
 
Nevertheless, some maintain that this right must be analysed in a traditional context. 
Nhlapo for example argues that lack of legal representation in traditional societies is 
                                                 
62
 M. C Bassiouni (1992-1993) op cit 283; K. Apuuli op cit 183. 
63
 S. Q (a) Guidelines op cit. Likewise Article 28 (3)(d)(e) constitution op cit provides for a lawyer of 
one‟s choice and state legal representation for capital offences with a sentence of death or life 
imprisonment. The importance of this right under Article14 (3) (b)(d) ICCPR op cit, was underscored 
by the Human Rights Committee in Michael and Brian Hill v Spain Communication No. 526/1993. 
64
 M. Bohlander, „A Fool for a Client-Remarks on the Freedom of Choice and Assignment of Counsel 
at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia‟ (2005) 16 (2) Criminal Law Forum 
159-173, 168. M. Damaska, „Assignment of counsel and Perceptions of Fairness‟ (2005) 3 (1) Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 3-8, points out that the right is not absolute and can be restricted as it 
was in Milosevic’s case (IT-02-54-T).  
65
 Ch. 4 S.3, op cit. Also K. Apuuli op cit 183- 186 on Gacaca courts under Rwanda Organic Law. M. 
Senyonjo (2007) op cit 64-65, likewise criticizes Acoli Mato Oput traditional mechanism for the lack 
of due process safeguards like the right to legal representation to the offender.  
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justified because the courts apply customary law, so emphasis must be placed on 
traditional modes of dispute settlement. He maintains that excluding legal 
representation is not necessarily a bad thing because this may help ameliorate power 
imbalances and make it possible for every person (including women) to cross 
examine witnesses and voice an opinion. It also preserves the non-technical nature of 




As we saw in the previous chapter, the Jopadhola, not being a chiefly society, 
had no system of legal representation because it was the duty of all kin to represent 
any party. Therefore when asked who is permitted to make representations on behalf 
of the offender, the study participants found it difficult to answer. Participants could 
not comprehend the notion of an offender needing legal representation, when all 
people may speak on his or her behalf, especially since there is no burden of proof. 
They pointed out that the judge, chair of the court, any person who knows details of 
the offence (witnesses), clan members, neighbours and the Local Council officials; 
could speak on the offender‟s behalf or intervene where necessary.  
 In this regard, although Morwa Guma courts have a prosecutor in the higher 
courts there is no defence lawyer. Morwa Guma participants reasoned that this does 
not create procedural inequality of arms because any person may speak in defence of 
the offender. The Jo-Gem courts are organised in an apparently more neutral manner, 
with the Local Council 1 Chairman acting as „legal‟ advisor. Without evidence, 
however, it was difficult to evaluate the extent to which the Local Council chairman 
helps the clan court ensure equality of arms or provides quasi-judicial „oversight‟. 
From the responses, it appears that the clan court inevitably applies its own concept 








                                                 
66
 R.T Nhlapo, „Legal duality and multiple judicial organization in Swaziland: An analysis and a 
Proposal‟ in P. Takirambude (ed.) (1981) op cit 71. 
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(b) A right to ‘judicial’ review 
 
The Guidelines provide that an aggrieved person may appeal to a higher 
traditional court, administrative authority or judicial tribunal,
67
 but scant literature 
exists on how this right is applied by traditional courts.  
The participants identified the right to „judicial‟ review as another area in 
which there is similarity between the national and traditional systems. Any person 
may seek review on behalf of any party, through the higher traditional courts.68 
Grounds for review could be a harsh, unconscionable sentence, or unfairness of the 
sentencing process. Morwa Guma Saza court gives 14 days within which to seek 
review though this is not strictly adhered to;
69
 whereas the Jo-Gem courts have no 
time limits. The process of review was described as follows: 
„If the people are dissatisfied with the punishment they can give court wisdom 
on how to find an alternative sentence that is suitable for the offence and the 
offender. These people include those from other clans who can come and 
listen to the case. These could be neighbours or friends.‟ 70 
 
This quote exemplifies the duty of kin in the review process. The community 
also reviews fairness of trial proceedings; deliberates afresh on sentence; and assists 
in eliciting evidence on mitigating or aggravating factors like possession by spirits: 
„The court must ensure that the punishment is commensurate with the 
offence based on the offender‟s behaviour everyday in the 
neighbourhood. The offender might be cursed, has mental health 
problems or is possessed by spirits like Bura.‟71 
 
Community input is thus invaluable in determining whether or not to vary or review 
sentence.  
Another notable feature of the review is the flexibility to opt out of the 
proceedings. This flexibility, participants explained, enables any party to seek a 
transfer of the case to a national court of law if they fear the clan may be unfair to 
them. Participants also pointed out that some victims file cases in both the clan courts 
and the government. The victim‟s reasoning is that if the clan court is unfair, the 
                                                 
67
 The Guidelines op cit S.Q (b) (11) adapts the right to judicial review in Article14 (5) ICCPR. The 
Uganda Bill of Rights Article 28 op cit does not provide for judicial review. 
68
 Gombolola Jo-Gem. 
69
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government will not be so, and vice versa.
72
 Participants stressed that parties were 
within their rights to opt out of clan court jurisdiction, but cautioned that:  
„[T]heir problem will continue to increase because it was not cleansed. For 
example: cursing, theft, witchcraft, adultery or fornication, murder or spirit 
possession. All this behaviour if the clan does not cleanse as it is required, 
then even if the government imprisons a person for 10 years, still these 
tendencies will remain. This behaviour retards the clan until the person is 
cleansed in accordance with traditional rites.‟73 
 
Accordingly, opting out of clan court jurisdiction allows aggrieved parties to seek 
legal redress, thereby protecting the right to seek judicial review. This is subject to 
one caveat. If the offender is possessed by spirits and these are not removed by a 
purification ritual, then the well being of the clan is in jeopardy. This is more so 
because courts of law lack the „jurisdiction‟ and „competence‟ to conduct these 
purification rituals. Judicial review is therefore enforced through participatory justice 
that allows individuals to opt out of clan court jurisdiction. Still, the „problem‟ may 
require spiritual intervention by the clan. 
(v) Individual rights v communitarian values for Ji Jie (all people) 
 
Participants had strong misgivings about international law bending to 
accommodate communitarian values. These concerns have been raised in the 
literature. In Chapter 3, scholars warn that the test for international criminal justice is 
its capacity to visualise forms of justice other than the „western‟ style trials that leave 
communitarian values unprotected.
74
 Baines argues, quite rightly, that spiritualism is 
a critical area of reconciliation and reconstruction of the lives of offenders, victim and 
the community.
75
 Cockayne also observes that international criminal tribunals often 
administer international criminal justice in a manner far removed from the values and 
politics of the traditional communities.
76
 All views correctly depict that offenders and 
victims alike, may feel unprotected by a „western‟ trial procedure that does not 
address these concerns.  
Study participants expressed concern that an international court, would not 
understand how communitarian values protect the clan and the individual from evil 
forces. International courts have practical limitations since they lack the „jurisdiction‟ 
                                                 
72
 Miluka Jo-Gem. 
73
 P`Oriwa.  
74
 A. Garapon op cit cited in Ch. 3 S.2 op cit. 
75
 E. Baines op cit at 114.  
76
 J. Cockayne (2005) op cit 460, 464-465 cited in Ch. 4 S.5 op cit. 
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to perform rituals. Only the clan can do that.
77
 Crucially, the international model 
makes no reference to reconciliation, restitution or the role of ritual as communitarian 
values. As we have seen, this may be explained by the fact that the international 
model is grounded in philosophical and human rights frameworks that have no place 
for spiritualism and collective responsibility. To make my point, the following 
examples will suffice.  
 
(a) Mandatory purification, and social obligations  
 
 
  Purification rituals are mandatory in certain circumstances. The exception is in 
the case of minors. In the Odoi case for example, the Ja Saza chair informed the 
offenders that the purification ritual would be waived because they were young.
78
 
Conversely, in the trial simulation, the adult female offender pleaded for a less severe 
whipping during the purification ritual, but the judge said she would be whipped in 
accordance with clan law. One explanation given for strict adherence to clan laws is 
„to ensure that laws of government are not entered into too much‟.79 This statement 
suggests that Jopadhola laws and rituals take precedence over individual autonomy. 
To this end mitigating some of the harsher aspects of rituals (like whipping) may be 
difficult.  
  The duty of protecting the clan from misfortune falls squarely on the clan court. 
This was evident in the Odoi case, where the court wavered between applying a harsh 
sentence to avert misfortune, and remaining within the ambit of local council laws: 
„We said those girls who stayed with relatives should be chased out that day. 
But now the law is in conjunction with local councils. That is why we have to 
correct it and consolidate and return to the line.‟80  
 
„Returning to the line‟ implies that clan law has to be read in consonance with the 
Local Council laws. There is no indication of how the clan law should be „corrected 
and consolidated‟ to return to the „line‟, but an alternative solution was sought by 
some clan members to enable the two offenders get married: 
„One gentleman Dismas … asked the father of the girl: “Will you be willing to 
accept the marriage payment (dowry) for your daughter?” Onyango answered 
that he is willing. Then the uncle of the girl, Mr. Owino stood up and refused 
                                                 
77
 Plenary discussion.  
78




 Transcript op cit para 10: My emphasis. 
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saying as the uncle of the girl, the child cannot stay at the home of Okongo as a 
Morwa Guma.  
Mr. Odaka (…) went on to say that “Okongo, if you still want to stay with the 
girl at your home than let us bring the staff of Morwa, we curse you and you get 
out of Morwa Guma.”‟81 
  
The fear of being cursed and banished from the clan, led both fathers to agree to take 
away the girl from Okongo‟s home. Furthermore, „marrying a relative is abominable 
and will ruin relations amongst clan mates.‟82 In short, the clan court has no 
obligation to positively protect individual rights but has to ensure that the clan is 
protected from misfortune (lusiwa). Further, spiritualism may abridge individual 
rights by „overriding‟ individual choice and autonomy. 
 
(b) Restitution, Reconciliation, and the role of ritual 
  
Study participants described the aim of the sentencing process as follows:  
„The clan give a sentence based on the strength of the offence, means of the 
offender, while aiming at uniting (riwo) the complainant and the offender.‟83 
 
Following delivery of sentence an obligatory reconciliation feast is held because the 
clan are „only there for the sole purpose of deciding the case between them‟.84 The 
aims of the feast are much the same as other ethnic communities in African countries 
like Rwanda or Sierra Leone.
85
 The main difference here is that the Jopadhola 
reconciliation feast is paid for with money called Pawo.
86
 Uniting parties and 
reintegrating the offender following rehabilitation, recapitulates the literature that 
says the process of harmony and equilibrium is restored to the community once it is 
understood the offender has paid his or her dues.
87
 Rituals reinforced by supernatural 
beliefs, complete the reparation processes. Examples of two Morwa Guma real-life 
cases will suffice.  
                                                 
81
 Ibid paras 8 and 11. 
82
 Prosecutor‟s opening statement in the trial simulation. 
83




 Ch. 4 S. 3 and 5, op cit.  
86
 Pawo is paid to initiate a case by the complainant/victim in the court. Pawo is a fixed amount for all 
the Jo-Gem courts at 3,000/= (0.80p); refundable if the defendant is found guilty. It is used exclusively 
for buying local beer (Kongo) for the feast. The Morwa Guma concept of Pawo is more like a modern 
notion of court fees that is incremental, depending on the hierarchy of the court. Unlike in the Jo-Gem 
courts, money for the feast is paid for separately by whoever loses the case. 
87
 Ch. 2 S.2 and 3 op cit, discusses literature like O. Elechi op cit, 19, 26-29. 
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         In Auma v Apio
88
 mother-in-law and daughter-in-law uttered abusive (swear) 
words towards each other, which is taboo. Both parties pleaded guilty before the clan 
court. They were each fined a chicken to remove the bad luck –lusiwa (signifying 
healing), and directed to take part in the reconciliation ritual of biting a chicken bone 
together (kayo choko) and share a feast with the clan.  
        In J. Okoth v Y. Okoth, 
89
 the son accused his father of kicking down the door to 
his house, which is a taboo because the son was married. At a family meeting the 
father admitted the offence, but said he was responding to an alarm raised by his 
daughter-in-law. Although the father nonetheless agreed to pay the fine of a sheep 
and a cockerel to remove the bad luck, his son insisted that the clan be invited to 
adjudicate the matter. The clan court endorsed payment of the fine and the son was 
also ordered to give the clan a cockerel. A reconciliatory feast followed.  
       In both cases, any supernatural consequences that may befall the family were 
forestalled through the reconciliation ritual that reintegrates the offender, completing 
the restitution process. Rituals that restore social harmony are regarded as more 
effective than adopting a strictly legalist approach, for instance to establish whether 
the pleas were unequivocal.  
  Another example is the removal of a verbal curse (lami):   
„We have to look for the reasons that brought about the cursing and look for 
the witnesses. If the person being cursed made a mistake, the person is 
given a punishment and has to ask for forgiveness in front of the clan. The 
curser is told to correct the curse. If the curse was truly uttered, the 
appropriate punishment and a reversion of the curse are ordered by the clan; 
including payment to the clan. To decide this case, there must be witnesses, 
chiefs, neighbours and other people.‟ 90  
 
After hearing the case on its merits, the victim who initially „wronged‟ the offender 
must first make amends, like paying reparation to the defendant. The hearing of the 
case culminates with rituals to remove the curse,
91
 and a reconciliation meal between 
                                                 
88
 Re Auma and Apio, Decision of 18/12/ 2005 (Gombolola Morwa Guma court). 
89 Re J. Okoth and Y. Okoth, Decision of 28/01/2006 (Gombolola Morwa Guma court). 
90
 Ssaza Morwa Guma. Lami is cast by someone in a parental or filial relationship who feels wronged 
by a grandchild, sibling or sibling‟s children for acts like insolence, non payment of dowry or an 
outstanding debt. The curse is believed to bring misfortune to that individual. The most feared 
„cursers‟ are paternal uncles (Ba mere), maternal aunties (Min), any grand parent and an older sibling 
who is the heir (and possesses the spear of the home) or heiress. However, it is believed that curses by 
biological parents cannot afflict a child. Lami is one offence where compensation may be paid to the 
clan as well. 
91
 I observed removal of a curse at a home in Iyolwa sub-county on the 12
th
 August 2006. Ms. A owed 
money to her Uncle Mr. O, and he allegedly cursed her after requesting the money in vain. She was to 
suffer problems in life. At a family gathering, testimony was heard from neighbours and in-laws on the 
 M. Owor  Page 225 
 
the two parties and clan. The fact that the clan may also get reparation from the 
offender, means that restitution to the clan bears as much importance as protecting 
rights of the individual to a fair hearing. This is apparently in direct opposition to the 
position of the African Commission in the Constitutional Rights Project case that 
stressed greater protection of an individual‟s rights over the rights of others.92 The 
participants nonetheless, emphasised that what is of utmost importance is for the 
court to restore social harmony, while forestalling any evil that may befall the entire 
family (or clan). 
Reconciliation, interlinked with rehabilitation and reintegration are an 
imperative for serious crimes under Jopadhola clan law. Take the example of murder 
whose processes remain largely unchanged since pre-colonial times. The bereaved 
family is paid as restitution a cow (dhiang luk) and one sheep: for Jo-Gem; or two 
cows, one sheep and a black chicken for Morwa Guma.
93
 The cow(s) must never be 
slaughtered, given away (as dowry) or sold, for it is believed this will bring bad luck 
to the bereaved family since the cow is meant to provide a livelihood for them.
94
 
Following restitution, a sheep is slaughtered and eaten at a feast shared by both the 
bereaved family and offender‟s family and clans. A reconciliation ritual of kayo 
choko follows where the bereaved family‟s representative and offender bite a thigh 
bone of a chicken together. Study participants stressed the importance of these rituals 
cannot be underestimated. The rituals must be performed whether or not there has 
been a trial in a court of law and a guilty verdict delivered. This imperative arises 
from the superstition that the ghost (tipo) of the deceased will haunt the offender and 
his family and wreak vengeance. This ritual forestalls such evil, but also serves to 
rehabilitate and reintegrate the offender into society. In all, the findings affirm the 
                                                                                                                            
circumstances surrounding the curse. Mr. O, without admitting liability, collected a chicken to perform 
the removal of the curse. This was regarded as proof of guilt by those present. 
 
He put the chicken in 
Ms. A‟s hand, then she drunk water from his right palm as he uttered words to the effect that the curse 
would be removed. This took place in front of Mr. O‟s house with neighbours and in-laws present. 
Later at Ms. A‟s home, the chicken was left to roam inside the house till it found its way outside and 
the curse was considered broken. The following morning a court case that had been pending for two 
years against Ms. A (in an unrelated matter), was dismissed for want of prosecution. This was regarded 
by her family as incontrovertible evidence that Mr. O had indeed cursed his niece then removed the 
curse. This view is still widely held within Ms. A‟s family. 
92
 Constitutional Rights Project (1999) op cit paras. 41-42 discussed in Ch. 5 S. 2 (iii) (b) op cit.  
93
 This affirms the argument that compensation in homicide cases was a continued means of support 
putting to an end intra- family feds and vendettas: Nsereko (2002) op cit 24 citing Katende, „Why were 
punishments in Pre-European Africa mainly compensatory rather than punitive?‟ (1967) Journal of the 
Denning Law Society 2. Also Shaidi op cit at 2, discussing sanctions in the Kilimanjaro area of 
Tanzania argues that compensation and reconciliation was aimed to prevent enmity within chiefdoms.    
94
 Morwa Guma participants cited cases where bad luck befell families that sold the dhiang luk.   
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literature, and underscore the centrality of supernatural beliefs in traditional 
restorative justice.  
 
(vi) Judicial discretion v freedom of expression  
 
Participants had strong misgivings about international law bending to 
accommodate a traditional notion of procedural fairness. Their major concerns were 
that judicial discretion may undermine the traditional notion of equality and even 
handedness. This would circumscribe the participatory „right‟ to be heard in the 
context of „face to face‟ justice, or social fairness.  
We saw in Chapter 2, that international sentencing procedure does not permit 
full participation of victims, offenders and the community in determining sentence 
because deliberations are done in secret by the judges.
95
 Such legalistic criteria 
arguably undermines the traditional notion of even handedness, may neglect the 
social context, arguably leading to sentencing decisions which are unstructured and 
pragmatic.
96
 This criticism that an unstructured sentence is evidence of exclusion of 
the social context is valid as I now show.   
International sentencing rules may inadvertently restrict the freedom of oral 
expression under Article 19 (2) ICCPR in a traditional context where oral expression 
is a „right‟.97 The participatory approach enables clan court officials to apply a 
criterion that focuses not only on individual criminal responsibility, but also enables 
the court to promote consequentialist objectives. The clan court involves the 
community in evaluating individual criminal responsibility by taking direct evidence 
on factors like: family background, behavioural patterns, personal traits, community 
views on the offender‟s character; and previous conduct: 
„The sentencing criteria is based on what the offender has done like having 
no respect for the court, despising clan elders, previous offences or 
convictions, always bothering others (Jakwinyo), rumour mongering and 
being a trouble-causer (Ja fitina).
98
 
                                                 
95
 Ch. 2 S. 3 op cit discussing Rome Statute op cit Articles 74, 76, 78, and ICC RPE Rules 142-5. 
Legal analyses are given for example by W. Schabas and R. Henham op cit.  
96
 M. Drumbl op cit at 11, 55-59, makes the compelling argument that despite attempts to standardise 
mitigating factors by international tribunals, sentencing practice remains disparate, inconsistent and 
gives rise to distributive inequities. Imposition of sanction remains an afterthought. 
97
 The African system allowed everyone a right to express their mind on public questions: O. Elechi op 
cit (2006) 65- 67 citing Sithole in K. Gyekye (1996) op cit at 153 and  Z. Motala (1989) op cit 381.  
98
 Miluka Morwa Guma. 
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The elders assess the offender based on his previous behaviour from way 
back. The one who likes relatives or the curser, after we have heard their 
words, it makes us think.‟99 
 
These „aggravating‟ factors may be considered in determination of sentence. Since 
evidence gathering is done jointly with the community, there is sufficient information 
on which to assess culpability. Additionally, a rigorous consistency test is applied to 
assess whether testimonies of the victim, offender and community all point 
irresistibly to truth.
100
 Crucially, the process by which a sentence is arrived at ought to 
be fair in the social context.  
Kisoko Jo-Gem group stated that „Where the audience also have advice for the 
elders of the court, then the punishment given is without argument.‟ However, during 
the plenary discussion it emerged that achieving consensus is not always possible in 
clan courts, which strongly suggests that freedom of expression is protected. This 
may be because judicial discretion is circumscribed by permitting impromptu 
interventions, divergent views on the sentence; in short, listening to the „words of the 
offender and their people‟.101 „People‟ includes local council officials and public 
servants in their individual capacity.102 In the trial simulation, for instance, the local 
council official gave evidence in the matter. 
Consequentialist objectives are promoted through unlimited freedom of 
expression. Let me illustrate with the Odoi case. There, the boy‟s father was ordered 
to pay as compensation to the girl‟s father (she was pregnant at the time) a goat, a 
cockerel and 5,000/= (£1.50) to host a reconciliatory feast for the clan. The transcript 
shows that friends of his father argued forcefully on deliberation of sentence: 
„Mr. Okongo M. from Namwaya said that the prescribed items (mutemwa) are: a 
goat, cockerel and some money. At that juncture, friends of Okongo L who are 
mature protested, saying that that would be too much.‟103  
 
In the event, the sentence was revised after intense public deliberations. The father of 
the girl agreed to take only one bull. The agreement was put in writing with the 
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 Kisoko Jo-Gem. 
100
 Miluka Morwa Guma: ‘The clan assess based on the person‟s words and that of witnesses. Also 
there has to be the complainant and witnesses and they bring them one by one to explain the truth of 
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names of all present appended as a sign of transparency and accountability.104 
Crucially, as the Odoi case shows, the Jopadhola notion of procedural rights permits 
individuals to exercise their „right to oral expression‟ with minimum „judicial 
interference‟.105 
The situation is not so straightforward in cases involving mandatory rituals. For 
example, in the trial simulation, both parties changed their pleas to guilty. Following 
the verdict, the female accused then requested to be allowed to call evidence before 
sentencing: 
 
ASSESSOR 2: Thank you Judge. May I ask Mr. O if he has something to say? 
Mr. O (accused): Yes, I agree, and admit to the offence. 
ASSESSOR 2: Then I leave it to the Clan. 
GRANDMA OF CLAN: I am ashamed at the behaviour of my fellow women as mothers and 
daughters. This act is a big curse called Lusiwa. It can only be treated and finished in accordance with 
the rites on lusiwa. 
JUDGE: Mr. O? 
Mr. O: I pray for leniency in the sentencing. 
JUDGE: Ms N do you have anything to say? 
Ms. N (accused): I pray for leniency, I did not know that he was a relative. Don‟t beat me very hard 
please. 
JUDGE: Askari go and fetch the parents of Mr O and the girl. 
(Parents come forward) 
JUDGE: We have called you here to finalise this matter. Both parties have admitted to the offence. 
Now we have to decide the case. 
Ms. N: Before you decide the case, call Nyachwo. 
JUDGE: We shall call her. I want the parents to teach their children about relations in the clan. 
Children should know clan mates. We have decided that both offenders be dealt with in accordance 
with the law and the Okewo will go tonight and build the grass hut. 
 
The trial simulation shows that when faced with an offender‟s request to call 
evidence after a plea of guilty, the courts are prepared to allow it, unlike in 
international tribunals. Nyachwo, however, was not called and she did not give 
                                                 
104
 There are 60 signatures of those present. Okongo L also agreed that if his son Olweny brought the 
girl Awor back to his home, he (the father) would take the blame. The agreement was signed in the 
presence of the clan leaders of Saza, Gombolola, Miluka and Kisoko; as well as clan members, 
neighbours and Local Council officials. The agreement bore names of parties, thumb prints and 
signature of the secretary. 
105
 This approach should address fears that the victim will suffer from a lack of information on what to 
expect from proceedings: A. Skelton and M. Sekhonyane op cit 586.  
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evidence. This implies that the practical impact of the right to oral expression is 
limited because, as the excerpt shows, the duty of the court remains to enforce the 
purification ritual to prevent bad luck afflicting both families and clan, hence the need 
to „treat and finish this‟. In sum, adopting an expanded view of judicial discretion, 
gives a moderate sense of autonomy to the individual, subject to community interests. 
(vii) Similarities: Enhanced procedural safeguards 
 
 The findings show that the right to language of choice and the right to be tried 
without undue delay are examples of procedural rights that are similar in both clan 
courts and local council courts.
106
 The rights seem to be better protected under the 
Jopadhola sentencing process than under national, even international procedures. I 
demonstrate why this is possible. 
The language of choice in clan courts is Dhupadhola which is understood by all 
parties. So there is no need for an interpreter where all parties including court 
officials, speak the same language. Adopting a foreign language for use in courts 
creates linguistic constraints that prevent people from solving conflicts through 
linguistic participation.
107
 In the national courts, the working language is English and 
the evidence is then translated for the accused.
108
 Moreover, there are no provisions 
for the court to use the language of all parties even when everybody present speaks it. 
It is arguably a form of denial of access to its users.
109
 By contrast, traditional courts 
allow linguistic participation through use of local language,
110
 which enables 
accommodation of linguistic and cultural factors.
111
  
                                                 
106
 S. 21 LCC Act op cit provides that the language of the local council court shall be the language of 
the area. Under S. 23, a local council court shall hear every case expeditiously. See Appendix 10 for 
the background to the Local Council Courts legislation. Article 14 (3) (a) ICCPR on the right to 
language of choice is replicated in Article 28 (3) (b) Uganda constitution op cit. S.Q (b) (7) of the 
Guidelines op cit only provides for interpreters in traditional court proceedings. 
107
 S. Byakutaga op cit 125-126.  
108
 S. 56 TIA and S. 139 MCA op cit: evidence to be interpreted to the advocate in English, affirmed in 
Tifu Lukwago v S. Kizza and another, S. Ct. Civ. App. No. 13 of 1996 per Mulenga J.S.C. 
109
 The absurdity of these rigid provisions in the local context is discussed by S. Byakutaga op cit at 
note 23. Citing Khiddu-Makubya An Introduction to Law: the Ugandan Case (Makerere University: 
Kampala, 1983) 116, Byakutaga is emphatic, correctly I believe, that this form of denial of access only 
serves to alienate the local population even further. For example, the problems of translation to and 
from Kinyarwanda during ICTR trials are well documented by E. Mose (2005) op cit 930-931.   
110
 S. Byakutaga ibid 135. For example, Article 50 (2) Rome Statute op cit specifies working languages 
of the ICC as English and French. This vindicates G. Nice‟s argument that cultural dominance through 
the imposition of the English language in trials is a form of „cultural imperialism‟: op cit 386-387. 
111
 This way the challenges in Akayesu op cit discussed in Ch. 4 S. 3(vi) op cit are minimised. 
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The right to be tried without undue delay
112
 is dependant on two factors: the 
venue of the trials and the time frame within which cases are completed. Trials take 
place within the locality, which reduces the time to complete cases since parties are 
within reach and can be summoned at short notice.
113
 Among the Jo-Gem, the venue 
for court hearings is the home of the clan court chairman where the court sits on a 
Saturday or Sunday. Hearings start at 10.00 am and the cases may be disposed of 
within a day. There were no pending cases before any of the Jo-Gem courts during 
this period. Among the Morwa Guma, the venue of the court varies. For easier 
accessibility, it may be the home of the complainant or Local Council 1 chairman‟s 
home. The courts aim to complete all cases within 3-5 hours, with the longest hearing 
lasting between 3-4 days. In Namwaya Saza court for example there were only 2 
cases pending: 1 on land and another on Kwero degi (extreme sibling hatred). 
Adjournments are permitted because they enable both sides to reflect on the problem 
and come to an amicable solution. In sum, easily accessible court venues and short 
completion times facilitate adequate protection of this right.  
By contrast, international trials are held away from the locus criminis
114
 and 
take a very long time to complete.
115
 This affects the legitimacy of the international 
trial in much the same way as national courts. National courts sit in designated 
magisterial, High Court and appeal circuits. These circuits do not correspond to 
villages, only to districts and regions. During my visit to the Grade II court in Kisoko 
sub-county, Tororo district I established the enormity of the problem. The magistrate 
was absent. I was informed that he came only on Fridays when the court sits from 
10.00 a.m till 3.00 p.m.
116
 Sometimes people wait the whole day then go away 
frustrated if the Magistrate has other courts to visit that day and does not come to 
court. The Chief Magistrate‟s court sits in Tororo town, a long journey for the 
                                                 
112
 Article 14 (3) (c) ICCPR op cit; S.Q (b) (10) Guidelines op cit and Article 28 (1) constitution op cit.  
113
 These were my observations during the trial simulation and the outcome of the pre-visit and plenary 
discussions. 
114
 Criticism over the choice of Arusha, Tanzania as the seat of the ICTR instead of Rwanda because of 
inter alia distance, are discussed in Shraga and Zacklin (1996) op cit 514-515. Similar arguments 
could be made about all trials relating to African conflict held at The Hague like that of Prosecutor v. 
Charles Taylor SCSL-03-01-PT; ongoing ICC trials of Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo  op cit 
and  Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo op cit, and the impending trial of Uganda LRA rebels.   
115
 E. Mose estimates the average length of each trial has been 62 trial days op cit 931-932. J. Maogoto 
(2004) op cit 198 on lengthy trials as a denial of speedy justice. Although international trials involve 
multiple allegations of great complexity like genocide, from a traditional perspective the delays may be 
attributed to the fact that the tribunals hold one trial, not smaller trials as is done at the local village 
level.  
116
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villagers and the High Court sits in Mbale town, several miles away.
117
 Worse still, 
the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court sit only in the capital city of Kampala. 
This makes it difficult for the victim, relatives of both parties, as well as the 
community to attend the hearings if they do not live in the city or nearby town. 
Viewing and listening to proceedings is a huge factor in participatory justice, and 
failure to do so „externalises‟ justice even further for the locals. These findings 
confirm the ISS study discussed in Chapter 5, on the unchallenged advantage of 
traditional courts, like location in villages. These advantages translate into procedural 
legitimacy for traditional courts despite legislative abolition of their criminal 
jurisdiction.  
Having juxtaposed the traditional participatory process with international rights 
standards, I have demonstrated in this section that the former, by prioritising the 
protection of social obligations, may abridge individual rights. This is both a strength 
and a weakness of the system. The strength lies in its emphasis on reparation, healing 
and aiming to restore equilibrium.
118
 The main weakness is in not ensuring that 
procedural equality applies to vulnerable and socially disadvantaged groups. 
Mitigating these weaknesses will depend in part on whether a prescriptive framework 
for protection of rights can be created. I address this point next.  
Section 4: The role of cultural institutions in creating a prescriptive human 
rights framework  
 
In this section, I make my second argument that any attempt at accommodating 
individual human rights is thwarted by the lack of a prescriptive framework. This is 
attributed to the weak position of Nono, a failure of Tieng Adhola to give guidance on 
the protection of procedural rights, and the inability of higher traditional courts to 
prescribe such a framework. These factors negatively affect the protection of 
procedural rights.  
                                                 
117
 Figure 5 in Ch. 6 op cit shows West Budama County in relation to Tororo Municipality. Appendix 5 
shows Tororo district in relation to Mbale district. Figure 1 in Ch. 1 S.5 op cit shows the location of the 
capital city Kampala in relation to Tororo district. This gives an idea of distances between the courts.  
118
 Skelton and Sekhoyane op cit 587. The intention of traditional justice was to restore the victim to 
his previous position: Nsereko (2002) op cit 22-23. 





The Uganda constitution prohibits traditions or customs that may violate the 
dignity or human rights of the person.
119
 Thus it may be argued that the role of the 
Nono as the policy making organ of the clan is to ensure that trial processes are 
consistent with the constitution. In particular, individual procedural rights must be 
protected during trials. In the previous chapter, however, we saw that Nono has no 
power to determine procedures in the clan courts because each court is independent of 
the Nono. The study participants also implied that Nono has no obligation to protect 
or negatively refrain from abusing individual rights. This is because firstly Nono is 
not a state in the legal sense; and secondly, clan court autonomy prevents imposition 
of a uniform human rights standard on the courts.  
(ii) Tieng Adhola and human rights 
 
Another body that could create a prescriptive framework is the Tieng Adhola
120
 
because its mandate under Article 8.03 of its constitution is to ensure that: „Every 
person in Padhola shall enjoy the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the 
individual as provided in the constitution of Uganda‟. These rights include the 
individual right to a fair trial. But the legal department has neither issued any 
guidelines, nor provided legal oversight on a Jopadhola notion of the right to a fair 
trial, leaving interpretation to the vagaries of clan courts. The ability of the legal 
department to act in an advisory capacity is limited given the absence of an 
overarching human rights framework within which to anchor their legal advice. 
Additionally, any legal advice would be based on judicial vindication of rights
121
 that 
may not take into account the social context. Moreover, some concepts like equality 
may prove difficult to give advice on because, as some argue, it is prescriptively 
                                                 
119
 Uganda Constitution op cit, Article 32 (2), as amended by the Constitution (Amendment) Act 2005 
reads as follows: „Laws, cultures, customs and traditions which are against the dignity, welfare or 
interest of women or any other marginalised group to which clause (1) relates or which undermine 
their status are prohibited by this Constitution.‟  
120
 Tieng Adhola is a cultural institution that brings together all heads of Jopadhola clans: Ch. 6 S. 5 
(iv) op cit.  
121
 A. An-Na`im, „The Legal Protection for Human Rights in Africa: How to do more with less‟ in A. 
Sarat and T. R Kearns (eds.), Human Rights: Concepts, Contests, Contingencies (Michigan: University 
of Michigan Press, 2001) 105. Justiciability is based on seeking legal redress in a court of law.  
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empty since it does not specify exact standards of measurement.
122
 To a greater 
extent, however, the verbal complaints received are of a spiritualist nature about 
kidada and witchcraft.
 123
 Arguably these complaints are difficult to solve using a 
legal approach per se. 
Tieng Adhola furthermore appears to lack social legitimacy, stemming from 
its creation during the period of cultural revivalism in the 1990s, and not as a decision 
evolving from the lower level Nono.
124
 This coupled with clan autonomy and lack of 
public awareness of its constitutional provisions, weakens the Tieng Adhola’s 
potential to provide guidance on interpreting procedural rights in the local context. It 
is of interest that none of the participants mentioned Tieng Adhola as an institution to 
which they related in any way, apart from registration and getting help with drafting 
clan constitutions.
125
 Crucially, none of the study participants drew links between 
Article 8.03 of the Tieng Adhola constitution and their court work.  
(iii) The higher traditional courts  
 
There is little evidence to show that the higher traditional courts have created 
a prescriptive framework for protection of rights. Study participants were sensitive to 
criticisms that they are not knowledgeable in national laws.
126
 This may be because of 
their pre-occupation with preserving communitarian values and maintaining 
equilibrium. Even so, the rigidity of custom, coupled with the ineffectiveness of the 
legal department of Tieng Adhola has prevented progress in this direction. This is 
exacerbated by a judicial framework that does not recognise the clan courts very 
existence. 
The foregoing discussion shows that the failure of the Nono, Tieng Adhola 
and higher traditional courts to create a prescriptive framework, gives a monopoly to 
clan courts to apply a Jopadhola notion of procedural rights in sentencing. This stifles 
protection of procedural rights because communitarian values perceive of rights as a 
                                                 
122
 T. Bennet (1995) op cit 89. 
123
 Interview with Kwar Adhola op cit. Kidada is a swelling of the stomach believed to be caused by 
casting a spell through witchcraft using sikoko- sharp razor-like implements that are put in the 
stomach. 
124
 The lack of awareness of the Tieng Adhola institution among rural folk in Padhola is a fact 
acknowledged by the Kwar Adhola: interviews op cit.  
125
 The Tieng Adhola cabinet holds meetings with the clan leaders to exhort them to draft clan 
constitutions under the guidance of the legal department. 
126
 Plenary discussion, op cit. 
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protection for all people. The clan court‟s consistency on this can be attributed to 
their reliance on precedent, a matter explored in section 5 below. 
Section 5:  Applying the doctrine of precedent  
 
In this section, I explore the reason why clan courts are consistent in their 
protection of a communitarian notion of human rights. This is because they apply a 
traditional notion of „precedent‟ that underscores protection of communitarian values. 
Clan court officials refer to earlier decided cases and in delivering their judgement, 
reiterate societal norms. Their practices have similarities with the international 
approach to precedent.  
The JLOS Criminal Justice Baseline survey
127
 makes no reference to any 
jurisprudence from kinship courts. I was also unable to get statistical figures to 
establish the volume of work handled by clan courts. Based on responses I received, I 
conclude that their workload is substantial enough to warrant an examination of 
whether they apply some sort of precedent. Still, it is difficult to discern the reasoning 
behind the verdicts and sentencing tariffs, particularly among the Jo-Gem who use 
oral jurisprudence and seem not to keep court records.  Although Jo-Gem clan assert 
that written court records in Dhupadhola have been kept from 2004, no such 
documents were available for scrutiny. In any case, some Jo-Gem members were 
strongly in favour of retaining oral jurisprudence arguing that decisions are arrived at 
after consensus so there is no need for written records. In any case, records are left 
with whichever party won the case and not the court.
128
  
The available court transcripts
129
 such as those of the Odoi case of Namwaya 
Saza court are not conclusive evidence that documentation is a widespread practice, 
and it appears to have been adopted recently. However, the transcripts are 
„inaccessible‟ both physically130 and figuratively, because assumptions cannot be 
made about what is not documented. For example, there is no mention of protection 
                                                 
127
 JLOS (2002) survey discussed in Ch.1 S. 3, op cit. 
128
 Mr. C. O a Jo-Gem elder strenuously argued that written records do not add value to the 
proceedings and are unnecessary. 
129
 There were four judgements: 1 on land and 3 criminal cases. Judgments were in Dhupadhola with 
some translations in English.  
130
 During the plenary discussion, I requested all the study participants to avail me copies of their 
decisions over the past 3-5 years. I followed this up with telephone calls and e-mail correspondence to 
my assistants during July –August 2007, February-March 2008 and a field visit in August 2008, but to 
no avail. 
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of individual rights, yet this appears to take place during the trial. Rather, the 
truncated transcripts are the secretary‟s observations of proceedings, based on 
assumptions that the reader knows the clan laws, processes and societal norms.  
These transcripts do however show that sanction of immoral behaviour is based 
on previously decided local cases: a „stare decisis‟ of sorts. Take the example of the 
Odoi case:  
„Mr Okongo M also got up and gave education touching on the laws of the clan 
while saying that in those early days we had O. Ojwali and his lorry. We said 
those girls who stayed with relatives should be chased out that day. 
The Miluka of Kidera gave an example how sometime back a girl was chased 
away who was a relative who was married at his home. This was the daughter of 
Obbo B. who is a Morwa.‟131 
 
Here, the „precedent‟ cited are the cases of Ojwali and Obbo where the clan 
court decided that girls who live in sexual relationships with men of the same clan 
should be sent back to their parent‟s home. Precedent is reinforced with teaching 
(fuonji) of norms and folk wisdom
132
 of the evil that befalls those who do not comply:  
„Mr. Owor O Odaka also brought fuonji by saying that when Okecho the 
Gombolola, son of Y. Okello and the daughter of Ongwada took the case up to 
the Government but there were no blessings at all that they ever received.‟133 
  
The message here is that misfortune comes about to those who disregard traditional 
processes. Such „lesson‟ appears to be irreconcilable with the principle of choice that 
permits one to opt out of clan law, and seek review from the courts of law. Then 
again, fuonji as applied through precedent uses a pragmatic approach to justice as 
conceived in social norms, of which the clan officials themselves are a part. 
Ultimately, fuonji is a process by which the officials reinforce adherence to 
communal norms and protect communitarian values, exhorted through spiritualism. 
Clan courts may not always protect procedural rights because of a strict adherence to 
precedent, but their approach is similar to the ICC‟s discretionary approach to 
precedent and the use of expressivism as an educational function about the aims of 
international criminal justice. 
                                                 
131
 Transcript op cit paras. 10,17. 
132
  An account of precedent and „judicial homilies‟ in pre-colonial Africa by T. Elias, is discussed in 
Ch.2 S.2 (i) op cit. 
133
 Transcript op cit para 11.  




Section 6: Conclusion 
 
I have shown informal ways in which clan courts integrate national law with 
the Jopadhola notion of procedural rights. My argument was based on two main 
points. Firstly, that applying a participatory approach to the Jopadhola notion of 
procedural rights may circumscribe individual rights thereby creating a conflict with 
international law. The second point is that this conflict arises in part from the lack of 
a prescriptive human rights framework from traditional justice institutions and in part 
from adherence to precedent by clan courts.  
The Jopadhola notion of human rights reflects how internal cultural discourse 
struggles to establish enlightened interpretations of cultural norms. The enlightened 
interpretations evolve from legal and political developments nationally, that force the 
clan to reproduce new normative frameworks. In some respects, in the Jopadhola 
courts, procedural safeguards are not merely routine or mundane. Rather, they are 
based on a reciprocal approach that combines procedural equality of arms with the 
principle of group rights and social fairness. 
Nonetheless, there is evidence of an abridgement of individual rights, like the 
right to legal representation, in preference for social responsibilities. The problem is 
compounded by mandatory rituals like purification from which there is no right of 
appeal. Parochialism results in lopsided procedural equality favouring the victim and 
the community. This in turn reinforces a patriarchal environment that does not give 
absolute equality before the courts to women and youth. There are also challenges 
like the little knowledge of national laws, lack of training in national procedural law 
and other problems of a practical nature.
134
 
I maintain that clan courts have not altogether failed to apply procedural rights; 
rather they have done it through an expanded construct of human rights as an 
entitlement of all people (conceived, at least in part, in group terms) not just an 
individual. This has proved Skelton and Sekhoyane‟s arguments correct. They posit 
that a human rights framework should be set by a democratic participatory process 
                                                 
134
 Study participants gave examples of courts sometimes sitting under trees at the mercy of the 
elements and the lack of reliable transportation for the court officials.  
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where the community develops its own principles to protect human rights.
135
 This 
process is hampered by the absence of a prescriptive framework for procedural rights 
by the Nono, Tieng Adhola and higher traditional courts. This stems partly from clan 
court autonomy and partly from a lack of guidance from the legal department of the 
Tieng Adhola. Additionally, adherence to precedent by clan courts excludes 
judgments from courts of law and vice versa. Still, the Jopadhola notion of procedural 
rights permits individuals to exercise their freedom, autonomy and rational choice 
during deliberation of sentence, evidenced by the fact that achieving consensus is not 
always possible in these courts. 
Following this analysis, the remaining question is whether the state could give 
guidance to the ICC on how to apply an expanded construct of rights within an 
international sentencing framework. I answer this question through an examination of 
Uganda‟s attempts at accommodating communitarian values and a traditional 
participatory approach in its sentencing framework in the next chapter.  
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 A. Skelton and M. Sekhonyane, op cit 591. They base their argument on J. Braithwaite‟s proposal 
for the need for standards in restorative justice, though not one imposed by the state. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: NATIONAL SENTENCING PRACTICE: 
LESSONS ON INTEGRATING TRADITIONAL NORMS 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 
The study findings in the previous chapter show how Jo-Gem and Morwa Guma 
clan courts translate „law out of context‟.1 The courts produce a specific procedural 
language of rights that views a right as an entitlement of all people not just an 
individual. This chapter examines the approach of the state to accommodating a 
traditional normative framework using an expanded notion of procedural rights. The 
paucity of research on this question can be explained by the researchers‟ focus in 
Uganda on the dichotomy between the traditional and international systems. Such 
conceptualisation limits their appreciation of the possibility of reconciling these two 
systems within a legal context.
2
  
 State practice provides a salutary lesson for the ICC on the vexed question of 
integrating traditional procedural norms. The ICC is obliged to apply principles of 
national law that conform to internationally recognised human rights law,
3
 therefore it 
ought to consider what the national sentencing framework, case law and the Bill of 
Rights have to offer. In theory, all three sources of law ought to provide sufficient 
guidance on a pluralist interpretation: one by which international due process 
guarantees are melded with a traditional notion of rights based on communitarian 
values.
4
   
 I argue that such guidance may not be easily forthcoming because even at the 
national level, it is problematic for courts of law to underpin reconciliation of divergent 
sentencing paradigms using a pluralist interpretation of procedural rights. This arises 
firstly because Uganda‟s sentencing reforms are built on the adversarial model. 
Secondly, normative rigidity in the Bill of Rights circumscribes communitarian values. 
Thirdly, the uncritical application of judicial precedent may not be conducive to a 
                                                 
1
 The local community following transplantation of alien laws on their system, reproduce what they 
consider to be „their‟ normative system in decision making: F. Benda- Beckman op cit 29.  
2
 As I have argued in Ch 3 S. 2 and 3 op cit, contemporary studies in Uganda focus on local council 
courts, while those on clan courts  in Acoli do not address the question of synthesis of divergent models. 
3
 Rome Statute op cit Article 21 (1) (c) and (3) discussed in detail in Ch.2 S. 3 (v) (c) op cit.  
4
 Communitarian values are duty to kin, restitution, reconciliation and the role of ritual defined in Ch.1 
S.4 op cit.  
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pluralistic interpretation of procedural rights. In conclusion, I suggest that there is need 
for a theoretical model within which the ICC could apply an expanded notion of 
procedural rights if it is to achieve legitimate, culturally appropriate sentencing 
outcomes.  
 Following this introduction, I examine Uganda‟s sentencing reforms (Section 2). 
Next is a historical account of Uganda‟s Bill of Rights, (Section 3) followed by a 
critique of procedural rights in sentencing based on the constitutional interpretation of 
Article 126 (1) by the superior courts (Section 4). Finally, I offer a brief conclusion 
(Section 5).  
 
Section 2: Uganda’s Sentencing Reforms  
 
 I make the first part of my argument in this section, on the cultural 
inappropriateness of Uganda‟s sentencing reforms. Although hostility to traditional 
forms of justice now seems set to change, the 2003 reforms are built on the 
preponderance of sole judicial discretion and a retributive sentencing philosophy, 
originating from the inherited English adversarial model. Ultimately, there is limited 
scope for customary law with even less room to accommodate a traditional notion of 
human rights.  
We saw in Chapter 1 that in 2003, the Uganda Law Reform Commission 
(ULRC) undertook a study on the reform of sentencing legislation.
5
 Using an empirical 
study, ULRC gathered views from all over Uganda on the sentencing process in 
national courts.
6
 Since the ULRC report has been handed over to the Chief Justice for 
further action,
7
 my comments are restricted to the draft recommendations on clan courts 
and their role in the sentencing process.  
From the outset, the report observes that best practices should be borrowed from 
„pre-colonial‟ methods of sentencing to develop sentencing policy and guidelines.8 This 
erroneously assumes a static traditional law that is not subject to change. Be that as it 
may, the study established that clan courts are regarded as functional in rural areas 
                                                 
5
 Draft Study Report of the Laws on Sentencing (2006) op cit discussed in Ch.1 S. 3 op cit.  
6
 Ibid, Chapter 3 describes the methodology, namely the use of interviews and focus group discussions 
and Chapter 4 presents the findings of the empirical study.  
7
 Interview with the Chief Justice on 25
th
 August 2006. At the time he said that the judiciary would set up 
a committee to study the report and make recommendations on sentencing guidelines. 
8
 Draft Study Report op cit 27. 
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because their sentencing procedures are more accessible, informal, conciliatory and 
expeditious, compared with national courts. ULRC recommends that the state should 
renew and strengthen the role of clan courts in the administration of justice in Uganda.
9
  
  From this recommendation, it is not clear how the role of clan courts can be 
strengthened. Firstly, in terms of Article 126(1) of the constitution on which the 
recommendation was grounded, the focus in the report is on promoting discussions 
between the judiciary and the people, to enable communities participate in the 
administration of justice.
10
 No mention is made of the sentencing process. Secondly, 
there is no discussion on how traditional processes could be used to develop sentencing 
policy. That these issues were not addressed is surprising, given the functions of the 
ULRC to integrate the local with international and national laws, and its own 
undertaking to borrow from traditional law.
11
 Arguably this reflects the pervasiveness 
of the common law, adversarial model. 
  On the question of how the sentencing process could be modified, respondents 
recommend that in both the High Court and Magistrates‟ courts, the victim and any 
aggrieved party should say something before sentence.
12
 Despite these laudable 
recommendations, the reforms fail to identify areas of convergence with traditional 
restorative approaches on which such recommendations could be anchored. This stems 
partly from the inelastic objectives of the study that excluded restorative justice. As a 
result, there is no reference in the report to communitarian values. 
  Likewise, there is no mention of the United Nations Basic Principles on the 
use of Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal Matters 
13
(hereafter „the 
                                                 
9
 Ibid, 109-111. 
10
 Ibid, 134. The text of Article 126(1) of the constitution is discussed in S. 3 (ii) infra.   
11
 Ibid, 27. S. 10 (b) of the Uganda Law Reform Commission Act, Cap 25 provides that the ULRC shall 
emphasise the „reflection in the laws of Uganda of the customs, values and norms of society‟ consistent 
with the UN Charter and African Charter op cit.  
12
 Ibid, 136-137. 
13
 E/CN.15/2002/5/Add.1. The development and case-by-case commentary on the Principles is 
undertaken by D. Van Ness „Proposed Basic Principles on the use of restorative justice: Recognising the 
aims and limits of restorative justice‟ in A. Von Hirsch et al (eds.) (2003) op cit. „Soft law‟ standard 
setting began with the Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the 21
st
 
Century passed by the 10
th
 UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (10-17 
April 2000). The Declaration encouraged states to develop restorative justice policies, procedure and 
programmes that respect rights, interests of victims, offenders and communities: A/CONF. 184/4/Rev.3, 
para 29. An Expert group then developed principles on restorative justice. In August 2002, the UN 
Economic and Social Council adopted ECOSOC Resolution 2002/12 on the Principles. The UN 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice then passed The Bangkok Declaration - Synergies 
and Responses: Strategic Alliances in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice at the 11
th
 UN Congress on 
the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, Bangkok 18-25 April 2005. The Declaration 
encourages member states to draw on the Principles: para 32.  
 M. Owor Page 241 
 
Principles‟). The Principles set out instances where national legal systems may apply 
restorative justice on a voluntary basis. Restorative justice processes should be 
available at all stages of the criminal justice process and may only be used with the 
voluntary consent of the parties.
14
 More importantly, the Principles set out procedural 
safeguards namely: the right to legal advice before and after the process; parties must 
be informed of their right; nature of the process and consequences of their decision; and 
no unfair means may be used to induce participation of victim or offender.
15
  
  The Principles have nonetheless been criticised because they do not provide 
how restorative justice should be applied locally or globally, given the fact that there 
are different ways of deploying them.
16
 Even so, the Principles are aimed at 
encouraging states to draw on them in applying restorative justice in their domestic 
jurisdictions. The ULRC report makes no mention of how these Principles may be 
applied to accommodate traditional restorative process and protect the right to a fair 
trial. Still, there are dangers in leaving the development of restorative justice to the 
state, for as Skelton and Sekhonyane correctly argue, it encourages a narrow construct 
of rights within the state‟s due process framework. Then individual rights would be as 
narrow as to only meet the needs of the criminal justice trial.
17
 This means that 
restorative justice programmes could theoretically exclude communitarian values - the 
bedrock of traditional restorative justice.  
Another outstanding problem is the absence of a theoretical model on which the 
ULRC study was grounded. During the first discussion of the report at a workshop for 
stakeholders, only one academic was invited.
18
 Not surprisingly, the report was 
criticised by participants for being too theoretical because it did not, in their view, refer 
sufficiently to court cases,
19
 not because it had a solid theoretical background. The 
recommendations then dealt with doctrinal and practical issues like judicial discretion 
in sentencing and the inclusion of sentencing topics in university law syllabi. The 
recommendations did not touch on the subject of integrating traditional law.
20
 Since the 
                                                 
14
 The Principles op cit s. II 6, 7. 
15
 Ibid, S. III 12 (a) (b) (c).  
16
 M. Findlay and R. Henham (2005) op cit 306. 
17
 A. Skelton and M. Sekhonyane op cit 591, 593. 
18





 August 2003). The participants were mainly judges, magistrates, prison officers, 
lawyers. The only academic was Mr. E. Kasimbazi (the Assistant Dean, School of Law, Makerere 
University). 
19
 Draft Study Report op cit part 6 (e).  
20
 Ibid part 7 (a)-(r) on the Recommendations. 
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final report has not been widely circulated for public scrutiny, there is a lack of 
academic debate on the theoretical issues in peer review journals. This in turn has 
culminated in a paucity of academic scholarship on Uganda‟s sentencing reform.  
ULRC‟s report has endeavoured to uphold Uganda‟s international obligations 
while struggling to find a place for clan courts. Nonetheless, an opportunity was 
squandered to make communitarian values and procedural rights a foundation for 
procedural reform. This reflects the tendency for public bodies to remain within 
judicially accepted parameters of procedural justice, rather than venture into the „new‟ 
area of traditional restorative justice. It is a matter of conjecture whether the proposed 
sentencing guidelines will guide the application of traditional and international human 
rights norms in sentencing.
21
 In expounding the problems raised above, I now address 
issues the ICC ought to consider if its sentencing practice is to have local legitimacy. 
The first is how the adversarial model marginalises clan court processes in the 
sentencing framework.  
 
(i) Sentencing procedure – an ‘alien’ framework 
 
The pervasive common law-adversarial model militates against adaptation of 
clan court processes. This is exemplified in the sentencing framework of the Trial on 
Indictments Act (TIA) on which, as we saw in Chapter 3, Uganda‟s ICC 2006 Bill is 
modelled. The failure of the TIA to apply a traditional participatory approach arises 
from sole judicial discretion in decision making. 
      The TIA provides for a single transaction in which both the conviction and 
sentence are delivered.
22
 Under Section 94, if an offender is convicted or pleads guilty, 
the judge shall ask if the offender has anything to say as to why sentence should not be 
passed upon them according to the law. Omitting to say anything, however, has no 
effect on the validity of the proceedings. Under Section 98, the court before passing any 
sentence other than a death sentence may:  
„Make such inquiries as it thinks fit in order to inform itself as to the proper 
sentence to be passed and may inquire into the character and antecedents of 
                                                 
21
 The Chief Justice announced that sentencing guidelines were being developed to make sentencing 
consistent: New Vision 10
th
 December 2008. 
22 Trials are heard by a single judge assisted by two assessors. Following closure of the defence case, 
both prosecution and defence lawyers make submissions. The judge then sums up the law and evidence 
to the assessors and requests their opinion, although this when given, is not binding on the judge. The 
judge retires to consider the verdict: TIA op cit S. 82 (1)-(3).  
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the accused person and may take into consideration either at the request of the 
prosecution or the accused person (…) such character and antecedents 
including any other offences admitted by him or her whether or not he or she 
has been convicted of such offences (…).‟  
 
In making these inquiries, the prosecution addresses the court on aggravating 
factors but is not permitted to propose a sentence. The defendant may make a 
submission in mitigation, except in cases attracting a mandatory sentence of death 
where the judge has no discretion in sentencing.
23
 In other cases, the defendant is 
availed an opportunity to reply to the prosecutor‟s prayer although the court may ignore 
the offender‟s reply in the absence of legal proof: Section 98 (a). Previous convictions, 
offences admitted and past history may be taken into account during sentencing: 
Section 98 (b). The court‟s enquiries are not based on social inquiry reports such as 
those prepared by a professional social worker under the Children Act
24
 or the 
Community Service Regulations.
25
 Further, the TIA lacks a reparations sentencing 
hearing in which the views of the offender, victims and interested parties could be 
heard, unlike Article 76 (3) of the Rome Statute. 
The judge alone determines the sentence in private. Although the judgement 
(containing points for determination and the reasons) is delivered in public,
26
 
deliberation of sentence under Section 82 is not open to public scrutiny or debate. This 
sole judicial discretion was considered in Agaba Job v Uganda where the Court of 
Appeal held that sentencing power is exercised when the judge takes into account 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
27
 
Even in the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court where procedural equality 
exists (because legal aid is always available for all criminal cases), the parties and 
community do not participate in the review of the sentence. Only lawyers for the 
                                                 
23
 For instance, in Uganda v Obua Dennis alias Amoki Milton High Court Criminal Session No. 30 of 
2001, the judge pronounced the sentence of death as the only one prescribed by the law: judgment of 9th 
April 2001 at 9. Obua’s appeal was rejected by the Court of Appeal (Obua Dennis alias Amoki Milton v 
Uganda Cr. App 36 /2001) and is pending a hearing in the Supreme Court.  
24
 Children Act Cap 59 op cit. Under S. 95 (1) court shall take into account the report by a probation and 
social welfare officer before passing sentence. S. 95(2): the report shall include, among others, the child‟s 
social background.  
25
 The Community Service Regulations SI-55 of 2001 made under the Community Service Act Cap 115. 
Guidelines Part A s. 2 provides that a pre-sentence report should give the court a clear appraisal of the 
offender‟s situation.   
26
 TIA S. 86 (1), op cit. An in-depth account of the steps followed by the judge in assessing sentence is 
given in F. Ayume Criminal Procedure and Law in Uganda (Nairobi: Longman Kenya Ltd, 1986) 153-
160. A more recent account is given by B. J. Odoki „Reforming the Sentencing System in Uganda‟ 
(2003) 1 (1) The Uganda Living Law Journal 1-22, 3-6. 
27
 Agaba Job v Uganda C. A Cr. App No.230 of 2003 (unreported) citing James s/o Yoram v R (1951) 
EACA 18. Emphasis is mine. 
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prosecution or the appellant make representations (submissions) on behalf of the victim 
and appellant. The judges analyse evidence on record only. They are reluctant to admit 
fresh evidence on the grounds that their role as an appellate court is to review evidence 
only: Pandya v Republic and Kifamunte v Uganda.
28
 The judgment and sentence of the 
appellate courts are likewise deliberated in private and the judgment delivered in 
public.  
The foregoing discussion shows that judicial control of deliberation and review 
of sentence is similar to that of the ICC discussed in Chapter 2. Such a procedure, 
dominated by a retributive ideology, does not engage parties or the victim community 
and therefore does not encourage transparency.
29
 I now turn to the retributive 
philosophy as the second issue for consideration.  
 
(ii) Retributive sentencing philosophy  
 
M. Langer‟s study shows that the state is the point of translation of structures 
and legal ideas. This means judges and law reformers are better placed to translate local 
traditional structures and values into national structures. I argue that judges fail to do so 
because they lack a sentencing policy to guide the application of the traditional 
restorative process and communitarian values.  What exists is a patchwork of 
sentencing principles grounded in a predominantly retributive philosophy. Yet explicit 
penal objectives could help in the process of structuring and applying sentences that are 
culturally appropriate. Although it remains unclear under the Rome Statute what role 
national sentencing practice could play when the ICC determines sentence,
30
 it is 
imperative that we examine Uganda‟s sentencing principles to see what guidance could 
be elicited from them. 
At the outset, there is no statutory provision setting out the purpose and 
principles of sentencing.
31
 Whatever principles exist is found in case law. In Uganda v 
Eliba, the High Court held that the sentence should be in proportion to gravity of the 
                                                 
28
 Pandya v Republic [1957] EALR 200 and Kifamunte Henry v Uganda Sup. Ct. Cr. App. 1 of 1987. 
The appellate courts have powers to order production of evidence or summon witnesses. Still, the judges 
interpret their powers restrictively except in rare circumstances, for instance, where despite due diligence 
the evidence could not be adduced at the trial. 
29
 These criticisms are made by R. Henham (2003) (2004) (2005) op cit discussed in Ch. 2 S. 3 op cit.  
30
 M. Drumbl op cit at 52. 
31
 Noted in A study on sentencing and offences legislation in Uganda, Report 5 (JLOS, Kampala, 2001) 
page 1 and paras 55.2.3 and 56.2. Available at http://www.commonlii.org/ug/other/UGJLOS/list.html, 
visited on 4/02/2009.  
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offence. Where there are mitigating factors, the sentence should reflect „the justice of 
the case‟.32 Also in Wanaba v Uganda, the Court of Appeal held that there is need for 
the court „always to tailor the sentence to fit the crime‟, thereby applying a just deserts 
theory.
33
 Where a wrong principle of sentencing is applied, the appellate court can 
„cure‟ the irregularity.34 Significantly, the guidance in the jurisprudence excludes a 
participatory notion of justice: making no reference to the social roles of the victim, 
offender, their kin and the community in the determination or review of sentence. 
Accordingly, the existing sentencing principles are based on retribution and deterrence. 
Rehabilitation only applies where the verdict is guilty but insane, institutionalises the 
healing of the individual
35
 but without addressing their reintegration in the community. 
Paradoxically, these sentencing principles aimed at protecting the public from an 
individual
36
 do not take into account communitarian values.  
In sum, there are no national sentencing guidelines on the application of 
traditional restorative justice in sentencing on which the ICC may rely. Pervasive 
judicial control and retributive philosophy: areas not covered in the sentencing reforms, 
originate from the inherited English adversarial model from which Uganda‟s procedural 
framework evolved. I turn to this next.  
(iii)  Historical background to the procedural framework   
 
Uganda‟s penal system was imported from England in the 18th century, with the 
political aim of subjugating the local people through divide and rule.
37
 The main 
features of the system were retributive punishments and an adversarial procedural 
framework based on the old English Assize courts.
38
 The present system retains the 
common law framework, in what Drumbl aptly describes as the outcome of old 
                                                 
32
 Uganda v Eliba [1978] HCB 273 paras 7 and 8. The holdings are reproduced in A. Tumwebaze 
Criminal Proceedings (Barrister‟s Reference Book series CGCU: Kampala, 2007)162-163. 
33
 Yunus Wanaba v Uganda [2001-2005] HCB 25, 26 para 3. S. Beresford op cit at 40-41 gives a concise 
description of the just deserts theory as retributive, though he points out that modern theorists like A. 
Von Hirsch (1976) call for proportionality and objectively fair punishment. 
34
 Meri Moses v Uganda Criminal Appeal No.59 of 2004 (Court of Appeal) para 20-30, page 4. 
35
  For instance, TIA op cit S.48. 
36
 B. J Odoki op cit 1-5. S. Birungi, The Law Governing Sentencing and Punishment in Uganda: a Case 
for Reform, Unpublished LLB Thesis, Makerere University, Uganda (1998) especially Chapter 3, 60-69. 
An overview of Uganda‟s sentencing legislation is in Appendix 9. 
37
 E. Beyaraza (2001) op cit at 119. 
38
 Ch. 1 and 6 op cit. H. Morris and J. Read (1966) op cit 264. 
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repeated processes of transplants that occurred throughout history, coinciding with 
colonialism.
39
   
As we saw in Chapter 6, Uganda‟s sentencing laws originated from the 
introduction of the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 brought in force by the 
1902 Order-in-Council: Section 15 (2). The Code introduced English rules of procedure 
based on principles of natural justice. The Code was replaced by the Criminal 
Procedure Ordinance 25 of 1919. In a major redrafting in 1930, the colonial office 
prepared a standard Criminal Procedure Code for the colonies.
40
 The procedure therein 
was based on that in the High Court of Justice, Courts of Oyer and Terminer and 




This imposition of English law sounded the death knell to traditional courts, but 
faced stiff opposition from the local population and some Europeans. This 
dissatisfaction culminated in an inquiry appointed in 1933 into the administration of 
criminal justice under the chairmanship of H. Bushe.
42
 As Mamdani observes, the 
Bushe Commission was set up against a backdrop of anti colonial protest, pitting 
lawyers against administrators. The administrators wanted speedy justice, while 
lawyers preferred „transplantation of the technicalities of English criminal law and 
procedures‟.43 The Commission‟s terms of reference were to enquire into criminal 
procedures and practice other than native courts and consider whether alterations were 
desirable in the case of natives.
44
 Effectively, traditional restorative process was 
omitted.  
As a result, the Commission paid little consideration to complaints about the 
inappropriateness of the transplanted criminal procedure code. Rather, the Commission 
focused on the sentences only.
45
 Recommendations that the state‟s criminal codes 
should be repealed in cases involving natives, and native law and custom remain as the 
                                                 
39
 M. Drumbl op cit 126-127. 
40
 A detailed explanation of the evolution of the criminal procedure codes up to the 1960s is in H. Morris 
and J. Read op cit 262 -271. In Uganda it was Code No. 8 of 1930. 
41
Criminal Procedure Code No 8 op cit, S. 250 also discussed in Morris and Read, op cit 268. The main 
provisions were: plea taking, hearing of the prosecution case, ruling on a prima facie case, defence case, 
final submissions, summing up to the assessors, verdict then sentence. 
42
 Report Of The Commission Of Inquiry Into The Administration Of Justice In Kenya, Uganda And The 
Tanganyika Territory In Criminal Matters, (London, HMSO, 1933).  
43
 M. Mamdani op cit 128-129. 
44
 Report of the Commission of Inquiry op cit, para.2. 
45
 Ibid, para 158-160. 
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only code, were ignored.
46
 Instead, the Commission observed that it was the duty of the 
government to „civilise‟ and maintain order, which could only be done by introducing 
„British concepts of wrong doing.‟47 Accordingly, its recommendations were that 
punishments from „enlightened systems of jurisprudence‟ like imprisonment, corporal 
punishment and the death penalty, be imposed.
48
 This lends credence to the criticism: 
“We have, rightly or wrongly, imposed upon natives of Uganda an alien system of 
justice. Our object in doing so was presumably to inculcate more satisfactory ideas of 
right and wrong.”49 In this respect, Morris and Read‟s observation that there was 




The Bushe Commission made no recommendations on the sentencing procedure 
of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) of 1919 so it was retained even in the 
subsequent edition of 1923. The CPC was redrafted in 1951. In matters of criminal 
procedure, a court was now guided by provisions of the CPC, itself based on English 
procedure and principles.
51
 The sentencing procedure remained the same and was 
replicated in subsequent editions of the CPC.
52
 The transplanted English procedure 
gave sole discretion to the judge to determine the sentence and protected international 
procedural rights for the defence like the right to a lawyer, and right to appeal.
53
 
Notably absent, was any reference to rights for victims or a voice for the community. 
This is hardly surprising given the context in which procedural reforms took place and 
the associated abolition of traditional customary law.  
Since 1951 there have been piece-meal amendments to procedural legislation. 
Post independence reform of the 1970s led to the passing of the Magistrates‟ Courts 
Act (MCA) and the TIA where the drafters merely took provisions from the CPC on 
trials before Magistrates‟ courts and the High Court then put them in two separate 
pieces of legislation.
54
 The provisions left in the CPC (now Cap 116) are mainly on 
appeals and revision. The 2000 Revision of the Laws of Uganda did little to change the 
                                                 
46
 Ibid, para 161,commenting on the recommendations in the Memorandum by Mr. Willis- an advocate.  
47
 Ibid, para 162 
48
 Ibid, paras 164-165. 
49
 Ibid, pages 132-133 paras. 15-16 citing the then Governor of Uganda.  
50
 H. Morris and J. Read, op cit, 256.  
51
 Cap 24 op cit S. 12. 
52
 Ibid, S. 290. 
53
 Criminal Procedure Code Cap 107 e.g. S. 279 on examination of witnesses.  
54
 The Magistrates‟ Courts Act 13/1970 and the Trial on Indictments Decree No. 26/1971.These laws 
were re-numbered in the 2000 law revision and are now the MCA Cap 16 and the TIA Cap 23. 
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trial procedure, particularly its sentencing provisions. These remain largely a replica of 
the 1923 edition,
55
 devoid of any participatory approach whatsoever. 
I have argued here that Uganda‟s procedural framework is grounded in 
retributive philosophy based on an antiquated piece of legislation whose common law-
adversarial origins date back to the 18
th
 century. The sentencing laws lack a process by 
which the community can perceive that offenders have been held accountable in a fair 
process. For this reason, a rule oriented approach fails to draw on the similarities with 
traditional restorative justice processes. Moreover, the ULRC report does not borrow 
from traditional restorative justice to bring it closer to communitarian values. This may 
be attributed to the fact that traditional criminal law does not fall under the scope of 
legally recognised customary law. 
 
(iv) The scope of customary law in Uganda  
 
We saw previously that constitutional and statutory developments by post- 
independence governments transferred the adjudication of criminal customary law from 
clan leaders to formal courts.
56
 This situation has not been reversed. Firstly, under 
Article 28 (12) of the constitution, all penalties must be prescribed by law. This 
explicitly excludes traditional clan law that is largely unwritten, and whose penalties 
are not prescribed by law. It is for this reason that some key respondents argued that the 
autonomy of traditional courts be retained since they fall outside the jurisdiction of the 
national system.
57
 There is however, some anecdotal evidence that magistrates handle 
decisions from the clan courts though informally. For example, the Chief Magistrate of 
Tororo said that he receives appeals from decisions of clan courts in civil matters 
relating to land allocation. The clan elders come to the court following a complaint by 
                                                 
55
 S. 290 of the Criminal Procedure Code Cap 24 (1923 Edition) provides:  
„The court, before passing any sentence other than a sentence of death, may make such 
inquiries, as it thinks fit in order to inform itself as to the sentence proper to be passed, 
and may inquire into the character and antecedents of the accused person either at the 
request of the prosecution of the accused person and may take into consideration in 
assessing the proper sentence to be passed such character and antecedents including 
other offences committed by him whether or not he has been convicted of such 
offences.‟  
This text has been replicated in S. 98 TIA op cit.  
56
 Ch. 6 op cit, s. 3 (iii) discussing the effect of S.9 (1) Magistrates Courts Act, Cap 36 (1964) op cit.  
57
 These include: Chief Justice B. Odoki interviewed on 25/08/06, Justice C. Byamugisha and Justice C. 
Kitumba interviewed on 3/08/06. Prof. Joseph Kakooza, Chairman Uganda Law Reform Commission 
interviewed on 22/08/06 and Dr. Masamba Sita Director UNAFRI interviewed on 31/08/06, both 
underscored the importance of a legal system taking into account local concepts of procedural justice. 
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an aggrieved party to give the facts of the case. This, he pointed out, is done informally 
not during court hearings.
58
 Even so, this does not legitimise traditional courts criminal 
jurisdiction.  
Secondly, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 14 (2) (b) (ii) of the 
Judicature Act shall be exercised subject to any „established and current custom or 
usage‟. This section must be read together with Section 15 (1) under which the High 
Court can observe or enforce the observance of any existing custom that is not 
repugnant to „natural justice, equity and good conscience‟ and is not incompatible with 
any written law. These provisions have been interpreted in Tifu Lukwago and another, 
per Mulenga JSC, to mean that custom is to be applied where the law is silent, subject 
to the „repugnancy‟ clause.59 However, these provisions in the Judicature Act refer to 




As a consequence of these two factors, traditional customary procedures are 
treated as circumstantial evidence by national courts, as can be seen in the decision of 
Dennis Obua. The facts were that the accused, Obua, confessed to murder before a 
Langi ethnic clan court. Obua handed over the murder weapon (a gun) to the clan 
members and a written confession was recorded and signed by him and the leader of the 
clan chiefs.
61
 The serial number of the murder weapon was also recorded. During the 
High Court trial, the only direct evidence adduced was that of the clan leader and clan 
members who were treated as witnesses for the prosecution.
62
 The accused was found 
guilty and sentenced to death. Since the Evidence Act applies only to proceedings in 
courts of law, Judge Opio-Aweri rightly treated the testimony of the clan elders as 
overwhelming circumstantial evidence of murder.
63
 He did not consider the written 
confession because he treated it as inadmissible since it fell outside the ambit of the 
                                                 
58
 Interview with Chief Magistrate of Tororo- Mr. P Rutakirwah, on 16/08/06 op cit. 
59
 Tifu Lukwago v S. Kizza and another, op cit. 
60
 The Customary Marriages Act, op cit. Customary marriages are preserved by law, thus the High Court 
made a declaration prohibiting marriage among members of the same clan in Kiwuwa v Serunkuma and 
Namazzi case op cit discussed in Ch. 6 S. 6 (i) op cit. Also magistrate‟s courts have jurisdiction to apply 
only civil customary law under S.10 MCA op cit. In Tifu Lukwago op cit the court considered the custom 
surrounding purchase of land under customary land tenure in Buganda.  
61
 Uganda v Obua D, High Court Criminal Session No. 30 of 2001 op cit, 10 -19 of the transcript citing 
the decision of the Langi clan court. 
62
 Ibid, 10-11, 16-19, evidence of Prosecution Witnesses No. 3, 5 and 6. 
63
 Ibid, Judgment pages 7-8 citing principles laid down in Teper v R [1952] 2 All E Reports 447 followed 
in Simon Musoke v R [1958] EALR 715.  




 Similarly, the record of the serial number of the gun was also 
inadmissible.
65
 Following summing up, the assessors gave a brief opinion, directing the 
court to convict the defendant since the prosecution had proved its case beyond 
reasonable doubt.
66
 The assessors‟ opinion is clearly legalistic, based less on traditional 
criminal law and more on the burden of proof. The judge determined the sentence in 
accordance with national law and sentenced the accused to death. His decision was 
unilateral because the Assessors opinions were not binding on him. This contrasts clan 
court procedure discussed in Chapter 7, where the assessors‟ opinion is central to the 
verdict and their participation key to the determination of sentence.  
Clearly, Uganda‟s legislation has a limited scope of customary criminal law. 
This follows a continuum of restrictive statutory and constitutional provisions that 
continue to subordinate traditional clan laws, leaving traditional participatory process 
on the fringes of national sentencing law. By not taking into account clan court 
sentencing practice, the law has no interactive characteristics (like public deliberation 
of evidence and sentence) equivalent to the traditional participatory process. The 
sentencing reforms lack effective procedural safeguards during sentencing and make no 
reference to the Principles. Besides, there are no provisions on the duty of kin, 
obligatory reconciliation feasts or purification rituals of the kind that are mandatory in 
clan courts. Against this backdrop, I now undertake an examination of the right to a fair 
trial in Uganda‟s Bill of Rights to explain this lack of traditional procedural safeguards. 
 
Section 3: Development of the Bill of rights 
 
In this section, I make the second part of my argument that the Uganda Bill of 
Rights reflects normative rigidity as a result of a „copy and paste‟ of human rights 
provisions transplanted from the ECHR. The absence of communitarian values arises 
from historical and political events in the country that also shaped the constitution. 
Ultimately, the Bill reflects international human rights norms, but fails to act as a 
normative bridge between individual procedural rights and communitarian values.  
 
                                                 
64
 Ibid, transcript page 11: evidence of Prosecution Witness 3. S.23-27 Evidence Act op cit provides that 
only a confession recorded by police officers or magistrates is admissible. F. Asenwa and D. Kakooza v 
Uganda S. C. Criminal Appeal 1 of 1998 confirmed the rules on recording of confessions.  
65
 Obua op cit, transcript, 16-17. 
66
 Ibid, 36.  
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(i) Locating communitarian values in the constitution 
 
Difficulties inherent in the application of human rights norms in culturally diverse 
societies, such as are found in Uganda, are recognised in the Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action:  
„While the significance of national and regional particularities and various 
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is 
the duty of the States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural 
systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.‟67  
 
This paragraph puts the onus on Uganda to protect human rights within an overarching 
framework. Uganda‟s constitution takes into account cultural interests but lacks a 
positive statement on communitarian values because it is not premised on cultural 
values. What exists under Article 37 is recognition of cultural institutions and 
protection of the individual‟s right to practice their culture: 
Article 37: 
„Every person has a right as applicable, to belong to, enjoy, practice, profess, 
maintain and promote any culture, cultural institution, language, tradition, 
creed or religion in community with others.‟  
 






 and also 
adopts the wording of Article 17 (2) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ 
Rights (hereafter‟ African Charter‟) in which „every individual may take part in the 
cultural life of his community.‟ Article 17 (3) of the African Charter states categorically 
that the state as duty bearer must promote and protect traditional values recognised by 
communities. Under the Cultural Objectives in Uganda‟s constitution, the state is also 
obliged to promote and preserve cultural values and practices that promote the dignity 
and well being of Ugandans.
71
 Duties of the citizen as set out in the National Objectives 
are largely political, but mention vaguely „contribution to the well being of the 
                                                 
67
 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action: United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc, 
A/CONF.157/23, 12
 
July 1993: para 5. 
68
 „Every one has the right to freely participate in the cultural life of the community (…)‟: Article 27 
UDHR op cit. 
69
 Article 27 ICCPR op cit: „In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members 
of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own 
language‟. 
70
 Article 15 (a) ICESCR op cit: State parties recognise every person‟s right „to take part in cultural life.‟ 
71
 Uganda constitution op cit, National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy: Cultural 
Objective (XXIV) (a). 
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community‟.72 Still, these constitutional objectives lack the clout of positive rights to be 
protected by the state.  
The state has also developed a National Cultural Policy to define cultural 
beliefs, traditions and values.
 
Traditional institutions are defined therein as inclusive of 
clans, kingdoms, chiefdoms, and the family
73
 and are protected by Article 246 of the 
constitution that recognises kings, traditional or cultural leaders.
74
 The Policy creates a 
framework to proscribe customs and traditions that infringe on human dignity and 
promote those that enhance it.
75
 To this end, the Ministry of Justice is tasked with 
initiating, drafting and revision of laws,
76
 although this is yet to happen.  
Despite constitutional and government recognition, Articles 37 and 246 of the 
constitution do not recognise the application of traditional criminal law by such cultural 
institutions for the reasons examined previously. Firstly, clan courts were abolished 
during post independence and their structures and procedures were rendered 
redundant.
77
 Additionally, Article 28(12) prohibits unwritten penal offences and 
punishments that include oral traditional laws. Finally, Article 37 does not grant 
absolute rights. The state can pass laws that derogate from this right.
78
 
In my view, Article 37 and the constitutional objectives do not go far enough to 
accommodate communitarian values or an African notion of procedural fairness. In 
particular, these provisions do not relate to articles in the African Charter (like the 
individual‟s duty to the community) nor do they ensure that individual rights are not 
subordinated to community interests. Yet Uganda has signed and ratified the African 
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 Ibid, Duties of a Citizen Objective (XXIX) (c). 
73
 National Cultural Policy, Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, December 2006: paras 
2.2.5 and 2.4.1. 
74
 Article 246 (6) constitution op cit, recognises such king, traditional or cultural leader: „who derives 
allegiance from the fact of birth or descent in accordance with the customs, traditions, usage or consent 
of the people (…).‟ 
75
 Cultural Policy op cit, 7.4. The text reads „mitigate‟ but no explanation is offered as to what this 
entails.  
76
 Ibid, 8.1. A law to guide communities seeking to have cultural leadership is in the offing- State 
Minister for Culture and Gender, Ms. R. Nakadama cited in Daily Monitor 12
th
 January 2009. 
77
 Discussed in Ch. 1 and Ch. 6 op cit. I argue in Ch. 5 op cit that the definition of traditional courts in 
Section S (1) of the Guidelines that expound the African Charter, appear to exclude traditional courts not 
legally recognised by the state.  
78
 The state can in public interest, limit rights and freedoms of individuals under Article 43. The rights 
and freedoms from which derogation is prohibited under Article 44 are: freedom from torture, cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment; freedom from slavery or servitude; the right to a fair hearing and the 
right to an order of habeas corpus. This point is discussed in some detail by M. Senyonjo (2002) op cit 
473-474. 




 Besides, under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is the principle 
of pacta sunt servanda: „Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must 
be performed in good faith‟.80 It follows that Uganda as a signatory to the Vienna 
Convention has an obligation to enforce all international treaties it has ratified, 
including the African Charter.
81
 This is because rights in these international instruments 




Article 45 appears to plug the gaps in Article 37 by providing that rights and 
duties „shall not be regarded as excluding others not specifically mentioned.‟ It has 
been convincingly argued that all rights in the UDHR that are guaranteed under the 
ICCPR are part of the Bill of Rights in the Uganda constitution.
83
 The same argument 
could be extended to duties of the individual, traditional and communal values, as set 
out in the African Charter and the Principles.  That the Bill of Rights makes no explicit 
reference to the African Charter provisions; arises from the historical and political 
events that shaped the constitution.   
 
(ii) Evolution of the Bill of Rights  
 
In the period leading up to independence (1894–1962), Uganda as a British 
Protectorate was characterised by lack of protection of human rights. There was no 
formal bill of rights because the colonial administration usurped the power of 
indigenous people to define their own rights and interests.
84
 The administration 
developed instead a political system that catered for Britain‟s economic needs while 
accommodating local interests that they felt needed recognition.
85
 These interests were 
                                                 
79
 Date of ratification was the 10/05/1986, deposit of the instrument was the 27/05/1986 and date of 
signature was 18/08/1986: http://www.achpr.org (visited 6/11/2007).   
80
 Vienna Convention, on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. A/Conf.39/27; 1155 UNTS 331; 8 ILM 679 
(1969) Article 26. Uganda acceded to the Convention on the 24
th
 June 1988. Source: 
http://ozone.unep.org/Ratfication_status_ratif_by_treaty.shtml?treaty=VC, last visited on 28/04/2008. 
81
 For instance, Uganda acceded to the ICCPR on 21 June 1995 and to the ICESCR on 21 January 1987. 
82
 P. M Walubiri, „An analysis of international human rights instruments and their relevance to a 
liberalised independent judiciary‟ in P. M Walubiri (ed.), Uganda: Constitutionalism at the Cross roads 
(Uganda Law Watch: Kampala, 1998) 96.  
83
 M. Senyonjo (2002) op cit 460.  
84
 Ibid, 447-448. G. Kanyeihamba (2002) op cit Ch. 1 and 2 op cit, for an excellent account of these 
events. 
85
 D. W Nabudere, „Politics And Constitution Making in Post Colonial Uganda‟ (2004) 2 (1) Uganda 
Living Law Journal 1-30, 1-2. Also J. C Mubangizi, „The Protection of Human Rights Awareness in 
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mainly those of the Buganda Kingdom, leading to what Nabudere calls a „mixed‟ 




Uganda achieved independence on 9
th
 October 1962. The 1962 Independence 
constitution declaring Uganda independent from Britain was annexed to the 
Independence Act that was passed by the British Parliament.
87
 This followed protracted 
negotiations between Britain and local nationalist politicians.
88
 The London 
constitutional conference drafted this independence constitution, and included in it a 
chapter containing human rights and freedoms.
89
 The Bill of Rights contained therein 
was based on the Nigerian Bill of Rights that in turn was modelled on the ECHR.
90
 For 
instance, the right to fair trial in Article 24 (2) protected due process guarantees to legal 
representation.
91
 The constitution also defined powers of the three organs of 
government: the legislature, executive and judiciary.
92
 There was no mention of 
economic, social and cultural rights because the drafters were the same colonial 
authorities that were insensitive to cultural rights of the indigenous Ugandans.
93
 
Significantly, the transplanted ECHR human rights provisions were modelled for 
industrialised nations that shared a common heritage, similar understanding of rights 
and had centrally governed liberalised democracies.  
To cater for Buganda‟s interests, the constitution guaranteed the retention of 
customary authority though it granted a superior status to Buganda. This is because, as 
we saw in Chapter 6, it was through Buganda kingdom that the British protectorate was 
established and gradually spread to the rest of Uganda. The King of Buganda was 
President and head of state and he appointed the Prime Minister who was leader of the 
                                                                                                                                                    
Uganda: Public awareness and perceptions‟ (2005) 3 (1) African Journal of Legal Studies 166-186, 169; 
M. Senyonjo op cit 448. 
86
 D. Nabudere op cit, 2. 
87
 10 &11Eliz.2.c.57 passed by the Imperial Parliament in August 1962. 
88
 J. Oloka-Onyango (1995) op cit, 157. 
89
 Colonial Office, Report of the Uganda Constitutional Conference, HMSO London, 1961, Cmnd 1523, 
29.  
90
 H. Morris and J. Read op cit 76 and 169; M. Senyonjo op cit 449-450 (note 26) citing B. O Nwabueze, 
Constitutional Law of Nigeria, (1964). The ECHR (1950) op cit was drafted by the British Foreign 
Office and was built, among others, on individual human rights principles. A comprehensive overview of 
normative considerations, negotiations and drafting history of the ECHR is in S. Greer (2006) op cit 15-
20. 
91
 1962 constitution, op cit Article 24 (2) (a-f). Other rights included: the right to life, liberty, prohibition 
from torture, grave and inhuman treatment (Articles 18, 19 and 21) that drew from the ECHR op cit 
Article 2(1) on life, Article 5 on liberty and Article 3 on prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.  
92
 1962 constitution op cit Chapters V, VI and IX. 
93
 M. Senyonjo op cit, 449.  




 The rest of the country comprised smaller kingdoms
95
 – which 
enjoyed a semi-federal status – and segmented societies like the Jopadhola who fell 
under this ill defined arrangement.
96
 
The Bill of Rights under Article 24 (8) outlawed unwritten penal laws and by 
implication their procedural rules. Traditional criminal law therefore ceased to exist at 
least in national legal theory and was not recognized under national law. This abolition 
was meant to recast African criminal justice systems along European lines.
97
 The 
response by communities was to resist and continue with the hearing of court cases, 
particularly those that involved spiritualism and some form of purification. Although 
this resistance is not well documented, my field study among the Jopadhola Jo-Gem 
and Morwa Guma clans shows how clan courts continue to try criminal cases and 
create their own sense of procedural justice. They have done so by purposely 
combining the local with the modern notions of justice as reflected in Uganda‟s 
national framework, as a deliberate strategy to survive.
98
  
The Independence constitution was abrogated by the 1966 Interim constitution 
that came into force on the 15
th
 April 1966. Since it was neither debated nor discussed, 
but just posted into the pigeon holes of the members of parliament, it has been fittingly 
described as the „pigeon hole constitution‟.99 Existing kingdoms like Buganda, together 
with their traditional rulers, were abolished under Article 118. Events that led to the 
making of the 1966 constitution evolved from the manner in which the colonial masters 
had pitted different parts of the country against each other under the indirect rule 
policy. Prime Minister Milton Obote (from northern Uganda) wanted to form a united 
republic, but the Baganda (central Uganda) were not willing to relinquish their 
Kingdom and unite with the rest of the country. Controversial land distribution by the 
colonialists to Buganda, led to the disenfranchisement of other ethnic groups, 
culminating into a battle between Obote (for the disenfranchised) and Buganda‟s King - 
the Kabaka. The Kabaka was forced into exile in the United Kingdom by Obote who 
                                                 
94
 H. Morris and J. Read op cit Chapter 4 pointing out that the constitution was written by diverse groups 
with self interests. 
95
 Kingdoms that were abolished included those of Ankole, Bunyoro, Toro and Busoga. 
96
 J. Oloka-Onyango op cit 157-159. On the constitutional developments in Uganda during this period, 
see H. Morris and J. Read, op cit: Chapter 3, and G. Kanyeihamba op cit Chapter 2. 
97
 R. A Bush, „Modern Roles for Customary Justice: Integration of Civil Procedure in African Courts‟ 
(1974) 26 (5) Stanford Law Review 1123-1159, 1123 note 2. 
98
 Clan court processes are investigated in detail in Ch. 6 and 7 op cit. 
99
 J. Oloka-Onyango op cit 158, also M. Senyonjo op cit 450. 
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 The legality of the 1966 
constitution and authority of the government was challenged in Uganda v 
Commissioner for Prisons Ex Parte Matovu.
101
 There the Constitutional Court, basing 
itself on the theory of Hans Kelsen, decided that the taking over of power by the Prime 
Minister, abrogation of the 1962 constitution and its replacement by the 1966 
constitution was a „victorious revolution‟ establishing a new order.102  
Once again, the 1966 constitution had no mention of economic, social or 
cultural rights. Although the Bill of rights was retained, it was „watered‟ down by 
subordinating it to state interests as reflected in the President‟s wide powers.103 Such 
powers included declaration of an unlimited state of emergency as well as arrest and 
detention without trial. This paved the way for abuse of human rights and creating 
fertile ground for the foundations of yet another constitution. 
The 1967 constitution replaced the 1966 constitution. Under the 1967 
Republican constitution, whose underlying philosophy was aptly described as „absolute 
centralism‟, Uganda became a Republic.104 Article 118 nullified the status quo of 
Buganda as a state within a state and abolished traditional monarchies in Uganda.
105
 
The constitution maintained the „weakened‟ Bill of Rights that was still subject to the 
President‟s extensive powers. For example, there was imposition of a state of 
emergency without limitation, arrest and detention without trial. These acts negated the 
substance of human rights.
106
   
Post independence Uganda was politically unstable as different groups, factions 
and political parties fought for power. The single most destructive regime was that of 
Idi Amin that saw the suspension of the constitution, abolition of parliament and 
destruction of the judiciary. Legislative authority was taken over by the executive: 
                                                 
100
 S. Kiwanuka Amin and the Tragedy of Uganda (Munchen:Werltforum Verlag,1979) 27 –29 on 
reasons for the overthrow of Obote. D. Nabudere (2004) op cit 3-6. 
101
 Uganda v Commissioner for Prisons Ex Parte Matovu [1966] EALR 514. 
102
 M. Senyonjo op cit 450-451. N. Bazaara in K. Kibwana, C. Maina and N. Bazaara (eds.) (2001) op cit 
54-55 observes quite rightly that the Ex Parte Matovu decision made the judiciary seem toothless. 
103
 1967 constitution op cit. Under Article 64 the President could promulgate ordinances in „exceptional 
circumstances‟ and executive power vested in the President under Article 65. F. M Sekandi and C. Gitta 
„Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Uganda Constitution‟ 26 (1994) Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review 191-214, 202. The Bill of Rights was in Cap III: Article 15 was on fair trial protection. 
104
 A. Mayanja, then a Member of Parliament, in „The Government‟s Proposals for a New Constitution of 
Uganda‟ 32 (1967) Transition 20-25, 23. This fulfilled Prime Minister Obote‟s wish to form a united 
republic. 
105
Ibid. Mayanja decried the abolition of kingdoms arguing that they were „inimical‟ to the building of a 
national state.  
106
 M. Senyonjo op cit pages 451-452. Mayanja ibid, condemning the erosion of fundamental rights and 
freedoms. 
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power was vested in the President alone and parliament was in abeyance. To validate 
this usurpation of power, Amin suspended key articles of the constitution.
107
 Although 
the Bill of Rights remained unchanged, it was difficult to enforce in the years that 
followed, which marked the worst violations of human rights in Uganda‟s history. A 
notorious example was when the then Chief Justice, B. Kiwanuka decided to apply the 
law judiciously and granted bail to a man who had been detained for a long period 
without trial. Kiwanuka‟s decision was regarded as an act undermining the powers of 
the President and he was murdered on Amin‟s orders.108 
The abolition of the rule of law lasted 8 years (1971-1979) during which time 
„official‟ courts of law existed marginally with little effective jurisdiction.109 The clan 
courts instead thrived because they filled a vacuum created by the undermined official 
court system. After the overthrow of Amin in 1979, there were a series of short lived 
governments that tinkered with the constitution but leaving the Bill of Rights intact.
110
  
After a protracted war, the National Resistance Movement under the leadership 
of Yoweri Museveni took over power in January 1986 promising a fundamental change 
and the defence of human rights.
111
 In 1988, a Constitutional Review Commission was 
appointed with 21 commissioners; hand picked by the Minister for Justice and chaired 
by B. Odoki, now the Chief Justice. Its task was to review the 1967 constitution to 
establish a free and democratic society of government that would guarantee the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the people of Uganda.
112
  
After a debate in the Constituent Assembly of elected representatives, the new 
1995 constitution was born.
113
 There were criticisms about the composition of the 
Constituent Assembly. A significant number were supporters of the ruling National 
Resistance Movement party (now „Movement Party‟) and it has been argued that the 
                                                 
107
 Under Legal Notice 1 of 1971 these were: Article 1 on supremacy of the constitution, Article 3 on its 
amendment and Article 63 on the legislature. 
108
 S. Kiwanuka op cit chapter Four. 
109
 D. Nsereko (1995) op cit 18-19.  
110
 Between 1980 to January 1968 there were several governments: D. Nabudere (2004) op cit 15-17 
gives a political analysis of these regimes of the Uganda National Liberation Front governments of Lule, 
Binaisa and Muwanga; the Milton Obote II Administration and the military junta of Tito Okello. Also J. 
Mubangizi op cit note 20. The governments mainly suspended the articles in the constitution giving 
power to the legislature. 
111
 Ten Point Programme of NRM, (NRM Publications: Kampala, 1985) 30-34: one of its ten points was 
cooperation with other African countries to defend human rights using democracy.  
112
 The Commission was set up under the Uganda Constitutional Commission Statute 1988 Section 2. Its 
terms of reference are available at http://www.parliam.go.ug/history.htm visited on 10/10/2008. N. 
Bazaara op cit 45-46 criticises the work of the commission on the grounds that questions they asked were 
biased, resulting in answers that led to entrenchment of the „Movement‟ system in the constitution. 
113
 The constitution was adopted on the 22
nd
 September 1995. Article 287 repealed the 1967 Constitution. 
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constitution reflects mainly Movement ideologies, not public consensus.
114
 Waliggo, 
however, points out that the debate centred on human rights.
115
 Indeed, Uganda‟s 
constitution recognises human rights standards as valid norms. Chapter 4 contains a Bill 
of Rights more detailed than previous ones. Article 28 protects the right to a fair trial. 
Notably, the constitution has made strides in the protection of women and marginalised 
groups (like children) by proscribing laws, cultures, customs and traditions that 
undermine their status.
116
 The constitution also re-establishes traditional rulers and 
kingdoms in Article 246 following a push by Buganda for restoration of their 
Kingdom.
117
 Still, Article 28 (12) outlaws unwritten penal law impliedly traditional 
criminal law.  
Uganda is now a Republic with a democratically elected government where all 
arms of the state are enjoined to uphold the rule of law. This constitution has an article 
not found in any other African constitution. Under Article 126(1) judicial power shall 
be exercised in accordance with the law and the „values, norms, and aspirations of the 
people‟. This provision creates space for the continued operation of traditional clan law 
at some level within the court structure of Uganda. Despite legislative abolition of 
traditional criminal jurisdiction, legal pluralism gradually evolved and now consists of 
two procedural traditions. One is the national system based on common law trial 
procedures buttressed by due process, and the other is a traditional restorative justice 
process based on communitarian values.  
                                                 
114
 Uganda Constituent Assembly Statute No 6 of 1993, S. 4 on the composition of members. Others 
were army representatives, presidential nominees and key political party representatives. J. Oloka-
Onyango op cit 168-169, criticises the lack of justification for these categories. Some like J. 
Waphakabulo as President Museveni states in his biography, Sowing the Mustard Seed (Fountain 
Publishers: Kampala, 2007) was his close friend: 26, 54. Wapakhabulo was appointed chairman of the 
Constituent Assembly. In 2001 the executive through the Ministry for Justice and Constitutional affairs, 
decided to review the constitution. A Commission of Inquiry was set up with its 15 members handpicked 
by the Minister to represent different interest groups including the government: Legal Notice No. 1/2001 
Section 3. Their terms of reference included a review of the role of traditional and cultural institutions 
and a review of the Bill of rights to consider whether the death penalty should be abolished under S. 4 (o) 
and (h). The Commission recommended that the death penalty should be retained and that government 
provide for the maintenance of traditional institutions: Report of the Commission of Inquiry 
(Constitutional Review): Findings and Recommendations (10
th
 December 2003) Chapters 13, 17 and 18. 
The Government accepted these recommendations in Government White Paper on the Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry and Government Proposals not Addressed by the Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry (Constitutional Review) (2004): para 12.3 (1). No amendment to the constitution was required.  
115
 J. Waliggo „Constitution-making and the politics of democratisation in Uganda‟ in H. Hansen and M. 
Twaddle (eds.) From Chaos to Order: the politics of constitution making in Uganda (Kampala, London: 
Fountain Publishers, James Currey, 1995). He was a Commissioner. Waliggo revealed that some 
representatives wanted the entire ICCPR to be incorporated in the constitution: 33. This did not happen. 
116
 Article 32 (2) 1995 constitution op cit as amended by the Constitution (Amendment) Act 2 of 2005. 
117
 J. Oloka-Onyango op cit 163-165 observes that the debate over restoration of kingdoms and 
traditional rulers was riddled with conflict between the government and Buganda‟s monarchists. 
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 The foregoing discussion shows that within the Bill of Rights, procedural rights in 
Article 28 and communitarian values (alluded to in Articles 37 and 126(1)) remain in 
contradistinction to each other. This emanates from a constitutional history of 
transplantation of western human rights norms, excluding even „African‟ provisions of 
the African Charter. Even the peremptory terms of Article 126 cover an uneasy mix of 
normative standards: individual rights (law) and communitarian values, which are not 
always mutually compatible. This incompatibility is not dealt with by the courts in their 
2009 decision on procedural rights in mandatory sentencing. The scale of this problem 
becomes clearer in the next section. 
Section 4: Constitutional interpretation of traditional values and norms  
 
A critical analysis of the jurisprudence on procedural rights in sentencing brings 
to the fore issues arising from the constitutional interpretation of Article 126 (1). These 
are a failure to distinguish the normative context in which the law is applied and an 
unimaginative application of precedent. This section expounds my third argument that 
adopting such a narrow construction of Article 126(1), negates any prospect that a 
pluralist interpretation of human rights in sentencing can be achieved.  
 
(i) Distinguishing the normative context of sentences: past trends 
 
Three public institutions safeguard human rights in Uganda. The first is the 
Uganda Human Rights Commission whose mandate is to investigate complaints and 
monitor government‟s compliance with international treaties.118 The second is the 
Inspector General of Government that provides oversight of administrative 
behaviour.
119
 The third are the courts of law, mandated to interpret the constitution in 
light of human rights standards.
120
  
                                                 
118
 Functions of the Commission are under S. 8 Uganda Human Rights Commission Act Cap 24, and 
Article 52 constitution op cit.  
119
 Constitution ibid Article 225 on functions of the Inspectorate. Article 226 provides that its jurisdiction 
is restricted to „officers and leaders whether employed in the public service or not‟. The Inspectorate of 
Government Act 2002 (amended by Act 11 Constitutional Amendment Act 2005) sets out its functions in 
S.8. 
120
 Ibid, Article 137. The Judicature (Fundamental Rights and Freedoms) (Enforcement Procedure) 
Rules, Statutory Instruments 13-13, 13-14, and 13-15 stipulate the procedure for interpretation of the 
constitution. 
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Although constitutional human rights jurisprudence is emerging, the challenge is 
to develop home grown African jurisprudence to strengthen norm enforcement.
121
 From 
the early 1990s, academics criticised the lacklustre performance on human rights issues 
by a Ugandan judiciary, historically constrained by a „doctrine of judicial „restraint‟ 
rather than judicial „activism‟.122 Failure to take the initiative was viewed by some as 
indicating a lack of appreciation by the judiciary of the importance of interpreting 
statutory law from a human rights perspective.
123
 
Gradually the Ugandan courts became active in interpreting the scope and effect 
of substantive human rights law in „traditional‟ punishments like witchcraft as 
happened in Abuki‟s case. As we saw previously in Abuki, the Supreme Court held that 
banishment under the Witchcraft Act was incompatible with Article 24 of the 
constitution that prohibits cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment and Article 26 (2) 
that protects the right to property. Furthermore, banishment was grossly 
disproportionate with the seriousness of the offence.
124
 I do not fault this reasoning, but 
note that the Supreme Court did not apply the peremptory terms of Article 126 (1) in 




Abuki’s decision, in my view, shows that Uganda‟s jurisprudence has not 
developed a systematic engagement with the human rights question of clan court 
sentences. By this I mean that the court did not draw on sentencing principles implicit 
both in international human rights law and communitarian values. Had they done so, 
the court could have established that both systems protect individual rights by 
proscribing banishment. For instance, the lower court record shows that Abuki pleaded 
guilty before officials including the clan chief, and was fined the witchdoctor‟s costs 
                                                 
121
 C. Heyns and F. Viljoen, „The Regional Projection of Human rights in Africa: in P. T Zeleza and P. J 
McConnaughay (eds.) (2004) op cit 132. 
122
 J. Oloka-Onyango, „Judicial Power and Constitutionalism in Uganda‟ in M. Mamdani and J. Oloka-
Onyango, (eds.) Uganda: Studies in Living Conditions, Popular Movements, and Constitutionalism, (JEP 
& CBR: Kampala, 1994) 50-55. 
123
 L. T. Ekirikubinza, „The Judiciary and Enforcement of Human Rights: Between Judicial Activism and 
Judicial Restraint‟ (2002) 8 (2) EAJPHR 145-173, 171-172.  She argues that a human rights 
interpretation of statutory law does not mean the courts are seeking to supplant the role of the legislature 
or the executive, but are acting in pursuit of constitutionalism. 
124
 Attorney General v S. Abuki Constitutional App. No. 1 of 1998 (SC) op cit discussed in Ch.6 S.6 (i) 
and Ch. 7 S. 3(ii) op cit. There, Kanyeihamba G. JSC, at 354-356 and Mulenga J. JSC, at 348-349, point 
out that constitutional protection of human dignity through prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment did not exist when the 1957 Witchcraft Act was passed.   
125
 Ibid. For example, Wambuzi, W. CJ, at 269-272, relied on the Canadian case of Osborne v Queen and 
2 others [1991] DLR 321 in arriving at his decision. Neither counsel for either side based their arguments 
on Article 126(1). 
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and a cow. This fine was restorative and arguably in conformity with traditional 
punishments of the Langi ethnic group whence the case originated.
126
  
In my view, this was an opportunity for the Supreme Court to give dicta by which 
opposing normative standards could be reconciled. A legal tool at the judge‟s disposal 
was gratis dictum that includes a court‟s discussion of issues not raised by the record.127 
Alternatively the court could use obiter dictum and make a non-essential judicial 
comment while delivering a judgement.
128
 Smit and Ashworth also make a compelling 
argument for the use of a reasonable hypothetical case by the courts in determining 
whether a sentencing law is unconstitutional or contrary to human rights.
129
 The court 
could use any of these three options to address the question of tensions that arise among 
traditional laws of other ethnic groups. For example, the Jopadhola regard banishment 
from the village or clan, as protection for the community from such anti-social crimes. 
Such views run contrary to the Abuki decision and substantive human rights law 
because banishment violates individual rights. Reconciling such conflicting aims of 
punishment would necessitate mitigating divergent normative standards. The court‟s 
narrow approach, however, thwarts any such mitigation. A similar legalistic approach 
was adopted in defining procedural rights in mandatory sentencing that I discuss next.  
 
(ii) Distinguishing normative context: procedural rights in sentencing 
 
In 2003, the first ever petition for recognition of procedural rights in mandatory 
sentencing was filed before the Constitutional Court in Sarah Kigula and others v 
Attorney General. One of the issues before the court was whether a mandatory sentence 
of death denies a defendant a fair hearing on sentence contrary to Article 28(1).
130
  The 
majority of the court per Okello JA., held that the sentencing procedure in Section 98 
TIA was „(…) repugnant to the principle of equality before the law and fair trial‟ 
                                                 
126
 This evidence of prosecution witnesses 1 and 3 is in the lower court record of Uganda v Salvatorio 
Abuki Magistrate court case 109/95. The Supreme Court ibid at 278, made a passing reference to the 
lower court record, but no mention is made of the clan punishment of reimbursing the witchdoctor‟s costs 
and a cow. 
127
 B. Garner (ed.), Black’s Law Dictionary (2004) op cit 485.  
128
 Ibid, 1102. 
129
 D. Smit and A. Ashworth „Disproportionate Sentences as Human Rights Violations‟ (2004) 67 (4) 
Modern Law Review 451-560, 557-559. 
130
Sarah Kigula and 416 others v Attorney General of Uganda Constitutional Petition No. 6 of 2003. 
Lead judgement of G. Okello, JA of 10
th
 June 2005 at page 25 with A. Twinomujuni, JA and C. 
Byamugisha, JA concurring; and A. Bahigeine, JA and S. Kavuuma, JA dissenting. The petition 
challenged the legality of the death penalty stating that it represents a violation of the right to life. 
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because Section 98 does not permit the convict to be heard in mitigation before 
sentencing. Further, the court is not permitted to inform itself on the appropriateness of 
the sentence.
131
 Okello pointed out that the term „fair trial‟ is not defined in the 
constitution and in any case the elements of a fair hearing are not exhaustively listed in 
Article 28. For instance, the right to be heard in mitigation before sentence, the right of 
the court to make inquiries before passing sentence and the right to determine the 
appropriateness of sentence are absent.
132
 The court declared that provisions of all 
principal legislation that prescribe mandatory sentences are inconsistent with Article 
28. It also ordered that offenders be accorded a hearing in mitigation on mandatory 
sentence, and that trial courts should exercise their discretion on whether or not to 
confirm a mandatory sentence.
133
  
In 2009, the Supreme Court in Attorney General v Susan Kigula and others 
upheld the decision of the Constitutional Court in part. The majority held that a 
petitioner must be granted a right to be heard on a mandatory sentence.
134
 The judgment 
is a victory for international human rights only, for as I argue below; it fails to develop 
jurisprudence on the integration of communitarian values. This is because the principles 
of constitutional interpretation were not applied in the normative context of Article 
126(1).  
Principles of constitutional interpretation are found in the constitution and 
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. The most important 
principle is in Article 126 (1).
135
 Other principles include social justice and a liberal 
approach of the court as set out in Tinyefunza’s case.136 The courts are exhorted to be 
                                                 
131
 Ibid, 39-40. The detailed text of S.98 TIA is in S. 2 (i) above. 
132
 Ibid, 34.  
133
 Ibid, 62-63.  
134
Attorney General of Uganda v Susan Kigula and 416 others, S. C. Constitutional Appeal No. 3 of 
2006, Judgment of 21
st
 January 2009 at page 45, per B. Odoki, CJ, J. Tsekoko JSC, J. Mulenga JSC, G. 
Kanyeihamba JSC, B. Katureebe JSC, and C. Kitumba Ag, JSC, with Egonda-Ntende Ag. JSC, 
dissenting. 
135
 I exclude „aspirations of the people‟ under Article 126(1) from my analysis. Other principles not 
analysed here include: the widest construction to be given to ordinary meaning of the words; and a 
written constitution prevails over precedent, practice and unwritten conventions: per Okello 9-10; per 
Twinomujuni 7-9 and per Bahigeine at 6 in Sarah Kigula op cit.  
136
 Social justice is found in constitution op cit Preambular para. 3.  In David Tinyefunza v Attorney 
General Constitutional Petition No. 1 of 1996, it was held that the approach of the court should be: 
„dynamic, progressive and liberal or flexible, keeping in view ideals of the people, socio-economic and 
political-cultural values so as to extend the benefit of the same to the maximum possible.‟- judgment of 
S. Manyindo DCJ, at 16. Also in constitutional petition of Zachary Olum vs Attorney General 
Constitutional Petition No. 6 of 1999, A. Twinomujuni JA, at 4, held that the Bill of rights needs to be 
interpreted in light of the social, historical context of „Uganda‟s constitutional instability and chequered 
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adventurous by Ugandan scholars. Some like Walubiri, want a „reinvigorated‟ judiciary 
ready to moderate a „rigid‟ state law and translate Article 126(1) into human rights 
jurisprudence using international instruments as an aid to construction.
137
 Others like 
Tumwine-Mukubwa maintain that the broad constitutional mandate in Article 126 can 
only be achieved by an activist court that acknowledges its powers in making laws is 
within constitutional limits where constitutional interpretation involves applying 
constitutional values.
138
   
While I agree with both views, I argue that Article 126(1) also denotes traditional 
values and norms as constitutional values and an aid to construction. Communitarian 
values are intrinsic to traditional normative standards and arguably form part of social 
justice and the socio-economic, politico-cultural values referred to in Tinyefunza‟s case. 
Therefore communitarian values are constitutional values within the context of Article 
126(1). Also as Murungi argues, social cohesion is intrinsic to the construction of 
African jurisprudence that views human beings in their social setting. This is because 
African traditional law recognises the communal connotation of being a person. 
Adopting such a communal connotation would avoid a derivative conception of 
jurisprudence that only investigates legal rules both substantive and procedural.
139
  
The courts have not used a pluralist approach to the interpretation of Article 126 
(1): one that would protect procedural rights while applying the communal connotation 
of a person. Rather, they adopt a strict terminological interpretation using the „ordinary 
and plain meaning‟ of the words in the statute.140 Consequently, the reasoning of the 
constitutional court reveals a narrow legalist approach. For instance, Twinomujuni only 
considered the first part of Article 126 (1) stating that exercise of judicial power must 
be in conformity with the law.
141
 Okello adopted a more moderate approach. He agreed 
that values and norms of the people must be considered, but cautioned that the spirit of 
the constitution must not be „compromised‟. Okello rightly held that a death sentence in 
the context of Article 22 (1) must follow a fair trial, which means hearing both sides. 
He then considered Article 126(1) in light of the principle of separation of powers, 
                                                                                                                                                    
history on human rights‟. Other case law includes: AG v Tinyefunza Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 1997 
and P.K. Ssemogerere and another v AG Constitutional Petition No. 3 of 2000. 
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 Sarah Kigula petition op cit, per Okello at 19. 
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 Ibid, per Twinomujuni at 45-46. 
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viewing mandatory sentencing as an intrusion on the powers of the judiciary to 
adjudicate. For Byamugisha, strict adherence to the principle of independence of the 
judiciary presupposes that courts are not to be guided by legislative provisions that 
deprive courts of the independence in exercising their judicial power.
142
 Twinomujuni‟s 
pronouncements aptly surmise the court‟s view:  
„[It] should be clear (…) that sentencing is a judicial function and not a 
legislative function. (…) the 1995 constitution in Article 126 prescribes the only 
limits to the exercise of judicial power and the legislature must now learn to 
trust that judges have enough sense of responsibility to bear in mind Article 126 
when considering whether to impose a death sentence or not.‟143   
 
Clearly the exercise of judicial power is viewed in the context of conformity with 
the law and not norms and values of the people. In her dissenting judgment, Bahigeine 
reasoned that the court looks at circumstances including „widely-held societal norms, 
values and aspirations‟ that she regarded as public opinion.144 Public opinion, she 
reasoned, is no substitute for the duty of the court to interpret the constitution and 
uphold its provisions. She agreed with the Attorney General‟s submission that in 
passing sentence, a court exercises a value judgment as to contemporary norms and 
aspirations to adhere to „a consensus of values in the civilised international community 
of which Uganda is a part‟.145 However, Bahigeine did not pursue this line of reasoning 
in coming to her decision that there was no need for specific rights in mandatory 
sentencing. Moreover, the constitutional court did not search for evidence or literature 
of these societal norms and values.  
 The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Constitutional Court on the 
interpretation of Article 126 (1). The judges reasoned that where the death sentence is 
„pre-ordained‟ by the legislature, this compromises the principle of a fair trial.146 In 
their opinion, Section 98 TIA that prohibits a defendant sentenced to death from 
making a statement in mitigation is inconsistent with the principle of equality under the 
law. Section 98 also contradicts Section 94 that appears to permit any accused person to 
present mitigation factors before sentence is passed. The judges reiterated that the entire 
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 Ibid, per Byamugisha at 28-29. 
143 Ibid, per Twinomujuni at 46. 
144
 Ibid, Dissenting Judgment of A. Bahigeine of 10
th
 June 2005 page 6. Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. 
Katende, argued that court should not base itself on public opinion.  
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These arguments are legally sound. However, both the Constitutional Court and 
the Supreme Court failed to distinguish the normative context in which the law is 
applied. In my view Article 126 (1) combines two normative contexts: the law 
(national) then norms, values (and aspirations) of the people (traditional). To interpret 
Article 126(1) in the normative context means the courts ought to view the traditional 
restorative justice model as representing people‟s norms and values within a social 
setting. This setting is based on a communal connotation of being a person. By 
concentrating on interpretation of rights within the context of administration of justice 
only, the courts did not consider Article 126(1) in the societal context as protecting an 
individual‟s rights within the communal connotation of being a person. This may be, as 
Bahigeine‟s judgment shows, because the judges equated norms and values to public 
opinion.  
The courts also did not approach Article 126(1) in light of cultural values, as 
required by the Tinyefunza decision. Also no reference was made to Articles 17 and 27 
in the African Charter, or it‟s associated Guidelines, on duties, traditional and cultural 
values. This may be because unwritten traditional criminal law is prohibited by Article 
28 (12) of the constitution. Still, a distinction could be made between unwritten 
traditional law, and the informal participatory process for adjudicating cases. The fruits 
of an informal participatory process can be treated as circumstantial evidence as the 
Obua case shows. Moreover, participatory process is alluded to in Article 37 on the 
right to practice culture. Neither the Obua case, nor Article 37 was drawn upon by the 
courts to attempt a reconciliation of the normative frameworks. 
 With regards to social justice, only a cursory point was made by Okello about it 
being a principle of interpretation.
148
 No further mention was made of it. Nor did the 
courts, interpret Article 126 (1) in light of clause (2) where the courts must inter alia, 
award adequate compensation and promote reconciliation in adjudication of criminal 
matters.
149
 Article 126 (2) resonates with communitarian values of restitution and 
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reconciliation. By drawing on these similarities, the court using a pluralist approach 
could arguably have created a richer jurisprudence that defined an African notion of 
procedural rights in sentencing. This would have included interactive characteristics of 
the participatory approach as part of social justice. 
I acknowledge this task is not straightforward because, as I argued previously, 
doctrinal constructions do not take into account traditional justice issues. Firstly 
interpreting human rights is based on seeking redress in the court of law.
150
 Secondly, 
despite the canons of construction discussed above, courts adopt a legalistic approach 
based on a strict adherence to the doctrine of precedent. I turn to this next. 
 
(iii) Applying Stare Decisis  
 
Stare Decisis (let the decision stand), the basis of the doctrine of judicial 
precedent, is one method by which the translators (judges) interpret legal principles or 
explain how a procedural rule or system ought to work in different structural models 
(institutions).
151
  By so doing, judges could reconcile these divergent paradigms. 
The Supreme Court in Kigula did not rely on any precedents in arriving at their 
decision on procedural rights in sentencing. The Constitutional Court on its part, noted 
that decisions from foreign jurisdictions with similar constitutions are helpful in 
interpretation. Equally, decisions of international courts and international human rights 
bodies are relevant to the interpretation of rights and freedoms.
152
 For example, Okello 
in his judgment, quoted in extensuo from two foreign judgements: Mithu v State of 
Punjab and Soering v UK, to support his argument that for a person facing a mandatory 
sentence, the procedure must be fair and reasonable.
153
 In her dissenting judgment, 
Bahigeine JA., reasoned that a court may seek direction from other common law 
jurisdictions. She also observed that foreign decisions relied upon in the lead judgement 
were from countries with no equivalent of Article 126.
154
 Despite her correct 
observation, Bahigeine still relied entirely on the Indian decision in Surja Ran v State of 
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Rajanshan as precedent. She used it to support her argument that punishment should be 
fair, should take into account rights of victims to have the assailant punished, and meet 
society‟s reasonable expectation for appropriate punishment.155 
This strict adherence to precedent has evolved since the colonial era. Following 
the abolition of native courts, customary law had to be proved as a question of fact. The 
view was taken that it would be incorrect for superior courts to treat decisions of local 
courts as binding on them.
156
 This approach was the reverse of the „inverted‟ doctrine 
where on matters of customary law, if an established decision of the lowest native court 
was the only one available on the point, and was not barbarous or against natural 
justice, then it was binding on the highest court or even the Privy Council.
157
 Uganda‟s 
independence government hoped (mistakenly as it turned out) that customary law 
would gradually wither away. This is why there was no move to restate or attempt to 
unify customary law as happened in neighbouring Tanzania and Kenya.
158
   
Heyns and Viljoen rightly observe that there remains a test for African courts to 
develop indigenous human rights jurisprudence and not merely rely on precedents from 
western jurisdictions without testing their applicability to local conditions.
159
 Others 
like Paul, describe judges as incapable of “escaping the tyranny of the kind of narrow, 
legalistic and positivistic outlook that has too often characterised the jurisprudence of 
African courts, and that is antithetical to the growth of rights.”160 Ugandan courts 
clearly adopt a narrow legalistic outlook, relying on precedents from western, even 
African jurisdictions, but not adequately testing their appropriateness for the local 
context. The problem therefore is the uncritical application of foreign precedents, the 
upshot of which is a failure to apply Article 126 (1) to shape Ugandan jurisprudence.   
Consider the treatment by the Supreme Court of the celebrated Makwanyane 
case, where the South African constitutional court declared that the death penalty was 
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 The judges rightly considered Makwanyane as a good precedent for 
the abolition of the death sentence in situations where a constitution does not expressly 
proscribe it. This is the case in South Africa.
162
 But the judges did not consider 
Makwanyane as setting a precedent on constitutional interpretation of norms and values 
in a traditional normative context. Yet, crucially in Makwanyane, the South African 
court aligned itself with Ubuntu values in abolishing the death penalty.
163
 It did so by 
creatively „translating‟ Ubuntu (which was not defined in the Interim constitution) as a 
constitutional value, using principles of interpretation under Section 35 of the South 
African constitution.
164
 The court per J. Mokgoro was of the view that Section 35 
recognised the „paucity of home grown judicial precedent upholding human rights‟, and 
that indigenous value systems were a premise on which the court could proceed.
165
 
Mokgoro accentuated that such enduring values are not the same as fluctuating public 
opinions that even if collected on a scientific basis, may be prejudiced or 
uninformed.
166
 She justified the importance of an all inclusive values system as a 
foundation on which to develop human rights jurisprudence encompassing Ubuntu: 
„Although South Africans have a history of deep divisions (…), „one shared 
value and ideal that runs like a golden thread across cultural lines is the value 
of Ubuntu-a notion now coming to be generally articulated in this country.‟167 
 
Sachs, J, developed this argument further.
168
 In his view, the function of the 
constitutional court is „to pay due regard to the values of all sections of society and not 
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confine ourselves to the values of one portion only, however exalted or subordinate it 
might have been in the past.‟169 In his interpretation of Section 35, the court had to refer 
to the common law and traditional African jurisprudence. This was obiter dictum 
because although materials were presented in the search for values consistent with the 
text and spirit of the constitution, these matters were not properly canvassed in the court 
by Ms Davids – Amicus Curiae. In a detailed critique of African research, Sachs 
underscored the importance of acknowledging adjudicatory systems based on rational 
procedures that were well entrenched in traditional societies.
170
  
Sachs nonetheless placed a caveat on recognition of traditional African law and 
procedures. He rejected an automatic adoption of aspects of traditional law that are 
inconsistent with freedom and equality, suggesting instead an ascription to those that 
enrich the fundamental rights in the constitution: the „rational and humane adjudicatory 
approach.‟171 The main weakness with Sach‟s reasoning is in not specifying who will 
discard or develop such aspects and values of traditional African law to ensure 
compatibility with the constitutional principles. Be that as it may, he gives some 
tentative suggestions for a judicial approach to drawing on positive values and 
mitigating the negatives in traditional law.
172
 
Some points for consideration arise. Firstly, although the Uganda constitution has 
no equivalent of Section 35, the latter is in pari materia with the principles of 
constitutional interpretation enunciated by Uganda‟s Constitutional Court. Secondly, 
Article 126 is more concise than Section 35 as it refers specifically to values and norms. 
Therefore a need for conceptualisation of these terms arises. In this regard, the speeches 
in Makwayane contain dicta relevant to an exploration of this conceptualisation. 
Thirdly, Mokgoro makes the important point that values are not the same as fluctuating 
public opinions that may be prejudiced or uninformed. Communal values discussed in 
Chapter 2, underpin normative frameworks within which the traditional restorative 
justice model operates. Public opinion is not the normative framework by which a 
society is governed, although arguably, not all public opinion is irrelevant. For instance, 
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there is anecdotal evidence in Uganda‟s Criminal Justice Baseline Survey 2002 that the 
study participants in Tororo district were completely opposed to the death penalty, 
arguing that it is a violation of human rights.
173
 Such public opinion was not relied on 
by the Ugandan courts in the Kigula cases.  
As Anderson puts forth, local values like Ubuntu have the potential to influence 
development of jurisprudence. Elsewhere, Mokgoro argues that for a legitimate law to 
be created for South Africa, it is crucial that cultural experiences must be integrated 
with legal notions and techniques.
174
 I agree with both views which, in my opinion, 
apply with equal force to Uganda‟s legal situation.  
A valid explanation for the uncritical application of precedent is the legal 
requirement for courts to try only those issues canvassed before them. Since the issues 
in the Sarah Kigula cases were on national law only, then it follows that the judges‟ 
reasons are in order. Further, with the abolition of traditional criminal law, the judges 
cannot rely on an „illegal‟ system to seek answers. To do so would render the 
judgments per incuriam and of no legal significance. Another plausible reason is the 
absence of academic scholarship.  
(iv) Lack of academic input 
 
The paucity of Ugandan academic research on a traditional notion of rights in 
sentencing is both a reflection of the narrow outlook of the courts and lack of academic 
scholarship in the area. During my field interviews, I established that the Chief Justice 
and other judges were very knowledgeable about the significance of clan courts and 
their jurisdiction.
175
 Yet curiously, the president of the Judicial Officers Association 
told me that judicial officers lack a „reading culture‟176 which may explain the non 
reliance on academic work in their judgments. To illustrate: both the Sarah Kigula 
judgments lack any reference to Ugandan or African academic scholarship, yet a 
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Equally, some judges decried the dearth of academic scholarship on traditional 
clan law.
178
 I verified this complaint by searching unsuccessfully for recent doctoral 
and masters of laws theses in this area.
179
 The academics, though, were very supportive 
of my research.
180
 This lack of initiative may be attributed to the nature of legal training 
that is biased towards adversarial trials, little academic interest in developments of 
contemporary traditional law as contrasted with recent transitional justice issues, and 
lack of funding for research in universities.
181
 A detailed discussion of these factors 
falls outside the scope of this thesis.  
      To summarise, Uganda‟s state practice raises some challenges for the ICC on the 
application of principles of national law using precedent. The challenges involve 
negotiating gaps in national legislation, distinguishing the normative context in which 
the law is applied, avoiding a deferral to precedent from „enlightened‟ legal systems 
and adopting a broad interpretation within narrow confines of statutes. It is too early to 
tell how the ICC would interpret issues of communitarian values within traditional 
justice in response to Kony‟s objections. I predict such issues will come up in situations 
like Uganda, where as Drumbl puts it, the ICC becomes an option of „exit‟ in which 
complex processes of justice are „externalised onto a foreign entity‟.182 
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Section 5: Conclusion 
 
This chapter has attempted to explain the salutary lessons that state practice 
provides for the ICC concerning how to draw on convergence and mitigate divergence 
between two incongruent normative frameworks. Challenges include the lack of 
appropriate sentencing guidance due to the illegal status of clan courts and lack of 
supportive legislation and case law. Uganda‟s antiquated procedural rules also fail to 
engage the victim, offender and community and do not take into account other sets of 
values legitimate to local communities. Worse still, sentencing reforms and case law on 
procedural rights in sentencing do not accommodate traditional restorative process. 
Crucially, international procedural rights and communitarian values are not fully 
protected in the sentencing process, so their influence is minimised. 
 Uganda‟s constitution has no definitive African concept of procedural rights. It does 
not protect duties or cultural values or even rights of others as required by the African 
Charter. For instance, the constitution has no provisions obliging traditional courts to 
protect individual rights during the trial. This lacuna is due to the turbulent history 
evidenced in the evolution of the Bill of Rights. What that development does not 
reflect, is a sense that traditional values should be incorporated into legal process. 
Ultimately, Article 28 proscribes clan courts‟ unwritten laws. Also Article 37 only 
gives an individual the right to practice culture, but does not protect communitarian 
values referred to tangentially in the cultural objectives of the constitution as „cultural 
values‟. The tension between these two articles is exacerbated by the lack of confluence 
with traditional law on participatory rights for victims and the community.  
  By adopting a wider construction of rights, national courts could arguably aid the 
ICC (and other international tribunals) by providing African jurisprudence and 
guidance on how to reconcile international with national laws to ensure fair, culturally 
relevant sentencing outcomes. This opportunity was missed in the Sarah Kigula cases, 
where the superior courts did not adopt a more radical interpretation of Article 126 (1). 
This „omission‟ arises from normative rigidity in constitutional interpretation. Such 
rigidity prevents an audit of the transformation of structures and doctrine during 
transplantation, along the lines of that adopted briefly by Sachs, J in the Makwanyane 
case.  
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The ICC will need to move beyond state practice in order to find out how to 
achieve an appropriate type of normative reconciliation between the two procedural 
models. This requires a more flexible, theoretical and pragmatic approach that permits 
consideration of when traditional restorative justice may be appropriate (and when not) 
and for what stage of the sentencing process. This culminates into one main issue which 
is this. To achieve an effective procedural rights approach to sentencing, there is need 
for a theoretical model within which such changes to procedural approach can be made. 
The changes must be based on a pluralist interpretation of rights within this restructured 
theoretical model. This will be discussed in the next chapter as part of my concluding 
remarks.  
----- 
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CHAPTER NINE: TOWARDS A TRANSLATION THEORETICAL 
MODEL IN SENTENCING 
 
In seeking to reconcile international sentencing outcomes with values of localized 
communities through an application of procedural rights, this thesis addressed two 
questions. The first question was whether the ICC could make its sentencing outcomes 
more legitimate in the traditional African context. The thesis then considered the 
question of how such legitimacy could be achieved. Key to the inquiry was the 
divergent interests between the international and traditional procedural models. 
 These interests fall in two broad areas. First, at the structural level, the traditional 
process-oriented model conflicts with the international procedure-oriented model. For 
instance, the participatory approach is at variance with the judge controlled approach. 
Second, at the doctrinal level, international criminal procedure is premised only on 
protection of individual rights contained in international instruments.
1
 Yet individual 
procedural rights based on principles of autonomy and equality, stand in 
contradistinction to communitarian values of duty to kin, restitution, reconciliation, and 
the role of ritual. For example, the right to legal representation conflicts with the 
communitarian duty to protect kin. This shows that protection of communitarian values 
in the ICC sentencing framework remains problematic. Ultimately, we need 
international sentencing norms to relate to the local context in order to gain domestic 
validity. 
In order to fulfil its objective of engendering respect for international criminal 
justice, I argued that the ICC needs to be more accommodative of distinct features of 
African restorative justice, and apply procedural rights as a normative bridge between 
the two models. The thesis has tested these arguments against the two frameworks. The 
results show that there are lessons to be drawn from the operation of clan courts’ de 
facto sentencing regime. Furthermore, there is a pressing need for a theoretical model 
on which to build a normative bridge based on a wider construct of procedural rights. 
This concluding chapter illustrates how the ICC could achieve this goal of 
reconciling competing interests using my theoretical translation model. My model will 
be useful in assessing the role of judges in the ‘Africanisation’ of international criminal 
procedure. Within current modes of legal thought it is imperative that we examine the 
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possibility that individual rights and communitarian goals could co-exist and 
complement each other in a way which would have widespread appeal (although not 
universal appeal) and protect procedural rights in sentencing. The ICC sentencing 
framework is arguably tolerant of such a plurality of ideas.  
Two broad doctrinal proposals flow from this. First, the translation model is the 
only one that takes into account modest changes in approach and sentencing practice 
that could be made by judges. Secondly, the translation model is the only one that is 
built on a liberal-communitarian notion of rights using the doctrine of precedent as a 
legal tool for interpretation. This chapter neither offers a detailed procedural framework 
nor a shopping list of practical doctrinal solutions, but only pinpoints some foundations 
for a fresh approach. 
Immediately after this introduction, I summarise the main outcomes of the 
research (Section 1). This is followed by the theoretical model set out in two sections. 
The first shows how to borrow distinct features from the Jopadhola through minor 
structural transformations (Section 2). The second shows how to apply a liberal-
communitarian approach through an adaptation of the Jopadhola notion of rights, using 
precedent (Section 3). I then offer a brief conclusion summarising my contribution to 
knowledge (Section 4).  
Section 1: Outcome of the research  
 
This section summarises the main findings of the thesis. I start by reminding 
ourselves what we have discovered so far in our audit of the procedural dichotomies 
between the two sentencing frameworks, and issues for procedural rights.   
The case of Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebel 
commanders, filed before the ICC in 2005, is discussed in Chapter 1, setting the scene 
for the thesis. LRA leaders seek to evade the paradigm of international criminal justice 
by opting for trial under traditional justice systems and national law. The rebels signed 
the 27
th
 June Agreement 2007 with the Uganda government. The Agreement and the 
19
th
 February 2008 Annexure, that received widespread national and international 
attention, reflect the parties’ efforts to address gaps in international criminal justice: 
namely the exclusion of traditional African restorative justice processes. The provisions 
on purification and reconciliation rituals signify that the Agreement is concerned 
primarily with the importance of communitarian values to traditional restorative justice. 
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The Agreement also subtly highlights the need for an appropriate traditional notion of 
procedural fairness within international sentencing procedure. The point being that 
sentencing is the phase where traditional and international frameworks strongly conflict 
each other. 
I now summarise the main findings justifying the need for reform. First, I 
established that international and traditional procedural frameworks are in tension with 
each other but do not draw on procedural rights as a normative bridge. Chapter 2 
showed how under the existing theoretical framework, this lack of perception emerges. 
At the structural level, there are opposing procedural traditions between the 
international and traditional systems. Still, the ICC could under the Rome Statute, draw 
similarity between traditional restorative features and Article 76 procedures of public 
pronouncement of sentence and reparative hearings. At the doctrinal level, lies the 
conflict between individual rights and communitarian values. Thus, human rights are 
not perceived as a normative bridge between international and traditional procedural 
frameworks. The haphazard growth of international criminal procedure and human 
rights may be partly to blame for the lack of a systematic approach to accommodate 
features of non-state systems. This exacerbates exclusion of indigenous traditional 
processes and values within it.  
In Chapter 3, the analytical debate revealed two opposing sides: the African and 
International apologists. The Africanist argument is premised on the fact that post-
traditional (African) and modern (state/international) systems cannot co-exist: one must 
supersede the other. To this end, scholars like Nahimana propose reforms to the 
existing traditional institutions like the Burundi Bashingantahe institution. This 
institution is underpinned by non-negotiable interests that form human dignity called 
Ubuntu. None of the proposals address changes in the ICC itself. Instead, the debate 
shows gaps in knowledge on lessons that could be drawn from micro-level clan 
systems. Conversely, the international apologists reject any suggestion of 
accommodating a traditional African restorative approach. Some like David Crane, a 
former Chief prosecutor at the SCSL, do not envisage how African customary 
approaches could ever substitute for international criminal procedures.
2
 Others like 
                                                 
2
 D. Crane op cit at www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial 55-56, 10/10/2005 quoted in Ch. 3 S. 4 op cit. 
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Apuuli, Drumbl, Findlay and Henham, put forth more concrete proposals on how 
traditional process could be accommodated.
3
  
The Apuuli-Drumbl-Findlay and Henham debate leaves unanswered one 
question. This is how the ICC could achieve procedural legitimacy by addressing 
incongruent normative differences such as the centrality of supernatural beliefs in 
traditional justice. In response, I propose applying my translation framework that is 
based on a liberal-communitarian theory and an adaptation of M. Langer’s translation 
model.
4
 By so doing, I provide terms of reference for analysing transformations that 
take place when divergent structures and normative standards are transferred from one 
model to the next. 
The second issue I established was that accommodating traditional restorative 
justice is problematic because international sentencing practice exhibits a degree of 
normative rigidity, excluding, as it does, participatory approach and communitarian 
values. In Chapter 4, I showed how sentencing practice of the ICTR and SCSL in 
Africa, indicate a preponderance of common law-civil law traditions and a rather 
narrow individualist construction of rights. The outcomes reflect the law’s limited 
capacity to steer social change and achieve culturally relevant sentencing process. The 
exclusion of traditional restorative justice is epitomised in Kamuhanda (ICTR) where 
Judge Maqtu ruled that there was no system in international law like the traditional 
Gacaca to put into effect reconciliation. The SCSL seems outright dismissive of African 
values and local social practices as exemplified in the Civilian Defence Forces trial. 
The evidence suggests that international and ‘mixed’ criminal tribunals have failed to 
identify ways of adopting features of the African normative system. Clearly the 
problem lies with the lack of legal guidance on how to accommodate traditional 
restorative approaches and communitarian values within the narrow context of 
international law. 
Thirdly, in Chapter 5, I showed that the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (hereafter ‘the African Charter’) and its associated Guidelines,5 fail to provide 
                                                 
3
 These are K. Apuuli’s integrated transitional justice model; M. Drumbl’s vertical-bottom up approach 
to procedure and sanction based on his cosmopolitan pluralism theory; and M. Findlay and R. Henham’s 
retributive-restorative justice model for the ICC: all analysed in Ch.1 S.3 and Ch.3 S.3 op cit. 
4
 I borrow the concept of translation wherein legal practice, legal institution or legal norm may undergo 
transformation by actors/translators within the target system: M. Langer (2004) op cit at 34-35. These 
actors include judges.   
5
 Principles and Guidelines on the right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, (2003) op cit. 
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for an African concept of procedural rights: one that melds individual rights with 
communitarian values. This arises from the wording of the Charter that is not intended 
to include communitarian values. There is also lack of clarity on the application of the 
Guidelines to traditional courts that were abolished by some African states. Part of the 
problem may be attributed to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(hereafter ‘African Commission’) itself. Its decisions do not provide guidance on the 
relationship between communitarian values and international procedural rights and how 
they may be applied ‘jointly’ as an African notion of procedural fairness. Lessons on 
such ‘joint’ applications may be gleaned from the experience of the Inter American 
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). Such experiences may shape jurisprudence of the 
newly created African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), and the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR). 
My findings now move from diagnosis to remedy. The fourth finding in Chapter 
6 was that Jopadhola clan courts have integrated features of national courts by creating 
a semi-regulatory framework, comprising the prosecutor, assessors, judges and quasi-
governmental oversight of the Local council 1 chairperson. Such adaptations have 
maintained legitimacy and social control but without compromising on traditional clan 
law. This innovative approach seems more integrative than that pursued by 
international tribunals. For example, women and youth representation within clan 
courts are non-traditional features. Their integration has done much to counter the 
criticism that customary justice often turns out, on scrutiny, to be patriarchal justice.  
Fifthly, I established that the Jopadhola notion of human rights reflects how 
internal discourse struggles to establish enlightened interpretations of cultural norms. I 
proved in Chapter 7 that clan courts have not altogether failed to apply procedural 
rights; rather they have done it through an expanded construct of human rights as an 
entitlement of all people, not just an individual. This is demonstrated in the social 
construction of roles where judicial and prosecutorial functions are shared communally 
through a participatory approach. A participatory approach is also used to mitigate 
underlying tensions with national law but without compromising communitarian 
values. The implications are that by safeguarding both communitarian values and 
individual rights using public participation, procedural guarantees like the right to 
language of choice and right to a trial without undue delay, are well protected. 
Arguably this approach achieves a fair, culturally relevant sentencing process.  
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It is worth reiterating that the Jopadhola lack a uniform prescriptive procedural 
rights framework. Rather, standard setting is done by clan courts operating independent 
from each other, from the clan governing body-Nono, the cultural institution of Tieng 
Adhola; and from the higher traditional courts. Nonetheless, there is evidence that in the 
clan courts, individual rights are sometimes abridged in preference to social 
responsibilities. This is exemplified in the lack of a right to appeal against mandatory 
purification rituals, as the courts endeavour to protect the clan from evil arising from 
crimes like incest. There is a lack of legal representation. A power imbalance in society, 
also results in lack of absolute procedural equality to women and youth.  
Sixthly, I showed how state practice provides a salutary lesson for the ICC on 
how problematic it is for courts of law to underpin the reconciliation of divergent 
sentencing paradigms using a pluralist interpretation of procedural rights. In Chapter 8, 
I analysed reasons why the ICC may find it difficult to apply principles of Uganda’s 
national law under Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute. Firstly, Uganda’s antiquated 
procedural rules fail to engage the victim, offender and community in sentencing. 
Secondly, Uganda’s jurisprudence on sentencing principles fails to take into account 
other sets of values legitimate to local communities. Thirdly, the Bill of Rights has no 
definitive African concept of procedural rights. It does not protect duties, traditional 
and cultural values or rights of others as required by the African Charter. This lacuna is 
due to the turbulent history of the evolution of the Bill of Rights. 
Finally, I established the failure by international, regional and national courts to 
use precedent as a tool of integration. In Chapter 4, I show how the ICTR and SCSL are 
bogged down by an unimaginative application of precedent. The same criticism applies 
to the African Commission. In Chapter 5, I argue that it remains a matter of speculation 
whether the newly operational ACHPR will depart from the approach of the African 
Commission, and apply precedent creatively so as to adopt a wider construction of 
procedural rights. National courts have fared no better. As illustrated in the Sarah 
Kigula cases in Chapter 8, Uganda’s superior courts failed to apply precedent in such a 
way as to adopt a more expansive construction of Article 126(1) of the constitution. Yet 
Article 126(1) creates space for the continued operation of African customary law at 
some level within the court structure of Uganda. As H. Friman cautions, uncertainty 
will arise where new international procedural systems set up to handle issues arising in 
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a special nationalised context, are challenged by lack of precedents.
6
 Uganda is a good 
test case of how this uncertainty will play out in practice, as there is nothing to suggest 
that reconciliation between traditional and International notion of procedural norms is 
on the cards. 
In sum, international sentencing frameworks have not considered distinctive 
features of traditional restorative process that separate the two systems. As a result, 
theoretical issues concerning the integration of communitarian values have not been 
addressed. In the next section, I show how in seeking to reconcile these paradigms, the 
ICC could achieve local procedural legitimacy using a translation theoretical model.   
Section 2: Synthesis in sentencing practice: borrowing from the Jopadhola  
 
The first part of my model may be used to accommodate distinctive legitimate 
features of clan courts. Langer’s model is instructive on how small structural changes to 
judges’ disposition (procedural approach) could promote social fairness. Crucially, the 
ICC needs to build on similarity while mitigating divergence, subject to human rights 
concerns. This means the judges’ ought to communicate effectively with the 
community about when such traditional features may be applicable under international 
procedures, or not. The Akayesu case as we saw in Chapter 4, demonstrates the strength 
of the international system in overcoming ‘cultural’ divides. 
For a start, the ICC could easily build on similarity with traditional process, 
specifically the public pronouncement of sentence and giving reasons in the decision 
under Article 76(4), and Article 74 (2) and (5): Rome Statute. Both features are a 
source of strength, in terms of explaining the sentencing decisions to the public and 
resonate somewhat with the traditional participatory approach.  
In mitigating divergence, the sentencing phase poses one human rights concern. 
As Zappala points out, international judges lack specific guidance on how to determine 
an appropriate sentence. He opines that judges may have to rely on a diverse set of 
factors that may lead to inequality of treatment among defendants.
7
 While I agree with 
Zappala, his views mirrors the challenges the ICC could face in ensuring equality of 
treatment for all parties to an African conflict, specifically if it applies a participatory 
approach to deliberation of sentence. Based on my discussions throughout the thesis, I 
                                                 
6
 H. Friman (2004) op cit 355-356. 
7
 S. Zappala, op cit 252. 
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now give three worked examples demonstrating how the ICC could accommodate a 
traditional notion of equal participation, without compromising on international due 
process safeguards.  
First of all, the ICC Trial Chamber needs to be innovative in their interpretation 
of Rule 143, by recognising the parties’ and community’s right to participate or 
interject sua sponte during sentencing hearings. This approach would signify a 
willingness on the part of the ICC to be impartial in a traditional sense. However, 
Benda-Beckmann has shown that judges could not reproduce a traditional type of court 
even where they were fully aware of the norms and processes applied by the locals.
8
 To 
circumvent this problem, the Trial Chamber could borrow the concept of a judge as a 
chairman (Won Komi) from the Jopadhola clan court models. Thus, the ICC would 
apply social fairness by permitting interjections suo sponte from all present, on the 
choice of sentence. The ICC would still apply legal fairness by protecting individual 
rights. Such approach would command public confidence especially for cases with 
mystical connotations, but does require attitude change, self restraint and acceptance of 
fallibility on the part of judges, to succeed.  
A different procedural approach is likely for the deliberation of sentence in the 
Appeals Chamber, whose remit is to make a finding on whether trial proceedings were 
unfair in any way that affected reliability of sentence, or the sentence was affected by 
procedural error.
9
  Moreover, appeal proceedings must be in writing unless the 
Chamber decides to convene a hearing.
10
 Written pleadings are contrary to traditional 
review process like that of the Jopadhola, where deliberations are open to the public 
and parties alike. Although the Appeals Chamber may convene a hearing, it is 
questionable to what extent it can permit parties and the community to deliberate the 
sentence. What may be possible is for the judges to accept written submissions from the 
communities on the sentence, perhaps through amicus curiae.
11
 While this is not the 
same as a participatory hearing, it signifies the willingness of the Appeals Chamber to 
engage with the local community through consideration of their written views.  
A second option is to borrow the Jo-Gem concept of inviting a government 
official in a quasi judicial capacity to advise the clan court on matters of law. This 
                                                 
8
 F. V Benda-Beckmann op cit 29 and note 6 citing for instance G. R. Woodman’s study of the 
application of customary law in state courts in Nigeria and Ghana (1985).  
9
 Rome Statute, op cit, Article 83 (2).  
10
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC, (ICC RPE) op cit, Rule 156 (3). 
11
 Ibid, Rule 103. S. Williams and H. Woolaver ‘The Role of the Amicus Curiae before International 
Tribunals’ (2006) 6 International Criminal Law Review 151-189, 151-154, 181-182 on the ICC. 
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would take care of the challenge that individualisation of sentence raises.
12
 
Individualisation of sentence, some argue, constrains the sentencing judge’s 
discretionary powers to promote consequentialist objectives.
13
 The ICC could still 
promote consequentialist objectives by inviting clan court officials under Article 76 (2) 
and (3) to advise on traditional process, punishments and accompanying rituals. Some 
clan leaders are retired senior civil servants who could easily adapt to the court 
atmosphere and take on this role. Being bi-lingual they could better articulate the 
community’s interests in the sentencing outcome.14  
In order to better protect the right to language of choice, modest changes could be 
made under Article 50(3). There, at the request of any party to proceedings, a language 
other than English or French could be used as the language of the court. Adopting 
Article 50(3) for sentencing hearings would depend entirely on the availability of 
judges, lawyers and other court officials who speak the local language fluently. The 
Jopadhola for instance, though one of Uganda’s smaller ethnic groups, have over 15 
practising lawyers who speak fluent Dhupadhola;
15
 and Kony was able to marshal a 
legal team of 3 Acoli lawyers- fluent in Acoli, almost immediately.
16
 The position with 
the ICC is more complex as its composition is international- there is only one Ugandan 
male judge: D. Nsereko.
17
 Therefore this option may only be feasible for international 
hybrid tribunals like the SCSL. 
Thirdly, on the issue of equality of representation, we saw how the Morwa Guma 
clan achieve this by reserving posts for women and youth representatives on the court. 
The recruitment of women into the ICC represents advancement in women rights. Out 
                                                 
12
 S. Zappala op cit defines the right to an individualised sentence to include determination of factors that 
affect sentence while protecting the principle of individual criminal responsibility. 
13
 R. Henham (2005) op cit 84. 
14
 Mr. N Odoi, a former Ambassador, former Permanent Secretary and former UNESCO Board 
Executive member is one of the highest qualified clan court officials among the Jopadhola. He was not 
among my study participants since he is from Budama South, but I met him informally in August 2006 
and he expressed support for this idea.  
15
 Uganda Law Society Register of practising lawyers at www.uls.or.ug/pdf/Members_Directory.pdf 
visited on 5/06/2008. This register excludes Judges, Magistrates, State Attorneys, and other enrolled 
lawyers who are not members of the Law Society (the equivalent of a Ugandan Bar Association). 
Members of Uganda’s legal profession, are to a large extent fluent in their local languages- some are bi-
lingual, others are even multi-lingual.  
16
 Ayena Adongo, A. Owiny-Dollo and N. Mao were among the first lawyers to get involved in initial 
LRA- Government negotiations. These lawyers no longer represent Kony’s interests.  
17
 Details of the judges can be found on the website of the ICC, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Chambers/The+Judges/The+Judges+++Biographical+Notes.
htm visited on 5/05/2009. 
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of a total of 18 judges, 9 are women with 4 from Africa.
18
 However, no ICC judge can 
be classified as youth, say between the age of 18 – 30, and this is not likely to change in 
the future. Yet youth representation is a distinctive feature of clan courts of which the 
ICC should take cognisance. The ICC could through effective communication explain 
why youth cannot sit on the ICC- primarily due to lack of required legal expertise. 
Better still, the ICC could invite youth to participate as ‘interested’ persons under 
Article 76 (3).  
These changes influence protection of the right to a trial without undue delay. 
Admittedly, granting every person locus standi in judicio during sentencing hearings, 
like the Jopadhola clan courts do, may inadvertently lengthen the trial. Still, the overall 
addition (of say 1 hour) is miniscule, given that it is during sentencing that the need to 
accommodate local procedural interests is greatest. Moreover, a strict application of 
Rule 101 ICC RPE that permits the ICC to set time limits to ensure a fair trial would be 
a welcome development. Additionally, Rule 100(1) RPE permits the ICC to hold trials 
in any state.
19
 Holding trials at the locus criminis reduces completion times, thereby 
enhancing procedural legitimacy of international trials.  
Finally, the ICC could adopt a circular sitting arrangement to create a holistic 
atmosphere in which all parties feel part of the whole. This may not be feasible given 
the ‘rectangular’ sitting arrangement of the ICC. Furthermore, separating the public 
from the judges reduces further the public’s role in international justice. The ICC’s 
sitting arrangement is no different to that of other international tribunals, so achieving 
social fairness in this regard will depend largely on the judges’ ability to change their 
procedural approach. 
To surmise, building on similarity while mitigating difference through small 
structural changes, may lead to greater equality of treatment among all parties without 
compromising international procedural safeguards. These changes could resonate with 
communities like the Jopadhola whose processes lack judicial control over decision 
making. To this end, communities would appreciate the concerted effort of the ICC to 
accommodate elements of collective decision making. Of equal importance, is an 
examination of ways in which the ICC could accommodate communitarian values using 
a liberal-communitarian synthesis of rights.  
                                                 
18
 Ibid. The four women judges from Africa are Judge A. Kuenyehia (Ghana) and Judge F. Diarra (Mali) 
Judge S. M Monageng (Botswana) and Judge J. Aluoch (Kenya).  
19
 Clause 91 of Uganda’s ICC Bill op cit likewise provides for the ICC to hold trials in Uganda. 
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Section 3: Synthesis in procedural norms: Borrowing from the Jopadhola model  
 
This section discusses the second part of my theoretical model. I show how the 
ICC judges (as translators) could synthesise liberal individual rights with traditional 
communitarian values. Langer’s translation theory is helpful because it provides a 
framework within which we can take account of transformations at the doctrinal level, 
arising from transfer of legal norms. My model uses a procedural approach that leaves 
judicial discretion intact. There are two stages to this: adopting a liberal-communitarian 
theory and applying the doctrine of precedent as a tool of translation.  
(i) Applying the Liberal-Communitarian theory  
 
The Rome Statute is silent on communitarian values as a source of rights. 
Applying international human rights law under Article 21(3) Rome Statute therefore 
presents a challenge, because the ICC must give superiority to protection of individual 
rights of the defendant. Yet under traditional law, individual’s rights are subordinate to 
community interests. It is here that translation provides a solution.  
In order to apply a liberal-communitarian approach, the ICC would undertake 
three tasks. First, identify the rights that require a pluralist interpretation. Secondly, 
borrow from the relevant traditional clan law, underlying principles that have a 
common denominator with individual rights. Finally, attempt to bridge individual rights 
with communitarian values, based on the common denominator. Two worked examples 
will illustrate my point.  
Take the example of the due process guarantee of the right to legal 
representation under Article 67(d)-Rome Statute. Legal representation, as an individual 
right, is unknown in Group B communities like the Jopadhola where it is the duty of kin 
to ‘represent’ the defendant. The ICC could therefore identify legal representation as 
being in need of a pluralist interpretation.  
Next, the ICC could identify a traditional clan law, say of the Jopadhola, from 
which to borrow principles that share a common denominator with the due process 
norm. Jopadhola law for instance, provides that human rights are for all people. This 
embodies Ubuntu principles of natural justice that grant equal opportunity to all kin to 
participate in defence of the offender. Natural justice is also a common principle of 
international due process as enunciated by Bayles. His principle of ‘inherent due 
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process’ is ideal because it conforms to natural justice and gives all parties the 
opportunity to be heard. Applied under An-Na`im’s principle of reciprocity, natural 




The third stage is creating a normative bridge based on the common denominator 
of natural justice. The premise would be that legal representation like other due process 
safeguards ought to apply equally to international sentencing hearings. The ICC could 
then set out the criteria by which the right to legal representation is admitted under the 
reciprocity principle. The judges would identify provisions in the African Charter that 
recognise the individual’s duty to society (Articles 27 and 29(7)). An individual’s duty 
could be construed to mean individual interests are part of society’s obligations. The 
judges could then apply the African Charter more expansively to the individual right to 
legal representation, by considering natural justice as part of due process and the 
communitarian notion of equal participation by kin. This would permit kin (and 
community) to make representations on behalf of the offender under group rights 
(recognised in Article 17 African Charter).  
In practice, the judges could use Article 76(2)-Rome Statute, to hold additional 
hearings thus permitting offender’s kin to make representations. Additionally, under 
Article 76 (3), the judges during reparations hearings, could hear representations from 
the offender’s kin, and the wider community as ‘interested persons’. In light of the 
Lubanga Dyilo decision on victim’s participatory rights,21 it is extremely likely that the 
ICC will extend victims participatory rights under Article 68 (3) to the sentencing 
process.  
By using Article 76 in this manner, the ICC would adopt a flexible principle that 
protects individual rights first, yet is elastic enough to adjust procedural guarantees to 
accommodate communitarian values of duty to kin. This in turn provides a yardstick by 
which the fairness of the sentencing process could be assessed. What this would require 
is balancing the notion of rights as entitlements, with the social obligations of the 
                                                 
20
 A. An-Na`im op cit (1990); An-Na`im op cit (1992); A. A An-Na`im, ‘Towards a Cross Cultural 
Approach to Defining International Standards of Human Rights,’ in A. A An-Na`im and F. Deng (eds.), 
Human Rights in Cross Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus, (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1992) and M. Bayles (1986) op cit. To recap, Bayles’s ‘inherent due process’ 
principles of participation and fairness permit all parties to have an equal opportunity to participate in the 
resolution of legal disputes. An-Na`im’s cross-cultural dialogue is based on the principle of reciprocity 
that defines a common denominator and criteria by which a given practice may be judged as 
objectionable.  
21
 Prosecutor v T. Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04-01/06-1432 of 18/01/2008 discussed in Ch. 2 S.3 (v) op cit. 
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kinship system. To this end, the reasoning of Judge Ramirez in Plan Sanchez,
22
 that 
each category of collective and individual rights retains their autonomy and although 
inter-related, both categories are subject to protection by the court, is instructive.
23
 
The ICC could also seek ways to communicate effectively with communities 
why absence of legal representation would be judged objectionable under international 
criminal law. To encapsulate natural justice in the social context, the ICC could apply 
national law, like Article 126 (1) of Uganda’s constitution that provides for judicial 
power to be applied in conformity with norms and values of the people. Traditional 
norms and values could be applied by drawing on research studies like that on the 
Jopadhola, discussed in extensuo in this thesis  
These 3 tasks and effective communication could be applied to other common 
denominators like inherent dignity of the individual that encapsulates autonomy and 
equality. The task for the court each time is to show how international due process 
safeguards are based on principles that encompass a traditional notion of equal 
participation and even handedness. The application of this formula is relatively 
straightforward but subject to one caveat: in cases of conflict, international criminal law 
prevails over the traditional.   
To illustrate such conflict in international sentencing, I will use a worked 
example of the determination of sentence-done in private in international law,
24
 but in 
public under traditional processes. First, the ICC needs to determine whether the right 
to a fair trial could be overridden by the duty of kin to participate in judicial functions. 
To do so, the judges could identify the right to a public hearing as a common 
denominator under both international human rights law and communitarian values-
group rights. Next, adapting the formula set forth above, the judges could borrow the 
Jopadhola concept of fuonji (teaching) as a tool to help in creating cross cultural 
dialogue. Fuonji bears similar aims to expressivism (an educative function of 
international criminal justice). Fuonji could be employed to explain the rationale 
behind private deliberation of sentence: to keep the confidentiality of all arguments 
expressed by judges during deliberations. The judges could even draw similarities with 
the Kamajor secret societies where the entire trial and subsequent deliberations are in 
                                                 
22
 Separate Opinion of Judge S. Ramirez in the Judgement on Reparations in the Plan de Sanchez 
Massacre (November 19 2004) para 2, discussed in Ch. 5 S.5 op cit.  
23
 The approach that I propose, builds on the established practice of interpreting international human 
rights adopted by international courts. The ICC could even draw inspiration from S. Greer’s ‘structural 
balancing’ of rights discussed in Ch.3 S. 4 op cit.   
24
 S. 74(4) and S. 78Rome Statute op cit, and Rule 142 (1) and Rule 145 ICC RPE op cit.  
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private. Even if, as seems likely, that does not convince acephalous communities (like 
the Jopadhola)–who deliberate the sentence in public, the ICC will have engaged in 
intellectual discourse towards finding common ideological ground. For the community, 
they will have been given a fair hearing based, a priori, on what their notion of fair 
sentencing hearing is, or should be like, even though they may view the international 
sentencing process and punishment as inappropriate.  
In sum, a liberal-communitarian approach does not fetter judicial discretion. 
Rather, this approach enhances procedural legitimacy by applying an expanded notion 
of rights based on the principles of reciprocity, participation and fairness. Such notion 
views community as legitimate holders of procedural rights, while preserving autonomy 
and equality of the individual. I now examine how precedent could be used as a tool for 
applying the liberal-communitarian theory. 
(ii) Using precedent as a tool of reconciliation 
 
To apply the liberal-communitarian theory in sentencing requires a second 
stage. This stage applies precedent as a tool that enables judges to borrow traditional 
norms and make doctrinal transformations. I acknowledge challenges to the application 
of precedent: the dearth of relevant academic research, drought of national 
jurisprudence, and lack of guidance from the African Commission on an African notion 
of procedural rights. The thesis shows that a more deep rooted challenge, however, may 
be the approach of the ICC. The judges may fail to distinguish the normative context in 
which the law is applied; defer to precedent from ‘enlightened’ legal systems; or adopt 
a narrow construction of the law in such a way that it negates any prospect of achieving 
a pluralist interpretation of human rights in sentencing. To these challenges doctrinal 
solutions must be found.  
To distinguish the normative text, one solution is provided by N. MacCormick 
who suggests that interpretation of law needs to undergo a radical change. The change 
necessitates substituting the purely interpretative argumentation based on precedent 
(that dictates conformity with previous judicial interpretation from superior courts) with 
a broader sphere of practical argumentation.
25
 In practical argumentation, the court 
reflects on the values and principles appropriate to the institutions of the societies 
                                                 
25
 N. MacCormick, ‘Argumentation and Interpretation in Law’ 9 (1995) (3) Argumentation 467-480, 474, 
476-478. 
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where people live, including procedural justice, equality before and under the law and 
human rights. Such values and principles must be considered when seeking the well 
reasoned approach to resolve interpretation in ‘trouble cases’.26 I posit that the Kony 
situation before the ICC is one such type of ‘trouble’ case where the ICC may need to 
apply practical argumentation while taking into consideration other factors. 
One factor to be considered is that the doctrine of precedent prevents the ICC 
from relying on clan courts’ largely oral jurisprudence since they are not courts of 
record. The ICC would need to develop ratio decidendi that draws on underlying 
principles of traditional justice. This is feasible in my view, if the ICC adopts practical 
argumentation by accommodating the values and principles of the specified community 
based on a pluralist interpretation of rights.  
For such pluralist interpretation, the ICC may give gratis dictum: where the 
court makes a statement of a principle that is broader than is necessary to decide the 
case, or suggests rules and principles that are not applicable to the case being decided.
27
 
Alternatively, the court could issue obiter dictum where a judge makes a non-essential 
judicial comment while delivering a judgement.
28
 Both dictums lack strong precedential 
value, but I maintain that gratis dictum is preferable because it is a judicial approach 
that involves an expansion of a principle which can then be discussed thoroughly. Also 
Drumbl makes the empirical argument that international judges do refer to theoretical 
principles in determining sentence.
29
 Using gratis dictum, the ICC could apply national 
law- Article 126(1) Uganda’s constitution, to draw on traditional norms and 
communitarian values. Speeches of judges, like those in Makwanyane that ‘translate’ 
traditional values into existing legislation may be distinguished by the ICC. The ICC 
could rely on available academic scholarship and existing research studies like that on 
the Jopadhola that analyse communitarian values and Ubuntu principles. Gratis dictum, 
if used creatively with MacCormick’s practical argumentation, puts the ICC in the 
unique position of being able to use judicial precedent to meld international due process 
with communitarian values, without abridging individual autonomy and equality. 
                                                 
26
 Ibid, 478- 479. 
27
 B. Garner (2004) op cit 485. As we saw in Ch. 8 S. 4 (i) op cit, the court could also discuss issues not 
raised by the record. 
28
 Ibid, 1102. 
29
 M. Drumbl op cit 60. 
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Significantly, the ICC could avoid a narrow construct of procedural rights in sentencing 
and deference to precedent from ‘enlightened systems’, say the IACtHR.30  
(iii) Translating Procedural Rights: overcoming normative differences   
 
Although precedent is a useful tool of translation, there remain facets of 
international human rights law that conflict with communitarian values especially 
where the latter override protection of individual rights. Two examples illustrate my 
point: ritual and imprisonment. 
My model deals with ritual as a third phase of sentencing: one that does not 
detract from the universality of international law. Considering ritual in this way enables 
the ICC to escape the branding of ‘white man’s justice.’ The ICC could combine penal 
objectives of rehabilitation, reintegration and reconciliation with communitarian values, 
to endorse those rituals that do not involve cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The 
ICC could also encourage the observation of such rituals, within the purview of the 
clan. Examples are obligatory reconciliation feasts, and reconciliation-cum-
rehabilitation-cum-re-integration rituals like the Jopadhola kayo choko or Acoli Mato 
Oput. Affirmation of good social practices will arguably go a long way towards 
achieving local legitimacy, thus bridging the normative divide.  
The ritual on the contrary, may involve cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 
Take the example of the purification ritual for incest among the Jopadhola, which 
involves whipping and stripping naked of offenders. The ICC ought to first identify the 
negative aspects of the ritual that conflict with a common denominator like inherent 
human dignity. During the sentencing hearing, the ICC could ask the community if the 
ritual cannot be waived - as was done in the Odoi case for the minors,
31
 or substituted 
for rituals that protect human dignity. It is imperative that this issue is discussed to 
enable the community make a choice. The choice would be controlled by what An-
Na`im refers to as culture’s internal criteria of legitimacy. If the community fails to 
find internal values that link the ritual to human dignity, then they could turn to external 
standards, namely international human rights law. By so doing, my findings in Chapter 
                                                 
30
 I acknowledge that the ICC has used jurisprudence of the IACtHR as persuasive precedent in Situation 
in Democratic Republic of Congo ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr of 17/01/2006 op cit discussed in Ch.3 S.4 
op cit. However, the Latin American procedures may not map directly onto African traditional practices 
which is why the ICC may have to borrow directly from African norms and communitarian values.  
31
 Re O. Odoi and L. Okongo op cit discussed in detail in Ch. 7 op cit S.3 and S.5. 
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7 indicate that the community may well find such rituals do conflict with international 
human rights law.  
If, as seems likely, the community still find international law is inapplicable and 
insist on applying the ritual, then the ICC would courteously decline to endorse this, 
giving their reasons for doing so. The ICC could use Smit’s compelling argument that 
human dignity (based on Kantian’s notion of respect for individual autonomy) is a core 
element that underpins sentences.
32
 The ICC could then explain that all rituals that 
accompany the sentence must be compatible with human rights standards and not be 
grossly disproportionate to the sentence. Although the two sides may never agree, at 
least the ICC will have made an attempt at initiating cross cultural dialogue on 
protecting human rights standards, without outright rejection of the offending ritual.  
Imprisonment as a punishment under international law appears to be inimical to 
the traditional notion of the right to liberty. If the ICC emphasises imprisonment as the 
predominant sentence, this will remain a bone of contention with communities like the 
Jopadhola, who favour traditional restorative options and for whom imprisonment is 
not ‘indigenous’. Still, communication- through fuonji (teaching)- of how the 
retributive philosophy of imprisonment is no different from notions of retribution 
expressed in traditional punishments like banishment, may go some way towards 
promoting a local understanding of aims and purposes of imprisonment. That 
imprisonment and banishment are both underpinned by a punitive philosophy means 
that parallels may be drawn.  
Equally, parallels could be drawn from restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation penalties under Article 75 (3), Rome Statute. The ICC ought to consider 
applying these restorative punishments as far as possible, where they resonate with 
communitarian values like restitution and reconciliation. For instance, as Keller 
suggests, collective reparations could be administered through the Trust Fund, for 
victims of international crimes.
33
 The ICC must nevertheless be mindful of the fact that 
collective reparations from the Trust Fund remove responsibility of compensation from 
the offender’s community. A person may only be punished in accordance with the 
Rome Statute (Article 23), but as Smit persuasively argues, the Statute does not exclude 
the development of international customary law on acceptable national penalties 
                                                 
32
 D. Smit (2002) op cit 4-5; (2005) op cit 361-362. This point is also made in D. Smit and A. Ashworth 
(2004) op cit 542-547. Kant reasons that no person should be used solely as a means to an end. 
33
 L. M. Keller, ‘Seeking Justice at the International Criminal Court: Victim’s Reparations’ (2007) 29 
Thomas Jefferson Law Review 189-218. 




 I would add that the ICC could arguably develop jurisprudence 
that considers traditional punishments that are comparable to national penalties. For 




In sum, the future of ICC sentencing may be shaped by traditional restorative 
justice and human rights imperatives, through cross cultural dialogue that engages 
directly with the community. This dialogue can be achieved so long as the ICC 
communicates effectively using a ‘participatory’ approach and analogous restorative 
philosophies, punishments and procedures to the traditional model. Even then, while 
affirming good social practices, the ICC must underscore the supremacy of 
international human rights law as a test for consistency. I now make my concluding 
remarks.  
Section 4: Concluding Note  
 
We have seen that integrating traditional restorative justice processes in an 
international model is a complex issue. This section identifies my contribution to 
knowledge on legal methods of dealing with this complexity when handling African 
conflict. 
Firstly, my thesis has made a case for a theoretical reconciliation between 
international criminal procedure and African customary criminal law to achieve fair and 
culturally appropriate sentencing outcomes. Secondly, I have identified a theoretical 
construct that builds on similarities, while accommodating structural and normative 
distinctions. Thirdly, I have contributed a legal solution for international sentencing that 
uses an expanded notion of rights based on cross cultural dialogue. Fourthly, my case 
study of Jopadhola clan courts has expanded the range of viewpoints from kinship 
courts, providing insight into the ways in which the Rome Statute may be applied in the 
African context to better accommodate traditional restorative features. Fifthly, the 
thesis underscores the need for legislative measures to recognise traditional courts as a 
separate legal system and bring them within the ambit of international human rights 
                                                 
34
 D. V Z Smit, Taking Life Imprisonment Seriously: in National and International Law (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2002) 191 bases his reasoning on Article 80 under which national application 
of penalties not provided in the Statute, is retained.  
35
 Magistrates Courts Act op cit, Trial on Indictments Act op cit, and Article 126 (2) (c) (d) of Uganda’s 
constitution op cit. An overview of national penalties is in Appendix 9. 
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law. Developments in Latin America are a good starting point.
36
 Finally, I posit that 
adopting a traditional restorative participatory approach, may have a part to play in 
preventing large scale war crimes because perpetrators will know that they are 
accountable to their kin and most importantly to the international community.   
My theoretical model may go further and secure greater protection of individual 
procedural rights and legal principles in clan courts. The Jopadhola have shown the 
ability and willingness to assimilate some structures and principles of national law, thus 
indicating the possibility that communities may also adapt features from international 
criminal procedure. This may occur when the ICC transforms its trials somewhat to 
take into account traditional process and communitarian values.  
Some broader questions remain. Firstly, will the reform be done in such a way as 
to undermine something important about international procedural justice? Secondly, 
will the ICC have to operate differently for different communities? I answer question 1 
in the negative. The translation model ensures that the certainty and universality of 
international law remains intact. It only calls upon the judges to adopt a broader 
approach to the interpretation and application of the Rome Statute. To question 2, the 
procedural framework of the ICC (using translation) will be the same whichever 
community they are dealing with. Still, sentencing practice that translation suggests as 
appropriate, will differ according to the characteristics of the community concerned.
37
 
 A third question is: what is the consequence of the ICC not following my model? 
In response, I argue that a failure to accommodate my translation model will deny local 
communities an opportunity to have sentencing decisions that resonate with their sense 
of procedural justice. This could lead to what Drumbl defines as a ‘democratic deficit’ 
where non western procedures are excluded from international court processes, because 
of perceived national or ethnic inferiorities.
38
 Extrapolating Drumbl’s reasoning to the 
ICC, we can foresee that the upshot of a ‘democratic deficit’ may be that international 
sentencing outcomes remain culturally irrelevant. Additionally, the aim of the Rome 
Statute to gain respect for international criminal justice (locally) may be thwarted.
39
 As 
                                                 
36
 In particular the decisions of the IACtHR and analysis of their work by scholars like D. Shelton op cit, 
J. Pasqualucci, op cit, and M. Guzman op cit discussed in Ch. 5 S.5 op cit.  
37
 M. Drumbl op cit 20 argues quite persuasively, that it is not prudent to flatten difference through a ‘one 
size fits all’ process, in view of the distinct social geographies of various atrocities. 
38
 Ibid, 136, 147. 
39
 M. C Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (Ardsley, N.Y: Transnational, 2003) at 
703 calls this ‘Potemkin’ Justice where international criminal law remains extant and not relevant to 
communities. 
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Findlay and Henham caution, international criminal trials will be ‘left behind as a 
symbol of international criminal justice’ if they fail to engage with communitarian as 
well as individualist ‘determinations.’40 For Henham, failure to address specific 
weaknesses in the ICC may render it susceptible to become an ‘unaccountable inter- 
state machinery’ by suppressing offenders’ and victims’ rights in the pursuit of wider 
state interests.
41
 Arguably, such entity could also subsume the rights of the community 
to participate in sentencing hearings in accordance with traditional norms.  
At the very worst, the ICC will be viewed as administering ‘white man’s 
justice’. Perpetrators of atrocities may enter into agreements with governments (like the 
June 2007 Agreement) to ‘escape’ international criminal justice, encouraged by the 
example set by the Kony saga. Governments could, as has Uganda, recommend that 
traditional courts should handle war criminals:
42
 but without appropriate procedural 
safeguards. Though the ICC is not precluded from trying small offenders,
43
 such 
agreements are akin to the state colluding with offenders to evade international criminal 
justice. 
On the positive side, the jurisprudence of the ICC enriched by an expanded 
notion of rights will create comparative penal jurisprudence that may strengthen 
African national, sub regional and regional courts to adopt a contextual interpretation of 
laws. Through precedent, the ICC jurisprudence could foster development of human 
rights jurisprudence that deals with the normative conflict of interests and the need for 
an African notion of procedural rights. The spin off effect will be the generation of 
academic scholarship on the positive contribution of contemporary African restorative 
justice to international criminal law. 
An unintended outcome is my contribution on power equality before clan 
courts. My findings point to the importance of attitude change towards participation of 
women and youth (including children) in clan trials as key actors, not merely witnesses, 
victims or defendants. Encouraging this attitude change, coupled with economic 
empowerment, may promote equality before traditional clan law. This builds on the 
premise that equality before traditional law will remain a chimera, absent the economic 
                                                 
40
 M. Findlay and R. Henham, op cit, 337. 
41
  R. Henham ‘Some issues for sentencing’ (2003) op cit 81-82. 
42
 See Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation of 19 February 2008 op cit para 
23. Such a proposition is also contained in a report by TERL Limited (Kampala, 2006) entitled 
Transitional Justice in Northern Uganda, Eastern Uganda and some parts of West Nile at 50-55. A copy 
was availed to me by the JLOS office and is on my file. 
43
 M. Drumbl op cit 146.  




 At the same time, we should not ignore those within 
traditional societies, who argue that traditional clan process based on equal 
participation of every person is inconsistent with the charge of power inequality.  
 In the final analysis, while the dominance of the Anglo-Franco procedural model 
cannot be changed or substituted, the translation model offers a progressive approach to 
adopting aspects of restorative justice based on convergence and mitigating divergence. 
The clan courts look forward to the day when international law will assimilate aspects 
of traditional criminal law. I believe my translation model offers the best opportunity to 
do that.    
                                                 
44
 Economic empowerment is evident in Jopadhola land tenure system nowadays. The case of Rose 
illustrates that Jopadhola do embrace the notion of individual ownership of land by women. Rose bought 
land in 2003 with her own money. The land was adjacent to but independent of family land owned by her 
husband. Her husband married a second wife and constructed for her a semi-permanent house on Rose’s 
land. Following his death, the second wife was directed by the clan to demolish the house because it was 
built on Rose’s land without the latter’s consent. The second wife was permitted to build her house on the 
communal family land instead. 
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APPENDIX 1 
RESEARCH METHODS  
The research design 
 
The objective of the thesis is to seek to reconcile international sentencing 
procedural law with values of localized communities through an application of 
procedural rights. To achieve this objective, I use two approaches. Through these two 
approaches, the capacity of the international system to integrate aspects of the traditional 
normative system will become clear.  
The first approach involves a legal analysis of the international and traditional 
sentencing frameworks to examine the tensions between them in light of human rights 
imperatives. The second involves the use of empirical methods. I presented the results of 
an empirical study I conducted in 2006 of clan courts of the Jopadhola ethnic group in 
Tororo district (Eastern Uganda). The focus is on the clan courts (Koti in the local 
language Dhupadhola)
 
of the Jo-Gem (or Jo-Gemi)
1
 and Morwa Guma Malasang 
(hereafter ‘Morwa Guma’) clans in Budama North constituency of West Budama County 
in the 5 sub counties of Kirewa, Kisoko, Petta, Paya and Nagongera. The choice of these 
clans was based on my interest in comparing contemporary sentencing practices of two 
clans with distinct origins. Of the 54 registered clans of the Jopadhola the Jo-Gem clan is 
smaller and newly created while the Morwa Guma clan is large and live in every part of 
the county. Both clans continue to apply traditional clan law using traditional restorative 
process. 
 
Justification for the research design 
 
The choice of methodology arises from the complexity of issues (both theoretical 
and methodological) in this type of restorative justice research.
2
 These complexities in 
relation to clan courts include: dearth of archival documentation both academic and non 
academic, poor electronic communication, low levels of literacy in rural areas and the 
holistic context within which the sentencing process is addressed. This necessitates 
application of several research methods in a process known as triangulation. 
Triangulation is appropriate because each method has strengths and weaknesses. A 
research design should therefore adopt more than one research method to compensate for 
                                                 
1
 The names are used interchangeably with Jo-Gemi being the official spelling in historical and 
anthropological texts. I use Jo-Gem in this thesis.  
2
 C. T Griffiths (1996) op cit 311-314. 
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limitations in each approach.
3
 To this end, three qualitative research methods were used: 
archival research; interviews both unstructured and semi structured, and trial simulation. 
The three methods are discussed next.  
Archival research 
 
Archival research techniques complemented other methods of information 
gathering. My methodological starting point was to examine available primary and 
secondary material including legislation, government publications, white papers, law 
reports, clan courts records, judgments of superior courts of record,
4
 and widely 
circulated local daily newspapers: The New Vision and Daily Monitor. I also examined 
books, periodicals, legal encyclopaedias and mimeographs. These sources provided 
insight into the doctrinal and historical aspects of the human rights framework in 
sentencing practice.  
However, little contemporary academic work exists on the sentencing practices of 
clan courts in Uganda. For example, there is only one law undergraduate study on 
sentencing legislation and no PhD or Master’s theses in law on clan court practices. 
There are two government studies on sentencing in Uganda.
5
 Equally, there is a lack of 
statistical information and other quantitative data on sentencing in clan courts because 
typically, these courts do not keep statistics or up to date court records.
6
 In the case of 
Jopadhola clan courts, the only records availed to me were from Namwaya Saza court of 
the Morwa Guma clan.
7
 I therefore relied on earlier historical and anthropological work 
done among the Jopadhola. In particular, my research draws on the works of B. Ogot a 
historian;
8
 F. Burke a social scientist
9
 and A. Oboth-Ofumbi a Jopadhola elder whose 
work is the only indigenous documentation of Jopadhola traditions and culture.
10
 Thus, 
                                                 
3
 E. Babbie, The Practice of Social Research 11
th
 edition (California: Thomson Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, 2007) 113. 
4
 The superior courts are: the High Court, Court of Appeal, Constitutional Court and Supreme 
Court of Uganda. 
5
 S. Birungi, Unpublished Thesis (1998) op cit; ULRC Draft Study Report on Sentencing (2006) 
op cit and JLOS Study on sentencing (2001) op cit. I conducted a search (2006, 2008) at the Main 
Library, School of Law and Institute of Social Research at Uganda’s oldest research university of 
Makerere. 
6
 Any studies on clan courts are among the Acoli and give largely anecdotal evidence on their trial 
procedures.   
7
 There were four judgements from the Namwaya Saza court: 1 on land and 3 criminal cases from 
2002-2006. Judgments were in Dhupadhola with one translated into English.  
8
 B. A. Ogot, History of the Southern Luo: Vol.1 Migration and Settlement 1500-1900 (Nairobi: 
East African Publishing House, 1967). 
9
 F. Burke, Local Government and Politics in Uganda (New York: Syracuse University Press, 
1964). 
10
 A. Oboth-Ofumbi, Lwo (Ludama) Uganda: History and Customs of the Jo Padhola (Nairobi: 
Eagle Press, 1960). 
 M. Owor Page 3 
 
given the limited insights available from a doctrinal or statistical study, it was necessary 
to use interviews to fill in the gaps. 
Interviews 
 
Unstructured and semi–structured interviews were used rather than survey 
questionnaires, because interviews attain a higher response rate than any survey 
technique and generate better quality data.
11
 Both types of interviews have the advantage 
that the interviewer is able to probe further any issues raised.
12
  
Unstructured interviews are very useful because they are open-ended and 
appropriate where the researcher wants to hear respondents’ opinions in their own 
words.
13
 Additionally, the respondents are relaxed and at ease. It is particularly helpful 
for people with busy schedules and those who do not want to spend time filling in bulky 
questionnaires. The disadvantage with unstructured interviews is that there is need for the 
researcher to monitor closely the direction and depth of the interview.
14
  Respondents 
may digress from the topic and getting them back on track may be difficult.  Another 
disadvantage with unstructured interviews is thought to be that the interviewer’s 
expectations or individual characteristics of the interviewee may influence responses.
15
 
Semi structured interviews use guidelines, while still preserving room for 
manoeuvre in obtaining data. Guidelines are particularly valuable in eliciting required 
information particularly from participants who are not very literate.
16
 Furthermore, study 
participants are enabled to be spontaneous and self-revealing.
17
 A disadvantage with 
semi-structured interviews, like the unstructured ones, is the likelihood of the 
interviewer’s expectations or individual characteristics of the interviewee influencing 
responses.
18
 Participants sometimes find it difficult to describe accurately what they do 
and it is difficult to discern whether one is receiving the ‘real’ or official response. 
  
                                                 
11
 C. M Judd, E. R Smith and L. H Kidder, Research Methods in Social Relations (1986) op cit 
218. The response rate may be over 80%. 
12
 B. Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1989) 
17-22.  
13
 T. Palys, Research Decisions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 2
nd
 Edition (Toronto: 
Harcourt Brace, 1997) 164. 
14
 R. G Burgess, In the Field: An Introduction to Field Research (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1984) Chapter 5 especially 119-120. 
15
 Ibid, 103-106.  
16
 C. Judd et al op cit 218. 
17
 Ibid, 223. 
18
 R. Burgess op cit 103-106.  
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(i) Unstructured Interviews 
  
Over a period of six and a half weeks from 27
th
 July to 11
th
 September 2006, un-
structured interviews were held with people in various institutions like Makerere 
University, government and non-government bodies. Those interviewed included the 
Chief Justice, academics, judges of the superior courts, a magistrate, public and civil 
servants and individuals. Selection of respondents was based on their knowledge (or lack 
of) in the area of traditional justice as well as the position they held. The aim of the 
interviews was to supplement the archival literature by getting a socio-legal perspective 
on their role, or that of their institutions, in taking into account traditional approaches. 
The interviews gave insights into the prospects and challenges faced. Some interviewees 
also gave me written documentation, conference papers, periodicals and books that were 
otherwise not easily accessible.
19
 Follow up interviews were conducted with the Chief 
Justice, head of the Jopadhola cultural union – Mr. Moses Owor, and the two Jopadhola 
clan heads in August 2008. The aim was to seek clarification on issues, and obtain 
supplemental information on clan courts. 
In all, 40 respondents were interviewed: 23 men and 17 women, whose details are 
in Appendix 4. The interviews were conducted in their offices where I took notes of the 
responses: none of the respondents objected to this. All the respondents were supportive 
of the research and participated enthusiastically.  
 
(ii) Semi structured interviews 
 
Semi-structured interviews were used in the empirical study among the Jopadhola 
in two stages: a pre-visit interview, followed by a formal workshop in August 2006. The 
term ‘pre-visit’ is used here to refer to the preparatory visit made to the study area prior 
to the main interviews. The aim was to establish when it was most suitable to carry out 
the interviews and to select participants. This is standard research practice in Uganda. 
The preparation for both the pre-visit and the workshop took three weeks, with the 
help of administrative assistants who were paid a daily fee.
20
 Their tasks were limited to 
sending out invitations (by bicycle), registration of participants for the workshop and 
organising meals for the workshop.  
                                                 
19
 These included: Ms F. Anglin, Mr. R. Byaruhanga Ms. E. Edroma Ms. C. Bainemugisha, Mr. 
M. Wamasebu, Ms. D. Lwanga, Ms. S. Mukasa, Ms. H. Lwabi, Prof. J. Kakooza, Ms T. Webaale, 
Mr. Musede, Ms R. Nyonyi and Ms S. Katutu, Ms. H. Wolayo and Ms R. Odoi. Details in 
Appendix 4. 
20
 The team was led by a Ms. Nyakecho, an elder and two assistants: (Mr. Omiel) a primary school 
teacher and (Ms. Achieng) in her final year of occupational therapy. All have grown up and lived 
in the village; were conversant with the habits and cultures of the area. The three were fluent in 
written and spoken Adhola and English. 
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(a) Pre-visit interview 
 
Findings from archival research and unstructured interviews affirmed the pervasive 
criminal jurisdiction of clan courts among the Jopadhola. I then set up a pre-visit meeting 
to get more background information about clan court systems and Jopadhola criminal 
laws. I selected two clan elders for the pre-visit who were most senior and who had an in-
depth knowledge of the clan system. They were Mr. A Oketcho the head of Jo-Gem clan 
and Mr. Y Opondo a high ranking Morwa Guma chief.
21
 Both were sent an advance copy 
of the interview guideline that I had pre-tested on three randomly selected Jopadhola and 
then re-drafted for accuracy. Preparation for this one day interview took one week and it 
was held on the 12
th




The semi structured interview sought answers in the following areas: 
1. Genealogy of the clan 
2. Composition of clan courts by gender, age and numbers  
3. Number and structure of clan courts (Hierarchy) 
4. Criteria for appointment to clan courts as well as the process of appointment  
5. Criminal jurisdiction of clan courts 
6. Sentencing jurisdiction of clan courts 
7. Common offences, perpetrators and victims 
8. Any rituals performed in relation to criminal cases 
9. Venue for clan court sittings 
10. Amount of clan court fees paid (if at all) 
11. Existence of judgments or court records (and a request for copies). 
 
The Jo-Gem leader Mr. Okecho brought detailed written responses to all the 
questions prepared jointly with the other Jo-Gem clan leaders, while Mr. Opondo gave a 
verbal response to all questions. I recorded all of Mr. Opondo’s responses and then we 
discussed the answers.  
At the end of the interview, I selected 32 participants including Mr. Okecho and 
Mr. Opondo, comprising 4 members per court. Jo-Gem courts comprise at least 5 people 
and Morwa Guma courts have between 5-9 members. I was guided in the selection by the 
two leaders but endeavoured to balance age and sex of the invitees. Furthermore, I 
selected participants who hold different positions of responsibility in the courts like the 
chair, judge, assessors, secretaries, women and youth representatives. The Jo-Gem clan 
                                                 
21
 Mr. Y. O was the clan head of Namwaya Saza. The supreme elder of the Morwa Guma clan was 
unable to attend due to a busy work schedule.  
22
 The pre-visit interview lasted the whole day because of the need for an in-depth understanding 
of the complex court structures prior to the main workshop. Both clan leaders later attended the 
workshop. 




 got 12 invites, while the Morwa Guma with 5 courts
24
 got 20 invites. 
Preparation for the next stage of administering the questionnaires lasted 3 days. During 
this time, I pre-tested the semi structured questionnaire on 4 randomly selected Jopadhola 
and then redrafted it for accuracy. 
 
(b) Workshop  
 





 at a one-day workshop at the same venue of Romo House chosen for its 
central location. All the participants were reimbursed travel expenses. In all, 25 
participants attended: 7 women and 18 men. 7 were absent with apology due to other 
commitments. I divided participants into 7 working groups representing 7 clan courts. 
Those present were: 
1. Gombolola Jo-Gem: chair, assessor, secretary and assistant  secretary   
2. Miluka Jo-Gem: chair, three assessors and secretary 
3.   Kisoko Jo-Gem: chair, assessor and secretary  
4.   P’Oriwa Morwa Guma: judge, grandmother of the clan, official in charge of rituals  
5.  Saza Morwa Guma: judge, chair, grandmother of the clan, secretary and chair of 
funeral dues      
6.  Gombolola Morwa Guma: chair and secretary
 
 
7.  Miluka Morwa Guma:  chair, grandmother of the clan and helper. The chair of the 
Kisoko Morwa Guma court, being the only attendee, joined the Miluka group. 
 
      The separation into groups was made consciously to assess the differences if any 
between the two clan approaches; more so since each group represented more than one 
view point. Furthermore, this workshop was the most effective way to get qualitative data 
because the clan court officials were familiar with one another as members of the 
‘Bench’. They also spoke the same language-Dhupadhola. The day’s events were then 
divided into four stages: Registration and introduction, group discussions, trial simulation 
and a plenary discussion.  
The first stage was registration at which personal details specifically names, sex, 
clan, position in the clan court, occupation and any other responsibilities; were recorded 
in attendance sheets. For those who could not write, an administrative assistant filled in 
the details, read it back to them, then the participant would put a thumbprint against their 
details. A complete list of participants and their personal profiles can be found in 
Appendix 3. Questions on age, marital status and level of education were not included on 
the registration form, because it is considered culturally insensitive to seek this 
                                                 
23
 In descending hierarchy: Gombolola, Miluka and Kisoko courts. 
24
 In descending hierarchy: P`Oriwa, Saza, Gombolola, Miluka and Kisoko courts.  
25
 Wednesday was most convenient for most participants because other days are reserved for 
community functions like the open market. 
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information in writing. Instead this information was voluntarily given during the formal 
introductions where participants introduced themselves by stating their name, marital 
status and clan.
26
 Married women stated their father’s clan and the husband’s clan into 
which they were married and where relevant, their ethnic group.
27
 Introductions were 
followed by an explanation of the thesis and how the day’s events fitted in the wider 
picture.  
The second stage was the administration of the questionnaires as illustrated in 
Figure 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 1: © Maureen Owor (2006). Kisoko Jo-Gem discussion group 
 
Each group was given a question guide in Dhupadhola, flip charts and markers. 
They read and discussed the questions, then wrote down their responses in Dhupadhola as 
depicted in Figures 1 above and Figure 2 overleaf. Writing down responses was a better 
method of documentation than tape recording for two reasons. In the first place all groups 
were able to digest the questions then answer the questions simultaneously. Secondly, I 
was able to move from group to group, seek clarity and re-direct the line of discussion 
where issues and written responses were not clear. Consequently, all the questions were 
answered in depth and within the time frame.  
 
                                                 
26
 Being respectful of the culture, I did not record or use information given orally during 
introductions.  
27
 Three female participants were originally from other ethnic groups. 
 M. Owor Page 8 
 
 
Figure 2: © Maureen Owor (2006). Discussion with the Miluka Morwa Guma group   
 
The method had its drawbacks. From the registration and introductions, it was 
evident that some participants had received formal education though not all. For example, 
most of the secretaries to the clan courts were teachers while some of the chairmen and 
assessors (helpers) were illiterate/semi-literate farmers. As a result, the less literate 
participants preferred an oral narrative, saying that they had never been asked to 
document their experiences before. The more literate secretaries were able to articulate 
their views and write down the answers legibly. However the less literate struggled to 
express their views in writing, even in Dhupadhola, and their accounts were more 
truncated. For Kisoko Jo-Gem group, the secretary wrote in Ja-Luo language which was 
then transcribed into Dhupadhola. The last stage comprised trial simulation- the third 
type of qualitative research used in this study. 
Trial simulation 
  
The study used simulation of a reconstructed trial involving two offenders accused 
of incest because they were related as same-clan members. The participants selected 
incest as one of the most common offence tried by clan courts. The choice of trial 
simulation permitted a controlled study, but did not put the court officials in the position 
where the decision could have real consequences. The simulation lasted approximately 90 
minutes and was done by participants who were real clan court officials acting as 
defendants, witnesses, court officials and the audience. The simulation applied clan court 
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procedures and Jopadhola clan law. The success of the trial simulation depended on a 
high level of authenticity as shown below. 
 
Figure 3: © Maureen Owor (2006).  Witnesses give testimony in trial simulation 
 
In this regard, it is worth noting that the participants made it so realistic. One 
member refused to take part saying the ‘trial’ would bring him bad luck since it 
‘involved’ his daughter-in-law.28 The use of trial simulation was to illuminate the hitherto 
undocumented restorative processes and reasoning that lead to a particular verdict and 
sentence: this process to me is of more importance than the verdict and sentence itself. As 
with all trial simulations and empirical studies generally, there is the risk of 
presentational bias where participants say what they think is socially desirable, or 
expectancy effect, where the researcher hears what they want to hear.
29
 These risks were 
ameliorated by comparing the results of the trial simulation with archival research- clan 
court records availed to me by the Namwaya Saza court of Morwa Guma. The findings 




Following the trial simulation, the study participants converged in a plenary 
session and deliberated upon Jopadhola law, sentencing practice and issues concerning 
                                                 
28
 No amount of persuasion could convince Mr. O to participate in the trial simulation. 
29
 E. Finch and V. E. Munro, ‘Lifting the Veil: The Use of Focus groups and Trial Simulations in 
Legal Research’ (2008) 35 Journal of Law and Society 30-51, 39-40.  
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integration of traditional law in international law. This group deliberation elicited the 
participants’ own analysis of what they perceived as weaknesses and strengths of the clan 
court system, and practical issues of accommodating international human rights 
standards. The deliberations were recorded then analysed.  
Presentation of results  
 
I transcribed all responses from the pre-visit interview and workshop into the 
English language since I am proficient in both Dhupadhola and English. The results of 
the pre-visit interview and workshop were analysed and the responses coded according to 
the groups. These findings are presented in a thematic form in Chapters 6 and 7 as group 
responses, trial simulation and plenary discussion. The views elicited from the 








 an insider is a person who conducts research on a cultural, 
racial or ethnic group of which the researcher is a member. The advantage to this 
approach is that the researcher has access to the research subjects; gains a better 
understanding of the phenomenon under study, and the validity of the research findings is 
accentuated.
32
 Since I am a Japadhola, I was able to get access to the subjects quite easily 
since I knew the ‘gate keepers’ of the system: elders and youth who had lived and worked 
in this community for a long period and were conversant with the customs. Furthermore, 
I knew the traditions and I am fluent in the local language, which opened channels of 
communication. These are all advantages which an outsider might not have.  
Another advantage to being an insider is trustworthiness that enables participants 
reveal elusive intimate thoughts and revelations.
33
 Trust was exemplified in two ways. 
The first was a request (which I met) for note books so participants could record the day’s 
proceedings and responses on the flip charts for future reference.
34
 The second was 
impromptu speeches following the end of the workshop.
35
 The speeches denoted 
participants’ feeling that the exercise had been mutually beneficial to all and that they had 
                                                 
30
 Ch. 6, 7 and 8 op cit. 
31
 D. J Jones, ‘Towards a Native Anthropology’ in J. B Cole (ed.) Anthropology for the Nineties: 
Introductory Readings (New York, The Free Press, 1988) 30. 
32
 O. O Elechi (2006) op cit 235. 
33
 Boas cited in D. J Jones op cit 36.  
34
 To this end, each group’s flip charts were pinned up on the walls till the end of the workshop. 
35
 There were two speeches from each clan; from male and female speakers, signifying an 
engaging research exercise.  
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learnt from each other’s practice. Participants expressed their willingness to collaborate 
with me in future on similar undertakings. These factors arguably authenticate the 
research findings. 
The limitations of an insider perspective are that research subjects may take it for 
granted that the researcher knows the area very well and do not give all the information.
36
 
Alternatively, they may assume there is no need to discuss every day affairs with an 
insider. The outsider would have an advantage in getting this information. To overcome 
this hurdle, I went into considerable detail and sat with each group, going over all the 
questions so as to get all the information.  
Ethical issues 
 
There were no ethical problems that arose with the study. In accordance with 
research regulations in Uganda, I applied for and was granted permission to carry out the 
research by the Research Ethics body: Uganda National Council for Science and 
Technology (UNCST). I also obtained written permission from the Resident District 
Commissioners of Kampala and Tororo to conduct research in the two districts:
37
 an 
additional requirement for researchers. This permission was extended in August 2008 and 
the letters are on the file. Having done some research for the Uganda Law Reform 
Commission (ULRC) on sentencing reform,
38
 I obtained permission from the chair of 
ULRC to use their draft report for my research. 
The participants voluntarily took part in the research. No minors were involved in 
the study and there was no risk to health, finances or violation of privacy. Standard 
research protocol in Uganda was observed. Firstly, the choice of language was 
Dhupadhola, this being the language of the participants. Secondly, the manner of dress 
was appropriate
39
 and thirdly any culturally sensitive questions or comments were 
avoided. Permission to quote research participants in this thesis was sought and, in all 
cases, granted.  
There were three main limitations. First, the archival research was insufficient. 
This combined with lack of a reliable source of existing research studies meant I had to 
rely on individuals giving me their copies of documents or alerting me to the whereabouts 
of others. Next, some people were unavailable due to various commitments so I was 
                                                 
36
 D. J Jones op cit 35. 
37
 All the three letters are on the file. Resident District Commissioners are senior civil servants 
appointed under Article 203 of the Constitution to co-ordinate various administrative functions, 
including approval for research.  
38
 January-October 2003. 
39
 Appropriate dress code was: long skirts or dresses, minimal jewellery, simple makeup and 
hairstyles for ladies, and long trousers for the men. 
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unable to interview them. Finally, I was not able to attend and observe actual clan court 
hearings as none were scheduled during this time. Despite these set backs I was able to 
get sufficient information about the sentencing process from both the respondents and 
study participants.  
 
 
APPENDIX 2: SEMI STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE CLAN 
WORKSHOP 
 
1. (a) Describe the trial process.  
(b) Who is allowed to make representations?    
2. Are there any rituals applied during the sentencing process to (a) the victim, (b) the 
offender and (c) the community? 
3. How do clan courts assess moral culpability and responsibility of the offender? 
4. What factors or criteria do you take into account while sentencing an offender?  
5. How do you satisfy the wishes of the victim against those of the offender and the 
community?  
6. What procedure is followed if a person is dissatisfied with the decision of the court? 
7. Are parties permitted to opt out of or reject trials in the clan courts? 
8. Is there any relationship between your court and that of the Local Council court or 
Magistrate’s court? 
9. How do you ensure that decisions are fair to all parties so as to prevent bias in decision 
making? 
10. Describe the challenges faced by the clan courts. 
 
 
APPENDIX 3- LIST OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS: JO –GEM CLAN  
  
Name  Position in clan court Other responsibility  Occupation  
A. Okecho Chair Gombolola _ Farmer 
D. Okoth Assessor Gombolola _  Farmer 
H. Onyango Secretary Gombolola _ Teacher 
C. Ochieng  (Ms) Ass. Secretary, Gombolola Women Council member Farmer 
C. Opendi Chair  Miluka  Secretary, Rural Bank Farmer 
A. Ogola Assessor Miluka Chair, married people  Farmer 
F. Akoth (Ms) Secretary Miluka Treasurer NAADS Teacher 
L. Okello Chair Kisoko Zone leader Gwaragwara  
church 
Farmer 
R. Opio (Ms) Assessor Kisoko Vice Chair Women’s Legion Farmer 
A. Nyadoi (Ms) Assessor Kisoko L.C. 1 Treasurer Farmer 
O. Ongwen Assessor Kisoko _ Farmer 
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APPENDIX 3:  STUDY PARTICIPANTS FROM MORWA GUMA CLAN 
Name  Position in clan court Other responsibility  Occupation  
O. Omuge Judge P`Oriwa  - Chief 
D. Olowo (Ms) Grandmother P`Oriwa  Secretary Women’s group Teacher 
D. Othieno In charge of rituals P`Oriwa Retired chief Farmer 
Y. Opondo Chair Saza  Chair Okwira PTA Farmer 
R. P Odongo Chief, Namwaya Saza 
Interviewed on 16/08/08  




O. Owere Judge Saza Pastor  Security 
guard 
I. B Oboth (Ms) Women rep. Saza L.C.1 Sec. for Information  Teacher 
S. Olowo Secretary Saza  Adviser at Parish Teacher 
M. Okongo Funeral chair, Saza Committee L.C 1 Farmer 
L. Owino Chair Gombolola  _ Farmer 
O. C. Okello  Secretary Gombolola Chair Local council 1 Farmer  
O. Onyango Miluka Chair Vice Chair Local Cl. 1 Farmer 
J. Okoth Assessor _ Self 
employed  
A. Olowo (Ms) Women rep. Miluka Chair Local council 1 Farmer 
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APPENDIX 4: LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS 
 
No. Institution  Name of person and title 
1 Tieng Adhola –cultural institution Mr. Moses Owor – The Kwar Adhola 
2 Supreme Court of Uganda Hon. B. J Odoki - The Chief Justice 
3             “ Hon. J. W.Tseekoko- Justice of Supreme 
Court 
4             “ Ms. H. Wolayo – Registrar Supreme Court 
5 Court of Appeal  Hon. C. K Byamugisha- Justice of Appeal 
(Ms) 
6                        “ Hon. C. B Kitumba – Justice of Appeal 
(Ms) 
7 High Court  Hon. I. M. Maitum- High Court Judge (Ms)  
8            “ Hon. R. Kasule- High Court Judge  
9            “ Ms F. Anglin – Registrar 
10            “ Mr. R. Byaruhanga- Registrar (Crime) 
11 Chief Magistrates’ Court -Tororo Mr. P. Rutakirwah – Chief Magistrate 
12 Sub county chief, Kisoko - Tororo Mr. Ondhoro  
13 Gwaragwara parish chief, Tororo Mr Tanga 
14 UNAFRI Dr. Masamba-Sita- Director 
15 Uganda Judicial Officers Association Mr. Keitirima – President   
16 Justice Law and Order Sector Ms. E. Edroma – Senior Technical Advisor 
17               “ Ms. C. Bainemugisha-  JLOS Secretariat 
18               “ Ms R. Odoi – Secretary to Transitional 
Justice Working group 
19 Uganda Law Society, Legal Aid Project Ms. S. Mukasa – Director Legal Aid clinic 
20 Directorate of Public Prosecutions Ms D. Lwanga- Commissioner  
21           “ Mr. M. Wamasebu –Commissioner  
22 First Parliamentary Counsel Ms. H. Lwabi-  Parliamentary Counsel 
23 Uganda Law Reform Commission Prof. J. M. N Kakooza – Chair ULRC 
24 Law Development Centre  Ms T. Webaale – Head, Legal Aid Project 
25  
Ministry of Local Government  
Mr. J. Musede – Senior Legal Research 
Officer 
26 Makerere University, School of Law Prof. J. Oloka-Onyango 
27                “ Ass. Prof. F. Juuko 
28                “ Ass. Prof. L. T. Ekirikubinza (Ms)  
Pro Vice Chancellor (Academic Affairs)   
29               “ Ass. Prof. S. Tamale – Dean (Ms) 
30               “ Mr. S. Tindifa – Senior Lecturer 
31               “  Linguistics 
Department 
Ms. J. Alowo- Senior Lecturer 
32               “   History Department Mr. Odoi-Tanga – Senior Lecturer 
33               “   Sociology 
Department 
Dr. Samula – Head of Department 
34               “  Philosophy 
Department 
Ass. Prof. E. Wamala- Head of Dept. 
35                                “ Ass. Prof. E. Beyaraza 
36               “ Adult Education Dept Mr. A. Oketch 
37 Ministry of Internal Affairs,  
Community Service Department 
Ms R. Nyonyi – National Co-ordinator 
38                 “ Mr. F. Wamukote – Probation Service Off. 
39                 “ Mr. P. Mugisa- Probation Service Officer 
40                 “ Ms. S. Katutu 





APPENDIX 5: Map of Tororo district and surrounding districts. Source: 
Department of Mapping and Surveys 
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APPENDIX 6: THE PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES ON THE RIGHT TO A 
FAIR TRIAL AND LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN AFRICA, 2003 (selected text) 
 
Section N  
6: Rights during a trial: 
 
(a) In criminal proceedings, the principle of equality of arms imposes procedural 
equality between the accused and the public prosecutor.  
1. The prosecution and defence shall be allowed equal time to present evidence.  
2. Prosecution and defence witnesses shall be given equal treatment in all 
procedural matters. 
(b) The accused is entitled to a hearing in which his or her individual culpability is 
determined. Group trials in which many persons are involved may violate the person's 
right to a fair hearing. 
(c) In criminal proceedings, the accused has the right to be tried in his or her presence. 
1. The accused has the right to appear in person before the judicial body. 
2. The accused may not be tried in absentia. If an accused is tried in absentia, the 
accused shall have the right to petition for a reopening of the proceedings upon a 
showing that inadequate notice was given, that the notice was not personally served 
on the accused, or that his or her failure to appear was for exigent reasons beyond 
his or her control. If the petition is granted, the accused is entitled to a fresh 
determination of the merits of the charge. 
3. The accused may voluntarily waive the right to appear at a hearing, but such a 
waiver shall be established in an unequivocal manner and preferably in writing.  
(d) The accused has the right not to be compelled to testify against him or herself or to 
confess guilt. 
1. Any confession or other evidence obtained by any form of coercion or force may 
not be admitted as evidence or considered as probative of any fact at trial or in 
sentencing. Any confession or admission obtained during incommunicado 
detention shall be considered to have been obtained by coercion. 
2. Silence by the accused may not be used as evidence to prove guilt and no 
adverse consequences may be drawn from the exercise of the right to remain silent. 
(e) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law. 
1. The presumption of innocence places the burden of proof during trial in any 
criminal case on the prosecution. 
2. Public officials shall maintain a presumption of innocence. Public officials, 
including prosecutors, may inform the public about criminal investigations or 
charges, but shall not express a view as to the guilt of any suspect. 
3. Legal presumptions of fact or law are permissible in a criminal case only if they 
are rebuttable, allowing a defendant to prove his or her innocence. 
(f) The accused has a right to examine, or have examined, witnesses against him or her 
and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the 
same conditions as witnesses against him or her. 
1. The prosecution shall provide the defence with the names of the witnesses it 
intends to call at trial within a reasonable time prior to trial which allows the 
defendant sufficient time to prepare his or her defence. 
2. The accused's right to examine witnesses may be limited to those witnesses 
whose testimony is relevant and likely to assist in ascertaining the truth. 
3. The accused has the right to be present during the testimony of a witness. This 
right may be limited only in exceptional circumstances such as when a witness 
reasonably fears reprisal by the defendant, when the accused engages in a course of 
conduct seriously disruptive of the proceedings, or when the accused repeatedly 
fails to appear for trivial reasons and after having been duly notified. 
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4. If the defendant is excluded or if the presence of the defendant cannot be 
ensured, the defendant's counsel shall always have the right to be present to 
preserve the defendant's right to examine the witness. 
5. If national law does not permit the accused to examine witnesses during pre-trial 
investigations, the defendant shall have the opportunity, personally or through 
defence counsel, to cross-examine the witness at trial. However, the right of a 
defendant to cross-examine witnesses personally may be limited in respect of 
victims of sexual violence and child witnesses, taking into consideration the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial. 
6. The testimony of anonymous witnesses during a trial will be allowed only in 
exceptional circumstances, taking into consideration the nature and the 
circumstances of the offence and the protection of the security of the witness and if 
it is determined to be in the interests of justice.  
(g) Evidence obtained by illegal means constituting a serious violation of 
internationally protected human rights shall not be used as evidence against the accused 
or against any other person in any proceeding, except in the prosecution of the 
perpetrators of the violations. 
 
7. Right to benefit from a lighter sentence or administrative sanction 
(a) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the 
time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that 
was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to 
the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter 
penalty, the offender shall benefit therefrom.  
(b) A lighter penalty created any time before an accused's sentence has been fully served 
should be applied to any offender serving a sentence under the previous penalty.  
(c) Administrative tribunals conducting disciplinary proceedings shall not impose a 
heavier penalty than the one that was applicable at the time when the offending conduct 
occurred. If, subsequent to the conduct, provision is made by law for the imposition of a 
lighter penalty, the person disciplined shall benefit thereby. 
 
Section P: VICTIMS OF CRIME AND ABUSE OF POWER 
 
a) Victims should be treated with compassion and respect for their dignity. They are 
entitled to have access to the mechanisms of justice and to prompt redress, as provided 
for by national legislation and international law, for the harm that they have suffered. 
b) States must ensure that women who are victims of crime, especially of a sexual 
nature, are interviewed by women police or judicial officials. 
c) Sates shall take steps to ensure that women who are complainants, victims or 
witnesses are not subjected to any cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment.  
d) Judicial and administrative mechanisms should be established and strengthened 
where necessary to enable victims to obtain redress through formal or informal 
procedures that are expeditious, fair, inexpensive and accessible. Victims should be 
informed of their rights in seeking redress through such mechanisms.  
e) States are required to investigate and punish all complaints of violence against 
women, including domestic violence, whether those acts are perpetrated by the state, its 
officials or agents or by private persons. Fair and effective procedures and mechanisms 
must be established and be accessible to women who have been subjected to violence to 
enable them to file criminal complaints and to obtain other redress for the proper 
investigation of the violence suffered, to obtain restitution or reparation and to prevent 
further violence. 
f) Judicial officers, prosecutors and lawyers, as appropriate, should facilitate the needs 
of victims by: 
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1. Informing them of their role and the scope, timing and progress of the 
proceedings and the final outcome of their cases;  
2. Allowing their views and concerns to be presented and considered at appropriate 
stages of the proceedings where their personal interests are affected, without 
prejudice to the accused and consistent with the relevant national criminal justice 
system; 
3. Providing them with proper assistance throughout the legal process;  
4. Taking measures to minimize inconvenience to them, protect their privacy, when 
necessary, and ensure their safety, as well as that of their families and witnesses on 
their behalf, from intimidation and retaliation;  
5. Avoiding unnecessary delay in the disposition of cases and the execution of 
orders or decrees granting awards to victims. 
g) Informal mechanisms for the resolution of disputes, including mediation, arbitration 
and traditional or customary practices, should be utilized where appropriate to facilitate 
conciliation and redress for victims. 
h) Offenders or third parties responsible for their behaviour should, where appropriate, 
make fair restitution to victims, their families or dependants. Such restitution should 
include the return of property or payment for the harm or loss suffered, reimbursement of 
expenses, the provision of services and the restoration of rights.  
i) States should review their practices, regulations and laws to consider restitution as an 
available sentencing option in criminal cases, in addition to other criminal sanctions.  
j) Where public officials or other agents acting in an official or quasi-official capacity 
have violated national criminal laws or international law, the victims should receive 
restitution from the State whose officials or agents were responsible for the harm 
inflicted.  
k) When compensation is not fully available from the offender or other sources, States 
should endeavour to provide financial compensation to:  
1. Victims who have sustained significant bodily injury or impairment of physical 
or mental health as a result of serious crimes;  
2. The family, in particular dependants of persons who have died or become 
physically or mentally incapacitated. 
l) States are encouraged to establish, strengthen and expand national funds for 
compensation to victims.  
m) States must ensure that : 
1. Victims receive the necessary material, medical, psychological and social 
assistance through state, voluntary, non-governmental and community-based 
means. 
2. Victims are informed of the availability of health and social services and other 
relevant assistance and be readily afforded access to them.  
3. Police, justice, health, social service and other personnel concerned receive 
training to sensitize them to the needs of victims, and guidelines are adopted to 
ensure proper and prompt aid. 
 
Section Q. TRADITIONAL COURTS 
a) Traditional courts, where they exist, are required to respect international standards on 
the right to a fair trial. 
b) The following provisions shall apply, as a minimum, to all proceedings before 
traditional courts: 
1. equality of persons without any distinction whatsoever as regards race, colour, 
sex, gender, religion, creed, language, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, means, disability, birth, status or other circumstances; 
2. respect for the inherent dignity of human persons, including the right not to be 
subject to torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment; 
3. respect for the right to liberty and security of every person, in particular the right 
of every individual not to be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention; 
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4. respect for the equality of women and men in all proceedings; 
5. respect for the inherent dignity of women, and their right not to be subjected to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; 
6. adequate opportunity to prepare a case, present arguments and evidence and to 
challenge or respond to opposing arguments or evidence; 
7. an entitlement to the assistance of an interpreter if he or she cannot understand or 
speak the language used in or by the traditional court; 
8. an entitlement to seek the assistance of and be represented by a representative of 
the party’s choosing in all proceedings before the traditional court; 
9. an entitlement to have a party’s rights and obligations affected only by a decision 
based solely on evidence presented to the traditional court; 
10. an entitlement to a determination of their rights and obligations without undue 
delay and with adequate notice of and reasons for the decisions; 
11. an entitlement to an appeal to a higher traditional court, administrative 
authority or a judicial tribunal; 
12. all hearings before traditional courts shall be held in public and its decisions 
shall be rendered in public, except where the interests of children require or where 
the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children; 
c) The independence of traditional courts shall be guaranteed by the laws of the country 
and respected by the government, its agencies and authorities:  
1.   they shall be independent from the executive branch;  
2.  there shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with 
proceedings before traditional courts. 
d) States shall ensure the impartiality of traditional courts.  In particular, members of 
traditional courts shall decide matters before them without any restrictions, improper 
influence, inducements, pressure, threats or interference, direct or indirect, from any 
quarter. 
1. The impartiality of a traditional court would be undermined when one of its 
members has: 
1.1 expressed an opinion which would influence the decision-making;  
1.2 some connection or involvement with the case or a party to the case;  
1.3 a pecuniary or other interest linked to the outcome of the case. 
2. Any party to proceedings before a traditional court shall be entitled to 
challenge its impartiality on the basis of ascertainable facts that the fairness any of 
its members or the traditional court appears to be in doubt. 
e) The procedures for complaints against and discipline of members of traditional courts 
shall be prescribed by law.  Complaints against members of traditional courts shall be 
processed promptly and expeditiously, and with all the guarantees of a fair hearing, 
including the right to be represented by a legal representative of choice and to an 
independent review of decisions of disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings. 
 
R. NON-DEGORABILITY CLAUSE 
No circumstances whatsoever, whether a threat of war, a state of international or internal 
armed conflict, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be 
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APPENDIX 7:  AGREEMENT ON ACCOUNTABILITY AND RECONCILIATION 
BETWEEN THE GOU AND LRA 26TH JUNE 2007 
 
This agreement, between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s 
Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) (herein referred to as the Parties), witnesseth that:  
 
Preamble  
Whereas the parties:  
Having been engaged in protracted negotiations in Juba, Southern Sudan, in order to find 
just, peaceful and lasting solutions to the long-running conflict, and to promote 
reconciliation and restore harmony and tranquillity within the affected communities and 
in Uganda generally;  
 
Conscious of the serious crimes, human rights violations and adverse socio-economic 
and political impacts of the conflict, and the need to honour the suffering of victims by 
promoting lasting peace with justice;  
 
Committed to preventing impunity and promoting redress in accordance with the 
Constitution and international obligations and recalling, in this connection, the 
requirements of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and in 
particular the principle of complementarity;  
 
Driven by the need for adopting appropriate justice mechanisms, including customary 
processes of accountability, that would resolve the conflict while promoting 
reconciliation and convinced that this Agreement is a sound basis for achieving that 
purpose;  
 
Guided by the objective principle of the Constitution, which directs that there shall be 
established and nurtured institutions and procedures for the resolution of conflicts fairly 
and peacefully; and further recalling the Constitutional duty on the courts of Uganda to 
promote reconciliation.  
 
Now therefore the parties agree as follows:  
Definitions: Unless the context suggests otherwise, the following words and phrases 
shall have the meaning assigned thereto:  
“Ailuc” refers to the traditional rituals performed by the Iteso to reconcile parties 
formerly in conflict, after full accountability.  
“Alternative justice mechanisms” refers to justice mechanisms not currently 
administered in the formal courts established under the Constitution.  
“Constitution” means the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda.  
“Culo Kwor” refers to the compensation to atone for homicide, as practiced in Acholi 
and Lango cultures, and to any other forms of reparation, after full accountability.  
“Gender” refers to the two sexes, men and women, within the context of society.  
“Kayo Cuk” refers to the traditional rituals performed by the Langi to reconcile parties 
formerly in conflict, after full accountability.  
“Mato Oput” refers to the traditional rituals performed by the Acholi to reconcile parties 
formerly in conflict, after full accountability.  
“Reconciliation” refers to the process of restoring broken relationships and re-
establishing harmony.  
“The Conflict” means the conflict between the Parties in Northern and North-eastern 
Uganda, including its impacts in the neighbouring countries.  
“Tonu ci Koka” refers to the traditional rituals performed by the Madi to reconcile 
parties formerly in conflict, after full accountability;  
“Victims” means persons who individually or collectively have adversely suffered harm 
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as a consequence of crimes and human rights violations committed during the conflict.  
 
Commitment to accountability and reconciliation  
2.1. The Parties shall promote national legal arrangements, consisting of formal and non 
formal institutions and measures for ensuring justice and reconciliation with respect to 
the conflict.  
 
2.2. The accountability processes stipulated in this Agreement shall relate to the period of 
the conflict. However, this clause shall not prevent the consideration and analysis of any 
relevant matter before this period, or the promotion of reconciliation with respect to 
events that occurred before this period.  
 
2.3. The Parties believe that a comprehensive, independent and impartial analysis of the 
history and manifestations of the conflict, especially the human rights violations and 
crimes committed during the course of the conflict, is an essential ingredient for attaining 
reconciliation at all levels.  
 
2.4. The Parties agree that at all stages of the development and implementation of the 
principles and mechanisms of this Agreement, the widest possible consultations shall be 
promoted and undertaken in order to receive the views and concerns of all stakeholders, 
and to ensure the widest national ownership of the accountability and reconciliation 
processes. Consultations shall extend to state institutions, civil society, academia, 
community leaders, traditional and religious leaders, and victims.  
2.5. The Parties undertake to honour and respect, at all times, all the terms of this 
Agreement which shall be implemented in the utmost good faith and shall adopt effective 
measures for monitoring and verifying the obligations assumed by the Parties under this 
Agreement.  
 
Principles of general application  
3.1. Traditional justice mechanisms, such as Culo Kwor, Mato Oput, Kayo Cuk, Ailuc 
and Tonu ci Koka and others as practiced in the communities affected by the conflict, 
shall be promoted, with necessary modifications, as a central part of the framework for 
accountability and reconciliation.  
 
Conduct of proceedings  
3.2. The Parties recognise that any meaningful accountability proceedings should, in the 
context of recovery from the conflict, promote reconciliation and encourage individuals 
to take personal responsibility for their conduct.  
 
3.3. With respect to any proceedings under this Agreement, the right of the individual to a 
fair hearing and due process, as guaranteed by the Constitution, shall at all times be 
protected. In particular, in the determination of civil rights and obligations or any 
criminal charge, a person shall be entitled to a fair, speedy and public hearing before an 
independent and impartial court or tribunal established by law.  
 
3.4. In the conduct of accountability and reconciliation processes, measures shall be taken 
to ensure the safety and privacy of witnesses.  
Witnesses shall be protected from intimidation or persecution on account of their 
testimony. Child witnesses and victims of sexual crimes shall be given particular 
protection during proceedings.  
 
Cooperation within proceedings  
3.5. The Parties shall promote procedures and approaches to enable individuals to 
cooperate with formal criminal or civil investigations, processes and proceedings.  
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Cooperation may include the making of confessions, disclosures and provision of 
information on relevant matters. The application of any cooperation procedures shall not 
prejudice the rights of cooperating individuals.  
 
3.6. Provisions may be made for the recognition of confessions or other forms of 
cooperation to be recognised for purposes of sentencing or sanctions.  
 
Legal representation  
3.7. Any person appearing before a formal proceeding shall be entitled to appear in 
person or to be represented at that person’s expense by a lawyer of his or her choice. 
Victims participating in proceedings shall be entitled to be legally represented.  
 
3.8. Provision shall be made for individuals facing serious criminal charges or allegations 
of serious human rights violations and for victims participating in such proceedings, who 
cannot afford representation, to be afforded legal representation at the expense of the 
State.  
 
Finality and effect of proceedings  
3.9. In order to achieve finality of legal processes, accountability and reconciliation 
procedures shall address the full extent of the offending conduct attributed to an 
individual. Legislation may stipulate the time within which accountability and 
reconciliation mechanisms should be undertaken.  
 
3.10. Where a person has already been subjected to proceedings or exempted from 
liability for any crime or civil acts or omissions, or has been subjected to accountability 
or reconciliation proceedings for any conduct in the course of the conflict, that person 
shall not be subjected to any other proceedings with respect to that conduct.  
 
Accountability  
4.1. Formal criminal and civil justice measures shall be applied to any individual who is 
alleged to have committed serious crimes or human rights violations in the course of the 
conflict. Provided that, state actors shall be subjected to existing criminal justice 
processes and not to special justice processes under this Agreement.  
 
4.2. Prosecutions and other formal accountability proceedings shall be based upon 
systematic, independent and impartial investigations.  
 
4.3. The choice of forum for the adjudication of any particular case shall depend, 
amongst other considerations, on the nature and gravity of the offending conduct and the 
role of the alleged perpetrator in that conduct.  
 
4.4. For purposes of this Agreement, accountability mechanisms shall be implemented 
through the adapted legal framework in Uganda.  
 
Legal and institutional framework  
5.1. The Parties affirm that Uganda has institutions and mechanisms, customs and usages 
as provided for and recognised under national laws, capable of addressing the crimes and 
human rights violations committed during the conflict. The Parties also recognise that 
modifications may be required within the national legal system to ensure a more effective 
and integrated justice and accountability response.  
 
5.2.The Parties therefore acknowledge the need for an overarching justice framework that 
will provide for the exercise of formal criminal jurisdiction, and for the adoption and 
recognition of complementary alternative justice mechanisms.  
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5.3. Alternative justice mechanisms shall promote reconciliation and shall include 
traditional justice processes, alternative sentences, reparations, and any other formal 
institutions or mechanisms.  
 
5.4. Insofar as practicable, accountability and reconciliation processes shall be promoted 
through existing national institutions and mechanisms, with necessary modifications. The 
Parties shall consult on the need to introduce any additional institutions or mechanisms 
for the implementation of this Agreement.  
 
5.5. The Parties consider that the Uganda Human Rights Commission and the Uganda 
Amnesty Commission are capable of implementing relevant aspects of this Agreement.  
 
Legislative and policy changes  
5.6. The Government will introduce any necessary legislation, policies and procedures to 
establish the framework for addressing accountability and reconciliation and shall 
introduce amendments to any existing law in order to promote the principles in this 
Agreement.  
 
Formal justice processes  
6.1. Formal courts provided for under the Constitution shall exercise jurisdiction over 
individuals who are alleged to bear particular responsibility for the most serious crimes, 
especially crimes amounting to international crimes, during the course of the conflict.  
 
6.2. Formal courts and tribunals established by law shall adjudicate allegations of gross 
human rights violations arising from the conflict.  
 
Sentences and Sanctions  
6.3. Legislation shall introduce a regime of alternative penalties and sanctions which shall 
apply, and replace existing penalties, with respect to serious crimes and human rights 
violations committed by non-state actors in the course of the conflict.  
 
6.4. Alternative penalties and sanctions shall, as relevant: reflect the gravity of the crimes 
or violations; promote reconciliation between individuals and within communities; 
promote the rehabilitation of offenders; take into account an individual’s admissions or 




7.1. The Parties shall promote appropriate reconciliation mechanisms to address issues 
arising from within or outside Uganda with respect to the conflict.  
 
7.2. The Parties shall promote collective as well as individual acts and processes of 
reconciliation shall be promoted at all levels.  
 
7.3. Truth-seeking and truth-telling processes and mechanisms shall be promoted.  
 
Victims  
8.1. The Parties agree that it is essential to acknowledge and address the suffering of 
victims, paying attention to the most vulnerable groups, and to promote and facilitate 
their right to contribute to society.  
 
8.2. The Government shall promote the effective and meaningful participation of victims 
in accountability and reconciliation proceedings, consistently with the rights of the other 
parties in the proceedings. Victims shall be informed of the processes and any decisions 
affecting their interests.  
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8.3. Victims have the right of access to relevant information about their experiences and 
to remember and commemorate past events affecting them.  
 
8.4. In the implementation of accountability and reconciliation mechanisms, the dignity, 
privacy and security of victims shall be respected and protected.  
 
Reparations  
9.1. Reparations may include a range of measures such as: rehabilitation; restitution; 
compensation; guarantees of non-recurrence and other symbolic measures such as 
apologies, memorials and commemorations. Priority shall be given to members of 
vulnerable groups.  
 
9.2. The Parties agree that collective as well as individual reparations should be made to 
victims through mechanisms to be adopted by the Parties upon further consultation.  
 
9.3. Reparations, which may be ordered to be paid to a victim as part of penalties and 




In the implementation of this Agreement, a gender-sensitive approach shall be promoted 
and in particular, implementers of this Agreement shall strive to prevent and eliminate 
any gender inequalities that may arise.  
 
Women and girls  
In the implementation of this Agreement it is agreed to:  
(i) Recognise and address the special needs of women and girls.  
(ii) Ensure that the experiences, views and concerns of women and girls are recognised 
and taken into account.  
(iii) Protect the dignity, privacy and security of women and girls.  
(iv) Encourage and facilitate the participation of women and girls in the processes for 
implementing this agreement.  
 
Children  
In the implementation of this Agreement it is agreed to:  
(i) Recognise and address the special needs of children and adopt child-sensitive 
approaches.  
(ii) Recognise and consider the experiences, views and concerns or children.  
(iii) Protect the dignity, privacy and security of children in any accountability and 
reconciliation proceedings.  
(iv) Ensure that children are not subjected to criminal justice proceedings, but may 
participate, as appropriate, in reconciliation processes.  
(v) Promote appropriate reparations for children.  
(vi) Encourage and facilitate the participation of children in the processes for 
implementing this Agreement.  
 
Resources  
The Government will avail and solicit resources for the effective implementation of this 
Agreement.  
 
Obligations and undertakings of the parties  
The Parties:  
14.1. Expeditiously consult upon and develop proposals for mechanisms for 
implementing these principles.  
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14.2. Ensure that any accountability and reconciliation issues arising in any other 
agreement between themselves are consistent and integrated with the provisions of this 
Agreement.  
 
The Government:  
14.3. Adopt an appropriate policy framework for implementing the terms of this 
Agreement.  
 
14.4. Introduce any amendments to the Amnesty Act or the Uganda Human Rights Act in 
order to bring it into conformity with the principles of this Agreement.  
 
14.5. Undertake any necessary representations or legal proceedings nationally or 
internationally, to implement the principles of this Agreement.  
 
14.6. Address conscientiously the question of the ICC arrest warrants relating to the 
leaders of the LRA/M.  
 
14.7. Remove the LRA/M from the list of Terrorist Organisations under the Anti-
Terrorism Act of Uganda upon the LRA/M abandoning rebellion, ceasing fire, and 
submitting its members to the process of Disarmament, Demobilisation, and 
Reintegration.  
 
14.8. Make representations to any state or institution which has proscribed the LRA/M to 
take steps to remove the LRA/M or its members from such list.  
 
The LRA/M:  
14.9. The LRA/M shall assume obligations and enjoy rights pursuant to this Agreement.  
14.10. The LRA/M shall actively promote the principles of this Agreement.  
 
Adoption of mechanisms for implementing this Agreement  
15.1. The Parties shall negotiate and adopt an annexure to this Agreement which shall set 
out elaborated principles and mechanisms for the implementation of this Agreement. The 
annexure shall form a part of this Agreement.  
 
15.2. The Parties may agree and the Mediator will provide additional guidance on the 
matters for the Parties to consider and consult upon in the interim period, in developing 
proposals for mechanisms for implementing this agreement.  
 
Commencement  
This agreement shall take effect upon signature.  
 
Signed by:  
Dr. S. P. Kagoda  
for Government of Uganda  
 
Martin Ojul for LRM/A  
 
Witnessed by: H.E Lt. Gen. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon, H.E Japheth R Getugi 
and H.E Ali I Siwa 
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APPENDIX 8 ANNEXURE TO THE AGREEMENT ON ACCOUNTABILITY 
AND RECONCILIATION, 19 FEBRUARY 2008
40
 (relevant extracts) 
THE Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation signed between 
the Government of the Republic of Uganda (the Government) and the Lord's Resistance 
Army/Movement (LRA/M) (the Parties) on 29th June 2007 (the Principal Agreement) 
provides as follows: 
The parties 
Having signed the Principal Agreement by which the parties committed themselves to 
implementing accountability and reconciliation with respect to the conflict; 
 
Pursuant to the terms of the principal agreement calling for the adoption of mechanisms 
for implementing accountability and reconciliation; 
 
Having carried out broad consultations within and outside Uganda, and in particular, 
with communities that have suffered most as a result of the conflict; 
 
Having established through consultations under Clause 2.4 of the principal agreement, 
that there is national consensus in Uganda that adequate mechanisms exist or can be 
expeditiously established to try the offences committed during the conflict; 
 
Recalling their commitment to preventing impunity and promoting redress in accordance 
with the Constitution and international obligations, and recalling, in this connection, the 
requirements of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and in 
particular the principle of complementarity; 
 
Confident that the Principal Agreement embodies the necessary principles by which the 
conflict can be resolved with justice and reconciliation and consistent with national and 
international aspirations and standards; 
 
Now therefore agree as follows: 
 
Primacy of the Principal Agreement 
1. This Annexure sets out a framework by which accountability and reconciliation are to 
be implemented pursuant to the principal agreement, provided that this annexure shall not 
in any way limit the application of that agreement, whose provisions are to be 
implemented in full. 
2. The government shall expeditiously prepare and develop the necessary legislation and 
modalities for implementing the principal agreement and this annexure ('the agreement'). 
3. The government, under clause 2 above, shall take into account any representations 
from the parties on findings arising from the consultations undertaken by the parties and 
any input by the public during the legislative process. 
 
Legal and Institutional Framework (Principal Agreement: Part 5) 
7. A special division of the High Court of Uganda shall be established to try individuals 
who are alleged to have committed serious crimes during the conflict. 
8. The special division of the High Court shall have a registry dedicated to the work of 
the division and in particular, shall make arrangements to facilitate the protection and 
participation of witnesses, victims, women and children. 
                                                 
40
 Available at AI Index: AFR 59/001/2008: 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2008.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/LRON-7CTEZN-
full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf visited on 17/03/09. 
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9. For the proper functioning of the special division of the court in accordance with the 
agreed principles of accountability and reconciliation, legislation may provide for: 
(a) The constitution of the court; 
(b) The substantive law to be applied; 
(c) Appeals against the decisions of the court; 
(d) Rules of procedure; 
(e) The recognition of traditional and community justice processes in proceedings. 
 
Reparations (Principal Agreement: Clauses 6.4 & 9) 
16. The government shall establish the necessary arrangements for making reparations to 
victims of the conflict in accordance with the terms of the principal agreement. 
17. Prior to establishing arrangements for reparations, the government shall review the 
financial and institutional requirements for reparations, in order to ensure the adoption of 
the most effective mechanisms for reparations. 
18. In reviewing the question of reparations, consideration shall be given to clarifying 
and determining the procedures for reparations. 
 
Traditional Justice (Principal Agreement: Clause 3.1) 
19. Traditional justice shall form a central part of the alternative justice and reconciliation 
framework identified in the principal agreement. 
20. The government shall, in consultation with relevant interlocutors, examine the 
practices of traditional justice mechanisms in affected areas, with a view to identifying 
the most appropriate roles for such mechanisms. In particular, it shall consider the role 
and impact of the processes on women and children. 
 
21. The Traditional Justice Mechanisms referred to include: 
i. Mato Oput in Acholi, Kayo Cuk in Lango, Ailuc in Teso, Tonu ci Koka in Madi and 
Okukaraba in Ankole; and 
ii. Communal dispute settlement institutions such as family and clan courts. 
22. A person shall not be compelled to undergo any traditional ritual. 
 
Provisions of General Application 
23. Subject to clause 4.1 of the principal agreement, the Government shall ensure that 
serious crimes committed during the conflict are addressed by the special Division of the 
High Court; traditional justice mechanisms; and any other alternative justice mechanism 
established under the principal agreement, but not the military courts. 
24. All bodies implementing the agreement shall establish internal procedures and 
arrangements for protecting and ensuring the participation of victims, traumatised 
individuals, women, children, persons with disabilities and victims of sexual violence in 
proceedings. 
25. In the appointment of members and staff of institutions envisaged by the Agreement, 
overriding consideration shall be given to the competences and skills required for the 
office, and gender balance shall be ensured. 
26. The mediator shall from time to time receive or make requests for reports on the 
progress of the implementation of the agreement. 






APPENDIX 9: OVERVIEW OF SENTENCES UNDER NATIONAL LAW  
 
Sentences are contained in the laws governing trials in the magistrates’ courts 
and High Court.
41
 Offences are set out in the Penal Code Act that prescribes punishments 
for various categories of offence. The High Court has the jurisdiction to pass any lawful 
sentence or combination of sentences.
42
 In magistrates’ courts, sentencing jurisdiction is 
graded under S. 162 MCA and Part XV. For example, under S. 162 (1) (a), a chief 
magistrate may pass any sentence authorised by law including life imprisonment, but not 
a death sentence. The choice of sentence is pre-determined for offences. Except for 
offences with mandatory sentences, the judge or magistrate has wide discretion in 
determining the sentence.
43
 The penalties contain some elements of retribution, 
rehabilitation and reparation.  
 An extreme retributive sentence is the death penalty that is carried out by hanging
44
 
although pregnant women and juvenile offenders are exempt.
45
 The death sentence is 
mandatory for certain offences
46
 and discretionary for others.
47
 The only court with the 
jurisdiction to pass a death sentence is the High Court under S.2 (1) TIA. Other sentences 
with retributive aims include life imprisonment (held to involve a maximum tariff of 20 
years imprisonment).
48
 For example, incest may attract a maximum sentence of life 
                                                 
41
 The Magistrates Courts Act (MCA) and Trial on Indictments Act (TIA). An earlier analysis of 
punishments in Uganda’s penal legislation can be found in F. Ayume op cit 163- 205 and D. 
Nsereko (1995) Chapter 8 op cit. A more recent appraisal of sentencing is in the Draft Sentencing 
Report (2006) op cit and A study on sentencing (2001) op cit.  
42
 TIA op cit Parts VIII, IX and S.2 (1) except where a young offender is tried with an adult, in 
which case the High Court must remit the case back to the Family and Children Court for 
sentencing under S. 104(2) Children Act op cit.  
43
 A study on sentencing (2001) op cit para 40.1 
44
 S. 99 TIA op cit. 
45
 Ibid, S. 103 and 105. These provisions incorporate Article 6 ICCPR that proscribes the passing 
of a death sentence on a person below 18, or a pregnant woman. Uganda has not signed the 2
nd
 
optional protocol to the ICCPR aimed at the abolition of the death penalty, but is party to the 1
st
 
optional protocol: General Assembly Resolution 44/128:15
th
 December 1989. Nonetheless, 
Economic Social Council Resolution 1984/50 on safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights 
of those facing the death penalty is applicable to Uganda. 
46
 Penal Code op cit: Murder (S.189), Treason (S.23) kidnap or detention with intent to murder (S. 
243(1)), aggravated robbery (S.286 (2)). 
47
 Ibid, for example: Rape (S.124), misprision of treason (S.25) and terrorism (S.7 (1) (b) of the 
Anti-Terrorism Act 14 of 2002.  
48
 Livingstone Kakooza v Uganda Sup. Ct. Cr. Appeal No.17/93, interpreting the Prisons Act Cap 
304 S.86 (6) (now S.84 Prisons Act 17 of 2006).  
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imprisonment if the victim is below 18 years of age.
49
Another retributive punishment is 
mandatory imprisonment following previous convictions under the Habitual Criminals 
(Prevention Detention) Act, Cap 118.
50
 There are also discretionary sentences of 
imprisonment. 
 Rehabilitation may be ordered where a defendant is found to be guilty but insane. 
The Minister responsible for Justice makes an order for the defendant to be confined in a 
mental hospital, prison or suitable place of custody.
51
  
Reparative sentences include fines, costs, compensation, restitution, 
reconciliation and community service orders. Additionally, the constitution promotes the 
application of compensation and reconciliation by the courts in criminal cases.
52
 Such 
sentences conform to traditional norms of reparation as well as the United Nations Tokyo 
Rules that promote use of non custodial measures.
53
  
       Fines may be paid to defray expenses incurred by the prosecution.
54
 Costs are paid 
to the defendant following acquittal, or to the prosecutor. However, the victim may not 
get costs from the defendant.
55
 Where compensation may be paid to the victim it is at the 
court’s discretion and covers only material loss or personal injury.56 In other instances 
like robbery, the court shall order mandatory compensation in addition to imprisonment
57
 
but the compensation order is deemed to be a decree under the Civil Procedure Act and 
executed under the provisions of that Act.
58
 Therefore to get compensation, a victim may 
have to file a civil suit. If victims are impecunious, they may not be able to afford legal 
services; moreover there is no legal aid for civil cases. The Poor Persons Defence Act,
59
 
as the title suggests, only provides for legal aid in criminal cases. 
                                                 
49
 For other categories of offender, incest attracts a maximum of 7 years imprisonment: S. 149 (1) 
PC op cit.  
50
 MCA op cit S. 163 permits the court to apply Cap 118. Under S.1 Cap 118, the court takes into 
account at least three previous convictions since the offender reached the age of 16 and was, in at 
least two of them, sentenced to imprisonment.  
51
 MCA ibid S. 117 and TIA op cit S.48 
52
 Uganda constitution op cit. Under Art.126 (2) (c): ‘adequate compensation shall be awarded to 
victims of wrongs and under Article126 (2) (d): ‘reconciliation between parties shall be 
promoted.’ 
53
 The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures called ‘The Tokyo 
Rules’ adopted by General Assembly Resolution 45/110 of 14 December 1990. 
54
 S. 180, S. 199 (1) MCA op cit and S.110, S.128 (1) TIA, op cit. 
55
 Ibid, S. 195 (1) MCA, S.125 (1) TIA.   
56
 Ibid, S.197 (1) MCA, S. 126 (1) TIA. Compensation may be paid to the prosecutor if the case is 
deemed to be frivolous. 
57
 Penal Code op cit S.270, if a person if convicted of robbery, embezzlement or causing financial 
loss they must pay compensation. 
58
 S. 25 Civil Procedure Act Cap 71 (2000 edition). The decree may be executed in various ways 
prescribed in S. 38 for example by attachment and sale or arrest and detention in prison.  
59
 Poor Persons Defence Act Cap 20 (2000 edition) S.2 is on the provision of legal aid in criminal 
matters. 
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 Restitution may be ordered following a conviction for theft or receiving or 
retaining stolen property under the Penal Code Act. Magistrates’ courts and the High 
Court may also order that the stolen property be returned to the owner.
60
  
     Magistrates’ courts under S. 160 MCA, may promote reconciliation and facilitate a 
settlement amicably by ordering payment of compensation, a stay of the proceedings, or 
other terms approved by the court. This is in cases of assault, offences of a personal or 
private nature, and any other offences that do not amount to a felony. For offences that 
are trivial in nature or where there are extenuating circumstances, the court may 
discharge without punishment or convict and caution the defendant.
61
 
 Under the Community Service Act, the community sentence is imposed only for 
minor offences.
62
 The offender is supervised to ensure they complete the work. The 
sentence is calculated according to a grid, based on information provided by the 
Probation and Welfare officer.
63
 Community service resonates with traditional sentences 
in parts of Uganda where it is a legitimate punishment.
64
 
Finally, there are restrictions on the application of some sentences. For example, 
where sentences are fixed by law, probation orders are not available under S. 2 (1) of the 
Probation Act, Cap 122. Likewise, a suspended sentence is only given by an appellate 
court under S.331 (3)-(10) of the Criminal Procedure Code.  
                                                 
60
 S. 201 (1) (2) MCA op cit, and S. 130(1) (2) TIA op cit.  
61
 Ibid, S. 190 MCA (1) (a) and TIA (b), S. 119 (1) (a) and (b). 
62
 Community Service Act Cap 115, S.2. S. 3 states that a person convicted of a minor offence 
may be sentenced to community service. 
63
Community Service Regulations 2001 SI 55-2001, s.15. Second schedule Part B, provides for 
making an assessment on whether the offender can be re-integrated into the community. This 
includes finding out: attitudes of the victim, the possibility of encouraging reconciliation; and risks 
to the community, offender and victim. A detailed critique of the effectiveness of community 
service is undertaken by C. Birungi, Community Service in Uganda as an Alternative to 
Imprisonment: a Case Study of Masaka and Mukono Districts, Unpublished MA Thesis, 
University of Western Cape, South Africa, (2005). 
64
 JLOS Criminal Justice Baseline Survey (2002) op cit 124 established that 26% of households 
surveyed in northern Uganda support community service as a punishment on the ground that it 
resonates with the traditional restorative penalty (of community service). My interview on 5
th
 
September 2006 and 8
th
 August 2008 with officials from the Community Service Department, 
confirmed this finding. Furthermore, a pilot National Community Service project in the Acoli sub 
region and Karamoja, attempts to integrate a  traditional system called Awitong (the spear), by 
calling upon the elders to give information to the national courts on the underlying social problem 
that led to the crime. Elders are expected to give counselling, supervise offenders doing 
community service and act as sureties. Preliminary results from Karamoja, however, show that 
integration may be difficult because the two systems (state and traditional) run parallel: 
Administration of community service orders in conflict areas and internally displaced peoples 
camps: Acoli and Lango sub region, National Community Service Committee (Kampala, July 
2004) and Incorporating traditional administration of justice into community service in Karamoja, 
research concept note, National Community Service Committee (Kampala, July 2004).  
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APPENDIX 10: BACKGROUND TO THE LOCAL COUNCIL COURT 
LEGISLATION  
 
    The origins of the resistance committee courts (now called ‘local council courts’), 
can be traced to the 1981-1986 guerrilla war waged by Yoweri Museveni. They started as 
committees whose aim was to provide support to the guerrilla fighters. Later the mandate 
expanded to control of law and order.
65
 There is little literature about the resistance 
council operations in the ‘bush’ as courts.66 Resistance committee courts originally 
operated as part of the socio-political liberation struggle against the Obote II regime 
(1981-1986), then later became part of the state machinery in 1986. The courts were 
founded on a promise by the National Resistance government to make ‘justice available 
for all.’67 Resistance committee courts were preceded by the 1987 Resistance Councils 
and Committees Statute that established local administrative units comprising lay people, 
including women and youth representatives, who combined legislative, executive and 
judicial powers.
68
  Although the statute gave the impression of independence, in reality 




A commission of inquiry into local government in Uganda pointed out that the 
context in which the courts operated had changed following the 1986 war. They usurped 
judicial and even security functions. Nevertheless, the commission recommended that 
since the courts were popular, their autonomy should not be limited.
70
 Notably, the 1987 
Statute provided that under S.11 (2), no person could be disqualified from serving on the 
court, on account of being illiterate in the official language (English). 
   The National Resistance Council later passed the Resistance Councils and 
Committees (Judicial Powers) Statute 1988.
71
 Under S. 3 (5), questions arising before the 
resistance committee court were to be determined by consensus and in default, by a 
                                                 
65
 Y. Museveni (2007) op cit 192-193. 
66
 J. Barya and J. Oloka-Onyango op cit paras 1.1 and 1.4 
67
 Ibid at page 11 referring to President Museveni’s address to the Uganda Law Society in 1987. 
68
 Resistance Councils and Committees Statute 9 of 1987, Section 6. The section established the 
Resistance Councils as a policy making organs a the local government level, with the power to 
formulate development plans and make by-laws. Each council had Resistance Committees to 
implement both the council and government policies and assist in maintenance of law and order. 
Under S. 10(1), the Resistance Committee comprised 9 persons elected by adult suffrage, handling 
matters relating to youth, women, information, mass mobilisation and education, security and 
finance. 
69
 Ibid. Under S. 6 (c) the council would perform functions as delegated to it by the Minster for 
Local Government. 
70
 Ministry of Local Government Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Local Government 
System, (Kampala, June 1987) paras. 54-57 and 58 (d). 
71
Resistance Councils and Committees (Judicial Powers) Statute 1 of 1988.  
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majority of members sitting. There were no procedural rules: S. 15(2) enjoined the courts 
to apply rules of natural justice. For instance, under S.15 (2) (a), each party had to be 
given an opportunity to be heard. The courts were obliged to hear every case 
expeditiously and without undue regard to technical rules of evidence and procedure: S. 
15(2). Under S. 12(2), no parties to the suit could be represented by an advocate unless 
proceedings were in respect of a violation of a council’s by-laws. Further, the court was 
permitted to determine its language which would in most cases be the indigenous 
language of the locality.
72
 Jurisdiction was limited to specific aspects of a civil customary 
nature like ‘impregnation of or elopement with a girl under 18 years of age.’73 The statute 
gave the right to appeal to the Chief Magistrate who also had supervisory powers under 
S. 26 (2) (d).  
The 1988 statute was replaced with the Executive Committees (Judicial Powers) 
Act that gave the courts criminal jurisdiction over young offenders.
74
 There were no 
changes to the provisions on decision making and natural justice- S. 17 (2) and S. 19, or 
determination of questions by consensus under S. 4(5). The Act also provided rather 
vaguely in S.14, that all proceedings and records would be in the language of the court.  
Under the Local Councils Courts Act, 2006, the courts were renamed the local 
council courts. Their powers are streamlined so that under S. 10 they only handle, among 
others, specified civil customary cases and criminal matters relating to children. 
Procedure and decision making is the same as before,
75
 like determination of questions by 
consensus under S. 8(2) (8), expeditious disposal of cases without undue regard to legal 
technicalities and the application of rules of natural justice.
76
 Significantly, local council 
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 Ibid S. 14 (1) (2). J. Barya and J. Oloka-Onyango op cit 28.  
73
 Statute 1 of 1988 op cit, Schedule 2. Other matters were cases involving land, marital status of 
women, paternity of children and identity of customary heirs and customary bailment. 
74
 The Executive Committees (Judicial Powers) Act Cap 8 (2000 edition) S. 6 
75
 Local Councils Courts Act, Act 13 of 2006: S. 8(7) and Part VIII. 
76
 Ibid, S. 23, S. 24 and right of appeal in S.32. The content was the same as previous legislation.  
77
 Ibid, S.4. The lower level local council courts comprise the entire executive committee 
including women and youth representatives of the village or parish. Legislative and executive 
functions are governed by the Local Government Act Cap 243. 
